

# COMMONSENSE ETHICS

Primarily, this is an Introductory Course in

# COMMONSENSE ETHICS

Secondarily, it is a Course in the History of Great Ideas, especially those directly related to the Problems of Philosophy in general

by

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## Dedication

To the literally thousands of college students to whom I have enjoyed the privilege, in past years, of presenting this course in ethics (in the form of lecture notes and outside readings), and whose many expressions of appreciation have been a never-ending source of inspiration to me, this text is now affectionately dedicated.

C. C. C.

# Acknowledgments

In the case of every excerpt appearing in this text from the copyrighted work of another author, the title, the author, and the publisher of the book from which the excerpt is taken are specified in a note at the end of the Proposition in which the quotation appears. In each case, permission to quote has been generously granted by the persons concerned. For these permissions I am sincerely grateful.

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I am indebted in a special sense to A. Watkins, Inc., for permission to use the illuminating, somewhat lengthy quotation from the book, The Mind of the Maker, by the late Dorothy L. Sayers; and to Holt, Rinehart and Winston, for permission to quote at some length from the text by Dr. Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation.

C.C. Crawford

# The Declaration of Independence

"When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the form to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism it is their right, it is their duty to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. —Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government....."

—Declaration of Independence
(In Congress, July 4, 1776)

## Prefatory Instructions
## Read Carefully!

Both teachers and pupils should give serious attention to the following facts and suggestions in order to use this text effectively.

1. The material of this course, it will be noted, is presented in a series of statements which may best be designated "ethical propositions."

2. These propositions (which appear as chapter headings) are not intended to be dogmas to be accepted on the authority of the author, but as common-sense conclusions derived chiefly from observation and experience, conclusions which, I believe, will be accepted as valid by most persons. It is my conviction that ethics is, by and large, the product of the application of common sense to life's problems. The aim of this course is not indoctrination; it is, rather, that of providing material for original thinking on the part of each student. If both teachers and pupils will approach the course with seriousness of purpose to get as much out of it as possible, all will be benefited.

3. These propositions, it will be noted also, build up, one upon another, into a system of thought. Therefore the student is advised to follow the course of the thought through to the end, and then to look back over it and survey it as a whole. I think the material as a whole will be found to be comprehensive, complete, instructive, and constructive. Of course, there is no proposition in ethics to which some persons will not take exception: that is to be expected. Not infrequently, in morality as in religion, the wish becomes father to the thought: the will to disbelieve sets itself up as having all the authority of true punditry. However, I believe the material of the present course, if dealt with honestly, that is, with as little bias or prejudice as possible, will be found to stand the test of "sweet reasonableness."

4. Any competent teacher will be able to present the material of the course without much difficulty. Supplementary matter may be found in current books, periodicals, and newspapers. Most newspaper columnists deal almost daily with many of the subjects treated herein, and their comments will be found invaluable as supplementary material. Students should make up scrapbooks of this supplementary material, under various headings corresponding to

the subjects treated. This will encourage outside reading by the student, and in addition the material thus gathered will provide pertinent topics for class discussion.

5. No doubt a great many names (of philosophers, scientists, statesmen, authors, etc.) and terms will be found throughout the course with which the students will not be familiar. They should be encouraged, therefore, to consult dictionaries and encyclopedias for an adequate understanding of this new nomenclature. Such a procedure will serve to enlarge their vocabulary. It will also give them something of a cultural background, and this, to be sure, is a secondary object of the course.

6. The presentation of the course must be in a serious vein. This is important. Flippancy on the part of either teacher or pupil will nullify the moral effect of the whole course. The student must be impressed with the fact that the subjects treated herein are not trivial; that, as a matter of fact, they are, on the whole, more far-reaching probably in their application to daily living than those of any other science. Human relations have to be lived, and ethics deals essentially with the business—or the art—of living itself.

7. This course is designed primarily for use at the college level. However, with some simplification by competent teachers it will be found not too difficult for juniors and seniors at the high school level. The course is, I believe, relatively simple and clear, or at least amenable to simplification by the teacher to the extent that any intelligent student can grasp its content. I believe that the teaching of ethics (and of logic as well) should begin at upperclass high school levels, and I am hoping that this text may be found serviceable at those levels. It is my conviction that we do not give our youth of high school age proper credit for the intelligence they really have; that the average high school curriculum does not really challenge them to think great thoughts. Surely it is a fact that present-day high school educationism is keyed down to mediocrity and not keyed up to intelligence. This should not be.

8. Dr. Henry Noble MacCracken, President of Vassar to 1947, once wrote as follows: "The modern college must lead in defining moral and social objectives. It is the moral obligation of a college in a democracy to teach democracy." I should like to amend this statement to affirm that it is the obligation of our entire public school system to teach democracy. Therefore I make no apology for having designed this course to emphasize the basic principles of what might properly be called the American Credo. To this end I have built it around the great phrases of the first and second paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence. Because these principles and ideals constitute the foundation of Western culture, and particularly of American political science, I make no apology for having presented them in this text clearly and positively. It is my firm conviction that upon the continued acceptance by our people of the doctrine of Natural Moral Law as the basis of human equality, human

liberty, and human rights and obligations, the future of our democratic society and republican structure of government will depend. The lines between democracy and totalitarianism are clearly drawn in our time. And the only alternative to the doctrine of Natural Moral Law (that is, law as the product of intelligent deliberation) would be the theory and practice that Might makes Right (law as the product of arbitrary will). I believe that when the doctrines of democracy and totalitarianism are set out side by side, in such a manner that the contrasts are made clear, ordinary common sense will prompt any intelligent student to repudiate the latter for the former: to him this superiority, as the Declaration affirms, will be self-evident. I insist that the race as a whole is constitutionally rational, and will prove itself so, if given the opportunity to "think things through," in a word, that "truth, crushed to earth, shall rise again," inevitably and without exception.

9. Nor do I make any defense of my including in the material of the course the ethics of the Bible, the Judaeo-Christian writings. This has ever been the most vital factor in our Western heritage and I see no valid reason for ignoring it today. As Mary Ellen Chase has written:

> The Bible belongs among the noblest and most indispensable of our humanistic and literary traditions. No liberal education is truly liberal without it. Yet in the last fifty years our colleges have, for the most part, abandoned its study as literature, and our schools, for reasons not sufficiently valid, have ceased to teach or, in many cases, even to read it to their young people. Students of English literature take for granted that a knowledge of the Iliad, the Odyssey, the Aeneid, and the Divine Comedy are necessary not only for the graduate schools but for cultured and civilized life, as, indeed, they are; but most of them remain in comfortable and colossal ignorance of a book which antedates Dante and, in large part, Virgil, by many centuries, some of which was written before Homer, and all of which has contributed more to the humanistic civilization of the Western world than have the so-called "Classics."[1]

Surely we are doing our youth a great disservice by allowing them to grow up without any knowledge of the moral standards enjoined upon mankind by the Bible—still the world's supreme text on all phases of human relations. I am aware of the fact, of course, that one occasionally encounters persons who think that even a glance into the Bible is a violation of the principle of separation of church and state (although they would raise no objection to reading from the Vedas, or the Avesta, or the Koran, in state-supported schools). Such an attitude is the mark of a closed mind, and a closed mind is a small mind. To my way of thinking, "academic freedom" in the best sense of the term is the right of the student to have presented to him, in as unbiased a manner as possible, the best thought of the

past and present on all phases of a given subject. From this point of view, therefore, no valid warrant exists for ignoring in any text on ethics the ethical content of the Biblical writings.

Incidentally, I have added numerous Biblical references to this, the published text, which were not in the material originally presented to my classes. I have done this, at the request of interested friends, to make the book serviceable to church-related institutions of learning.

10. I feel sure that the material of this course can be presented in our public schools without violating the cherished principle of the separation of church and state. Sectarian doctrines cannot be taught in our state-supported schools, to be sure; this, I believe, is as it should be. However, it happens that the courts of the United States have established fairly well-defined procedures to govern various aspects of this problem of church-state relationship. They have ruled uniformly against the teaching of religious doctrines, and especially of sectarian dogmas, on public school property. On the other hand, they have validated the following procedures: (1) the reading of the Bible as literature; (2) the teaching of the role of religion in life, and (3) the teaching of religious thought as history. Moreover, in a decision handed down in 1951, the United States Supreme Court validated the "released time" program of religious education. According to this procedure, public school pupils may be released from classes, at their own request, to receive religious instruction away from school property. Justice W.O. Douglas, in delivering the majority opinion in this case, held that the Constitutional provision (the ban against any "establishment" of religion) does not mean that "in every and all aspects there shall be a separation of church and state." If it did, Justice Douglas went on to say, "the state and religion would be aliens to each other—hostile, suspicious and even unfriendly"—to such an extent that prayers in legislative halls, and even police protection of worshiping assemblies, would be forbidden.[2]

Surely, then, we may conclude that as long as teachers stay within these limits set by the federal courts, and certainly there is no reason why they cannot do so in teaching ethics, they need not be apprehensive of any difficulties on this score. After all is said and done, the fact remains that the restraints upon the teaching of religion do not confer upon any instructor the license to propagate irreligion. I have earnestly tried to conform the material of this course to the legal norms established by our courts, and I believe that I have succeeded in doing so. Teachers must present this material, of course, as far as possible without prejudice on their part. I believe that if they will confine their personal observations within the limitations set by the present text they will encounter no opposition from any segment of the community life.

11. As for the style of this text, I have sought simplicity throughout, avoiding as much as possible the gobbledygook that

ordinarily characterizes a highly specialized branch of learning. This is an introductory text: this means that it must be elementary; hence there is no place in it for "linguistic pomposity." The book is not designed especially for the "intelligentsia," but for future average citizens of the United States of America. It probably will not please the cynics, the opportunists, or the devotees of the principle of expediency; as a matter of fact, it is not intended to do so. On the contrary, it is my hope that the content of the present text may fortify the student against what has rightly been called "the cheap cocksure intellectuality" so obviously characteristic of the so-called "higher learning" throughout the first half of our century; that it may foster in the student's heart a realization of his own creaturehood and the accompanying sense of humility which is indispensable to the genuinely scientific quest.

12. As stated on the title page, whereas this is primarily a course in common-sense ethics, at the same time it is, secondarily, a course in the history of great ideas, ideas which, because of their obvious pertinence to people of all ages, have persisted from generation to generation in human literature. This, to be sure, is an essential function of any branch of philosophy if it is taught constructively. Hence, the material presented herein may be described rightly as a study of the basic problems of philosophy, for the simple reason that there is no problem of philosophy that is without ethical significance.

Philosophy deals with ideas, meanings, concepts, universals, and ethics is one of the most important branches of philosophy. I am reminded here of a story which appeared recently in a syndicated press column as follows: An old gentleman who owned a large tract of timberland on which he operated a sawmill, once went to talk to the Dean of a near-by college about enrolling his son in that college. "What is your son doing now?" asked the Dean. "Driving mules at the sawmill," was the terse reply. "What would you like to have him do when he has completed his college work?" asked the Dean. "Go on driving mules at the sawmill," answered the old man. "But," said the Dean, in some amazement, "Why do you want him to spend four years in college if he's going to do nothing but keep on driving mules at your sawmill?" "Well," answered the father in the typically honest "unEnglish" English of his kind, "You see, Dean, I want him to be jest as different from them mules as he can be." I think this is the answer to all who would belittle "divine philosophy." As Milton has written:

> How charming is divine philosophy!
> Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,
> But musical as is Apollo's lute,
> And a perpetual feast of nectar'd sweets
> Where no crude surfeit reigns.[3]

However, philosophy can be taught destructively, with the effect of turning the student's mind into a perpetual merry-go-round.

Chesterton's counsel is recommended here, namely, that one should keep an open mind largely for the purpose of closing it on a few positive convictions.

13. Again, with reference to the excerpts appearing herein from the copyrighted works of other authors, the title, the name of the author and that of the publisher of the book from which each excerpt is taken, are all specified in the notes which follow the respective Propositions in which the excerpts occur. In each case, permission to quote has been generously granted, and for these permissions I am deeply indebted to the various authors and publishing houses named. I am truly appreciative of the privilege of quoting in each instance, particularly because the quoted material contributes substantially to the personalistic motif of the entire text. To be sure, in some instances I have not been able to ascertain the sources of the quotations used: for these unavoidable omissions I crave the reader's indulgence.

14. There is some repetition here and there throughout the course. Usually this is for the sake of emphasis rather than an oversight. I believe that repetition tends to "stamp in" truths that need to be remembered.

15. In using this material in the classroom I have become more and more aware of the fact that the presentation of the whole should be extended over two semesters. The volume of material presented in the first two Parts, especially on the general subjects of the person, personality, and personal motivation, can easily be spread over the first semester, leaving the rest of the material to be presented in the second semester, of the school term. Wherever possible, this, I believe, should be done. I am convinced that this extension would be intellectually profitable to all concerned.

16. Again, it will be noted that my method is to use the Aristotelian-Thomistic system as the background, so to speak, of the entire course, and to present other ethical systems by way of comparison or contrast. Hence, I gratefully acknowledge my profound debt to Aristotelian and Thomistic oriented textbooks which it has been my privilege to consult. I have also relied a great deal on my own class notes taken down in courses in philosophy at the universities which I attended. Many of these notes were of the character of personal thoughts on the ideas that were being presented by the various instructors. The system used as a basis in this text is Aristotelian eudaimonism, and the other systems—hedonism, stoicism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, skepticism, etc.—are presented in relation to this Aristotelian basis. This methodology serves to point up both the parallels and divergences among these various systems, and is, I think, a reasonable approach to the subject (concerning many facets of which there has always been controversy) and one that is fair to all concerned.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Mary Ellen Chase, The Bible and the Common Reader, p. 9. (Macmillan, New York, 1944.)

[2]"Supreme Court of the United States: No. 431—October term, 1951." May be procured from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, 25, D.C.

[3]John Milton, Comus, lines 476 ff.

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# PART ONE

## INTRODUCTION

## I. Ethics is perhaps best defined as "the practical natural science directive of the right use of human liberty."

The etymology of our English words "ethics" and "morals" shows that they had a rather homely origin. As one eminent authority puts it:

> The English word ethics is formed from the Greek word ēthika. This Aristotle derives from ethos, to which he allies the lengthened form ēthos. The first of these terms signifies a customary way of acting, and is equivalent to the Latin word, mos, from which Cicero formed the adjective, moralis, on the analogy of the Greek ēthikos. The other term denotes a certain combination of natural dispositions fixed into habit, which become thereby a principle or faculty of repeated similarity of action. Mos, especially in the plural form, mores, has often this meaning also.[1]

Even though the etymological connection of the original Greek and Latin terms with the notion of prevailing usage or custom is apparent, the fact remains, however, that from Aristotle's time (384-322 B.C.) down to the present the two adjectival forms (in English, "ethical" or "moral") have had a far deeper signification. It is only

> that customary conduct which arises from an innate tendency of reason to discriminate between right and wrong, and to attach the highest value to right conduct [which] receives by historical usage the name Ethical or Moral, in order to distinguish it from custom of an inferior kind, and to designate it as pre-eminently the distinctive custom of mankind.[2]

Moral obligation, as we shall see later, is not merely local custom or convention: the difference between doing right and merely being careful is a profound difference. Morality is far more than mere "folkways"—a much overworked term in our day.

The science of ethics has been validly defined from so many different points of view, that to attempt to construct a new definition here would be unnecessary if not actually impossible. The following is a list of the more common definitions of the subject:

1. Ethics is said to be "the science that deals with conduct, insofar as this is considered as right or wrong, good or bad," "A single term for conduct so considered is 'moral conduct' or the 'moral life.'"[3] As a matter of fact, it is this "moral" connotation (i.e., of right or wrong, good or bad) which, speaking precisely, distinguishes the term "conduct" from such kindred terms as "behavior," "activity," and the like. Only a being who possesses intelligence as directive of the power of choice, that is to say, a "moral" being, a person, is capable of conduct in the strict sense of the term. As Dr. Rollo May puts it:

> Man is the "ethical animal"—ethical in potentiality even if, unfortunately, not in actuality. His capacity for ethical judgment—like freedom, reason, and the other unique characteristics of the human being—is based upon his consciousness of himself.[4]

2. Ethics is also defined as "the science of ideal human character."[5] In the thought of the ancient Greek philosophers (notably in that of Aristotle, who wrote the first formal textbook on the subject, the Nicomachean Ethics, so named because addressed to his son, Nicomachus), the science of ethics was that of moral excellence. The Greek word, aretē, which Aristotle used in this connection, meant literally an "excellence" and came to be rendered in English as "virtue" (from the Latin virtus, meaning "manliness," "valor," "worth," from vir, "a male person," later a "man of principle"). Hence, the word virtue, means in its general sense, "a certain moral excellence." (Aristotle used the phrase, aretē ēthikē, to signify an excellence of character, as distinguished from the phrase, aretē dianoētikē, to signify an excellence of intellect. These phrases are properly translated, respectively, "moral virtue" and "intellectual virtue."[6]) A virtue, then, in the ethical sense of the term, is an excellence of character, and virtue in general, as when we speak of a "virtuous" man or woman, is excellence of character in general. And ethics is the science of ideal human character; that is, not necessarily of what is, but of what ought to be, in human character, and indeed of what must be, if social order is to be maintained and man is to achieve his natural and proper ends in life. Herein is the difference between sociology and ethics: the former is the study of human behavior as it is, but the latter is the study of human behavior as it ought to be, that is to say, human conduct.

3. Again, ethics is defined as "the principles of morality, including both the science of the good and the nature of the right."[7] In fact, the meaning of the terms "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," is the essence of ethical study. Hence the word "moral" (synonym, "ethical") is defined as follows:

> Of or pertaining to character or disposition considered as good or bad, virtuous or vicious; of or pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in

relation to the actions, volitions, or character of responsible beings.[8]

4. Ethics is also properly defined as the science of moral obligation or duty. (1) The word obligation is from the Latin obligare, meaning "to bind upon." The idea of obligation is expressed in ethics by the verb ought. Oughtness in ethics is duty. Ought signifies something owed; duty signifies something due; hence, obligation or duty is that which is in some sense binding upon persons, and only on persons. (2) The four basic questions in ethics are these: Is it true that some free acts of a person are right and good, but others wrong and bad? If so, what is it—that is, what norm is it—that makes some of those free acts right and good, but others wrong and bad? Is there an obligation upon every accountable person to elicit those acts which are right and good, but to omit those which are wrong and bad? And if so, what is the source of this obligation? In a word, the "material cause" of the science of ethics is human acts, the "formal cause" is oughtness or duty.

5. Ethics has also been defined at times as the science of ends and means. The principle of the adaptation of specific means to specific ends seems to characterize the cosmos throughout. For example, in order to form a molecule of water, two atoms of hydrogen must fuse with one atom of oxygen in precisely these proportions. Or, if I would live I must eat: my body must have nourishing food in order to live and to grow. Or again, I cannot expect to receive a college degree simply by sitting along a river bank day after day fishing. To achieve whatever ends I may have in view I must conform my activity to the means correlated with those respective ends. Ethics asks such vital questions as these: Does man have natural and proper ends in life, in relation to the totality of being? If so, what are these ends and what are the means of attaining them? And to what extent is man obligated to seek the truth regarding his natural and proper ends and the means of attaining them? We hear a great deal in these days, especially in so-called "dynamic psychology" about conation or "striving." But ethics asks: Which, after all, is important—the striving or the goal?

6. Again, ethics may be defined, and that precisely, as the study of the act of choice, including its motives and its consequences. Wheelwright points out that two factors are indispensable to the moral situation, namely, the presence of value (the factor which prompts the choice), and the presence of possible alternatives (the factor which occasions, or indeed may necessitate, the choice).[9] Roberts writes as follows:

> The practical problems with which life confronts every one of us are questions as to which of two or more. . . attractive possibilities we shall choose. Where there is no choice, there is no problem. If there ever is really only one thing to be done, there is no uncertainty. We do it. If we hesitate at all, it is because we suspect there

may be another possibility. When we review and appraise action, our own or others', it never occurs to us to praise or blame actions which could not have been other than they were. Whatever is truly necessary is neither good nor bad, neither right nor wrong.[10]

Again, quoting Dr. Rollo May:

> The human being not only can make such choices of values and goals, but he is the animal who must do so if he is to attain integration. For the value—the goal he moves toward—serves him as a psychological center, a kind of core of integration which draws together his powers as the core of a magnet draws the magnet's lines of force together.[11]

The simple fact of the matter is that where there can be no act of choice, there can be no moral obligation, no personal responsibility; or, as Dr. J.B. Rhine has written: "Without free volition there can be no morality, no real democracy, not even any science itself as a free inquiry."[12] And vice versa, one who denies this power of choice, this possibility of self-determination in man, thereby repudiates ethics in toto. This is simply a common-sense conclusion.

7. Again, because the presence of value is indispensable to any moral situation, it follows that the material of ethics, if ethics is to be an empirical science, is essentially of the character of value-judgments. Hence the science of ethics may rightly be defined as that of value-judgments. That moral judgments are inescapable is obvious from the fact that all normal persons make them continually, and as far as we know have always done so. Men repeatedly express judgments respecting their own conduct and that of their fellows. Some acts they praise, calling them "right" and "good"; others they censure or condemn outright, calling them "wrong" and "bad" or "evil." That the human race—"savage" or "barbarian" or "civilized"—has always expressed such judgments, formally in customary or in statutory law, is a fact both of anthropology and of history. Moreover, as Titus puts it, "Consciously or unconsciously, men have been trying to discover the kind of life which is most worth living."[13] The results of this age-long quest constitute, basically, the subject-matter of the science of ethics. Whereas the physical (or as they are frequently called, the natural) sciences are essentially descriptive, attempting to tell us what is and how it is, it is the function of ethics to tell us what matters or what ought to be. Whereas sociology, for example, is descriptive, purporting to tell us what human relationships are, that is, how persons act and live them, it is the function of ethics to tell us, in the light of human experience, what those relationships ought to be. Ethics cannot dispense with the word ought, and oughtness implies value: to quote Titus again:

> Ethics seeks to point out to men the true values of life. Ethics asks and attempts to answer such questions as:

> What values are most worth while? Why is one act better than another? No person can live a satisfactory life who has not set up for himself some scale of values. Ethics is a study of human values. It attempts to stimulate the moral senses, discover the true values of life, and inspire men to join in the quest for these values.[14]

As MacIver says, "To live is to act, and to act is to choose, and to choose is to evaluate."[15] History testifies eloquently to the fact that man is

> Straining forever to the light
> That flows from regions out of sight.

8. Perhaps the most concise, and at the same time the most comprehensive, definition of ethics that has been formulated, however, is the following: "Ethics is the practical natural science directive of the right use of human liberty."[16] (1) Ethics is a science: i.e., it proposes a body of principles, co-ordinated into a rational system, for the direction of human conduct. (2) Ethics is a natural science. It is a systematized body of reasoned judgments, arrived at in the light of human experience, both individual and social; that is, the actual experience of human nature and human relationships themselves. Its material is derived (a) from personal introspection, (b) from personal observation of the acts of other persons and especially of the consequences of those acts, (c) all this supplemented by available information regarding the customs and laws of primitive, prehistoric and historic peoples. As one author, Cronin, says: Ethics is "the science of human conduct as according with human reason and as directed by reason toward man's final natural end."[17] As a science, ethics is fundamentally empirical (indeed it must be so, to properly be designated a science) in the fact that it is the product of a rational or common-sense study of human nature and human natural relationships. In this respect it differs from moral theology, the study which embraces those moral codes purporting to be handed down by special revelation and hence associated with the world's religions. This does not mean, of course, that we have any quarrel with those persons who accept and follow what are regarded as divinely revealed systems. It means simply that the question of special revelation, (that is, of religious authority and sanction) cannot enter into ethics if ethics is to be formulated scientifically; that as a science, ethics must, by the very definition of the word "science," be constructed from empirical evidence alone. Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of the mediaeval philosophers (the Schoolmen), himself a theologian of the first rank, pointed out long ago that if a moral science is possible, it must be constructed by the method of observation; that its content must be data collected by the assiduous examination of phenomena; that its constitutive principles must be found to be established by sufficient human experience. He states expressly:

> In moral questions we must start with certain effects produced by human acts . . . because in moral questions the

> first principle is the existence of the moral act; and we attain knowledge of this existence by experience.[18]

To this, a modern writer, Simon Deploige, adds the following pertinent comment:

> We scarcely need to say that the acquisition of moral science will demand patient effort, and attentive and prolonged observation of the character of men, the customs of society, the play of laws, and the mechanism of institutions.[19]

All this points up the fact that ethics is a natural science; that is to say, a science which derives its content from the study of human nature and of natural human relationships. (3) Ethics is a practical science. Its aim is to guide human action, and surely there is nothing as practical as a human act. (4) Ethics is directive: its function is to direct man in the proper use of his freedom. To quote Cronin again:

> The end of ethics is to discover moral truths—to establish, in the first place, the general moral principles, and then to deduce from these the laws which govern human action in particular cases. Ethics is therefore a science—a practical science of course, not a theoretic science, since its end is to direct action.[20]

In a word, the science of ethics provides norms for human conduct. In the thinking of the ancients there were two supreme sciences, namely, logic, the science of correct ("straight") thinking, and ethics, the science of right acting. (5) Ethics is the science directive of the right use of human liberty. This statement implies that there is a wrong, as well as a right, use of this liberty; and the common sense of man will, I think, corroborate this implication. Certainly we will all agree that no man has the right "to do as he pleases" under all circumstances. No man, for example, has the liberty to drive his car into a crowd, thus killing or wounding other persons, just for a thrill. No man has the liberty to set fire to his own house, thus endangering the lives and properties of his neighbors. Hence, it is the aim of ethics to discover the norms whereby the right use of human liberty may properly be distinguished from the wrong use of it. (6) Ethics is the science directive of the right use of human liberty. Human liberty is the exercise of individual freedom in relation to other persons. And freedom is rightly defined as that power which a human being—a person—has (a) to act or not to act, or (b) to act in one way instead of another, given the circumstances, in the form of motives, for such action. This freedom to choose and to act is commonly designated free will, and the free act of a person constitutes what is commonly called human conduct or volitional activity.

Finally, because ethics is the natural science directive of right human action, it follows that it is the science which touches upon and affects every field of human endeavor. The principles of ethics

are such as to be applicable to politics, art, law, medicine, economics, commerce and finance, in fact to every area in which man decides and acts. Indeed, if these principles are to be of any practical value, they must be applied to personal, domestic, social, business, professional, in fact to all human, relations: hence the formal distinction which is commonly made by ethicians between that part of the general subject which they call basic ethics and that part which they designate applied ethics.

## FOOTNOTES

[1] Timothy J. Brosnahan, S.J., Prolegomena to Ethics, edited by Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J., p. 19. (Fordham University Press, New York, 1941.) Cf. Aristotle (Greek philosopher, 384-322 B.C.), Nicomachean Ethics, II, i, ff.; also Cicero (Roman statesman, orator, and essayist, 106-43 B.C.), De Fato, II, ii.

[2] Brosnahan, ibid., p. 21.

[3] John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 1. (Holt, N.Y., 1908.)

[4] Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself, p. 174. (Norton, N.Y., 1953.)

[5] Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. (G. and C. Merriam, Springfield, Mass., 1949.)

[6] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, i.

[7] The American College Dictionary (Harper), s.v.

[8] The Oxford English Dictionary, Corrected Re-issue, with an Introduction, Supplement, and Bibliography, s.v. "moral." Edited by Murray, Bradley, Craigie, and Onions.

[9] Philip Wheelwright, A Critical Introduction to Ethics, Revised, pp. 11-12. (Odyssey Press, N.Y., 1935 and 1949.)

[10] William Henry Roberts, The Problem of Choice, p. 6. (Ginn and Co., N.Y., 1941.)

[11] May, op. cit., p. 175.

[12] J.B. Rhine, The Reach of the Mind, p. 9. (Sloane Associates, N.Y., 1947.)

[13] Harold H. Titus, Ethics for Today, Second Edition, p. 7. (American Book Co., New York, 1954): a third edition was issued in 1957.

[14] Titus, ibid., p. 11.

[15] R.M. MacIver, Society: A Textbook of Sociology, p. 520. (Farrar and Rinehart, N.Y., 1937.)

[16]Ignatius W. Cox, Liberty, Its Use and Abuse, p. 1. (Fordham University Press, N.Y., 1946.)

[17]Michael Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, p. 1. (Gill, Dublin, 1939.)

[18]Aquinas, Ethicorum, I, 2, 3, 4.

[19]Simon Deploige, The Conflict Between Ethics and Sociology, translated from the French by C.C. Miltner, p. 274. (Herder, St. Louis, 1938.)

[20]Cronin, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 1.

## II. Because of its character as a practical science, ethics cannot claim the exactness that is claimed by certain other sciences.

Ethics can never be an exact science, of the order, for example, of the various branches of mathematics, for the simple reason that in every moral situation there are two variables involved, namely, (1) the human being, the person, who is under the necessity of deciding and acting, and (2) the particular combination of circumstances in which the person finds decision and action to be necessary. Now it is a scientific fact that no two persons are alike in every particular: as Emerson has said, "Nature never rhymes her children nor makes two men alike." It is the property of a person to be unique: he is never duplicated. It is equally true that particular combinations of circumstances seldom if ever repeat themselves in every detail. Hence, no matter what broad ethical norm is followed, it must always be applied by the individual to the concrete life situation. Take such a generally accepted norm, for example, as the Golden Rule: "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise."[1] Obviously, this well-known rule must be interpreted by the person in reference to the particular situation in which he finds himself: that is, he must first decide what he would have the other person do to him in the given situation before he can determine what he should do to the other person. Again, take the command, "Thou shalt not kill"—think how many forms of homicide are possible, e. g., murder, manslaughter, self-defense, suicide, abortion, war, etc. Compare the ramifications of the command against "bearing false witness": perjury, deceit, lying, slander, libel, contract-breaking, etc. And so with the prohibition of theft: there are many ways of stealing other than direct thefts of money from a cash register or articles from a store counter. As a matter of fact any form of social exploitation is a form of stealing in that it deprives a person of the rightful fruits of his labor: "the laborer is worthy of his hire."[2] In ethics, therefore, we must be content with the formulation of broad general principles. The application of these principles, however, to the specific life situation calls for a discriminatory exercise of individual conscience, and may reduce exactitude to a minimum because of the range of probability involved: and in the final analysis, probability is—as we shall see later—the "law of life." Hence, ethics can never claim the exactness that is claimed by the physical sciences, and certainly not that which characterizes the various branches of mathematics.

The inexact character of the science of ethics was clearly pointed out by Aristotle, who, in his great treatise on the subject written in the fourth century before Christ—a treatise which could well be used today as a textbook—had this to say:

> Our treatment of this science will be adequate if it achieves that amount of precision which belongs to the subject-matter. The same exactness must not be expected in all departments of philosophy alike any more than in all the products of the arts and crafts. The subjects studied by political science are Moral Nobility and Justice; but these conceptions involve much difference of opinion and uncertainty, so that they are sometimes believed to be mere conventions and to have no real existence in the nature of things. And a similar uncertainty surrounds the conception of the Good, because it frequently occurs that good things have harmful consequences; people have before now been ruined by wealth, and in other cases courage has cost men their lives. We must therefore be content if, in dealing with subjects and starting from premises thus uncertain, we succeed in presenting broad outlines of the truth: when our subjects and our premises are merely generalities, it is enough if we arrive at generally valid conclusions. Accordingly we may ask the student also to accept the various views we put forward in the same spirit: for it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits. It is equally unreasonable to accept merely probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict demonstration from an orator.[3]

We all know that there is a widespread tendency in our day to deny in toto any general standards of right and wrong, good and bad, in human conduct. This was the position taken by the Sophists of ancient Greece, who substituted expediency for right and taught that justice is "the interest of the stronger" (the view that was vigorously opposed by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in succession). This was, of course, nothing but the world-old doctrine that Might made Right. This notion—that morality, if there be such a thing, is nothing but the fashion of a particular time and place, or indeed nothing but what each human individual thinks it to be—is found all too frequently in current literature, especially in that of the earlier part of our century. Vincent Sheean, for example, tells us that morality seems "never to have been anything but a series of convenient arrangements,"[4] that is, within a given culture or locality. George Bernard Shaw reflects the same skepticism, in words dripping with sarcasm, in these lines from one of his best known plays, Major Barbara:

> Undershaft: Is there anything you know or care for?
> Stephen: I know the difference between right and wrong.

Undershaft: You don't say so! What, no capacity for business, no knowledge of law, no sympathy for art, no pretension to philosophy: only a simple knowledge of the secret that has puzzled all the philosophers, baffled all the lawyers, muddled all the men of business, and ruined most of the artists: the secret of right and wrong. Why, man, you're a genius, a master of masters, a god.[5]

And in a lecture to Harvard students in 1934, Lincoln Steffens spoke in the same dogmatic and cocksure vein. "By arguing what is right and what is wrong," said he, "you never get anywhere. Theoretical ethics is the bunk."[6] "Such adolescent doubts," writes Cabot, are "perennial or recurrent."[7] One is reminded of Pilate's cynical question, "What is truth?"[8]

Protagonists of this view which repudiates any ultimate or general standard of right and wrong in human action (that is, any norm embodied in human nature and human natural relationships per se) may be classified roughly, with considerable overlapping, of course, as follows: as (1) ethical nihilists, (2) ethical positivists, and (3) ethical relativists.

Ethical absolutists, on the other hand, following Plato and Aristotle, hold that values, such as truth, beauty, and goodness, are incorporated in the very structure of the universe both physical and moral; hence, that there are certain human acts which are intrinsically good, and others which are intrinsically bad, regardless of time, place, or culture.

1. Ethical nihilists contend that a science of morality or moral action is, by the definition of a science, impossible. The emphasis in this view is on the meaning of the word "science." All science, according to the nihilists, aims solely at establishing what is ("facts"); hence, propositions aimed at establishing what ought to be or what must be if the act is right and good (ideals, values), are scientifically meaningless.

2. Ethical positivists are those who hold that such concepts as those of "value," "right," "duty," and the like, the fundamental ethical ideas, have no objective reality, but are solely expressions of feeling, without logical content; that such words as "good," "bad," "right," "wrong," and the like, are purely "emotive" utterances, i.e., expressive of the likes or dislikes of the person using them: in a word, that "good" has no more meaning than "hooray," and "bad" no more meaning than "awful," "disgusting," "ouch," or the like. Thus when I say, "Torture is wrong," I mean only that torture is repulsive to me, that it produces in me a feeling of unpleasantness. Or, when I affirm that the "life of contemplation" is the "good" life, I mean only that I like that kind of life, that it produces in me feelings of pleasantness or personal satisfaction. In a word, to say that anything is "valuable" or "desirable" is simply to affirm

my own liking for it, a liking based on the pleasurable feeling I derive from the experience of it.

> Those who hold this view hold that it is as meaningless to ask whether an emotion can be reasonable and justified as it is to ask whether a sneeze or toothache can be.[9]

This, obviously, is a complete repudiation of morality: it is, practically speaking, the substitution of pure hedonism (the view that man's sole end in life is pleasure) for what has been known traditionally as morality. Persons advocating these views (always a small but vociferous minority) are, as has been stated, designated either ethical nihilists or ethical positivists; in the final analysis, however, the two designations merge, for all practical purposes at least. Moreover, since personal likes and dislikes are considered to be accompaniments of the beliefs which characterize the particular "tradition" in which one is born and reared, ethical positivism, in large measure, fuses into what we shall study later as ethical relativism. All these views add up practically to the rejection of all that has been known historically as morality.

We are compelled to reject ethical nihilism and ethical positivism, on the following grounds:

1. If a science of ethics is impossible, it follows that a science of law (jurisprudence) is equally so. Jurisprudence is the product of man's effort throughout the ages to determine and to conserve those values which he has found essential both to social order and to individual well-being. This is to say, of course, that jurisprudence has its foundation in human nature itself and human natural relationships. Under the nihilistic and positivistic views, however, (1) morality is reduced to sheer expediency, and (2) all law degenerates into an instrument of sheer force utilized by those who have at their command the superior force of the moment. This is but the age-old doctrine that Might makes Right.

The nihilist or positivist will frequently contend that the concepts of right and duty are imaginary concepts which presumably owe their origin to ideas embodied in primitive law. But they fail to explain what those ideas were or how they arose and became incorporated into primitive law in the first place. Would it not be reasonable to assume that those original ideas were actually the ideas or concepts—in rudimentary form, of course—of "right," "order," "justice," and the like: ideas which indeed may have emerged from social experience; ideas, however, which must have obtruded themselves on the mind of homo sapiens from the very beginning of his existence as such; the ideas which subsequently have become basic in all well-developed systems of ethics and jurisprudence? Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a just law which would not be the expression of a prior ethical idea. (Aristotle and many thinkers after him have contended that the sense of justice is innate in man. Many hold that the judgment that there is a difference between right and wrong, good and bad, in man's free activity,

and that therefore there are some free acts which man ought to elicit and others which he ought not to elicit, is a universal judgment: the universality of this judgment they designate the Ethical Fact. Biblical teaching is that the fundamental moral law was implanted in man by the Creator Himself; that the story of Adam and Eve is that of man's first violation of the moral law (resulting in the birth of conscience); that the Decalogue of Moses was the first formal codification of the moral law which has existed from the beginning (in the form of tradition handed down by word of mouth from generation to generation), this Mosaic codification having been necessitated by the "transgressions" of the people (the result of their increasing ignorance of, and insensitivity to, the distinctions between right and wrong). (Cf. Gal. 3:19, Rom. 1:18-32, 2:14-16.) We take the position here that conscience (as the voice of practical reason) is co-temporaneous with the power of reason in man, and that wherever reason and conscience are found, there are found ideas of "right" and "duty"; that wherever, conversely, reason and conscience are not functioning, ideas of "justice," "right," "duty," and the like, do not exist, as in the lower animals. All this reduces to the common-sense proposition that where there is reason, there is a moral being and there is moral law.

2. If a science of ethics is impossible, then history is meaningless. However, it simply is not true that history is meaningless. Anyone who has given more than a cursory glance at the story of mankind knows that history does repeat itself, that the past has many lessons from which future generations may profit greatly. [E.g., see (1) Plato's description of the process by which democracies, by prostituting liberty into license, degenerate into tyrannies;[10] (2) Aristotle's classification of governments, and his insistence on the importance of the middle class to the stability of a nation;[11] (3) the Thucydidean distinction between the occasion (pretext, "grounds," aitia) for a war and the real cause (prophasis) of it;[12] (4) Jesus' affirmation that all who make brute force their first principle of action will, sooner or later, encounter superior force,[13] etc.] History also affords some interesting comparisons between the age of Pericles in ancient Athens, the age of Augustus in Rome, and the age of the New Deal in the United States. Many essentially moral norms are to be gotten from history, if men will but seek and heed.

3. If a science of ethics is impossible, then personal experience has little or no significance in pointing up standards of right and wrong action. But personal experience, in the form of personal observation of human acts and their consequences, or in that of personal introspection of one's interior life, its impulses, motives, needs, and ends, can, and does yield valid conclusions about what one ought to do for his own good and for the good of society. Dr. Vinding Kruse, for example, Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Copenhagen, in opposition to ethical nihilism, argues—quite conclusively—that our knowledge (or science, for

"science" means "knowledge" etymologically) of the powers, needs and ends of the human being, knowledge arrived at by inferential reasoning from the facts of personal experience, is far more reliable, by virtue of its immediacy, than what we call our "knowledge" of the external world and its phenomena. He writes:

> Whereas, most deeply considered, we do not know the material world, what it is in itself, we have, on the other hand, an immediate knowledge of the inner, spiritual world, namely in ourselves.[14]

Certainly present-day physicists would agree that whatever understanding we have of the basic processes in matter is derived largely from mathematical procedures and set forth in mathematical formulas: the ultimate forces of the world of the atom seem to be shut off from human physical sense altogether. On the other hand, there is no knowledge as immediate as that which a man has of his own inner being, its powers, motives, needs, and ends. ("For who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man, which is in him?")[15] Hence, Dr. Kruse insists that before we exclude the possibility of a science of human conduct, we should evaluate the word "science" or "knowledge"; that in fact epistemology should provide the criteria for our conclusions regarding the validity of a science of ethics, and indeed of a science of anything. In short, epistemology, the study of what we actually "know," and of the grounds on which we may rightfully claim to "know" that we "know," must validate our conclusions in any field of investigation. Unfortunately, however, epistemology, like its sister science, ontology (the science of being-as-such), is a universally neglected subject in our day.

To recapitulate, at this point: He who denies that man can, in the realm of moral action, by the use of his reason focused on human nature itself and human natural relationships, arrive at valid conclusions about what he ought to do for his own good and for the good of society in general, denies the validity of, and renders meaningless, every fact of his own personal experience. This is not just nihilism—it is sheer nonsense.

4. Positivism, of whatever kind it may be, actually is a form of willful ignorance, in that it arbitrarily limits the area of possible sources of knowledge.

"Positivism" in philosophical language (as it originated with Comte, 1798-1857) is the name given to the presupposition that the content of knowledge must be limited to observable and measurable "facts." This definition, obviously, requires another, namely, that of the word "fact," and a fact is not so easily defined. Perhaps Brightman puts it more to the point when he says that "the postulate of positivism is a fundamental rejection of all aspects of experience except sensation."[16] But is not this negative approach an extremely arbitrary assumption in itself—a kind of willful ignorance? Rela-

tions (such as signified, for example, by the word "justice"), anticipations, beliefs, ideals, values, meanings, etc., are just as truly facts of experience as are the objects of sense-perception or the relations indicated by the symbols of the laboratory. Yet none of the first-mentioned group of phenomena are amenable either to observation or to measurement. Again quoting Brightman: "The empiricist who appeals to experience has no right to restrict his attention to specially favored parts of experience."[17] Someone has rightly remarked that positivism is the "academic version" of Popeye's dictum, "I yam what I yam"; that is to say, why I am, whence I came, and whither I am bound—these are all questions relating to ultimates (first things and final things), all of which lie beyond observation and measurement and hence are not subjects for human investigation. But this notion of a Totality of Being in which everything is and works of its own accord still does not eliminate—it merely ignores—consideration of ultimates. But of course man never has limited and never will limit his thinking simply to what is (that is, sense-perceived): we are all Columbuses and the pull of the horizon is a force which the human intellect cannot resist: we insist on seeking the truth respecting the more beyond. As Cassirer has pointed out, man's most significant power as man is his ability to differentiate the possible from the actual, or what is commonly called the "ideal" from what is commonly called "real."[18] (Kant observed that for the human understanding it is necessary to distinguish between the reality and the possibility of things. As Goethe has said: "To live in the ideal world is to treat the impossible as if it were possible.") Positivism ignores that which is the very essence of creative imagination—the "music and the dream" of life. It is by means of symbols—in the forms of language, art, and ritual—that man bridges the gap between the physical and intelligible worlds: this power of "symbolifying" is the source of his culture. Positivism not only ignores necessary inference and necessary truth—it even negates itself: one must think in order to be a positivist, and thought itself, as a process, is neither observable nor measurable. One is reminded of the old-time bit of whimsical verse which went as follows:

> There was an ape in days that were earlier;
> Centuries passed, and his hair became curlier;
> Centuries more, and his thumb gave a twist—
> And he was a man, and a Positivist.

The simple fact of the matter is that science, important as it is, in many respects, is not the final stage of human thought. The final stage is of necessity a faith.

5. Ethical nihilists, in denying validity to such concepts as those of right and wrong, good and bad, etc., cannot keep themselves clear of ethical evaluation in so doing. Again quoting Kruse:

> Even if they reject all ethical values, the concepts of value, right, and duty, in the further exposition of their ideas,

they cannot exclude evaluations, but must often have recourse to them, though without being conscious of doing so.[19]

That is, the person who denies values in toto can do so only by reference to his own preconceived notion of value: his very use of such words as "value," "valid," "validity," and the like, shows that he is practicing evaluation. Similarly, implicit in the very use of the word "relative" is the fact of reference to a norm; that is, anything can be said to be "relative" only in relation to something else taken as a norm or standard. Regardless of theory, all men think and act in terms of meanings and values.

6. The arbitrary distinction made by the positivist school between "facts" and "values" is a false one. Consider, for instance, scientific ("factual") and the poetic ("valuative," or "appreciative") description of a rainbow: Can either description by itself, or indeed both taken together, be said to give us complete understanding of the rainbow "as it is"? I think not. Is any event ever purely "factual"? I think not. We are reminded here of May Kendall's parody as addressed to the scientist T.H. Huxley:

Primroses by the river's brim
Dicotyledons were to him,
And they were nothing more.

But does the scientific ("factual") classification of the primrose as a dicotyledon exhaust the "factual" significance of the primrose? Is there not an esthetic "fact" to be considered here, namely, the primrose's beauty? W.R. Inge once said: "I am prepared to maintain that a fact which has no value is not a fact, and that a value which has no existence is not a value."[20] Scientists themselves are not, indeed cannot be, completely neutral with respect to values; that is, they cannot be content just with the study of what is. As F.S.C. Northrop has written: "The truth of the matter is that the scientific attitude of mind is one of the highest values, and a primary value in a democracy."[21] How can the atomic scientist of our day be indifferent to values, to the question as to what will be done with the instruments of power which he is constructing? Whether or not science itself is, surely the scientist must be, considerate of what ought to be done with these instruments. Nor is the ought in this case a matter of personal feeling: it is a matter of fact that the human race can be all but destroyed by the use of these instruments for purposes of destruction. Facts cannot be separated from values, for the simple reason that values attach to, and are inseparable from, facts (i.e., actual things and their functions). In addition to this, we must never forget that sense-perception itself, supposed to be the reliable medium for the apprehension of "facts," is indeed anything but reliable for that purpose: as a matter of fact, it is prolific of deception, e.g., a mirage, the apparent convergence of the parallel rails of a railroad track, the deceptively apparent nearness of a mountain peak under clear Western skies, and many other

optical illusions. In short, the burden is on the positivist to define a "fact" and to tell us just how a fact is to be fully apprehended. Mothershead writes to the point, in this connection:

> One suspects that the positivist is a man with a preference for a rather narrow definition of experience. He claims too much for sense experience and closes his mind to the possible cognitive significance of evaluations.[22]

7. To admit the presence of value in any situation is to admit good and bad. Since "to live is to act, to act is to choose, and to choose is to evaluate," it follows that a situation without values (i.e., one involving a person or persons) is hardly conceivable. But there can be no values in fact (e.g., truth, beauty, goodness) for the positivist or the materialist. The materialist, for example, in attempting to reduce all phenomena, theoretically, to "physical" atoms or energy, thereby robs his theory of any possibility of truth, because truth as such is not a "material" thing. The materialist, it has been rightly said, can explain almost everything except some things—he cannot explain his theory because his theory is not "material." Meaning does not belong to the realm of materiality: there is no correlate in the brain for meaning in thought. C.E.M. Joad states the case clearly as follows:

> Inconsistent with ethics and aesthetics and owning an inadequate basis in physics, Materialism is indefensible in logic. More precisely, in so far as it establishes the conclusions which it asserts, it robs those conclusions of any possibility of being true.[23]

Similarly, the positivist who contends that there is neither right nor wrong in fact, thereby puts himself completely beyond the pale of values. In denying values (anything beyond personal likes and dislikes) he arbitrarily shuts himself off from making any warrantable claim of value for his theory. His theory can be neither right nor wrong, true nor false: It simply is, and that is the end of the matter. But our experience testifies that whereas meaning does indeed belong to the world of the mind, it is directly correlated with the order (truth, right, values) which characterizes the structure of the Totality of Being. It is our contention, therefore, that values are among those facts which constitute the structure of being, and are therefore, like all such facts, not formulated, but discovered by the human mind.

8. Positivism stops with the fact that a man lives, and refuses to go beyond that fact: it cannot consistently champion the conviction that a man has the right to life, much less rights that attach to personality as such. As a matter of fact, under the positivistic view, rights simply do not exist: what we commonly think of as rights become nothing but gratuities dispensed by a ruling regime. Nihilism and positivism (in essence the two are one) all correlate logically with the doctrine that Might makes Right, or as Thrasyma-

chus the Sophist put it, in Plato's Republic, that "justice is the interest of the stronger."[24] The simple fact is that if values are not inherent in the structure of being, then rights (which surely belong in the category of values) are fictions of the human imagination. That is to say, apart from values, oughtness, morality, etc., there could never by any such thing as a human right. And conversely, where there is a right, there is value, oughtness, morality, etc.

9. The notion that "right" and "wrong" are terms signifying nothing more than "emotive" reactions is not supported by clear thinking. To make use of an illustration suggested by Dr. Brand Blanshard: let us start from the premise that when we say that physical pain is "bad," the statement means only that we have a certain feeling with regard to pain, a feeling of dislike for it. Suppose, then, that when we are away from home, our pet dog gets caught in a trap and is killed in his long and vain struggle to free himself; and we find him dead on our return. As we think back over what the dog must have experienced we conclude that it was a very "bad" thing that the dog had to suffer as he did. Is our judgment nothing more than the expression of our feeling about the incident? I hardly think so. The suffering of the dog was a fact, and was anything but "good," regardless of our feeling about it. As Blanshard goes on to say:

> But according to the [positivist] theory, the suffering was not bad at all, and all we are doing when we say it was bad is expressing our present feelings about it. Nothing in fact was bad until we came home and said our say; and if the dog had remained undiscovered, nothing bad would have happened at all; for it is only as people take up attitudes that good or bad comes into being. And if people could manage to delight in the suffering, once they had discovered it, then it would be good. This conclusion has actually been held by able men; but it does small credit either to their heads or to their hearts.[25]

(It should be noted that it is physical evil—i.e., suffering—that is under consideration here; the argument is equally valid, however, with respect to moral evil.) As a matter of fact, would not such a conclusion justify even such abnormalities as sadism and masochism? Moreover, if this theory is true, arguments, agreements and disagreements about moral matters are pointless. Blanshard goes on to show that when one man says, "Bull-fighting is all right," and another says, "No, it is wrong," the latter obviously is meaning to deny what the former has affirmed; that according to the positivist view, however, such a denial is impossible because all such statements never assert anything to be true or false, but merely give utterance to personal feelings; that "in view of the fact that moral issues are among our most constant subjects of debate, this denial that there can never be any difference of opinion about them

is most implausible." As a matter of fact, we all know that ethical nomenclature has developed out of man's thinking about such problems throughout the course of his struggle with them in real life. We must agree with Blanshard's conclusion, therefore, as follows:

> Is there anything objectively right or good for thought to reveal? Perhaps these things are matters of fashion, of changing whim and taste about which it is proverbially idle to dispute. But this theory, for all its seeming sophistication, turns out to be a confusion, the more tiresome because, after all, it is playing with fire. There is every reason to believe that when we dispute about what we should do, there is a truth waiting there to be found as truly as when we dispute about the right sum for a column of figures. In saying that something is right, we are not merely exclaiming in delight or disgust; we mean to point out a truth which is what it is regardless of how we think or feel.[26]

C.L. Stevenson affirms that moral evaluations and choices merely express or influence attitudes, and that this is the one factor which differentiates ethics from psychology; a moralist, he states expressly is "one who endeavors to influence attitudes."[27] [He defines attitude as "a disposition to act in certain ways and to experience certain feelings."[28] It follows from this thesis that the "good" moralist must be one who can effectively "influence attitudes," that is to say, the "good" moralist is the successful moralist (just as—by way of analogy—the "good" lawyer is one who can influence juries and win cases irrespective of the truth involved.)] Concerning this view Mothershead comments aptly as follows:

> The positivist is either engaged in a word game or he is concerned to promote the interest of the successful moralist—that is, to enable him to obtain what he desires. Presupposed is something very close to the ancient doctrine, attributed to the sophist Thrasymachus, that right, good, just, and the like are so many names for the interest of the stronger. This is the law of the jungle, but in the hands of the positivist it becomes a somewhat sophisticated law of the jungle in which a clever use of emotive meanings rather than teeth and claws determines what is right and just.[29]

Ethical positivism is, in a word, an ultra-sophisticated version of the world-old doctrine that Might makes Right.

10. As stated heretofore, it is difficult to see how mere subjective feeling (like or dislike) wholly isolated from the objective world—the world around us—could justify the legal process which has characterized human history from the first appearance of homo sapiens on this earth. (To take subjective feeling in isolation from objective fact would be equivalent to assuming that sensations could occur without objective sense data to produce them.) No people has

ever been found without some form of customary or statutory law. But if ethical positivism is the final word, then laws, courts, judges, juries, sanctions, and the like are monstrous impositions upon the race—all are aspects, one might well say, of man's inhumanity to man. If right and wrong are simply matters of personal like or dislike, on what basis is any person really obligated to obey the civil law? On what ground does any man or group of men presume to ordain law of any kind? If someone should reply that they do it to establish and maintain social order, obviously this would be an admission that social order is a value of itself, regardless of personal likes and dislikes. But—on what ground can social order be justified as a value in itself? Simply and solely on the ground of the dignity and worth of the human being as a human being, or person. (And does not this rest in turn on the conviction that man was created in the image of God and that all men, therefore, are equal in the sight of their Creator?) The fact is that neither positivists nor relativists actually believe what they preach; at least they do not, and indeed they dare not, act as if they believed it. Let the positivist or the relativist commit murder and see what happens. Could the specious "ivory tower" theory of either be legitimately offered in a court of law as a defense against the charge of murder? To ask this question is to answer it. The positivist does not, and dares not, practice what he preaches. The common sense of mankind is against him. If men would only be honest with themselves (instead of riding their superficial academic hobbies), they would admit that right and wrong exist ultimately in the very structure of the world and especially in that of human natural relationships. Theories of the kind under consideration here are not the products of "straight" thinking, of "thinking things through," but of "fuzzy" thinking—thinking inspired largely by a man's will to disbelieve, to rebel, and to glorify himself. And the will to disbelieve not infrequently is the product of habits of thought and action which have deadened the moral sensibilities. By way of summary, Mothershead writes:

> Positivism is an elaborate and sophisticated way of saying what Jim Casey in John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath manages to say quite simply. "There ain't no sin and there ain't no virtue. There's just stuff people do." This, of course, is moral nihilism. That it is the conclusion of positivism is admitted by forthright upholders of that view.

Again:

> To depend for your moral philosophy on the way in which people actually do use certain words is to prostrate yourself before what Francis Bacon called "the idols of the marketplace." Positivists in ethics confuse the reality under study with the words by means of which it is studied.[30]

And C.I. Lewis writes of the emotive theory as follows:

> This is one of the strangest aberrations ever to visit the mind of man. The denial to value-apprehensions in general of the character of truth or falsity and of knowledge, would imply both moral and practical cynicism. It would invalidate all action; because action becomes pointless unless there can be some measure of assurance of a valuable result which it may realize. And this negation, if it be carried out consistently, likewise invalidates all knowledge; both because believing is itself an active attitude which would have no point if it were not better to be right than wrong in what one believes, and because knowledge in general is for the sake of action. If action in general is pointless, then knowledge also is futile, and one belief is as good as another.[31]

That is to say, to be specific, belief in "Hitlerism" or in "Stalinism" is just as "good" as belief in democracy and freedom. Again we say: This is not nihilism—it is nonsense!

To be sure, we grant, on the one hand, that ethics as a science cannot claim the exactness which is characteristic of certain other sciences, notably, for example, the branches of mathematics. But common sense—and critical thinking as well—compels us to reject, on the other hand, the extremes of nihilism and positivism. These extreme forms of destructive thinking constitute a denial, not only of the possibility of a science of ethics, but even the possibility in human relations of morality itself. In fact, positivism in any and all of its forms is the most conclusive proof that could be offered of the superficiality which characterized much of "academic" thinking (?) throughout the first half of the present century.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]The words of Jesus, Luke 6:31; cf. Matt. 7:12.

[2]The words of Jesus, Luke 10:7; cf. the Apostle Paul, First Timothy 5:18.

[3]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, iii. Loeb Classical Library Edition. Trans. by H. Rackham. (In Aristotle's thinking ethics was a subdivision of the over-all science of politics, the science of relations within a polis, a Greek city-state.)

[4]Sheean, Personal History, p. 310. (Garden City Publishing Company, New York, 1939.)

[5]G.B. Shaw, Major Barbara, Act III, p. 126. (Brentano's, New York, 1907.)

[6]Quoted by Richard Cabot, The Meaning of Right and Wrong, Revised Edition, p. 3. (Macmillan, 1936.)

[7]Cabot, ibid., p. 5.

[8]New Testament, John 18:38.

[9]Lloyd D. Easton, Ethics, Policy, and Social Ends, p. 23. (Wm. C. Brown Co. Publishers, Dubuque, Iowa, 1955.)

[10]Plato, Republic, 557-564.

[11]Aristotle, Politics, III, 6-11; IV, 11-12.

[12]Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, I, 23, 6.

[13]Jesus, in Matt. 26:52.

[14]Vinding Kruse, The Foundations of Human Thought, p. 339. Trans. by Miss Ingebord Lund. (Oxford University Press, 1949.)

[15]The Apostle Paul, First Corinthians 2:11.

[16]E.S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 396. (Prentice-Hall, 1940.)

[17]Ibid., p. 397.

[18]See Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man, Doubleday Anchor Book, pp. 79-86.

[19]Vinding Kruse, op. cit., p. 63.

[20]Quoted by Troy W. Organ, The Examined Life, p. 182. (Houghton Mifflin, 1956.)

[21]F.S.C. Northrop, in The Logic of the Sciences, quoted by Organ, ibid., p. 183.

[22]John L. Mothershead, Jr., Ethics, p. 128. (Henry Holt, 1955.)

[23]C.E.M. Joad, Guide to Philosophy, pp. 538-539. (By special permission Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London, and Dover Publications, New York.)

[24]Plato, Republic, Bk. I, 336-354.

[25]Brand Blanshard, Preface to Philosophy: Textbook, by Hocking, Blanshard, Hendel, and Randall, pp. 126-127. Macmillan, 1947.

[26]Blanshard, ibid., p. 128.

[27]C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, (Yale University Press, 1944).

[28]Stevenson, ibid., p. 90.

[29]Mothershead, op. cit., p. 127.

[30]Mothershead, ibid., pp. 129-130. See The Grapes of Wrath, by John Steinbeck, p. 32. (Modern Library, New York; copyright by Viking Press, 1939.)

[31]C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 336. (Open Court, LaSalle, Illinois, 1946.)

## III. The fact that ethics as a science cannot claim the exactness which is characteristic of certain other sciences does not mean, however, that morality is wholly "relative."

Closely related to the ethical nihilists and positivists are the ethical relativists, those who would reduce morals to "nothing but" mores, and morality to "nothing but" legality. (This is another case of the "nothing-but fallacy"; cf. for example, the notion that man is "nothing but" an animal, a notion which even the most ardent evolutionists are now willing to dub a "vicious" fallacy.) Protagonists of this school stretch the inexactness of ethics to the point of absolute relativism, namely, that morality is simply the "fashion" of a particular place and time; the only absolute (unlimited, universal) which they recognize in the field of morals is the relativity itself of all morality. Negatively speaking, ethical relativism is the denial of any general or universal standards of right and wrong. To the great detriment, I believe, of the moral and social order of mankind, this view has been all too characteristic of the literature of the last half-century. At present men everywhere, fortunately, are becoming increasingly aware of the dangers that are certain to follow should this view generally permeate human thought and life. (Incidentally, this was the very thing which Socrates, Plato and Aristotle so vehemently opposed in ancient times; in their day, it went under the name of Sophism as championed by the Sophists.)

The argument most commonly offered to support ethical relativism, is that of the known diversity of human customs. The fact of this diversity has been highlighted with the rise, in recent years, of the science of anthropology (the study of human origins and of prehistoric and primitive cultures). This new science has developed so rapidly that its architects, unfortunately, seem not to have taken the time to weigh carefully the implications of their discoveries or to synthesize those implications with the totality of human thought. The net result has been the general confusion of group-approved mores with moral law, and the resultant notion that any practice which bears the stamp of group approval must be "good" (i.e., in the sense of being the expedient thing to be done by the particular group which practices it). It is contended that no true moral norms can be disentangled from the welter of group-sanctioned mores which anthropologists have brought to light, and hence that morality is entirely a subjective matter of group or individual preference. Ethical relativists are fond of repeating the old

cliches, that "nothing is ever really better or worse than anything else," that "whatever an individual or a group thinks to be right, is right to him or them," or, in a word, that "all cultures are equally valid." Obviously, these contentions logically can lead only to the ultimate view that the roots of morality lie no deeper than the authority of the policeman. Can the human race afford to translate into actual practice the full implications of this view? I think not, for the evident reason that it could be used to justify everything that man ever did, every manifestation of "man's inhumanity to man."

The more common objections to extreme ethical relativism may be stated as follows:

1. The platitude (one which may well be classified among Bacon's "idols of the market-place") that "whatever an individual or a group thinks to be right, is right to him or them," involves a serious fallacy. It can be justified in a sense (i.e., not as true but as practicable) only for those who are invincibly (unavoidably) ignorant, those who have never had an opportunity to educate their consciences according to any higher standards, especially those who have actually been prevented by circumstances from doing so. The woman, for example, who tosses her baby into the "sacred" river in order (as she thinks) to appease the wrath of the river god, is following her conscience, but to the extent only that her conscience has been enlightened. This does not mean, however, that her act is intrinsically right and good; on the contrary, it is evident that if her practice were universalized it would result in the degradation of the race. No doubt this—the enlightenment of human conscience—is the reason why mankind generally abandoned human sacrifice long ago. Because the practice may be excusable for some, living under conditions such that they could not "know better," does not mean that it is intrinsically right and good, no more so for those by whose culture the custom was permitted through unavoidable ignorance than for all those by whose culture it is now repudiated.

2. The uncritical statement that "there is nothing that is ever really better or worse than anything else" is simply another way of stating the basic premise of ethical nihilism. It leads to the inference, for example, that Hitlerism was no better, no worse, than democracy, and vice versa. The Nazis, by way of illustration, invaded Poland: as far as the Poles were concerned, this act was "wrong to them," but as far as the Nazis were concerned, it was "right to them." Since, according to the theory under consideration, this is all that being right or wrong implies, the conclusion must be that the two groups were equally justified in their conflicting views. But this, I repeat, is nonsense. (Surely, anyone can see that the phrase, "to them," is sheer sophistry!)

> If marauders are ever troubled by the thought of people who feel differently, there is one way by which the rightness of their cause can be placed beyond all doubt. Let them exterminate their enemies utterly, so that nobody is left who

fails to approve, and, then, since the favorable feeling is unanimous, they will be right beyond any question.[1]

One who holds the view under consideration here is looked upon by many as being "broadminded," when as a matter of fact he is really "flat"—his moral sensibility is spread out so thin that it is, for all practical purposes, "splendidly nil." The view is often said to be a "tolerant" one; as a matter of fact, it is so "tolerant" that it leaves no ground whatever for saying that there is anything objectively wrong in treachery, torture, cruelty, brigandage, murder, or anything else. It is equivalent, on the whole and in the long run, to ethical nihilism.

3. The fact that a custom bears the stamp of group approval does not mean necessarily that it is right and good. Slavery, for example, enjoyed general approval at one time throughout our Southern states. Yet it would be difficult today to find an intelligent American who would contend that the institution of slavery was a good thing morally: it is now generally recognized that it was a derogation of the dignity and worth of the person and an outright violation of the natural equality of man. Nor could many American citizens be found in our day who would justify slavery even on the ground of expediency; it is now generally admitted, even by the people of the South themselves, that reliance upon slave labor was the direct cause of the industrial backwardness of that region, a backwardness from which the Southern states are just now emerging to take their place economically alongside the other states of the Union. It can now be seen, moreover, that had slavery never been introduced into the United States in the first place, our terrible Civil War and all its disastrous consequences would have been averted. We realize now that Negro slavery was prompted largely by human lust for wealth and power, and that Civil War and its attendant evils were only the natural sanctions for such an immoral institution. In a word, looked at from any point of view, human slavery cannot be considered a good thing. Again, this confounding of the customary with the moral (or mores with morality) is thoroughly discredited by the numerous cases of individuals who have sacrificially followed conscience, in some instances to martyrdom, in defiance of popular tradition, established custom, or the edict of a tyrant. Shall we cynically conclude that all human sacrifice in behalf of ideas and ideals has been futile?

4. The oft-heard claim that "all cultures are equally valid" (a statement which subsumes the cliches considered in the foregoing sections) is fallacious from at least two points of view: (1) It is incomplete in that it fails to consider the question, valid—for what? Are all cultures equally valid for progress toward an enlightened social order? Are all cultures equally valid for the increase of human knowledge, for the extension of human freedom, for the deepening of the human sense of responsibility, for the enrichment of the human personality? Of course not. We find it difficult to subscribe

to the dictum that "where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise." We reject this old saw on the common-sense ground that the "bliss" engendered by the fruits of wisdom is far more delectable than that which stems from ignorance. It is difficult to think, for instance, that the Pueblo Indian, whose culture, to be sure, was basically that of peaceable pursuits in an environment of pure nature (but essentially a culture of inertia withal) derived as much happiness from life as the philosopher or sage whom Plato has defined as "he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence."[2] This tendency to glorify the so-called "state of nature"—a sort of nostalgic yearning for the "ole swimmin' hole"—has all the aspects of a philosophy of escape. Obviously it is utterly devoid of the ideal of service. This, by the way, is our chief objection to Oriental mysticisms—Brahmanism, Buddhism, Taoism, and the like; they are de facto ways of escape from the world of men, from human obligations to a common humanity. It is this retreat-from-the-world character of these Oriental systems, moreover, which makes them stand out poles apart from Biblical religion with its ideals of personal freedom, social justice and loving service. To say that all cultures are "equally valid" is to affirm, for example, that Nazi-ism is equally valid with liberal democracy, or that cultures founded on racism and genocide are on a par morally with cultures which practice, however imperfectly, the principle of human equality. The common sense of the average person rebels against such a view. Moreover, it is quite doubtful that those persons who would claim that all cultures are "equally valid" would exchange their environment in a cultured Western community for that of an Eskimo igloo or Indian hogan. As a matter of fact, there are few of us who would want to go back even to the "horse-and-buggy" days. There are exceptional individuals, to be sure, who would make such an exchange; recurrently, persons of this persuasion have arisen, to plead for what they chose to call a return to the "simple life." Human eccentrics, like the poor, we seem to have with us always, and history records several instances of such "back to nature" treks. (One naturally wonders whether they mean "back to" human nature or to animal nature.) But as far as our knowledge goes, they soon fizzle out. They do not appeal to Mr. Average Man who, after all, constitutes human society. We do not mean to intimate, of course, that a higher material standard of living is indispensable to human happiness, but we are realistic enough to think, with Aristotle, that a reasonably high standard of living and a fair measure of security of a material kind, are conducive to the happiness of the general run of human beings. We contend also that the material goods of the earth are of sufficient quantity to provide, if justly allocated, this standard of living and this measure of security for all who are willing to pay the price of honest toil for such benefits. (2) Hence, the claim that all cultures are "equally valid" is refuted historically by the tendency of men, in all parts of the world and in all ages, to press on toward what they believe to be higher values—in a word, to the more abundant life, both material and

spiritual. On the view that all cultures are "equally valid" how shall we account for man's world-old struggle for greater mastery of his environment—his struggle for a progressively higher standard of living, for a progressively greater measure of liberty, of security, of peace? If all cultures are truly equally valid, why are not people satisfied with them? Why not universal satisfaction with the status quo? Why did not all culture freeze, let us say, at the Stone Age level? How account for the awakening nationalism among the backward peoples of our day? The whole history of man is a refutation of the claim under consideration here; history proves that the race as a whole has never believed it, and contemporary events prove that they do not believe it in our time.

5. A closer scrutiny reveals the fact that undergirding the various divergences in human custom basic identities are to be found. Fiji Islanders, for example, were accustomed to "dispose of" their parents at a certain age in order that the latter might take their faculties into the next life unimpaired; certain American Indian offspring followed the same practice in order to free their aging parents from the vicissitudes of a nomadic environment; in other cultures, however, particularly those undergirded by Biblical religion, aged folk are well cared for, as a rule, either by their own children or by society at large, until they die a natural death. The significant thing is that back of all these diverse customs there is an identity of principle, namely, that of respect for parents and elders—a norm which has characterized all human society from the beginning, familial, tribal, or national. Again, the old "blood revenge" (lex talionis) which was the ancient tribal method of keeping murder reduced to a minimum, execution under the laws of the modern state, present-day traffic laws, and the like, are all directed toward the protection of what man believes to be his most fundamental right, the right to life itself. And a study of the diversity of human customs in other areas will bring to light other deeper identities; moreover, the study of history will show that men have outgrown these diversities to the extent that they have discovered the deeper identities.

6. Relativity is, in the nature of the case, relativity with respect to a norm. Anything that is relative must be relative to something, to something taken as a norm. "If the alleged natural rights of life or liberty or property are relative to something, then the rule that they are relative to that something is itself an absolute rule."[3] It is self-evident that whatever is relative must be relative to an absolute. In fact, it is necessary for man, in order to think and to live and to act, to take hold somewhere of that which is permanent in the total structure of being.

7. Human relationships are not wholly subjective: they are relationships with other entities, for the most part with other persons. These relationships exist objectively, regardless of the likes, dislikes, and opinions of individual persons. Common sense tells us

that there are certain human acts which violate these relationships, and which therefore, if universally practiced, would destroy the human race. Hence we contend that there are some human acts which are intrinsically bad: murder, for example, the voluntary killing of another person on one's own authority if universalized would destroy the race; adultery, if universally practiced, would destroy the family; lying, perjury, contract-breaking, theft, rape, etc., would, if generally indulged, destroy social order. These are facts regardless of the opinions of individual men.

8. Truth is one: it does not contradict itself. Now it can hardly be denied that the truth respecting the physical world around us is embodied in that world: it is not formulated, it is discovered, by man. Lightning, for example, was a form of electricity long before Franklin flew his kite. King Tut might easily have had a radio or television set to provide him with entertainment on his journey to the land of Osiris, had his contemporaries only had the necessary know-how in the field of electronics. Rome could easily have dropped a hydrogen bomb on Carthage if her engineers had known how to harness the powers of the atom. All that was lacking in any case was the knowledge on man's part; the ingredients and the processes had been a part of the cosmic order from the beginning. The fact is that man discovers the truth insofar as the physical world and its processes are concerned—he never formulates it himself. What reason do we have for not thinking the same to be true of the moral world, namely, that ultimate moral truth is in the very structure of human nature and human relationships themselves? For truth is one. It follows, then, that the developing science of ethics embodies man's progressive discovery of this ultimate moral law and moral truth. Moreover, as it has been with the race in this respect, so it is with the individual: as Easton has written:

> One of our commonest experiences as we become more mature and reflective about the direction of our lives is the realization that we often like things which are not desirable or good. We often immediately approve or prefer what is really undesirable. These experiences suggest that liking and ethical value are not identical. To be sure . . . all worth or desirability may involve the satisfaction of man's interests and desires. This is the half-truth in subjectivism. But it does not follow that every satisfaction is choiceworthy or desirable.[4]

What is true, as stated here, of the experience of the individual is also true of the experience of the race. The science of ethics did not spring into existence full-blown; on the contrary, it has been a progressive development as man, throughout the ages, has advanced in his discovery, understanding and application of the moral law. In fact, man seems to have realized from the beginning that morality is the scaffolding of his universe.

9. Morality is not identical with legality, nor are morals necessarily identical with mores. These are correlated, to be sure, but correlation is not identity. Human law is the expression of human will. Now if the will of one man (a Hitler, for example), or the will of a group of men (the elders of a tribe), or that of a majority of men (as in a democracy), alone determines right and differentiates it from wrong, it follows that force, i.e., the coercion exercised by this individual or by this majority in imposing its will upon others, is the ultimate norm of human social order; and surely it becomes questionable whether such a social order can rightly be called a moral order in any sense of the term. Under such a system, the right of a minority simply does not exist, and much less the right of individual conscience. The ethical relativist (and certainly the ethical nihilist) is compelled by the inexorable logic of his position to subscribe to the age-old doctrine that Might makes "Right." To be sure, I do not affirm here that all ethical relativists do subscribe to this doctrine; obviously, many of them do not, in theory. But I do affirm that the relativistic position can lead logically, in actual practice, to no other end. Where no over-all moral law is recognized, one that is binding alike on the ruler and on the ruled, then the arbitrary will of the ruler (or of the ruling regime), backed as it always is by force, becomes the law from which, theoretically, there is no right of appeal. And what is this but the actual practice of the doctrine that Might makes "Right"? I therefore reaffirm here that the roots of morality must lie deeper than the authority of the policeman, if "morality" is to mean anything at all.

10. Finally, it is doubtful that there are de facto any absolute relativists. (1) I once startled an avowed agnostic who was boasting that his "religion"—he called it "humanism"—was to make two grains of corn grow where only one had grown before (so that with the rapidly increasing global population none would have to die of starvation), by asking him why he was concerned about the matter, why he was unwilling to let the surplus population starve (a la the doctrines of the "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest"). It seems that he had never given any thought to this more profound question—the why of the matter. This is, of course, a basic problem: as Jesus put it, "How much then is a man of more value than a sheep?"[5]—that is, of more value than any brute? If the answer is in the negative (that a man is of no more value than a brute), then, obviously, there is no such thing as the dignity and worth of the person, and hence no such thing as morality: there is only the law of the jungle. If the answer is just the opposite, the more searching question is raised: On what ground is the claim warranted that a person is of more value than a brute? And this, in turn, raises the ultimate question, namely, for what purpose, if any, was man created, and to what natural intrinsic and extrinsic ends, if any, is he ordained? (Morality, if it is more than a fiction, must have its roots somewhere in cosmic ends and means.) The point is that the agnostic alluded to above, whether or not he

could give any reason for doing so, was recognizing the dignity and worth of the person, and, wittingly or unwittingly, was elevating the human being himself to the status of an absolute norm. (Incidentally, the most forthright humanism to be found in any teaching is that of the Bible itself: according to the Bible, the two great commandments of the moral law are love for God and love for one's fellow-men; moreover, love for one's fellow-men is declared to be a necessary part of one's manifestation of one's love for God. Cf. Matt. 22:25-30; Mark 12:28-34; Deut. 6:4-5; Lev. 19-18. This is humanism with a capital "H"). (2) "In reality," writes Dr. Robert Ulich of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, "not even the most ardent theoretical relativist believes in such a doctrine." He then proceeds to give an example from a "scholarly discussion" in which one of the speakers defended the view that the only rule to which the scientist must submit is the system which his own given culture recognizes as the most valid. Whereupon one of his hearers asked him whether science (medicine, sociology, psychology, etc.) had advanced to the point of manipulating the variables in human conditioning so that it would be possible to make a criminal of a child. The next question was whether, from the point of view of science, it would not be "conducive to further research" if a number of healthy children were subjected to such a procedure. The speaker conceded that from the viewpoint of science, such a test would no doubt be profitable. The interrogator then asked him bluntly why he did not make this test. "Because I could not find the children, or, respectively, their parents," was the answer. The disputant then pressed the matter further: "But if you could find them, would you do it?" This immediately invoked the indignant response: "Do you think I am one of the Nazi war crime doctors who tortured human beings for so-called scientific experiments? Who would willfully turn a child into a criminal?" Dr. Ulich goes on to say:

> What was happening in this discussion was the denial of relativism by its defender. Unconsciously, he had always made his scientific system relative to something he apparently considered absolute, namely, the human being. This human being was to him not another piece of flesh or another species of animals (with which he constantly experimented). Rather it was sacred, belonging, if one wants to say so, to a system superior to all other systems. Making a criminal out of a man by scientific means would have meant to him not only degradation of the value and dignity of humanity, but also of science itself.

Dr. Ulich concludes:

> If relativism meant merely the admission that man depends to a high degree on his environment, physically, mentally, and morally, then we could never escape from it . . . But there is something more in human life than just

> actuality; there is vision, faith, and purpose. There is self-transcendence. Man is within the environment, but he also transcends it. Human destiny is not only here and there, but also beyond. Unless we have the courage to admit this, there is, indeed, no way out of the relativist position. Any one actuality which helps man and his group to survive under some set of rules is then just as good as the other.[6]

Although stated in somewhat different terms, this is precisely Cassirer's argument, namely, that man's true greatness lies in his ability to look beyond the actual to the possible, beyond the "real" to the ideal, beyond so-called "facts" to values.[7] It is this power essentially which constitutes man a moral being.

In refutation of the argument, based on the known diversity of primitive customs, that morality is entirely a subjective matter of individual or group preference, Louise Saxe Eby writes as follows:

> The argument from the variability of primitive codes proves nothing about the nature of true morality, for the primitive is as yet largely an amoral being . . . Naturally, just as in other realms of culture, a few foundation stones of morality are laid in primitive times with the beginnings of justice, hospitality, and other virtues; but, on the whole, it is a fallacy to imagine that the origin of morality any more than of anything else explains its true nature, subsequent development, and metamorphoses.[8]

Surely no intelligent person would look back to prehistoric, or even to early historic, peoples for a well-developed science of physics, chemistry, biology, sociology or anything else. Why, then, should we expect of prehistoric, primitive, or early historic peoples a mature science of ethics? Rashdall sums up the whole matter clearly in these words:

> A clear and adequate conception of the scope and object-matter of a science and of its relation to other sciences is usually arrived at only at a tolerably advanced stage in the development of the science itself.

"For practical purposes, morals means customs, folkways, established collective habits,"[10] wrote the late John Dewey, Columbia University educationist, himself an outstanding proponent of ethical relativism. Morality, according to Dewey, is exclusively social.[11] But this is "going too far," asserts another distinguished Columbia professor (of political philosophy and sociology), R.M. MacIver, who writes as follows:

> No doubt the nearer we get to primitive life, the more true this statement becomes, but if we are seeking for the differences between social phenomena it is obviously to the more developed societies that we should look, and

> in these there is considerable opportunity to observe or reject customs; to approve or to adjudge them "more honor'd in the breach than in the observance." It may even be misleading to identify moral conduct with social conduct unless we mean by the latter that mode of behavior which persons ought to exhibit in view of their social situation and the responsibility it imposes. It is misleading if it implies that there can be no moral conduct except in a social setting. This would involve the curious commentary that the decisions of a Robinson Crusoe, whether he yields to despair or lives on bravely, whether he lives like animals or builds a decent hut, whether he grows addicted to a poisonous drug or maintains his self-respect, are morally indifferent, without distinction of right and wrong or its basis in better and worse.[12]

To this the same author adds the following comment in a footnote:

> It is of course true that morality is historically and psychologically derived from the experience of social relationships, but we must distinguish between origins and developed significance. The conduct of a Crusoe is affected by his past social life, but the question is whether it has a present moral significance.[13]

(Certainly Crusoe at least believed that he had certain duties not only to himself but to his God as well. If morality is exclusively social, then obviously the "morality of self-respect" is a fiction.) (Of course, persons with religious training and conviction, will not accept this author's dictum that morality is derived altogether "from the experience of social relationships." The Decalogue of Moses, for instance, and the Beatitudes of Jesus, are accepted by many as divine revelations. Indeed this author accepts them wholeheartedly as such. However, it lies outside the scope of the present text to delve into the problem of revelation—that is a subject which belongs either to theology or to the philosophy of religion.)

It is my contention here that no matter how much it may be conditioned by folkways and customs, morality is, in the final analysis, that of the individual. The person certainly has duties to himself; he can also work injury to himself through habits that weaken his will and debase his character. A group, moreover, does not have being per se, that is, separate and apart from its individual members; hence "group morality" can never be anything but the sum total, so to speak, of the moralities of its individual members. Morality, as we shall see later, functions in three separate, yet interrelated orders—the individual, the social, and the universal; yet it is always the morality of the individual that so functions. Nature is in fact individualistic throughout: we come into the world one by one, and we go out of it one by one. And although we live in society, we do so as individuals. Therefore, to regard morality as exclusively social is to ignore some of the most important aspects of the subject.

For the many theoretical and practical reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, although frankly admitting the inexactness of the science of ethics at many points, nevertheless due reflection compels us to reject the extremes of ethical nihilism, positivism, and relativism. We shall adhere to the view, therefore, that ethics should rightly be regarded not only as a science, but as a normative science as well.

ADDENDA: 1. In a recently published article, the distinguished anthropologist, Margaret Mead, discusses "conceptions of human rights that are universal to all known cultures." She calls attention to what she calls "certain persistent regularities, due to the species—specific characteristics of human beings." She points up three "constancies" in particular, namely (1) "categories of justified and unjustified killing," (2) "incest rules governing the three primary incest relationships—mother-son, father-daughter, brother-sister," and (3) "some institution of private property." These constancies, she states explicitly, occur in all known cultures. She concludes as follows:

> "Natural law" might thus be defined as those rules of behavior which had developed from a species-specific capacity to ethicalize as a feature of those examples of such ethicalizing that appear in all known societies.[14]

I think we might add to these "constancies" certain other norms which appear to be universal, e.g., (1) respect for parents and elders: this was more rigidly enforced in primitive groups than it is in modern society; (2) profound respect for, and rigid adherence to, oath: perjury was one of the worst crimes that the member of an ancient tribe could commit; and (3) some form of family relationship. I believe anthropologists generally would agree also that there is no known instance, among primitive, prehistoric or historic peoples, of the practice of completely uninhibited sexual promiscuity.

2. It is the conviction of this writer, as we shall see later, that the fundamental aspects of truth, beauty, goodness (justice, order, etc.) are built into the structure of the moral world, that is to say, into human nature itself and human natural relationships. I am convinced that there are certain human acts which are intrinsically bad, that is, bad regardless of time or place or environmental context; that among these should be included murder (the deliberate killing of another person on one's own authority and with malice aforethought), any malicious assault upon a child, any lustful assault upon a woman, and perhaps kidnaping and torture. It is difficult to see how any of these acts could be justified under any circumstances. On the other hand, are not acts of service, motivated by good will (love) intrinsically good?

3. As opposed to ethical relativism: (1) If all cultures are equally valid, why do not men change to one that is less complex, and hence less demanding? Why is there not a world-wide rush to

that mythical milieu commonly designated the "simple life"? As a matter of fact we know that, with the obvious upsurge of nationalism in all parts of the world, the trend is in the opposite direction, that is, toward what is believed to be "higher standards," and hence greater complexity of living. This could not be true if people actually believed that all cultures are equally valid. (2) Cultures do not promote equally the ideal of service to our fellow men. Oriental cultures, generally speaking, are characterized by an attitude of escape-ism; Orientals look on life as maya, illusion, something that is to be left behind ultimately. In our Western tradition, on the other hand, life is regarded as man's greatest good, a divine gift that is to be cherished for both the here and the hereafter. (3) The cliche that all cultures are equally valid implies that a culture favoring, and even practicing, racism and genocide is equally valid with the cultures based on the conviction of human equality. (4) This position indicates, on the whole, an utter lack of concern for human ends, for individual human nature and destiny. It suffers greatly from a lack of appreciation of the dignity and worth of the person. (5) Finally, does not the claim that all cultures are equally valid involve the presumption on the part of the claimant that he knows all that there is to be known about all cultures? This, to be sure, would be for him to claim omniscience, about the most absurd claim that any human being could make.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Brand Blanshard, Preface to Philosophy: Textbook, by Hocking, Blanshard, Hendel, and Randall, Jr., p. 123. (Macmillan, New York, 1947.)

[2]Plato, Republic, VI, 486a.

[3]Blanshard, op. cit., p. 64.

[4]Lloyd D. Easton, Ethics, Policy, and Social Ends, p. 23. (Wm. C. Brown Co., Dubuque, 1955.)

[5]New Testament, Matthew 12:12.

[6]Robert Ulich, The Human Career, pp. 149-150. (Harper, New York, 1955.)

[7]See Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man, pp. 79-86. (Doubleday Anchor Book.)

[8]Louise Saxe Eby, The Quest for Moral Law, pp. 252-253. (Columbia University Press, New York, 1944.)

[9]Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Second Edition, Vol. I, p. 1. (Oxford University Press, London, 1907.)

[10]John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, Part I, Section IV, Modern Library Edition, p. 75.

[11] Ibid., Part IV, Section IV, p. 319.

[12] R.M. MacIver, Society: A Textbook of Sociology, p. 385. (Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1937.)

[13] Ibid., p. 385, n. 10.

[14] Margaret Mead, "Some Anthropological Considerations Concerning Natural Law," Natural Law Forum, Vol. VI, 1961. (Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana.)

## IV. The science of ethics, if it is to be directive of the right use of human liberty, must be a normative science.

By a normative science is meant a science which validates itself as such by presenting norms (standards, rules, laws, canons, etc.), in this case norms for human conduct, norms "directive of the right use of human liberty." These norms are derived from the following sources: (1) personal introspection of the "inner man," its powers, impulses, needs and ends; (2) personal observation of the acts of others, and especially of the consequences of those acts; (3) the study of human cultures, primitive, prehistoric and historic, and (4) the study of the development of jurisprudence (the science of law).

It must be understood, of course, that ethics as a science did not spring into existence fully developed at any one time. On the contrary, it, like all other sciences, must be regarded as a progressive development throughout the ages of rational man's life upon earth. J.H. Breasted, the noted Egyptologist, for example, argues explicitly that what he calls the Age of Power or Weapons goes back, no one knows how far, into prehistoric times, but that this Age began to give way to what he calls the Age of Conscience or Character as early as 3500 B.C., particularly in the valley of the Nile, and probably in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates (Mesopotamia) as well. (From the implications of the Hebrew writings—the Old Testament of our Bible—we may well conclude that this Age of Conscience extended back, among Semitic peoples, probably a millennium or two beyond Breasted's figures. As a matter of fact, the account of the Man and Woman that is given us in the opening chapters of Genesis obviously is designed to be the story of man's first transgression of the moral law and of the birth of conscience in him.) In a word, according to Breasted, the so-called historic period is but the story of the development of character in mankind. Such words as "righteousness," "truth," "justice," and the like, he tells us, are to be found in the Egyptian fragments as old as the fourth millennium before Christ. His thesis is that the use of such words marked the beginning of man's emergence from a state of barbarism into that of civilization, his emergence from the age of his struggle with nature into that of his struggle with himself. This struggle of man with himself, Breasted concludes, is as yet "an

unfinished historical process." On this point the noted archaeologist writes as follows:

> The greatest constructive contribution which the recovery of the lost oriental civilizations is making, therefore, is the restoration to use of an inheritance as broad as the horizon—a heritage left us by the life of man as a whole. Herein lies the greatest of all revelations that we can now demonstrate as a process of history, and as a result of social experience, man's dawning comprehension of the difference between right and wrong conduct, and the supreme value of that growing comprehension as an unfinished historical process. It is the recovery of the lost civilizations that has enabled us to demonstrate that we have barely emerged from pre-moral darkness, that the dawn of conscience is still behind us, and that we still stand in the sun-rise of the age of character.[1]

As far as I know, only two sources of moral obligation have been proposed, in the entire history of human thought, namely, (1) the natural moral law which is said to be embodied in human nature and human natural relationships and hence to be common, at least in its basic norms, to all mankind; and (2) those value-judgments which men themselves have formulated throughout the centuries, out of their own individual and social experience, and have embodied in their own customary or statutory law. Now a more careful examination of these two views will show, I think, that the divergence between them is, after all, not as great as might appear at first glance. It strikes us forcefully that, granting the fact of a universal moral law embedded in the nature and relationships of man, it was inevitable that the fundamental principles of moral order should have been discovered and verified, in the course of time, in the history and experience of the race; that is to say, that those value-judgments (the products of human reason rather than of arbitrary human will) discovered by human experience to be the most effective in promoting individual and social well-being, and to undergird the most advanced cultures, should be found to be identical with the universal principles of right and wrong traditionally conceived as embraced in what is called the natural moral law. As the old saying has it, "Truth will out." We must remember that man does not formulate truth; rather, he discovers it in the nature of things: physical truth in the physical processes and "laws" of the cosmos, and moral truth in the nature and relationships of man. And just as physical truth has been embodied in the cosmos itself for man to spell out slowly through the ages in the development of his physical sciences, so moral truth has been incorporated in human nature itself for man to spell out—word for word, one might well say—in the development of his moral science.

That such is the case can be proved, I think, by appeals to archaeology, anthropology, history and jurisprudence. These sciences testify that there are certain value-judgments which have persisted

throughout the entire history of rational man, which appear to have been characteristic of all cultures, both primitive and advanced, and which, therefore, must be regarded as of a higher order than that of mere generalizations from masses of observed phenomena. These judgments, which seem to spring from desire (shall we call them "instincts"?) for self-preservation, order, and well-being, though perhaps manifesting themselves at first only in their crudest forms, have gained such widespread acceptance as to have become embodied in the statutory law of all advanced peoples of historic times. Take the law against murder, for example (taking the life of another on one's own authority): No people is known ever to have been without it. The same may be said of adultery: "So far as the evidence goes," writes the anthropologist Hoebel, "homicide and adultery are the two acts that are legally punishable in all societies."[2] The universal condemnation of murder is, of course, for the protection of the race itself, and that of adultery, for the protection of the family, an institution which is regarded as indispensable by all human groups. Penalties, customary or statutory, seem to have existed quite generally also against theft, perjury, contract-breaking, and the like; these practices seem to have been frowned upon, if not condemned outright, by the vast majority of people, at all levels of moral development. Respect for parents and elders is another ethical and social ideal which has characterized practically all cultures—one more rigidly inculcated, in fact, among primitives than in many contemporary societies. The overriding harmony of human thought on all these matters certainly goes to show that homo sapiens has proved himself capable of attaining progressively higher moral levels, whether as a result of his own social experience exclusively or of the operation of the natural moral law incorporated in his own being. As a matter of fact, the majority of thinkers have held that the world-wide prevalence of these value-judgments confirms the fact of the operation of the natural moral law in man; indeed many (notably the ancient Greek and Roman Stoics) have identified the natural moral law with human reason itself. The student must understand, I repeat at this point, that for present purposes we are putting aside all claims of divine revelation for historic moral codes, such as, e.g., the Decalogue (Ten Commandments) of Moses. This does not mean that we are repudiating the claim of special revelation. It means only that we choose to confine ourselves here to the empirical or common-sense approach. We do this deliberately, for two reasons: first, in order to adhere strictly, in the present text, to the scientific method: second, in order that we may not be charged with violating the principle of the separation of church and state.

Dr. H.A. Overstreet, in one of his well-known writings,[3] has listed what he calls the great "insights" by means of which man has progressed toward his present social, political and moral levels, especially in the Western world. These insights, according to Overstreet, were the following: (1) The idea of one God, the Source

of all Truth, Beauty and Goodness—the supreme conviction contributed to subsequent generations by the ancient Hebrew people. (2) The idea that man is a creature of moral law—another "insight" contributed by the Hebrew people and embodied in the Decalogue of Moses, the first classless code, rightly called a "mandate to humanity." (3) The ideal of social justice as contributed by the ancient Hebrew prophets: e.g., the unforgettable words of the prophet Micah: "He [Jehovah] hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth Jehovah require of thee but to do justly, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (Mic. 6:8). Also the words of the prophet Isaiah: "Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek justice, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow" (Isa. 1:16-17). (4) The "new commandment" enunciated by Jesus of Nazareth, that all men should love one another (John 13:34), or, as amplified by Paul, "Love worketh no ill to his neighbor; love therefore is the fulfilment of the law" (Rom. 13:10). (5) The idea that man is a rational animal, and that his fulfilment calls, therefore, for the exercise of his reason to keep his animal appetites and passions in proper subjection. This was the special contribution of the Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. (6) The affirmation of human individuality—the "insight" that "invited the human being to become acquainted with his individual earthly self and to make independent creative use of the powers he discovered within himself." This was the distinctive contribution of the Renaissance. (7) The "insight" that man is a species capable of transcending his own limitations of sense and of subjectivity. This, says Overstreet, is the contribution especially of modern science. "Man is a creature capable of so transcending his own limitations of sense and of subjectivity as to gain ever more knowledge about his world and about himself in that world. This is the insight that invites man to maturity." (8) Finally, the two ennobling ideas contributed by the Founding Fathers of our republic, namely, that all men are "created equal," and that governments derive their just powers from "the consent of the governed." Certainly these "insights" (which may properly be called "revelations" from the standpoint of the Source of truth, and "discoveries" from man's standpoint) do mark out man's forward march toward the attainment of an enlightened moral and social order. Moreover, is it not our duty to keep these ideals alive, and vigorously alive, in the hearts of our people, and to share them with other peoples as well, wherever possible? Can we hope for world order on any other basis than that of the universal acceptance of these ideals? Is this too much to expect of our race as a whole?

There are those in our day, of course, who would insist that the words "progress" and "civilization" have little or no significance. Such terms, they contend, can represent only subjective interpretations—interpretations made in the light of the specific culture by which the person who makes them has been "conditioned."

This again, however, is but the reaffirmation, in substance, of the old saying that "where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise." It is extremely doubtful, as we have already seen, that even the ethical positivists and relativists themselves would be willing to follow this view through to its practical application. And let us not forget, in this connection, that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating."

Common sense witnesses to the fact that one of the first marks of civilized man is his repudiation of the doctrine that might makes right, and his substitution of reason for force as the means of resolving conflicts. As Rabindranath Tagore has written,

> Civilization must be judged and prized, not by the amount of power it has developed, but by how much it has evolved and given expression to, by its laws and institutions, the love of humanity. The first question and the last which it has to answer is, whether and how far it recognizes man more as a spirit than as a machine? Whenever some ancient civilization fell into decay and died, it was owing to causes which produced callousness of heart and led to the cheapening of man's worth; when either the state or some powerful group of men began to look upon the people as a mere instrument of their power; when, by compelling weaker races to slavery and trying to keep them down by every means, man struck at the foundations of his greatness, his own love of freedom and fair-play. Civilization can never sustain itself upon cannibalism of any form. For that by which alone man is true can only be nourished by love and justice.[4]

Reason, implemented by love as good will toward all mankind, must, in the very nature of the case, be the mainspring of what may properly be called civilization.

Will Durant states expressly, and rightly we think, that control of the sexual impulse is "the first principle of civilization."[5] Surely history testifies that a nation's morale is based on its morality, and that the level of its morality will be determined primarily by the standard of its sex morality.

Common sense testifies that there are other marks of civilized man, among which might be mentioned the following: (1) individual character, (2) social order, (3) science, (4) art, (5) literature, and (6) religious faith, the essence of which is, in practice, love that is good will toward one's fellows. Common sense testifies that progress, generally speaking, consists in the progressive accumulation of means—both material and spiritual—provided by the given culture for the enrichment of the individual personality.

In all these matters, history proves that man—in many parts of the world—has made progress. To realize the truth of this statement, one needs only to read the histories of Herodotus, Polybius, Tacitus, Suetonius, and others of ancient times, with their accounts

of the cultures of early historic peoples. Man has made progress morally. If David and Solomon were alive today, and doing the things they did in their own times, they would be in jail in many countries within twenty-four hours. Think of the many practices of the ancient world, and of primitives as well, which have been all but eliminated, most of them by law, from parts if not all of our modern world—such practices as infanticide, human sacrifice, "exposure" of aged persons, torture, phallic worship and prostitution practiced in the name of "religion," necromancy, witchcraft, publicly-approved homosexuality, polygamy, dueling, slavery and the like. Consider, too, in this connection, the rise and spread of both political and economic freedom in more recent times, and the present-day crusade against man's economic exploitation of his fellows. Social justice is not just a fiction: it has definitely become an ideal in many parts of the world. (Even such a prominent industrialist as Mr. Clarence B. Randall tells us that "free enterprise" is seen in its proper perspective as "the intelligent harnessing of the self-interest of the individual for the advancement of the common good."[6] I think that many present-day industrialists would agree with Mr. Randall's statement.) And today, for perhaps the first time in history, there are statesmen throughout the world who believe that reason and international order can be substituted for force and war in the settlement of international disputes. I insist that mankind has made progress morally, and that to take the contrary view is to be blind to the facts of history.

To summarize: Even though, as someone has said, there is no litmus paper test of right and wrong, still and all there is an undercurrent of unanimity among practically all peoples that there are certain human acts which are constructive and therefore good, and certain other human acts which are destructive and therefore bad, both for the individual and for society. Indeed, most of these bad acts would, if universally indulged, destroy both individual and social well-being. Now it is the function of the science of ethics to summarize, so to speak, this testimony of some fifty centuries of human experience, and, in the light of this evidence, to differentiate those human acts which are right and good from those which are wrong and bad. Moreover, in order to do this, ethics must also specify—in the light of the same testimony of human experience—the norms whereby such a differentiation is properly to be made. That ethics as a science, formulated by human reason on the basis of human experience, can and does provide such norms, is the contention of the present text. It is insisted, therefore, that ethics is a normative science; that it can and does specify norms for human conduct, norms directive of the right use of human liberty. As Dr. Vernon J. Bourke has written:

> Ethics. . . is not a descriptive social science. Its purpose is not to tell us about variations of popular opinion on moral questions. Moral philosophy is a normative science. . . It should aim at the establishing of definite norms, or rules,

> of behavior for men. Without this, the basic ethical concepts of duty, of obligation, of moral responsibility, of a pattern of human action which is universally good for all men, under all circumstances, lose their meaning. The validity of such norms cannot be established by statistical procedure, by popular surveys, any more than the propositions of geometry can be demonstrated by popular vote.[7]

Finally, we might raise the question here which was put forward by Plato some twenty-four centuries ago: Can ethics (i.e., virtue) be taught at all? Plato answered the question in the affirmative, and so must we. As stated above, there is an over-all unanimity among practically all peoples that certain human acts are constructive and therefore good, but that certain other acts are destructive and therefore bad, both for the individual and for society. Indeed most of these bad acts would, I repeat, if universally practiced, destroy both individual and social order. Now surely it is possible to acquaint the student regarding such acts, and also regarding the norms whereby such acts are so generally approved or condemned, as the case may be, by human reason based on human experience. Along with this, it is possible to review the great ethical codes which have existed historically, and to evaluate these codes in the light of human nature itself and of human natural relationships. In a word, it is possible, surely, to acquaint the student with those values which are generally accepted by mankind, and with the reasons why those values are generally regarded as values. The mere teaching is no guarantee, of course, that the recipient will act upon it in his daily living. Indeed men are susceptible always to inordinate desire, passion, ambition, pride, greed, prejudice, emotion, and like irrational forces, any one of which may come into their lives at any time to warp, or even to dethrone, their better judgment. We do not mean to affirm that just because man has the power of reason he always uses it; indeed, the contrary seems to be true in many instances—he permits emotion rather than reason to rule him. (As Freud has remarked somewhere: In every situation the intellect will have its say, but all too frequently its injunctions go unheeded.) One can give the essential information to the student, therefore, but one cannot compel him to act upon it, although in the majority of cases society will discipline him if he does not. I am convinced, however, that this knowledge will be an arresting influence throughout his life, and a significant factor as well in determining his attitude, his approaches, his ends and his acts. At any rate, I contend that the effort must be made. And because of the fact that so many of our high school graduates fail to go on through college, together with the additional fact that courses in ethics are not, as a rule, required even of college students, it is my firm conviction that the teaching of ethics—as formulated in the present text—should begin at the upperclass high school level.

ADDENDA: Anyone who will take the time to look into some of the practices of the ancient "gentile" (non-Hebrew) world will soon discover that man has made progress morally (as a result largely, of course, of the impact of Biblical religion). Such a study leads one into the ramifications of the theory and practice of the Cult of Fertility, characterized by ritual prostitution, phallic worship, and all kinds of sex perversion. Nearly all of these non-Hebrew peoples made a kind of fetish of the reproductive powers of living things: permeating this Cult of Fertility was the motif—on the basis of sympathetic (homeopathic) magic—that human coition enhanced the productivity of the soil. Hence the veneration given to bulls and snakes (species reputedly noted for their powers of procreation) in many areas, particularly in Crete. In recent decades, archaeologists have dug up, in Mediterranean lands, and particularly in Crete, which seems to have been one of principal centers of diffusion of this Fertility Cult, hundreds of "Venus figurines" (idols of pregnant women). The most prominent feature of the Cult was the worship of the "Earth-Mother" (along with that of the "Sun-Father"); this practice seems to have been universal, the Hebrew people alone excepted. (It must be recalled here that the Hebrew nation had its beginning with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.) In Babylon, Terra Mater was known as Ishtar, among the Canaanites as Ashtaroth, in Phoenicia as Astarte, in Syria as Atargatis, in Phrygia as Kybele, among the Germanic tribes as Oestra, in Egypt as Isis, in Greece as Demeter (or Aphrodite), in Rome as Venus, etc. In every instance ritual prostitution in the name of "religion" was a prominent phase of the worship of these goddesses of fertility: in their various temples thousands of priestesses were dedicated to this form of "sanctified harlotry." Phallic worship (veneration of icons of the male reproductive organs) was equally widespread: it was, in various localities, an integral part of the worship of Apollo, Artemis (the Roman Diana), Demeter, and especially of that of Dionysos (Bacchus, in Latin). In most of the great festivals of ancient Greece, including even those of the athletic games, there was an undercurrent of eroticism present. Replicas of the phallus, even as late as the so-called "Enlightenment," were carried through the streets of Athens in solemn processions. So-called "orgiastic" religion was invariably characterized by wanton dances, gross erotic practices, all forms of sex perversion. (See the Bacchae of Euripides. Incidentally, this correlation of "orgiastic" religious frenzy with sexual excess is the element of truth in Sinclair Lewis' novel, Elmer Gantry; otherwise the book is an utter travesty in its implied treatment of Biblical evangelism.) This Cult of Fertility became a prominent phrase of the Roman state "religion," with the coming in of the Empire: indeed the Saturnalia was a time of general public promiscuity. (Cf. Paul's enumeration of the vices and sins of the gentile world, in Romans 1:18-32.) (A word of caution is needed here: As an established practice the year round there is no evidence that any people, primitive, prehistoric, or historic, ever practiced complete sexual promiscuity.)

It will be recalled here that in Overstreet's listing of man's great moral "insights" (see Proposition IV), monotheism is put at the head of the list. This is as it should be. It is historically true that Hebrew monotheism wrought wonders, one might well say, in dignifying family life and cleaning up sex relationships generally. The ancient polytheistic deities were personifications of natural forces (headed up by the "Sun-Father" and the "Earth-Mother," as a rule). The gods all had their female consorts, and to all of them, both male and female, were attributed the grossest forms of immorality, including lying, treachery, homosexuality, kidnaping, rape, homicide and the like. (It should be noted here that Plato repudiated in toto these tales of the immoralities of the gods: see the Republic, Books II, III.) The God of the Bible, on the other hand, has none of these characteristics. The Biblical God is not a mere personification, not the THAT WHICH IS of Greek philosophical pantheism, but HE WHO IS, that is to say, Pure Personality (see Exodus 3:14). He has no female counterpart and indeed is devoid of all corporeal characteristics. Nor is He presented to us in any such anthropomorphic terms as are common to the polytheistic deities of the ancient pagan world. He is characterized by the attributes of uniqueness (Deut. 6:4—"Jehovah our God is one Jehovah," that is, the only Jehovah: see also Isa. 45:5-7, Exo. 20:3, Mark 12:29, 1 Tim. 2:5, Acts 17:23-31, 1 Cor. 8:4, etc.) Undoubtedly, it was the conviction of the uniqueness, purity, and spirituality of Deity, as faithfully proclaimed and maintained by all their great prophets from Moses to John the Baptist, which enabled the Hebrew people of old to resist generally the idolatrous and licentious cults of the peoples by whom they were surrounded geographically.

In addition to these practices characteristic of the Cult of Fertility, the ancient gentile world was a veritable ocean of magic, superstition, necromancy, sorcery, oracles, divination, witchcraft, of occultism of every conceivable kind (much of which came to be known as "black magic," and persisted down to medieval times). It is interesting to note that under the Mosaic Code these various forms of occultism were capital offenses, that is, punishable by death. (See Lev. 19:31, 20:27; Gal. 5:20; Rev. 21:8, 22:15.) It will be recalled that King Saul reached the bottom rung of the ladder of moral apostasy when he consulted the witch of Endor: cf. First Samuel, ch. 28.[8]

FOOTNOTES

[1]James H. Breasted, The Dawn of Conscience, p. 386. (Scribners, New York, 1939.)

[2]E. Adamson Hoebel, Man in the Primitive World, p. 219. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1949.)

[3]H.S. Overstreet, The Mature Mind, Text Edition, pp. 90-115, esp. pp. 108, 112. (Norton, New York, 1949.)

[4]Rabindranath Tagore, Sadhana, pp. 111-112. (Macmillan, New York, 1925.)

[5]See infra, following Proposition XVIII.

[6]Quoted in Economic Intelligence, Number 53, December, 1952, published by the United States Chamber of Commerce.

[7]Vernon J. Bourke, Ethics, p. 13. (Macmillan, New York, 1951.)

[8]For source material in re these practices of the ancient world, see the following: Hans Licht, Sexual Life in Ancient Greece; Otto Kiefer, Sexual Life in Ancient Rome; Johann J. Meyer, Sexual Life in Ancient India: all published by Barnes and Noble, New York, 1953. Also Phallic Worship, by George R. Scott, published by Mental Health Press, or Associated Booksellers, New York, 1952. See also Will Durant's thoroughly documented histories of the ancient world, entitled, Our Oriental Heritage, The Life of Greece, and Caesar and Christ: all published by Simon and Schuster, New York.

## V. Certain conditions which prevail, both in our own country and throughout the world, make the teaching of ethics in our public schools more imperative today than in any previous time in our history.

Those facts of the contemporary scene which make this teaching necessary may be listed as follows:

1. The wide gap which exists between technological progress on the one hand, and socio-moral progress on the other. In these days when man has penetrated the secrets of nature to such a depth as to unleash forces capable, apparently, of destroying not only man himself but even the planet on which he lives, statesmen, educators, scientists, philosophers, religious leaders, in fact thinkers in all fields, are raising the cry that we must do something to direct the human race into the use of these forces for constructive rather than destructive ends. One might well ask: Of what value is it to man to be able to send a message around the earth in a few minutes if he has no worth-while message to send? Of what value is it for a man to be able to encircle the globe in a few hours, in a transcontinental airliner, if he makes the journey only for the purpose of doing injury to his fellow men? Of what value is it to man, on the whole and in the long run (to use a favorite phrase of the late William James) to invent innumerable machines, even to split the atom, if these devices are to be used only to destroy the civilization which he has built up through the centuries by the expenditure of his own blood, sweat and tears? Of what value is it to man to manufacture time-saving and labor-saving gadgets, and thus make possible for himself more hours of leisure, if he is to spend those leisure hours in vice and crime destructive both of individual character and of social order? After all, it is not the things that we invent that make us great, but what we do with those things after we have invented them. There is nothing either moral or immoral in material goods per se; wrong derives only from our own misuse of such goods. Hence, one hears it proclaimed on all sides today that our culture is bogging down because our social and ethical development has not kept pace with out technological progress. The Industrial Revolution has come upon us so suddenly—within a century and a half, one may rightly say, only a small fraction of the entire historic period—and has gathered such momentum in recent years that the race has indeed lagged in its ethical adjustment to the consequences of this amazing technological development.

2. The wide gap which has developed between education for work and education for life. Just a few years ago, special attention was called to this gap by President Truman's Commission on Higher Education, with the accompanying injunction that steps be taken at once to bridge it. But the gap still exists. (As Chesterton has put it somewhere, The thing that is ruining us today is the ignorance of the experts.) Under our present highly specialized and segmentalized educational procedures, we seem to have overlooked the fact that the person is, first of all, a human being and a citizen, and that only secondarily is he a lawyer, a physician, an engineer, an industrialist, a farmer, or what not. Even in the engineering field, the leaders of industry are demanding that our graduates have some cultural background, that they have some understanding of how to get along with their fellows, and that they be men of integrity as well as ability in their chosen fields. The shrinking of our planet into one world, knit together by our amazing facilities of transportation and of communication, compels us to re-study and to re-establish those values which men have ever found essential to their living together in a progressive social order. It would seem that we must get back to the "grass roots," so to speak, and re-establish those "cardinal virtues" which men of social discrimination—from Solon's time down to our own day—have ever insisted upon as necessary to the development of the personality and to the maintenance of social order, namely, the virtues of prudence, fortitude, justice, and temperance. Indeed it seems that the first lesson to be learned from conditions which exist throughout our world today is that men cannot grow, cannot thrive, cannot even exist, either individually or collectively, on greed or hate as the dominating motive of their acts; that somehow we must revive and put into practice, the world over if possible, the vision of social justice vouchsafed the ancient Hebrew prophets and the sublime Christian ethic of love, which is best defined as good will toward all men and justice tempered with mercy. The very conditions which prevail throughout our world at this moment challenge us to renewed effort to inculcate in men everywhere those values which are the essence of fruitful human relations. As a matter of fact, making a living is only one phase of the totality of a man's life. And although the total process of education necessarily includes education for work, that is, for one's chosen occupation, yet it certainly reaches out far beyond this limited goal. Education, if worthy of the name, must be primarily education for living—for living both with oneself and with one's fellows; living a philosophy of life that does not fall short of harmonizing the individual with the scheme of things as a whole. For it is only such a cosmic philosophy that can produce a rich, fruitful, well-rounded life.

3. The concentration of population in urban centers. This—the migration of families from the rural areas to the big cities, a change characteristic of the last four decades especially—is another consequence of the Industrial Revolution. Sociologists are generally

agreed that urban life, largely because of its stress and strain and also because of the anonymity it affords, is productive, far more than rural life, of vice, crime, neurosis, insanity, suicide, and many other social ills. Concentration of population always fosters disregard for the individual. The life or death of one human being hardly makes an impression in a big city whose population runs up into the hundred-thousands or millions; this fact perhaps explains the disregard for individual life so characteristic of Oriental countries with their teeming populations. History itself proves that the extreme concentration of population has ever been prolific of moral and social disorder. (Cf. Genesis 11:1-9.) These are not matters of speculation: they are facts statistically established. We all know, of course, that the great metropolitan area—the big city and its suburbs—is the most distinctive aspect of present-day social organization, both in the United States and in many other countries. Nor is there any indication of a reversal of this trend from country to city; as a matter of fact, facilities of transportation and communication make such a reversal most unlikely. On the contrary, the chances are that the trend will gain even greater momentum in the years ahead. The net result is the large number of social ills which press upon us for correction, e.g., gangsterism, racketeering, all forms of crime, juvenile delinquency, political graft and corruption, divorce, insanity and many others. A grounding of our youth in fundamental ethical attitudes should serve to protect them, in some measure at least, against becoming engulfed in this maelstrom of social disintegration.

4. The all too general breakdown of home life, one of the great tragedies of our day. Here again we find general agreement among sociologists and criminologists that the family is the most potent and permanent influence both in the personality development of the individual and in the maintenance of social order. It is in the home that the first and most lasting impressions are made on the growing person; and next to the home in influence stands the play group of children and the neighborhood group of elders. Wholesome family life is indispensable to the proper development of the growing child. This is true for the simple reason that the human infant is the most helpless, and the most helpless for the longest time, of all animal offspring. Hence sociologists and criminologists are agreed that the majority of criminals are made in early adolescence, and that juvenile delinquency, which has become so alarmingly widespread in recent years, must be attributed chiefly to the breakdown of family life. Surely most of us will agree that it is first of all a parental duty to implant in the developing child the understanding and practice of the homely, yet indispensable, virtues of intelligent obedience, self-discipline, kindness, courtesy, honesty, industry, thrift and the like. A child who goes out from a broken home, or even from an unpleasant childhood environment, is, in most cases, doomed to an anti-social attitude himself and eventually to the imposition of discipline by some larger unit of society.

Now the breakdown of home life in our day takes two forms, namely, (1) in outright divorce of parents, in which case the home ceases to exist (and we are all aware of the alarming rise of the divorce rate in our own country): and (2) in the failure of families to live at home, in itself a contributing factor to the spread of divorce. The simple fact is that almost every home in our land has ceased to be the vital center of influence which it once was. The demands of the community, of the many different groups outside the home, groups into which both parents and children are impelled today by social pressures, have turned the American home largely into a place of last resort for purposes of eating and sleeping only. It has been said, somewhat facetiously of course, that fifty years ago Americans were born at home, grew up at home, ate and slept at home, died at home, and were buried from the home; that today, however, they are born in a hospital, grow up on the streets and highways, eat at cafeterias, sleep in trailers and motels, die in a hospital, and finally are buried from an undertaker's chapel. Truly we have become a nation of "joiners"; the outstanding social dereliction of our time is failure to "belong." I think it was Will Rogers who once remarked that if a group of airplane passengers in our day were to be catapulted suddenly from their plane and thus compelled to resort to parachutes, no doubt by the time they reached Mother Earth they would have "organized" a Society for the Relief and Protection of Falling Parachutists (an SRPFP), and would have elected a president, a vice-president, and a secretary-treasurer thereof. "Organization," "centralization," "regimentation"—much as many of us dislike these words, they are the shibboleths of the hour. Sociologists know that the United States is today the land of associations and their conventions; in 1930, New York City alone, for example, was host to over seven hundred different conventions. Clubs, societies, orders of all kinds, flourish everywhere. Professor Goldhamer of Stanford University, who recently collected statistics on voluntary associations in the United States, estimates that there are over 15,000 such different associations in the city of Chicago alone. All in all, we have become such a nation of "belongers" that the average family seldom finds an opportunity to spend an evening together at home. Now, as Edgar Guest has put it, "It takes a heap o' livin' in a house to make it home," and in the light of this statement, the oldtime American home has all but disappeared from the contemporary scene. The consequences, morally, are obvious. We meet student after student in our colleges who, although they may have read the Declaration of Independence, under pressure, at some point in their high school career, yet certainly have never even heard of the Ten Commandments or the Cardinal Virtues or even the Sermon on the Mount—the ethical foundations upon which our whole Western culture has been erected. Moreover, the woods are full of persons who insist vociferously, and sometimes forcibly, upon their "rights," but who have no more idea than a jaybird of the source of those rights—the right by which they themselves claim to possess

rights. And no matter how zealous they may be for their rights, their zeal often vanishes mysteriously with respect to the discharge of their obligations. They are utterly ignorant of the fact that with every right which a person has, there is a corresponding obligation—the obligation at least to respect the same right in other persons. Rights and duties always go together: they are the Siamese twins of the Order of Justice. Surely this growing ignorance of the meaning of rights and duties, and of the basic values and virtues which undergird Western society, and indeed social order anywhere in the world, can be corrected, in some measure at least, by the teaching of ethics to our children and youth.

5. The current breakdown in political morality: the fact of corruption in high places. I need not dwell on this point at any length: the newspapers have been filled with evidence of it for many years. A few statements from a speech of Senator J. William Fulbright, former president of the University of Arkansas, before the Senate of the United States, will suffice to cover the matter:

> It [this condition] presents a very difficult problem. It is difficult because the evils to be dealt with are so seldom amenable to the processes of law. When confronted with an evil, we Americans are prone to say, "There ought to be a law." But the law does not and cannot. . . reach those evils which are subtle and impalpable. . . The law cannot prevent gossip. . . It cannot restrain men from avarice and gluttony. It cannot restrain a man from betraying his friend. In short, it cannot prevent much of the evil to which men are, unfortunately, too prone. The law being inadequate, men long ago supplemented the law courts with courts of equity, where the spirit of the law, rather than its letter, is paramount. Underlying the law are the codes of ethics promulgated by the great religions and recognized by all civilized men as being essential to a humane and enlightened existence. . .
>
> Scandals in our govenment are not a new phenomenon in our history. What seems to be new about these scandals is the moral blindness or callousness which allows those in responsible positions to accept the practices which the facts reveal. It is bad enough for us to have corruption in our midst, but it is worse if it is to be condoned and accepted as inevitable.

Senator Fulbright, after proposing the creation by Congress of a special commission of eminent citizens "to consider the problem of ethical standards of conduct in public affairs," concluded his address with these forceful statements:

> Too many people in our nation do not believe anything with conviction. They question the precepts of God or of man, indiscriminately. The values of life which were clear to

> the Pilgrims and the Founding Fathers have become dim and fuzzy in outline. . . The principal objective of the study I suggest is the restoration of the faith of our people in the validity of the traditional precepts of our democratic society. . . I am unwilling to accept the view that nothing can be done, that the moral deterioration, which is so evident to all, must continue to its logical conclusion, which is the destruction of our free democratic system.[1]

Note well, in this connection, the many other alarming evidences of fundamental dishonesty that seems to prevail among all classes in the United States, e.g., (1) student cheating on examinations, (2) racketeering (gangsterism) in some of our labor unions, (3) dishonesty ("rigging") in television quiz programs, (4) "payola," (5) questionable advertising methods and claims, (6) insurance scandals, such as those exposed in Texas in recent years (7) illegal concerted action to share contracts, fix prices, etc., sub rosa ("bid-rigging," it has been called and price-fixing, monopolistic elimination of free competition) by men prominent in American industrial circles, (8) resistance to taxation, schemes to beat the income tax, by rich and poor alike; and all this in a period in which our very survival depends on preparedness. One is prompted to light a lantern and go about, like Diogenes of old, looking for an honest man. One is tempted to think, Does every man, after all, have his price? (And what shall we say about "slanted oil wells"?)

I fully agree with the Senator that something can be done about this current moral deterioration. I believe that it must be done. I believe, furthermore, that any such remedial effort must include the inculcation in our young people of those basic ethical principles which are known, from human experience itself, to be absolutely essential both to individual personality development and to social order in general. This effort, however, must be vigorous, consistent and persistent: the change which is desired cannot be brought about in a few years.

6. The rise and spread of international immorality. When the Germans marched their troops into Belgium in 1914, after tearing up their treaty with the Belgians, pronouncing it a mere "scrap of paper," that event marked the beginning of an era of international immorality which is still with us. Without so much as the courtesy of a formal declaration of war, ambitious dictators make sneak attacks on their prospective victims in order to gain initial advantage in their grandiose schemes of empire building. There are nations in the world today whose ruling regimes are committed to world revolution by force, whose only guiding principle is expediency, whose signatures to a treaty are not worth the paper they are written on; if self-interest should dictate disregard of treaty commitments, they would not hesitate one moment to break their pledged word. Or, if on the ground of expediency they refrain from actual military

invasion, they seek to accomplish the same end (conquest) sub rosa by infiltration and espionage. Conspiratorial minorities are at work today within practically every nation on earth, seeking to stir up internal strife and thus to bring about the overthrow of the existing government, this designed in turn to make way for the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Obviously, unless there is general regard for orderly relations among national states, relations based on signed commitments, such a happy condition as an effective international order must continue to be a figment of the imagination. (Cf. the traditional Seven Deadly Sins: pride, avarice, lust, anger, gluttony, envy and sloth. Could it not be maintained that the ultimate origin of all these is in human pride, the choice of self above everything else? Undoubtedly it is overweening pride and ambition which, above all other factors, plunge the peoples of the earth into global and fratricidal wars.)

7. The unique character of current world-wide political and economic issues. Our world today is divided politically into two powerful camps labeled "democratic" and "totalitarian"—designations which indicate two political ideologies that are as far apart as the poles; hence the phrase, "bipolar world," which one sees frequently in contemporary political writings. One of these ideologies—the totalitarian—holds that the individual exists only for the State, the Cause, the Plan, etc., and therefore rejects in toto the concepts of individual and of minority rights. The other—the democratic—holds that the state exists and functions only to protect the basic rights of the individual, rights which are regarded as inherent in him by creation, by virtue of the fact that he is a person. It is difficult to see how these two ideologies can ever be reconciled, or even how they can long thrive side by side in the same world without the destruction of the one or the other. It is not difficult to see, however, that the issue involved in this clash of ideologies is fundamentally ethical, revolving around the ideal of the dignity and worth of the human person. If totalitarianism succeeds, this ideal must go: the person must become only a tool of the state, an instrument of production, a cog in the economic machine, etc. On the other hand, if democracy prevails, this ideal is bound to be spread abroad more and more throughout the whole world.

Totalitarianism, says J.S. Schapiro, Emeritus Professor of History, City College of New York, is that order "in which the state dominates and directs all political, social, economic, and cultural life." This, obviously, is an accurate definition. Concerning the democratic ideology, the same author writes as follows:

> No system of government can be classified as democratic unless it has two essential features: (1) that majority rule is exercised by a legislature, freely elected by universal suffrage, in which every citizen counts for one, and only one; (2) and that all citizens are protected against despotic acts of the government by constitutional guarantees of civil liberties.[2]

This, too, is an excellent definition. It must be obvious that the essential features of a democracy are the following: (1) the right of a minority to exist and to transform itself into a majority, if it can do so by appeal to reason, that is, by moral persuasion: and (2) the obligation of the majority, while it is in power, to protect the minority in the exercise of its rights. To abandon either of these principles is to abandon democracy. A democratic social and political order rests upon certain articles of faith, all of which are ethical in character. These are (1) the dignity and worth of the human individual, (2) the spiritual equality of all persons, nationalities and races, by virtue of their being the handiwork of a common Creator, (3) the natural moral law, binding alike on the ruler and the ruled, as the source of all human rights and obligations, (4) superiority of human or spiritual values over material values, (5) liberty as distinguished from license, (6) self-sacrifice for the good of others, that is, for the general welfare, and (7) the protection of basic human rights as the proper function of government. These are the supreme values of our democratic tradition; anyone can see that they are essentially ethical in character. Hence democracy has been well defined as that form of society in which the welfare of all is the chief concern of each. The idea of democracy is not so much a form of government as it is a confession of human brotherhood; it is the equal recognition of mutual obligations, the confession of common aims, common duties, common responsibilities. As a matter of fact, all political science that would serve the ends of justice must of necessity have its roots in ethics. All problems of human relations are those of the constructive correlation of individual with social well-being. To be sure, we the people of the United States have realized this ideal of democracy only in part; nevertheless it is the ideal and we must never lose sight of it, never cease to strive to attain it. And this we can do only to the extent that we understand it and are committed to its realization.

Again, from the economic point of view, the peoples of the world are divided at present into three main camps: the so-called "capitalistic" states (those chiefly of the Americas), "socialistic" states (those of Western Europe), and "communistic" states (those of Eastern Europe and parts of Asia). In this field, too, the basic points at issue are fundamentally ethical, centering in the main around two problems, namely, (1) that of the right of private property, its limitations and regulations, and (2) that of the implications of the phrase, "the general welfare," and the proper function of government in relation thereto. Closely bound up with these basic issues are many interrelated problems, such as the following: (1) that of the growing centralization of power in government, involving as it always does the spread of bureaucracy; (2) that of paternalism in government, and its effect upon individual initiative and character; (3) that of the relation of economic freedom ("freedom from want") to freedom in general; (4) that of maintaining a satisfactory balance between personal freedom and social "secu-

rity"; (5) that of personal liberty versus governmental regimentation; and (6) closely related to this, the problem of "free enterprise" versus governmental control of economic factors. It is well known that a democracy can, even unwittingly, destroy itself by repeatedly voting more and more power to government—the very possibility which our Founding Fathers so greatly feared. All these problems have been thrust upon us by the Industrial Revolution. The rise of the "welfare state"—itself a by-product of technological development—has injected these new problems into the contemporary scene, all of which are essentially ethical in character. It is exceedingly important that our young people be made familiar with all aspects of these pressing problems of our time, for the simple reason that the world conflict ("cold war") which rages today will be resolved ultimately in "the vast and darkling battlefield of the human soul." Subsequent generations of Americans need to know how to meet these moral issues and how to meet them intelligently.

Another by-product of the Industrial Revolution has been the rise and spread of trade-unionism in the United States and in many European countries. This in itself has created a number of problems different from any which have arisen before in our history. It has necessitated the formulation of an entirely new type of legislation designed (1) to define the rights and duties of labor and management, (2) to regulate relations between the two groups, and (3) to protect the general public from the injurious effects of prolonged industrial strife. Our own Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act) explicitly affirms it to be the right of employees to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities if they choose so to do (except, of course, in cases where the union shop has been legally established). Now these legally affirmed rights of unionization, collective bargaining, the wage contract, and the strike, all have their basis in ethical principles; they have been validated by our courts chiefly on ethical grounds. To be explicit, these procedures have their foundation in the right of private property, one form of which is labor, mental or physical. And the problem of private property is basically ethical rather than political, as we shall see later. It gives rise, moreover, to such corollary problems as that of the validity of various kinds of contracts, one of which, of course, is the wage contract. Prior to the beginning of the first World War, practically no precedents existed in the statutory law of the United States to guide Congress and the courts in formulating legislation necessary to deal with problems of labor-management relations. Hence our courts were compelled to validate this new type of legislation largely, and in some cases entirely, on ethical grounds.

As a matter of fact, all jurisprudence has its basis in ethics; in human nature and human relationships. This fact has been

recognized by philosophers and legislators from time immemorial. Aristotle declared long ago that "the law is reason unaffected by desire." His exact words are:

> He who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire.[3]

Cicero wrote, in the first century before Christ,

> . . . Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is Law. . . . Now if this is correct, as I think it to be in general, then the origin of Justice is to be found in Law, for Law is a natural force; it is the mind and reason of intelligent man, the standard by which Justice and injustice are measured.[4]

In harmony with this, the late Supreme Court Justice Cardozo wrote, not so many years ago, as follows:

> What really matters is that the judge is under a duty, within the limitations of his power of innovation, to maintain a relation between law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and those of reason and good conscience.[5]

All this boils down to one fact, namely, that whenever the Court is presented with an issue for the determination of which there is no precedent in existing statutory law, there is but one course which the Court can pursue, and that is to adjudicate the case on the basis of reason and conscience, that is to say, on ethical principles. In a civilized society, a society in which no longer might makes right—and this principle, I contend, is a fundamental criterion of a civilized society—ethics cannot be abrogated without the complete loss both of individual character and of social order and justice. It is very important, therefore, that our young people have an adequate understanding of the ethical principles on which all these new legal procedures have been validated.

## FOOTNOTES

[1] J. William Fulbright, art., "Something to Paste in Your Hat," in Life, April 9, 1951. (By permission of Senator Fulbright.)

[2] J.S. Schapiro, The World in Crisis, p. 202. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1950.)

[3] Aristotle, Politics, III, 16, 1287a. Jowett Translation. (Modern Library Edition.)

[4]Cicero, De Legibus, Loeb Classical Library Edition, Trans. by C.W. Keyes. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge.)

[5]Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, quoted by Justice Edward S. Dore of New York, art., "Human Rights and the Law," in Life, July 1, 1946. (By personal permission of Justice Dore.)

# PART TWO

## THE HUMAN BEING

## VI. There are certain facts which any man can know about himself simply through the use of his own common sense.

Alexander Pope (1688-1744), the English poet of the Restoration, was the author of these well-known lines:

> Know then thyself, presume not God to scan,
> The proper study of mankind is man.
> Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
> A being darkly wise and rudely great:
> With too much knowledge for the skeptic side,
> With too much weakness for the stoic's pride,
> He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest;
> In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast;
> In doubt his mind or body to prefer;
> Born but to die, and reasoning but to err;
> Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
> Whether he thinks too little or too much:
> Chaos of thought and passion, all confused;
> Still by himself abused, or disabused;
> Created half to rise, and half to fall;
> Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
> Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurled:
> The glory, jest, and riddle of the world.[1]

Shakespeare (1564-1616), however, wrote of homo sapiens in more extravagant terms:

> What piece of work is a man; How noble in reason! How infinite in faculties! In form and moving how express and admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a god; The beauty of the world! The paragon of animals. . . .[2]

Jonathan Swift (1667-1745), the English satirist, at the opposite pole of thinking, once exclaimed: "I hate and detest the animal called man." But Aristotle strikes a saner, more felicitous, yet more realistic note:

> Man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is

equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he had not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony.[3]

What is man? Let us approach this question from the point of view of personal experience. What are the facts that I know about myself (that any man can know about himself)?

1. I know that I am. The cogito, ergo sum, "I think, therefore I am" (or dubito, ergo sum, "I doubt, therefore I am") of the French philosopher Descartes (1596-1650) is the beginning point of all philosophy. If there were not an "I," an Ego, a Self, to think, there could be no thought. Thought presupposes a thinker; love presupposes a lover; activity presupposes a being to act; the first category of human thought is being. The one fact I cannot successfully deny is that of my own existence; to try to do so would be a mark of insanity.

2. I know that within me there is a world the vastness of which staggers the imagination—a world of impulses, urges, drives, inhibitions, desires, affections, emotions, impressions, images, memories, and thoughts. In my waking hours I can only stand on the threshold of this world and peer at the mysteries which lie hidden within its depths. Sometimes, in my dreams, I seem actually to enter into this inner world, and I become amazed at its vastness and its potentialities. I find that in my dreams I can re-experience the events of an entire period of my life within the time required for the tick of a clock; that even while my body may be at repose upon my bed at home, I myself may be bathing in the surf at Atlantic City, or, perhaps, picking strawberries again on the little Illinois farm of my childhood days. The glimpses which I get occasionally of this inner world—the world of the self—prove beyond any doubt that it is unlimited by our human concepts of distance, space or time. It seems to be an infinite world—this vast world of my interior being. And it is a world exclusively my own: in the very nature of the case it cannot be anyone else's world. (It may well be that this is the world into which I shall emerge at death with the dissolution of my body.)

3. I know that within this internal world of my own being, I sustain certain definite relations. When I look within myself, I apprehend clearly the interplay of certain faculties or powers—the powers of thought, feeling, conscience, and will. (1) I know that I think, or at least that there goes on within me an activity (whatever its basic character may be, whether "physical" or "mental" or both) that goes by the name of thinking. Impressions coming into me from the external world produce sensations within me; then some sort of a power within my own being (Aristotle called it the "active intellect"; Kant, the German philosopher, "the synthetic unity of apperception," "apperception" being defined as the process of adding present to past

perceptions) binds these sensations together into a perception (of an object). Then when I, having perceived an object, predicate something of that object (e.g., that a rose is red), this constitutes an act of judgment, an assent of my own mind to a specific fact. Finally, when I think connectedly, from this to that, and reach a conclusion, I perform the process of ratiocination or reasoning. (Real thinking, said John Dewey, is problem-solving.) This faculty or power of reason within me I know to be the power most characteristic of me as a human being. (2) I know, too, that I experience certain affections, desires, emotions. I love, this love being essentially an attraction toward its object. I may hate—I am repelled by the object of my hate. I experience fear, anger, joy; I weep and I laugh; I mourn, sing, dance, fight, sulk, exult, as the case may be. These are experiences which, whatever their true nature or function may be, I know that I have from day to day, from time to time. (3) I know that I deliberate, decide, make a choice: in a word, I will either to act or not to act, or to act in this way instead of that. It is no doubt true that factors of heredity and factors of environment, and perhaps physical factors within my own organism, do influence my deliberation and my ultimate choice, because I certainly do act from motives. But in every act of mine there is, in addition to all these factors, a personal reaction. That is to say, within a certain framework there is in every act of mine an exercise of what is commonly called "free will." I know that within the area of my acquaintanceship I do make choices: I know this directly, as a matter of personal experience, and I want no one trying to tell me otherwise. I know that in the vast majority of my acts I have not been necessitated (compelled); that in the instances in which I have done evil, I could have chosen to do the good. Every person who is willing to be honest with himself knows this to be true of his own acts. (4) Finally, introspection convinces me that in every act of mine these powers of intellection, feeling, desire, and will are in some measure present and active; that there is always an interplay of these internal powers, crystallizing ultimately in the volition which is essentially the human act. No line of separation can be drawn between thought, feeling, and will (as separate "faculties") in the evolution of a human act; it is essentially an act of the organism as a whole. (We do not say, "My eyes see," "My ears hear," etc., but we say, "I see," "I hear," etc.) This is in harmony with contemporary psychology.

4. Again, I know that, in addition to the world within me, there is a world outside me—a world of things, inanimate and animate: a world of rocks, trees, plants, animals, and fellow human beings. And I know that the impressions coming into me all the time from that exterior world provide me with the sensations which constitute the raw material of my knowledge. To be sure, I know that I am a victim, as long as I am confined to my physical body, of what is called the "egocentric predicament"; that is, that my knowledge of things "out there" is limited to my sensations of those things, and

necessary inferences therefrom. But I know, too, that if there were not certain "things" (motions, "sense data") "out there" to produce the sensations in me I would not have the sensations at all. Hence I must conclude that both of these worlds—the interior and the exterior—are in some mysterious sense "real." (Which of these two worlds—the world within or the world without—is the more "real," that is, if there are degrees in "reality"? No human thinker has ever provided the certain answer to this question.)

5. Finally, I know that I, as a human being, sustain certain relationships with the external world in its various aspects or "parts." (1) I sustain a certain relationship with nature as a whole (the cosmos), or, as the Christian (or any theist) would put it, with nature's God. (Cf. the phrase in the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," etc.) If "Nature" or "Nature's God" had not provided the water I drink, the food I eat, the air I breathe, the very ground I walk on, I could not live. Undoubtedly, I am a creature. Neither I nor any other human being is self-sufficient. (2) I sustain a certain relationship toward my fellow human beings. I live in the society of my own kind, my own species—I must do so in order to realize the potentialities of my own being. In a word, I am a person living in the society of persons. (3) I sustain a certain relationship toward all sub-human orders of being: that is, toward the animal, vegetable and mineral orders. Indeed I am compelled to utilize the products of these sub-human orders to sustain myself in existence physically. These are all just matters of common-sense experience.

Finally, I enter into all those relationships at birth, and by virtue of having been born into the world: they are inherent in the very nature of things. And wherever I go in this world, these relationships go with me; they are inalienable; that is to say, they cannot be taken from me, nor can I escape them myself. Moreover, as we shall see later, my conception of these various relationships, and my attitude toward the obligations which naturally flow out of them, are bound to determine my whole ethical theory and practice.

In a word, here I am! The world is here, and I am in it! I know that I had nothing to do with my being in this present world in the first place, and I am quite sure that I shall have little to do with my going out of it. What, then, shall I do about it while I am here? Truly, it is a world which presents to me a plethora of mysteries—the mysteries of matter, energy, life, consciousness, personality, space, time, and eternity, and the greatest of all mysteries, the mystery of being. It is not only a world of mysteries, but a world of burdens and joys as well, a world of adversities and successes often chaotically intermingled, a world which appears at times to be without rhyme or reason. What, then, shall be my attitude as I make my transitory pilgrimage through it? I can, of course, just as a great many persons have done and are doing, simply ignore all these mysteries and these facts of experience, and go on my way

"eating and drinking and making merry"—in the words of Omar Khayyam, "taking the Cash and letting the Credit go"—living my life in the manner of a grasshopper floating down stream. Or I can, like the agnostic, throw up my hands in effortless abandon, and cry, "Oh, what's the use? It is all unknowable anyway!" That, however, is simply, in the language of gangland, "taking a run-out powder"; it is hiding one's head, ostrich-like, in the sands of reality; and I could never warm up to an escapist, much less become one myself. Or, again, I can rebel against this world in which I find myself, rebel against "Fate," "Destiny," or "God"—however I may choose to designate the great Satirist who, under this view, sits upon the throne of the universe—only in the long run to dash out my brains, so to speak, against the stone wall which I thus build around my better self. That, of course, would be living and dying without faith and without hope. (Benjamin de Casseres has written somewhere that the three everlasting symbols of humanity are Prometheus, Cain and Christ: Prometheus the symbol of man in chains; Cain the symbol of man in rebellion; and Christ, the symbol of man in triumph over all circumstances.) Certainly there would be little happiness in this attitude, in fact absolutely nothing to make life really worth living, for the complete cynic must be of all men the most miserable.

Very well, then, what attitude shall I take? For the answer to this question I shall appeal to my own observation and experience, which testify that the sub-human world, being impersonal, is amoral in itself, and is therefore neither for me nor against me; that, as a matter of fact, man brings most of his troubles on himself, through his own transgressions of the moral law and in general through what has been poetically, yet realistically, called "man's inhumanity to man." Common sense tells me, therefore, to accept the world and life as a kind of "neutral" laboratory in which an assortment of elements—of adversity and of success, of frustration and of achievement, of sorrow and of joy—are bound to be more or less intermingled; hence, to enter this laboratory, take off my coat, and go to work building a life, realizing full well that it is not these ingredients in themselves, but the manner in which I shall make use of them, that will determine whether the life I build shall be crass, dull and barren or rich and fruitful. In a word, common sense bids me to accept the world and life as a challenge. It tells me that by doing so—by doing my very best, in harmony with my potentialities, to meet the challenge—ultimately I shall not be disappointed either in life or in myself.

Common sense tells me, in the second place, that my very best effort can be nothing short of an earnest quest for an understanding of the meaning of human life and destiny—an understanding sufficient at least to enable me to orient myself within the cosmic environment in which I "live and move and have my being." (It is said that Margaret Fuller once exclaimed, in a moment of exuberance, "I accept the universe!" Crusty old Thomas Carlyle, on hearing of

the statement, caustically remarked, "Gad, she'd better!") I want to know; I want to know more; I want always to be fascinated by the More that lies beyond the present known. Common sense tells me, in the third place, that I can attain such knowledge only by positive and constructive thinking and living. I am convinced that no man ever got very far on the road to a unifying philosophy of life (and hence to a satisfactory solution of the broad problems of human relations) by negative and destructive thinking. As Maurice Maeterlinck says, "Let our ignorance be a constructive one."[4] Common sense tells me, in the fourth place, that I must pursue this quest for a satisfactory Weltanschauung (World-View) in a spirit of humility, in full realization of the fact that I am a creature, and that, being a creature, I am hedged about by the limitations of my own being. I cannot expect to find the answers to all problems in any system of thought. I must be content, therefore, with the system that provides the most satisfying answers to the greatest number of problems, the view that gives the greatest measure of coherence and meaning to the world I live in and to my life in that world. Beyond this, no human being will ever be able to go, in this present life at least. For there is little doubt that the most profound mysteries of this universe lie beyond the reach of mere human intellection. For this reason, humility is an evident characteristic of all truly great scientists, and in fact of all truly great souls.

To all those students who are willing to approach the study of human life, human relations, and human destiny, in this spirit, the content of the present course is recommended. To those who are unwilling to approach these subjects in such a spirit, perhaps no course of study will ever be of any great practical value.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Pope, "An Essay on Man."

[2]Hamlet, II, ii, 315-320.

[3]Aristotle, Politics, I, 2, 1253a. Jowett translation (Modern Library Edition)

[4]Maeterlinck, The Great Beyond, p. 36. (Philosophical Library, New York, 1947.)

## VII. A study of the dimensions of the human being, from the point of view of science, begins properly with that of the vegetative dimension.

The term "dimension" as used here does not mean that the human being can be "cut up," so to speak, into measurable "parts"; rather, it signifies that his various powers and operations may be classified, for purposes of study, into certain categories. The fact must not be overlooked that man, as he is now constituted, is an organism, hence a unity of many diverse powers.

Obviously, man stands at the head of the visible creation, the most highly developed, the most complex, of all known living beings. The various "dimensions" of which he is constituted, and through which his potentialities manifest themselves, may be enumerated roughly as follows: the vegetative, the psychical, the metapsychical, the social, and especially those through which his higher reaches and aspirations express themselves, namely, the esthetic, the moral, and the spiritual or religious. Let us now briefly summarize the essential facts regarding these various dimensions, and the powers characteristic of each, taking them up in the ascending order of their complexity and nobility.

According to Aristotle,[1] the totality of things is a hierarchy (i.e., organized on different levels, in an ascending order of complexity); that is to say, our world is a terraced world, and not a continuum (without a single break from the lowest to the highest of forms). Aristotle based this hierarchical arrangement of all organisms on what he called the "powers of the soul" (psyche) possessed by those individual existents at each level, those of each higher order subsuming in themselves the powers of those below them in the scale, and possessing an additional differentiating or specifying power of their own. At the lowest level, of course, are the processes of the inanimate creation (matter-in-motion), what today we call physiochemical bases of all created things. At the next level, according to Aristotle, is the plant creation (what he called the vegetative psyche), which has the same physiochemical basis, plus the vegetative or nutritive powers (the cellular processes, etc.). At the third level is the animal order (animal psyche) which has both the physiochemical and vegetative powers, plus the powers of sensitivity and locomotion. At the highest level stands man, the rational creation (rational psyche), who has the same physiochemical basis insofar as his body is concerned, who also shares the

vegetative powers with the plant and animal orders, and the powers of sensitivity and locomotion with the animal creation alone, but who has in addition the power of reason (the thought processes and their by-products). Over all is the Prime Mover, the First Cause, God, whom Aristotle defines as "Pure Self-thinking Thought." (Cf. the Hebrew Name for the Deity, THE I AM, HE WHO IS, Exo. 3:14; also the statement of Jesus, "God is a Spirit," John 4:24; also Plato's Form of the Good, Unity, The One, etc.).

It is interesting to contrast with Aristotle's "hierarchy" of being, the notion of the totality of being as a continuum as embodied in the famous doctrine (developed in early modern times) of the Great Chain of Being. According to this view our world being the handiwork of a perfect Creator must be "the best of all possible worlds"; hence, again reasoning a priori, all possible beings must be actualized, all possible places filled, therein: that is, there must be an unbroken continuity—a progressive gradation—of organisms from the very lowest living being up to the very highest, God Himself. As stated clearly by Alexander Pope,

> Of systems possible if 'tis confest
> That wisdom infinite must form the best,

then

> . . . all must full or not coherent be,
> And all that rises, rise in due degree.

The resultant picture is as follows:

> Vast chain of being! which from God began,
> Natures aethereal, human, angel, man,
> Beast, bird, fish, insect, what no eye can see,
> No glass can reach; from Infinite to thee,
> From thee to nothing.—On superior pow'rs
> Were we to press, inferior might on ours;
> Or in the full creation leave a void,
> Where, one step broken, the great scale's destroy'd;
> For Nature's chain whatever link you strike,
> Tenth, or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike.[2]

(Biblical teaching, of course, completes the Aristotelian picture with its doctrine of angels (from the Greek angelos meaning "messenger") who are represented as occupying the intermediate position between God and man. Angels are pictured as celestial (ethereal) beings, higher than man in intelligence and power, whose function is to serve as "messengers" of God in the execution of His plans for His creation. (Cf. 2 Pet. 2:11, Heb. 1:14.)

A study of the dimensions of the human being begins necessarily with that of the vegetative dimension. We know today, both from science and from personal experience, that man does subsume in himself, and hence share with the lower orders, the basic physio-chemical and biological processes. But we know also that man is

specified as man, that is, set apart from plants and animals, by his powers of reason (his thought processes).

1. At the base of the human organism are the physiochemical activities (cells are made up of atoms and molecules). Superimposed upon these, and subsuming them, are the biochemical and physiological processes, all of which together go to make up what may properly be designated the vegetative dimension of man (from the Latin vegeo, vegere, "to be lively, active," etc., whence the lengthened form, vegetare, "to enliven," "to animate," etc., whence our word "vegetative" has come to mean "growing" or "having the power of growing").

2. The ultimate unit of the human organism, as of all living things, is the living cell, which consists of a bit of protoplasm with a nucleus. Cells, moreover, are derived always from other previously existing cells: life comes only from antecedent life, or as Spallanzani (or Redi?) contended and Pasteur proved, "even microbes have parents." The mystery of the life process resides in the cell protoplasm, a semifluid, jellylike substance possessing not only physical and chemical properties, but also such definitely physiological functions as growth and repair, liberation of energy from food, sensitivity or irritability, and reproduction.

3. Plant cells differ from animal cells primarily in the fact that the former, but not the latter, contain the pigment chlorophyll, which is responsible for the green color of plants and which is best known for its mysterious action in photosynthesis, the complex and subtle process whereby green plants convert the energy of the sun's rays into stored food energy. (Science has not yet been able to break this process down and to learn exactly how it works, but it has long been known that without chlorophyll, neither plants nor animals, including human beings, could live.)

4. What there is in the living cell to vitalize it and thus to differentiate it from the nonliving atom, or from mere quanta of energy, as yet no one knows. The most that has been learned thus far is that "life requires a large number of highly specific proteins with different shapes, sizes, and patterns."[4] These protein molecules and "sub-molecules," each containing a large number of atoms, are invariably present in protoplasm. [Even if scientists should succeed in synthesizing a living cell in the laboratory, we should still be faced with the greater problem of what Creative Energy brought into existence the first cell, the problem of the origin of life itself. Obviously, man did not "create" life, for the simple reason that (as all scientists agree) life existed long before man appeared on the earth.]

5. Every human individual starts life as a single cell, the ovum which was produced by the ovary of the mother and fertilized by the spermatozoon of the father. Immediately following this fertilization (conception), the basic cellular processes set in, namely, those

of cell segmentation (continuous division and multiplication), cell differentiation (change of structure), and cell specialization (the change of function which accompanies differentiation), so that by the time the child is ready to be born it has its full complement of different tissues. (At the end of thirty hours after conception, we are told, the one cell has "pulled apart" to make two cells; at fifty hours, the two split to make four; at sixty hours, the four become eight, etc., until—by the process of "geometrical" progression—at the end of the third day of life there are thirty-two cells. This is the start toward the vast multitude of cells which go to make up the body of the newborn babe.[5]) (Dr. George W. Corner, embryologist at the Rockefeller Institute, has written:

> The fertilization of an egg by a sperm cell is one of the greatest wonders of nature. If it were a rare event, or if it occurred only in some distant land, our museums and universities would organize expeditions to witness it, and newcomers would record its outcome with enthusiasm.[6]

But as it is, like the shining of the sun, we simply take it for granted.) (Incidentally, when a group of cells multiply only, and so "run wild," that is, not only fail to differentiate and specialize, but also to viciously "attack" neighboring cells, a cancer is formed in the given area.) Thus the organism is seen to be a hierarchy in itself: by these basic cellular processes, cells build up into tissues, tissues into organs, organs into systems (skeletal, neurosensory, muscular, digestive, endocrine, circulatory, respiratory, excretory, reproductive, etc.), and the systems into the whole—the organism itself. It is estimated that the human body is composed of some 26,500,000,000,000 cells,[7] all organized into tissues, organs, and systems, in such a way that the total organism is a unitary whole, and that its total life is infinitely more complex than any of its parts. Yet this life permeates every cell, tissue, organ, and system in equal measure; the organism itself, therefore, is not a mere aggregate of units, like a crowd, but a living entity. (It has been rightly said that in the realm of matter the whole is equal to the sum of the parts, but that in the realm of life ("spirit") on the other hand, any part is equal to the whole: there is as much life in my little finger as in my big toe. Infinity, therefore, in the realm of matter (quantity) means unlimited in extent, whereas in the realm of life, spirit, values, etc. (quality) it means inexhaustibleness of power.) Moreover, the life of the mature organism existed at first in the original cell, the fertilized ovum, and continued to exist and function in and through the cells, and organizations of cells, subsequently developed from it. Furthermore, this life was not a creation, even in the fertilized ovum, but was transmitted thereto: the life that a man enjoys was not created in him—it flowed into him from his parents, through the chromosomes and genes, just as their life flowed into them from their parents, and so on back as far as one wants to go on tracing it. This River of Life seems to have been flowing out from an unoriginated Source forever.

6. Cf. the important metaphysical doctrine that all being exists either in potency or in actuality; that maturing in every case is the actualization of a potency (e.g., the oak tree existed at first in the acorn); hence that if a potency does not exist, the actualization does not take place. Therefore, endocrine or other physiological dysfunctions, including tendency to certain diseases or to alcohol addiction, result from the lack of a proper mechanism (potency) in the body metabolism to prevent them. Potency, moreover, is correlated in nature with the biological principle, each after its own kind. One looking at a poppy seed and a mustard seed, for instance, cannot tell them apart. But the poppy seed has the potency of producing only a poppy, and the mustard seed the potency of producing only a mustard plant: there is no known natural process whereby the poppy seed can produce a mustard plant, or vice versa. Gen. 1:12—"after their kind" is a universal law.

7. It is interesting to note here, also, that no theory of evolution presumes to account for (1) the origin of life; (2) the life movement itself (e.g., what causes cells to divide, multiply, differentiate, specialize, etc., and what causes the movement of life to surge upward through progressively more complex beings, or what is this mysterious Will to Live which seems to permeate all nature, manifesting itself in the obvious effort of all living creatures to resist extinction, to preserve themselves and their respective species in existence? Do animals commit suicide?); (3) the why of the functioning of the various factors involved in heredity (the Mendelian laws simply indicate how these factors operate); and (4) the problem of mutations (i.e., alleged sudden and great leaps from one species to a new species which per se breeds true from its origin). The mysteries of the life process seem to be as inscrutable today, even with all our recently acquired knowledge, as they ever were.

8. Biblical teaching is, of course, that the ultimate source of this River of Life is the eternally self-existent living Being, God, Biblically named I AM, HE WHO IS. (Hence, the God of the Bible is known as the "living God," that is to say, He is Activity, He gets things done. His very essence is to be.) (Exo. 3:14—"And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and He said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me to you.") The God of the Bible is not a personification (of some natural force) as were the deities of ancient polytheistic systems. He is, rather, pure personality, the Divine Person. Rev. 22:1—"And he showed me a river of water of life, bright as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb." 1 Thess. 1:9—"how ye turned unto God from idols, to serve a living and true God." Heb. 10:31—"It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

9. On the other hand, there are those who think that the source of life eventually will be found to be somewhere in primal "physical" energy, perhaps in relationships within the atom. We usually call

this type of thinking materialism or mechanism. But even if this theory should be substantiated, that would only be moving the problem a step farther back, and would still leave the life process itself unexplained; this primal energy and its potencies would either have to be accounted for, or simply accepted as existing eternally, i.e., without beginning or end. (Moreover, if the "seeds" of life are inherent in matter itself, this would simply mean that the life movement is the actualization of those potencies which have existed, in some mysterious manner, in the atom or in the molecule either "from the beginning" or "without beginning or end.") Should the latter view—that of the eternity of matter or energy—be adopted, then its protagonists would be faced with the necessity of accounting, not only for the vital processes in all living things, but for the higher thought processes in man as well, as phenomena produced simply by the various aspects of matter in motion. This is sheer materialism. This I think the great majority of scientists and philosophers would pronounce another example of the fallacy of over-simplification, a type of fallacy of which the undisciplined inductive method is prolific.

10. Vitalism, on the other hand, is the philosophical view that there is a vital principle, a life force, functioning in all living things, in addition to (or perhaps it would be correct to say, superimposed upon) their physiochemical constitution.

11. Again, science tells us that the billions of living cells, of various structures and functions, which go to make up the human body, are in a state of constant flux; that in fact the body undergoes a cellular transformation every four or five years. It should be noted, however, that both memory and personal identity (self-consciousness) persist through all these cellular changes. (I know that I am basically the same "I" as the "I" who climbed on my father's lap to learn the alphabet many years ago, etc. I know this immediately, as a matter of personal experience.) This persistence of personal identity is a very important fact in relation to the science of ethics. [Does not this persistence of personal identity through some fifteen or twenty cellular transformations in the course of a lifetime indicate the probability, or at least the possibility, of the person's survival of the last great change, that which occurs in the "death" of the body? The answer depends, of course, on whether or not the person is a product exclusively of physiochemical activity, or whether or not the person might emerge from this activity (as water, for example, emerges from the fusion of hydrogen and oxygen) and become imperishable in his own right.]

12. From the viewpoint of the science of ethics, health, both physical and mental, must be regarded as one of the real goods of life. (Other such goods that might be listed are knowledge, work, play, friendship, faith, hope, love, etc.) "With health," said Schopenhauer, "everything is a source of pleasure; without it, nothing else is enjoyable." The belief, deriving not from Biblical

teaching, but from Platonic dualism ("the body is the tomb of the soul," said Plato), that body and mind (or soul) are constantly at war with each other, has been prolific throughout the centuries, of a "tragic waste of life and happiness." (Cf. Dr. Johnson's famous lines—

What is mind? No matter!
What is matter? Never mind!)

There is no evidence that the body as such is either moral or immoral: it becomes one or the other only as it may be used rightly, or misused, by the controlling person. (Cf. the Apostle Paul's contrast of the "mind of the flesh" and the "mind of the Spirit," in Romans 8:5-8; also Proverbs 23:7—"For as one thinketh within himself, so is he.") All subhuman entities as such are amoral; they become instruments of morality or of immorality only by virtue of their proper use, or of their misuse, by mankind. Certainly extreme asceticism (self-inflicted "punishment" of the body to "purify" the soul) cannot be looked upon as moral. On the other hand, a certain measure of asceticism, as self-discipline of the appetites and passions, is essential to the proper development of the personality and to the attainment of happiness; inordinate indulgence of physical appetite results only in disease and suffering, in warped bodies or warped minds or both. No man can practice undisciplined hedonism and live very long.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Aristotle, De Anima, i.e., "On the Soul," or "Psychology."

[2]Pope, "An Essay on Man."

[3]Paul DeKruif, Microbe Hunters, chs. 2, 3. (Pocket Book Edition, 1940.)

[4]J.A.V. Butler, Man is a Microcosm, p. 15. (Macmillan, New York, 1951.)

[5]Dr. L.B. Shettles, of Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons, in Today's Health, March, 1957. Published by the American Medical Association.

[6]Quoted by Dr. Shettles, ibid.

[7]Dr. Jesse F. Williams, A Textbook of Anatomy and Physiology, Seventh Edition, 1943, p. 1.

## VIII. Superimposed upon the vegetative dimension in the human being, and transcending it, is the psychical (or psychological) dimension.

The word "psychical" derives from the Greek word psyche, which in earliest Greek thought (in Homer especially) frequently signified only the life principle, but by the time of Plato had come to mean "soul" as distinct from body (soma). In scientific terminology it has come to stand for "mind"; hence, strictly speaking, psychology is the study (logos) of the mind or mental processes. Actually, it is the study not only of the intellectual, but also of the emotional and volitional powers, in man. Hence, the content of the psychical dimension of the human being, as the object of study, may properly be called the psychological dimension.

Incidentally, the word "soul," as used traditionally to designate "the inward man" (2 Cor. 4:16—"though our outward man is decaying, yet our inward man is renewed day by day"), is just as valid as it ever was. As the distinguished German-born nuclear physicist, Henry Margenau, consultant to our Atomic Energy Commission, has put it:

> The smug and complacent attitude of the 19th century physicist who, to choose a trivial example, denied the existence of the human soul because he could not weigh it or locate its whereabouts, is gone forever. Whitehead's reference to the fallacy of simple location, the reminder that existence need not be tied to localizability, was useful in its day but is almost a commonplace to modern physics.[1]

[For example, in re the fallacy of localizability, an electron has been described as an elementary "particle" which can move in all directions at once without ever being found at any intermediate point. Cf. also the Principle of Indeterminacy or Uncertainty (the Heisenberg Principle), namely, that it is impossible to determine both the position and velocity of an electron at any given moment. Physicists do not know whether to call these ultimate forces "particles" ("corpuscles") or "waves." Someone has facetiously remarked that perhaps they should be designated "wavicles."] All this adds up to the fact that the psychical dimension of man is justifiably called the "soul-ish" (psychikos, cf. 1 Cor. 15:44) dimension.

1. The Mind-Body Problem. That thought processes do take place continuously in man, no matter how they are to be accounted for, cannot be a matter of controversy: such processes are facts of every person's experience. This, of course, raises the old mind-body problem, which is no nearer solution today than it ever was.

(1) In general, it appears to be an empirical fact that mental life, as man experiences it in his present state, is correlated with brain activity: if certain parts of the brain are damaged or removed, certain aspects of conscious life cease to occur. To say, however, that either consciousness or thought is connected with the activity of brain cells in some inscrutable way is a far cry from affirming that either consciousness or thought is exclusively brain activity. Such words, for example, as "heat," "pain," "sound," "color," "red," "sweet," etc., "stand for" different kinds of experienced sensations. The excitation of the neurosensory system (correlated with the word "sensation") is one thing, however, and the consciousness (awareness) of that excitation (correlated with the word "perception") is another thing, not to mention, of course, the further attribution of meaning to the given word-symbol by which the sensation is identified—meaning established in the light of one's past experience of the specific mental event as preserved in memory (in the form of what we call "images"). The abyss between a sensation (an event in the nervous system) and the consciousness of that sensation (a "mental" event, charged with meaning) remains unbridged by any adequate theory: indeed it seems to be inscrutable. [Meaning is an essential feature of consciousness over and above, and of a nature different from, the sensory content. A word that is read to a person comes into that person's consciousness as sound and meaning. A wild beast perceives a sound in the human voice; a trained animal discerns a meaning (perhaps a command, or a summons to food and drink, etc.), but a human being alone discerns therein a thought.] There is no alchemy of wishful thinking by which a mental process can be reduced to a cellular process exclusively: no matter how the two processes may be correlated, obviously they are not identical. Psychology cannot be reduced to sheer physiology: there is no correlate in the brain for meaning in thought. Any theory that consciousness has no real efficacy or significance, or that mind as the projection of a biological process can be described simply in terms of stimulus and response is utterly inadequate to account for the more refined abstract phenomena of man's psychical dimension.

(2) Even those psychologists who adopt the organismic approach to the study of the human being (that is, who profess to study man as an individual whole, an entity, an organism) find themselves compelled to adopt dualistic concepts in describing human motivation: hence they distinguish between what they call "viscerogenic" drives and what they call "psychogenic" drives. I suggest that it would be conducive to clarity of understanding to use the simpler terms, "physical" and "mental," respectively.

(3) Consciousness as perception is, of course, just the initial act of the thought process: the psyche in man is far more comprehensive in content than what may be in consciousness at any given time.

(4) Perhaps it should be noted here that the fact that brain activity is in some way connected with mental activity in no way militates against the doctrines of survival and immortality. The ancient Egyptians and others believed that immortality consisted in the resurrection and revivification of the present physical body as the organ of the soul in the next life. Oriental philosophy, on the other hand, has persisted in holding that survival is a bodiless form of existence, commonly described as reabsorption into the cosmos, into Brahma, Tao, etc. This doctrine of "disembodied spirits" was also characteristic of Platonic thought in its various forms: it definitely is not a Biblical doctrine. Biblical teaching regarding immortality is, by way of contrast, that the bodies of the saints will be transfigured (metamorphosed) from physical into ethereal ("spiritual") bodies, that is, bodies of a finer texture of matter. (Democritus, it will be recalled, as did the Stoics after him in ancient Greece, held that soul atoms are of a finer texture than the atoms of gross matter.) From this point of view, physical death may be analogous to the kind of metamorphosis that occurs repeatedly in nature: for all we know the constituent elements of the ethereal body may be present in the natural body. (See 1 Cor. 15:35-37, 2 Cor. 5:1-10.)

(5) We often hear such statements as the following: "Thoughts are nothing but electro-chemical impulses through neural pathways in the brain." "Colors are nothing but differing wave-lengths of radiant energy." "Pain is nothing but a certain kind of excitation of the nerve-endings." "Sounds are nothing but movements in a vibrating medium which make their impact on the human ear." True, we may say that neural processes seem to be necessary conditions for the occurrence of thought, as the human being is now constituted. But if event A is the necessary condition for event B, then A and B cannot be one and the same event. The foregoing statements are examples again of the fallacy of oversimplification, sometimes called the "nothing-but" fallacy or the "reductive" fallacy. They are unjustified identifications of mental events with physical or physiological events. The human being is not so simply constructed.

(6) One theory of the mind-body problem is that of epiphenomenalism (a word coined by T.H. Huxley). This is the view that "mind" is just the name that we give to certain phenomena which merely accompany certain kinds of processes and changes in the nervous system: so-called mental states are a kind of aura, so to speak, which hover about the brain processes without having any substantive existence themselves or any special function; in a word, mind is "nothing but" a function of the brain. Consciousness arises

in some kind of transformation of neural energy, but is not itself a distinct form of being of any kind. Whatever movement takes place is a one-way process: from body toward what is called "mind," never from mind to body. This view is usually described as materialistic, which indeed it is: it presupposes that the laws of physics and chemistry cover the whole field of human experience and account for everything embraced in human knowing and knowledge. [It should be pointed out, however, that even this extreme view does not in any way militate against the concept that mind or spirit may "emerge" out of its neural background into an existence of its own, and thus become the unifying principle of a new life after death, and indeed of an ethereal body, constituting the latter to be a "spiritual" (pneumatikos) body, much in the same manner (shall we say?) as a magnet attracts iron filings. Biblical teaching is that the human being is a body-mind (or body-spirit) unity in this present world: cf. Gen. 2:7—"Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life" (that is, the spirit of life); "and man became a living soul." Is not this in harmony with the present-day organismic approach in psychology to the study of the human being? Moreover, if man is a body-mind unity in his present existence, is there any valid ground for doubting that the complete, the whole, man can be a body-mind (or body-spirit) unity in the next life, with a different kind of body, of course? Science has nothing to say against such a doctrine.]

(7) The common-sense view of the mind-body relationship is known as interactionism. According to this view, mind and body continuously interact, each upon the other; the relation is a two-way process, that of mind upon body, and at the same time that of body upon mind. This is the view that is implicit in the theory and practice of psychosomatic medicine. That interaction of this kind does take place is the testimony of everyday experience, although it must be admitted that the method of this interaction seems to be inscrutable. The student, for example, does not leave the room after class until he "makes up his mind" to propel his feet toward the door; the pitcher in a baseball game throws the ball if and when and how he "makes up his mind" to use his arm to throw it. I am reminded here of what Dr. Rudolph Otto has written:

> For a manifestation of the influence exerted by the psychical upon the physical we need in fact go no farther than the power of our will to move our body—the power, that is, of a spiritual cause to bring about a mechanical effect. This assuredly is an absolutely insoluble riddle, and it is only the fact that we have grown so used to it that prevents it from seeming a "miracle" to us.[2]

As the late C.E.M. Joad has put it,

> Mind and body continually interact in an infinite number of different ways: in fact, mind influences body and body mind at every moment of waking life. If I am

drunk, I see two lamp-posts instead of one; if I fail to digest my supper, I have a nightmare and see blue devils; if I smoke opium or inhale nitrous oxide gas, I experience celestial visions, pass into a state of beatitude, and discourse with the Almighty and His angels. These are instances of the influence of the body upon the mind. If I see a ghost, my hair stands on end; if I am moved to anger, my face becomes red; if I receive a sudden shock, I turn pale; if I am in dread of a coming ordeal, my mouth becomes dry and the palms of my hands moist. These are instances of the influence of the mind upon the body. The examples just quoted are only extreme and rather obvious cases of what is going on all the time. Many psychologists, indeed, assert that there can be no event in the mind which is not accompanied by some corresponding event in the body, and vice versa, although the corresponding event in the body may be too small to be perceptible by such recording instruments as we at present possess. The apparent interaction between mind and body is, at any rate, a fact beyond dispute.[3]

(8) On the mind-body problem as a whole, I commend the following, also by Joad:

> Common sense holds that a human being is not exclusively a body. He has a body, but he is, it would normally be said, more than his body; and he is more, in virtue of the existence of an immaterial principle which, whether it be called mind, soul, consciousness, or personality, constitutes the reality of his being. This immaterial principle, most people hold, is in some way associated with the body—it is frequently said to reside in it, and animates and controls it.[4]

(9) I recall that the late John Dewey once wrote a book which he entitled How We Think. But John Dewey did not then know, nor does any one today know, just how we think; the process is as mysterious as it ever was. J.B. Rhine writes:

> What are we human beings, you and I? No one knows. A great deal is known about man, but his fundamental nature—what makes him behave as he does—is still a profound mystery. Science cannot explain what the human mind really is and how it works with the brain. No one even pretends to know how consciousness is produced. What kind of a natural phenomenon is thought? There isn't even a "theory."[5]

And Dr. Alexis Carrel has written:

> What is thought, that strange being, which lives in the depth of ourselves without consuming a measurable quantity of chemical energy? Is it related to the known forms

of energy? Could it be a constituent of our universe, ignored by the physicists, but infinitely more important than light? The mind is hidden within living matter, completely ignored by physiologists and economists, almost unnoticed by physicians. And yet it is the most colossal power of this world. Is it produced by the cerebral cells, like insulin by the pancreas and bile by the liver? From what substance is it elaborated? Does it come from a preexisting element, as glucose from glycogen, or fibrin from fibrinogen? Does it consist of a kind of energy differing from that studied by physics, expressing itself by other laws, and generated by the cells of the cerebral cortex? Or should it be considered as an immaterial being, located outside space and time, outside the dimensions of the cosmic universe, and inserting itself by an unknown procedure into our brain, which would be the indispensable condition of its manifestation and the determining agent of its characteristics? At all times, and in all countries, great philosophers have devoted their lives to the investigation of these problems. They have not found their solution. We cannot refrain from asking the same questions. But those questions will remain unanswered until new methods for penetrating more deeply into consciousness are discovered.[6]

2. The operations of the intellect, in the ascending order of their complexity, are the following:

(1) Simple apprehension, or the perception, of an object. Perception in ordinary experience must not be confused with imagination, recollection, or dreaming, e.g., perceiving a steak on the table before me could lead to my satisfying of my hunger; but experiencing a steak in recollection or in imagination would not bring about this result. Sitting before a fire in my waking hours, I see the flame, hear the crackling sounds, and feel the heat. Experiencing the fire in recollection or in imagination, however, I would probably experience only the image of the flame. But experiencing the same fire in a dream, I would probably experience, and that almost as vividly, the aspects that characterized the original perception, including the crackling and the heat. (We are reminded here of the oft-told tale of the Chinaman who once dreamed he was a butterfly. On awakening from his dream, he said to himself: "I don't know whether I was, a few moments ago, a Chinaman dreaming I was a butterfly, or I am now a butterfly dreaming that I am a Chinaman." Dreams can be most vivid experiences, as everyone knows; they do not belong, however, in the category of perception.) (a) Sensations undoubtedly are "atomistic," that is, in the sense that they originate through different channels of excitation in the nervous system. Vision, for example, is effectuated by means of the optic nerve; sound, by way of the auditory nerve endings; touch, by means of the thousands of nerve endings (receptors) scattered all

over the surface of the skin; smell, by means of the receptors in the nasal cavity; taste, by means of the taste buds on the tongue. In addition to these, there are innumerable kinesthetic receptors, pain receptors, cold and warmth receptors, and millions of internal sense receptors scattered throughout the inner linings of the body. What, then, is this mysterious power in man which gathers up these different excitations of the nervous system and unifies them into the perception of a thing as an object, preserves this perception in the form of an image, and in addition to all this, vests the whole process with meaning? It would seem to be a process (like the vital process) designed to be experienced only, never to be defined. (Who can define the infinitive, "to be"? Being is experienced, but cannot be defined.) The process itself, however, is conclusive proof of the unceasing activity of mind. (Cf. Wm. James' "stream-of-consciousness" psychology; also Von Hartman, The Philosophy of the Unconscious.) The simple fact of the matter is that mind never rests, never sleeps: mental activity is continuous. (b) Simple apprehension is the act by which the mind grasps or perceives something without affirming or denying anything about that something. It is to conceive (form in the mind) an idea in which one perceives or "apprehends" ("seizes," "takes hold of") something. It is to think, e.g., "apple," "man," "chair," "red," "soft," etc. Sensations, of course, provide the raw material for this elementary kind of "knowledge.". It must be admitted that in the great majority of instances our mental powers are awakened and excited, directly or indirectly, by sensations; that our first acquired ideas have reference to sensible objects, and that, furthermore, these primary ideas become the occasions for, and the antecedents of, other ideas and emotions which derive from our higher rational and moral nature. But, as we have seen, sensations are in themselves operations of the individual neurosensory system, separate impressions of different aspects (qualities) of the thing producing them. (Obviously, then, there must be an external something—which becomes the object of cognition—to produce these sensations, or they would not occur; therefore we must reject as contrary to fact, the outright denial of the existence of "matter." Physicists would describe these motions in matter which cause sensations in the percipient, by their impact upon his nervous system, as sense data: vision, for example, is produced by the refraction of quanta of radiant energy, sound by vibrations in a medium, etc.) For example, let us imagine an apple lying before us on the desk. On looking at it, we experience a sensation of color ("redness"), another of configuration ("roundness"). If we touch the apple, we experience another sensation, that of a certain quality of "hardness" or "softness," depending on how ripe the apple is. And if we bite into the apple, we experience a fourth sensation, that of a certain pleasantness or unpleasantness to the taste ("sweet," "sour," etc.). But, obviously, in order to perceive the thing (the apple) as an object, some activity within each of us must unite these sensations into a whole. (As Gestalt psychology contends, no analysis of separate percepts can account for the

total experience.) This internal activity of weaving into a whole the sensations produced by a thing in becoming an object of cognition is properly designated one's perception of the object. Now the sensations themselves may be explained as activities, or at least as the result of the activities, of brain and nerve cells. But certainly the perception of the object, the process in which these sensations are unified, cannot be explained solely in terms of cellular processes. Nor can one's attachment of the conventional word-symbol (in this case, "apple") to the perceived object, the symbol established by social usage, be explained on the ground of any cellular or other physiological process, for the use of language involves memory and memory images, and in addition gives "meaning" to the perception. It is utterly inconceivable that cells should remain in juxtaposition over a period of years in such a manner as to repeatedly produce memory images themselves. We conclude, therefore, that neither the retention of memory images nor their recall can be identified with any cellular process exclusively, and that the phenomena of perception, retention and recall are properly described as "mental" rather than "physical."

[What is the mysterious relation between the objective thing and the mental idea, the relation that is known as cognition? Note here Thomas Aquinas' theory of cognition (knowledge) as a process of progressive abstraction from matter. (Abstraction is from the Latin prefix, ab, abs, "away from," and the Latin verb traho, trahere, "to draw" or "to drag," hence abstrahere, "to draw away from.") Knowledge, said Aquinas, begins in sense-perception of the objective thing. (Things are designated in grammar by common nouns; relations among things, including persons, by abstract nouns.) The second step in cognition, said Aquinas, is that of image-ing or imagination, the process by which the mind abstracts and stores away the image of the thing perceived. (When a student leaves the classroom, he does not take out with him mentally the actual chair in which he has been sitting; he takes out only the image of the chair.) The third and final step in cognition occurs when the mind abstracts from both the sense-perceived thing and the image thereof—a process which is known as conceptualization. The concept (universal, form) is an act of pure thought, a determination of the very essence of the thing once perceived, that is, the aggregate of properties which puts the thing (apprehended as the object) in its particular class of things. It is by conceptualization that man rises above the space-time dimension in which he is now "imprisoned," one might well say.]

(2) The second operation of the intellect is called judgment: a judgment is an act of the mind whereby it unites two concepts by affirming or separates them by denying. In forming a judgment, e.g., The apple is red, Man is mortal, etc., the person gives assent mentally to what he believes to be an actual (real, ontological) relationship and thus declares himself to be in possession of the truth on this or that point. A judgment in epistemology (the science

of the ways of knowing and of the criteria of truth) becomes a proposition in logic (the science of correct thinking) and a sentence in grammar (the science of meaningful communication by means of language). (Grammar is not a matter of convention: its rules have their basis in the inflexible demands of logic.)

(3) The third and highest operation of the intellect is reasoning, or thinking connectedly, from this to that, etc. It is the logical relating of single judgments. Formal reasoning involves the syllogism, the classic example of which is the following:

> All men are mortal. (Major Premise)
> Socrates is a man. (Minor Premise)
> Therefore, Socrates is mortal. (Conclusion)

(In the syllogism, obviously, the conclusion must be valid only if the premises are valid, and the validity of the premises can be determined only by the inductive method.) As Maritain writes:

> Reasoning is the most complex operation of our mind; it is by reasoning that we go from what we know already to what we do not yet know, that we discover, that we demonstrate, that we make progress in knowledge.[7]

In inductive reasoning, the mind moves from the sensible (sense-perception) to the intelligible level. In deductive reasoning, the mind moves purely on the intelligible plane, that is, it moves from idea to idea ("intelligible" meaning "apprehensible by the intellect only.") Reasoning is essentially problem-solving. Thought, however, may be contemplative (else art is a fiction) as well as instrumental (for purposes of adaptation).

To sum up: Sensations may be cellular processes. They may, and undoubtedly do, serve to awaken consciousness. But what is consciousness? Should anyone answer, Consciousness is awareness, we must reply that "awareness" is merely a synonym for, not a definition of, "consciousness." What consciousness is in itself, no one knows, and there is no present indication that any man will ever know. Sensations, however, do not provide meaning, understanding, belief, or truth. These are facts (and values) characteristic of a higher level of being than the mere physiochemical or biological. By no stretch of the imagination can any unbiased person identify these higher thought processes—simple apprehension, judgment, retention and recall of memory images, and inductive and deductive reasoning—with the shuffling and reshuffling of brain cells. These are activities of the mind (or spirit) that is in man, or, speaking precisely, that is man.

FOOTNOTES

[1]H. Margenau, art., "Faith and Physics," in Think, May, 1957.

[2]Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 214, Third Revision. Trans. by John W. Harvey. (Humphrey Milford and Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1925.)

[3]C.E.M. Joad, Guide to Philosophy, pp. 499-500. (Victor Gollancz, London, and Dover Publications, New York, 1936.)

[4]Ibid., p. 498.

[5]J. B. Rhine, The Reach of the Mind, p. 3. (Sloane Associates, New York, 1947.)

[6]Alexis Carrel, Man the Unknown, pp. 118-119. (Harper, New York, 1935.)

[7]Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Logic, p. 2. Trans. from the French by Imelda Choquette. (Sheed and Ward, New York, 1937.)

## IX. Hidden deep in the recesses of the human being is what students of psychic phenomena usually designate the metapsychical dimension which takes in the activities of the subconscious.

Metapsychical is from meta, "along with," "after," "beyond," and psyche; corresponding terms are subconscious, "below consciousness"; subliminal, from limen, liminis, "threshold," that is, "below the threshold" (of consciousness); or, as used at Duke University, parapsychological, meaning "beyond," or "alongside" psychology.

1. Historical: British Society for Psychical Research, founded in 1882, by such eminent scientists as Henry Sidgwick, A.J. Balfour, Edmund Gurney, Oliver Lodge, Frederic W.H. Myers, William Crookes, Alfred Russel Wallace, and others. The American Society for Psychical Research established in 1884 (contemporary president, Hamlin Garland). International Institute of Metapsychics established in Paris, under direction of the distinguished physiologist, Charles Richet, and the learned physician, Joseph Teissier. Records of the work and findings of these Societies fill many volumes of "Proceedings" and "Journals." Researches in other parts of the world by Dr. Karl Bruck and Professor Rudolph Tischner in Germany; by the French engineer, Rene Warcollier; by the American novelist, Upton Sinclair (see his Mental Radio); by Brugmans and Heymans on the continent, and by Estabrooks and McDougall, at Harvard. Recent experiments in this field were instituted at Duke University in 1930, under William McDougall and his chief assistant, Dr. J.B. Rhine. Experiments in ESP (extrasensory perception) and PK (psychokinesis) are now being carried on in many American colleges and universities (under the direction of Dr. Rhine at Duke, in a new Department of Parapsychology, which publishes a quarterly Journal of Parapsychology).

Bibliography: For additional reading in this field, the following works are suggested: F.W.H. Myers, The Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death, two volumes, Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1903-4. (This was the work which made such an impression on Wm. James and suggested the latter's "stream-of-consciousness" psychology. It is still a classic in its field.) Hereward Carrington, The Story of Psychic Science, Ives Washburn, New York, 1931; A Primer of Psychical Research, Ives Washburn, New York, 1932; The Psychic World, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New

York, 1937. H. Bernheim, Suggestive Therapeutics (perhaps the most authoritative work on hypnotism), Herter translation, 1889, available from the London Book Company, 30-41 Fiftieth St., New York. Alexis Carrel, Man the Unknown, Harper and Bros., New York, 1935. E. Von Hartmann, The Philosophy of the Unconscious, published first in 1868; a new edition published in one volume by Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1931. Sir Oliver Lodge, Phantom Walls, Putnam's Sons, 1930; Why I Believe in Personal Immortality, Cassell, London, 1928. Charles Richet, Thirty Years of Psychical Research, trans. from the French by Stanley DeBrath. Hamlin Garland, Forty Years of Psychic Research, Macmillan, New York, 1937. Perhaps the best known of all books on psychic phenomena is that of Dr. T.J. Hudson, The Law of Psychic Phenomena, the 32nd edition of which was published by McClurg, Chicago, in 1909. Dr. Hudson also wrote The Divine Pedigree of Man, and A Scientific Demonstration of the Future Life. Several of these books are now out of print, but copies are usually available at second-hand bookstores. For out-of-print and second-hand books, write London Book Co., Woodside, New York, or Basil Blackwell, Broad St., Oxford, England. Recent Bibliography: Books by Dr. J.B. Rhine, Extra-Sensory Perception; New Frontiers of the Mind; recent, The Reach of the Mind, and The New World of the Mind. Also by Dr. Louisa E. Rhine, Hidden Channels of the Mind, recently published. These may be procured by writing Dr. J.B. Rhine, Duke University, or William Sloane Associates, New York City.

Phenomena of the Subconscious:

(1) According to the stream-of-consciousness psychology of Wm. James, psychic activity goes on all the time below the threshold of consciousness; fragments of this activity, elicited by association of some sort, rising above the threshold of consciousness constitute recall, or what we know as remembering or memory. That is to say, the content of the psyche is, at any given time, far more comprehensive than the content of consciousness at that particular time. (Indeed, there is no more generally accepted fact in present-day psychology than that of the unbroken continuity of the psychic process on the subliminal level. The notion of mind as a "blank tablet" has been abandoned completely.) Intimations of the powers of the inner self which has been opened to view by psychic research are found in two of the most common facts of human experience, namely, the subconscious association of ideas and the subconscious maturing of thought, as illustrated in the sudden appearing, in a dream or in a dreamlike moment of waking, of the solution of a problem which has been vexing the mind in the hours of objective awareness and reasoning. Jastrow says: "There exists in all intellectual endeavor a period of incubation, a process in great part subconscious, a slow, concealed maturing through absorption of suitable pabulum."[1] Schopenhauer called this activity "unconscious rumination." The unconscious, writes E.R. Groves,

"may be the source of energy, the origin of inspiration, and even, as comes out so clearly in the case of genius, a means of insight so direct and penetrating that we commonly call it intuition."[2] Bergson, the late French philosopher, held that within each of us there are "two different selves, one of which is, as it were, the external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representation." Only the inner or "fundamental" self, he contends, is free; the other unfolds in space, because we live for the external world rather than for ourselves. This inner self, he says, is practically unlimited in its powers. "Considered in themselves," he says, "the deep-seated conscious states have no relation to quantity, they are pure quality."[3] According to Bergson, the physical senses, functioning to adapt us to our present environment, shut out from our view the real or metaphysical world; the brain, he contends, functions to help us, not to remember, but temporarily to forget.

(2) Students of psychic phenomena describe the human psyche as a house, so to speak, with two rooms in it: a front room which faces the external world and through which impressions from that world make their entrance by way of the physical senses; and a back room in which the impressions which have entered by way of the front room find a permanent abiding-place. This front room is commonly designated the objective (conscious, supra-liminal) part of the self, or simply the "objective mind"; this back room, the subjective (subconscious, subliminal) part of the self, or simply the "subjective mind." It is this room to which we refer when we speak of the Subconscious in man. The objective takes cognizance of the external world; its media of knowledge are the physical senses; it is an adaptation to man's physical necessities, his guide in adjusting to his present temporal environment. Its highest function is that of reason: its powers, therefore, are best correlated perhaps with what we include under the word "mind" in ordinary usage. The subjective, on the other hand, takes cognizance of its environment by means independent of physical sense; it perceives by intuition; it is the storehouse of memory; it performs its highest functions when the objective processes are in abeyance (that is, in natural or induced sleep; induced sleep is hypnosis); and it is especially amenable to suggestion. This subliminal part of the "inner man" seems to be unlimited by objective concepts of distance, space and time (one can go back into childhood, or travel throughout the cosmos, in a dream); it functions effectively outside the space-time dimension. It has all the appearance of a distinct entity, with independent powers and functions, having a psychical order of its own and being capable of functioning independently of the corporeal body. It is in a sense the very core of the human being. We suggest that it may be, in its ultimate aspect, the ontological self, the essential and imperishable being of the human individual: that is, as the objective powers may rightly be correlated with what we call "mind," so the subjective might rightly be correlated with what we call "spirit" in man. In harmony with this view, the term "soul"

is perhaps synonymous with "person," that is, it stands for a mind-body unity. Cf. Gen. 2:7—"Jehovah God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath [spirit] of life: and the man became a living soul." [A word of caution here: The Subconscious of psychic phenomena must not be confused with the Unconscious of Freudian psychology. The latter is a "mystic deep," perhaps best described as partly physiological (viscerogenic) and partly psychological (psychogenic), whereas the Subconscious, as the metapsychical dimension in man, is wholly incorporeal or psychical.]

(3) Hypnosis is a common phenomenon: it is used in medical and dental surgery, and even in childbirth. It is often demonstrated and studied in psychology departments today in our colleges and universities. Catalepsy is a state of deep hypnosis in which the subject is rendered insensible to fleshly pain. (The Hindu "fakir," for example, will hypnotize himself and lie on a bed of nails without feeling pain at all. Cf. hibernation in animals and suspended animation in human beings.)

(4) Phenomena of the Subconscious which indicate the human spirit's transcendence of the space-time dimension are telepathy, clairvoyance, and prescience. (To this list should be added, of course, the dreams which one experiences: as stated heretofore, the subconscious in man reaches out in dreams beyond all limitations of time and space.) Telepathy (communication of thought and feeling from one person to another without the mediation of the physical senses—said to be completely independent of the distance involved), clairvoyance (the power to see physical objects and events apart from the medium of physical sense), and prescience (foreknowledge of events in time), are the phenomena included under the term Extrasensory Perception (ESP). These phenomena are being studied scientifically in various colleges and universities in our day, notably by Dr. J.B. Rhine and his colleagues in the Department of Parapsychology at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. Dr. Rhine affirms positively that the prevalence of such phenomena has been established beyond all reasonable doubt, and established, moreover, not by hearsay, but by strict mathematical or statistical methods and norms which rule out the possibility of chance production. Even though materialistic scientists may continue to doubt these conclusions, he says, largely because they do not want to accept any finding that tends to undermine their own cherished predilections, still and all they have not, and indeed can not, question the mathematical accuracy of his methods. Scientists (Rhine goes on to explain) can be "very human" at times. (See especially J.B. Rhine, The Reach of the Mind, and The New World of the Mind.)

(5) Phenomena of the Subconscious which indicate the human spirit's apparently unlimited power of knowing are (a) perfect memory and (b) perfect perception of the fixed (mathematical) laws

of nature. (a) The Subconscious is said to be the storehouse of all impressions received in this life; that is to say, it is the seat of perfect memory; it acts, one may rightly say, as a kind of tape recorder, and in all degrees of hypnotic sleep, the revivification of memory is one of the most striking of all the attendant phenomena. All the impressions of a lifetime, we are told, are stored away there, in the depths of the human spirit, awaiting only some proper external impulsion or association to bring them to consciousness. (b) Another power of the Subconscious is that of the perception of the fixed laws of nature. For example, mathematical and musical "prodigies." Such "gifts" do not depend on subjective memory, that is, upon raw material which comes into the mind through sensation and remains therein in the form of images. The subjective self, for example, does not seem to know by intuition the name of a person, or a geographical location, or an event in history. But it does know by intuition that two and two are four. No one without an objective education can, by the development of his subjective powers alone, become a great poet, artist, orator, statesman, or engineer: sensation, imaging, and reasoning, it must be remembered, belong to the objective mind. But one may be a great mathematician, or a great musician, independently of an objective education, just by the development of his subjective powers. For example: Zerah Colburn, the mathematical prodigy; Blind Tom, an imbecile, who could reproduce difficult classical compositions with accuracy; Blind Boone, Blind Joe, and others, whose abilities to improvise, without objective training, were fairly prodigious. Cf. "idiot-savants," "lightning calculators," "persons with photographic memory," "perfect pitch," etc. (Everyone recognizes the mathematical bases of music, of course.) As a matter of fact, creativity in all its forms seemingly has its roots in the subliminal self. For example, the "genius" of Archimedes, of Da Vinci, of Shakespeare, of Michelangelo, of Louis Pasteur, and many others. (See Dr. Schweitzer's theory of "insight.") The operation of this power of perfect perception would seem to indicate that when the person shall be freed from the trammels of his objective environment (Plato's cave of sense-perception), he will be able to perceive and to know all truth intuitively. "Now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; but then shall I know fully, even as also I was fully known" (St. Paul, 1 Cor. 13:12).

(6) Phenomena of the Subconscious which support the view that spirit is pre-eminent over body are those which are exhibited in cases of suggestion and auto-suggestion. (a) Even in ordinary life, most of us are susceptible to suggestion more than we realize. We are inclined to believe the choice bit of gossip, the newspaper headline, or the propaganda article: most persons are not sufficiently critical in their thinking to distinguish propaganda from truth. The Hitlerian theory of the "big lie" falls in this category, as does also the technique of "brain-washing." (Note the "subliminal suggestion" that is often characteristic of present-day advertising.)

(b) In our daily lives our bodies move at the command of that non-physical power within each of us which we call "will." The pitcher in a baseball game, for example, does not "wind up" and throw the ball in a mechanical fashion, that is, at regular intervals, like a machine. On the contrary, he throws the ball only if and when his "will" directs him to throw it. A man may "decide" to walk from his residence to the neighborhood store, but he takes the first step, and each succeeding step, only when and as his mind ("will") in some inscrutable manner causes his feet and body to move. In all activities of life which proceed from choice, the body responds to suggestion. (c) We are not surprised, therefore, when we are told that there resides in the subconscious a psychic power over the functions of the body, a power which can be invoked under proper conditions to heal the ravages of disease and especially dysfunctions of the neurosensory system. "Mental healings" have taken place in all ages. Bernheim, Moll, and others may be cited as authority for the claim that symptoms of disease (fever, rapid pulse, flushed cheeks, etc.) partial or total paralysis, pains in the body, hemorrhages, bloody stigmata, and even structural changes, have been produced in various subjects by means of suggestion. (Trances, of course, are produced by autosuggestion.) All this being true, how much easier it should be to alleviate the symptoms and ravages of disease by the same method, for it is well known that nature per se is constitutionally constructive and restorative. [Mental healing figured significantly in the art of medicine developed under Asclepius (who later became the great god of medicine, with a sanctuary at Epidaurus) several centuries before Christ.] Indeed the powers of suggestion and autosuggestion are the principles which undergird the practice of mental therapeutics, or what is called in more recent parlance, psychosomatic medicine. It is a matter of general agreement among scientists today that nothing is so conducive to the health of the body as a healthful mental outlook on life. As R.J. Williams, the biochemist, puts it:

> While psychologists, psychiatrists, and students of mental hygiene could not unanimously endorse theology as a beneficial agent in life, they would be practically unanimous in their endorsement of religion if they could specify that the religion must be the kind that engenders in human beings the triad of faith, hope, and love, of which the greatest is love. These three are probably the most important mental medicines, and their opposites—fear, despair, and hate—are among the worst mental poisons.[4]

Dr. Thomson J. Hudson has this to say:

> The faith required for therapeutic purposes is a purely subjective faith, and is attainable upon the cessation of active opposition on the part of the objective mind. And this is why it is that, under all systems of mental therapeutics, the perfect passivity of the patient is insisted

upon as the first essential condition. Of course, it is desirable to secure the concurrent faith of both the objective and subjective minds; but it is not essential, if the patient will in good faith make the necessary autosuggestion, either in words, or by submitting passively to the suggestions of the healer.[5]

(7) Phenomena such as psychokinesis, levitation, automatic writing, the projection of ectoplasms and phantasms, and the like, seem to indicate that the thought of the Subconscious has the power to transmute itself into what we call "physical" phenomena. Psychokinesis (PK) sometimes called telekinesis—is that phenomenon in which ponderable objects are influenced, and even moved, by the power of thought alone. Dr. Rhine and his associates have long been experimenting in this field (largely with the power of thought to influence the falling of dice) and claim to have obtained positive results. Automatic writing consists in holding a pencil in one hand and letting it write; the subconscious assumes control of the nerves and muscles of the arm and hand, and propels the pencil, the objective mind being perfectly quiescent and oftentimes totally oblivious of what is written. Levitation is not, as often defined, the illusion that a heavy body is suspended in the air without visible support: it is alleged by students of psychic phenomena to be the real thing, produced by subconscious thought power. Ectoplasm is defined by Hamlin Garland as an elementary substance given off by the human body, at the command of the Subconscious, in varying degrees. He conceives it to be ideoplastic, that is, capable of being moulded, by the subjective thought power either of the psychic or of the sitter, into various shapes. He writes as follows:

> In a public meeting recently, Millikan is reported to have rebuked a speaker for speaking of the electron as though it were well known while the soul was an abstraction. He [Millikan] is reported as saying, "We know nothing of the electron other than that it is a center for chemical forces." Richet. . . refuses to admit that these psychical phenomena are in opposition to official science. He says: "To admit telekinesis and the formation of ectoplasmic phantasms is not to destroy the smallest fragment of science—it is but to admit new data, to recognize that there are unknown energies. Materialization does not contradict one established fact—it merely adds new facts.[6]

(It will be recalled that Dr. Robert Millikan was one of the most noted nuclear physicists of the first half of our century.) Charles Richet writes:

> 1. There is in us a faculty of cognition that differs radically from the usual sensorial faculties (cryptesthesia). 2. There are, even in full light, movements of objects without contact (telekinesis). 3. Hands, bodies and objects seem to take shape in their entirety from a cloud

and take on all the semblance of life (ectoplasms).
4. There occur premonitions that can be explained neither by chance nor by perspicacity, and are sometimes verified in minute detail. Such are my firm and explicit conclusions. I cannot go beyond them.[7]

"Spirit materializations" are said to be thought projections of the Subconscious, that is, ethereal reconstructions of matter by the power of thought. Dr. Hudson writes:

> The power resides in the subjective mind of man to create phantasms perceptible to the objective senses of others. . . The medium goes into a trance, or hypnotic state, and projects the shapes of various persons, generally of the deceased friends of some of those present. A good medium will produce any number of visions, of any number of persons, men and women, large and small.[8]

Phantasms may be called "embodied thoughts," we are told, as man may be called the embodied thought of God.

> It is fair to presume that that part of the Infinite which is embodied in each of us must partake, to a limited extent, of His power to create.[9]

Truly, then, thoughts are things. (Cf. Gen. 1:3, 6, 9, 14, 20, 24, 26; Ps. 33:6, 9; Heb. 11:3, etc.)

3. The Over-all Significance of the Phenomena of the Subconscious is two-fold: (1) They prove that "mind," whatever else it may be, is a continuous activity, at least below the threshold of consciousness: that it never "sleeps." (2) They support the traditional view that the human being is fundamentally an imperishable spirit or soul, dwelling as such in this life in a physical or natural body. They confirm man's natural and almost universal conviction of his own survival, or continuance as a person, beyond the death (dissolution) of the body. (a) The phenomena of telepathy and clairvoyance support the religious doctrines of revelation and inspiration: if human spirit can communicate with human spirit without the use of physical media, surely the Divine Spirit can in like manner communicate truth to the human spirit. (b) The phenomenon of prescience, of course, supports the claim of prophetic insight, and prophetic transcendence of time that is characteristic of revealed religion. (c) The perfect memory of the subconscious provides a scientific basis for the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. Who knows but that perfect memory, by which the self preserves the records of its own deeds, both good and evil, may prove to be "the worm that never dies," and conscience "the fire that is never quenched"? For, closely related to the law of memory is the law of conscience, the law by which men, knowing themselves to be unforgiven, voluntarily anticipate punishment for their own misdeeds: as Wordsworth has written:

For, like a plague, will memory break out,
And, in the blank and solitude of things,
Upon his spirit, with a fever's strength,
Will conscience prey.[10]

And there is another law which is closely linked up with those of memory and conscience, namely, the law of character, according to which a person's every thought and deed in the course of his lifetime, makes an indelible impress upon his moral character. (d) Again, the perfect perception, by the Subconscious, of the fixed laws of nature, supports the view that the life everlasting will not be a matter of stretched-out time, but essentially illumination or fulness of knowledge, that is, intuitive apprehension of the fulness of truth, beauty and goodness: in a word, eternal life will be wholeness or holiness. (3) The phenomena of suggestion and autosuggestion remind us that all men have been endowed by their Creator with psychic powers designed to be of great value to them in maintaining physical and mental health, if they will but utilize these powers as they should. It is still just as true as it ever was that as a man thinketh in his heart, so he is. (4) All such phenomena as psychokinesis, levitation, ectoplasms, phantasms, etc., serve to support the view of the primacy of mind or thought in the totality of being. In the possessing and functioning of these powers of thought energy, thought projection, and thought materialization, man, it is contended, again reveals the spark of the Infinite that is in him, and thus himself gives evidence of having been created "in the image of God." For is not the Cosmos itself, according to Biblical teaching, a constitution of the Divine Will, a projection of the Divine Spirit, an embodiment of the Divine Thought as expressed by the Divine Word? Psa. 33:6, 9—"By the word of Jehovah were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth. . . .For he spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." (Cf. Gen. 1:3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 20, 24, 26, 28, etc.; Psa. 148:1-6; Heb. 11:3; 2 Pet. 3:5-7.) Biblical teaching is simply that the Will of God, as expressed by His Word, and actualized by His Spirit, is the constitution (that which constitutes) of our universe both physical and moral. (And why, pray, should Biblical teaching be ignored in the present-day schoolroom just because it is in, or from, the Bible?) Thus it will be seen, from the material presented in the foregoing paragraphs, that the phenomena of the Subconscious all go to prove the independence, transcendence, persistence, and imperishability of the human person, and therefore support the spiritualistic (as against the materialistic) view of man's origin, nature, and destiny.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]J. Jastrow, The Subconscious, pp. 95, 99. (Houghton Mifflin, 1916.)

[2]E.R. Groves, Understanding Yourself, p. 172. (Greenberg, 1935.)

[3]Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 231, 137. Fifth Impression. Trans. from the French by F.L. Pogson. (Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1928.)

[4]Roger J. Williams, The Human Frontier, p. 182. (Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1946.)

[5]Thomson J. Hudson, Ph.D., LL.D., The Law of Psychic Phenomena, Thirty-second Edition, p. 156. (McClurg, Chicago, 1909.)

[6]Quoted by Hamlin Garland, Forty Years of Psychic Research, pp. 379-380; see also pp. 261-265. (Macmillan, 1937.)

[7]Charles Richet, Thirty Years of Psychic Research, pp. 496-597. Trans. from the French by Stanley DeBrath. (Macmillan, 1923.)

[8]T.J. Hudson, op. cit., pp. 289, 291.

[9]Hudson, ibid., pp. 293-294.

[10]Wordsworth, "Excursion."

## X. The social dimension of the human being is that which is largely the product of environmental factors.

1. On the relative importance of heredity and environment in the life of the human being, A.E. Wiggam has written as follows:

> Nearly all the happiness and nearly all the misery of the world are due, not to environment, but to heredity: the differences among men are, in the main, due to differences in the germ cells from which they are born.[1]

These words were written some thirty years ago. At about the same time, Dr. John B. Watson, then a professor of psychology, was writing in diametrically opposite vein, as follows:

> Give me a dozen healthy infants well formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in, and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any kind of specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant, chief, and yes, even beggarman and thief, regardless of talents, peculiarities, tendencies, abilities, vocations and race of his ancestors. . . .There is no such thing as inheritance of capacity, talent, temperament, mental constitution and characteristics.[2]

(Dr. Watson, it will be remembered, repudiated the traditional concept of thought, describing it as nothing more than subvocal speech. This caused Will Durant to quip that Dr. Watson "had made up his larynx that he did not have a mind." Watson's Behaviorism has now gone the way of Dianetics, Hadacol, and "Kilroy was here." It has always been a matter of amazement to this author that any intelligent person could "swallow" such a shallow concept.)

The foregoing two excerpts represent the extreme positions taken a few years ago in the heredity-versus-environment feud which was raging at that time. Today scientists seem to be generally agreed that there is a constant interdependence of heredity and environment in the development of the human being.

2. Those factors of the human organism generally regarded as inherited are the following: physique and physiology (the entire human body, its mechanisms and processes; temperament (emotional range and intensity, that is, emotional tonicity and fluctua-

tion: children of very different temperaments are often born to the same parents); general mental endowment (general intelligence: no amount of training can transform a moron into a genius; idiots have an I.Q. range of 0 to 25; imbeciles, 25 to 50, and morons, 50 to 75); special mental aptitudes and abilities, such as facility with numbers, capacity for spatial and visual imagery, word familiarity, ability to memorize rote material, musical ability, mechanical ability, etc. Mozart, at the age of four, amazed his family by going up into the garret and playing the spinet, without having received any instruction; and some of his compositions were written in a childish hand at the age of five. Samuel Rzeszewski moved his chessmen to a world championship before he was ten. There is probably a genetic factor involved also in personality traits. Geneticists seem to agree that no feature of personality is devoid of hereditary influence, but that culture plays the dominant role, of course, in the development of personality traits.

3. On the subject of RACE, science gives us the following well established conclusions: (a) It is impossible, in undertaking a study of "purity" of races, to determine what the criteria of "purity" shall be; (b) granting that a "pure" race may have existed in the early history of man, subsequent history shows that in the course of the centuries races have become so fused through war, conquest, slavery, migration, and commerce, that no "pure" race can be said to exist today; (c) in determining racial origins and affiliations physically, hair form and eye color are known to be the most stable genetic factors (such factors as body-build, skin color, facial features, etc., are exceedingly variable); (d) wide physical variability prevails from individual to individual within each separate race, and even within such a small group as a clan or tribe; (e) such racial differences as do exist are primarily cultural rather than physical or biological; (f) no such thing as the inherent mental superiority or inferiority of any one race, in relation to any other, exists in fact; (g) most important of all, the over-all psychic unity of mankind is an incontrovertible fact. "All the fundamental traits of the psychic make-up of man anywhere are present everywhere."[3] Most anthropologists accept the existence of three original human groups: the Mongoloid, the Caucasoid, and the Negroid. Some add the Composite (Indonesian); others, the Amerindian, etc.

4. Personality is the product of the interplay of heredity, group life, and culture, and the personal reaction to all these factors. (a) Personality "is neither exclusively mental nor exclusively neural. The organization entails the operation of both body and mind, inextricably fused into a personal unity."[4] The social environment, which is so important to personality, is made up of two general factors, namely, group interaction and culture. (b) Group interaction—a term used by sociologists to indicate person-to-person relationships, as distinguished from standardized ideas and habits common to a group—is characteristic of human life in all cultures, in all ages. "Man," said Aristotle, "is by nature a political

animal," that is, a dweller in a polis (the Greek city-state), hence a social being. Group relationships are usually differentiated into in-group and out-group relationships. This differentiation is based on the obvious human tendency to be friendly toward those whom we identify with our own particular "kind," and to manifest unfavorable attitudes (indifference, scorn, suspicion, or outright hostility) toward those who are not "of us." Thus we characterize certain persons as "Negroes," "Jews," "Gentiles," "foreigners," etc., and deal with them, not as persons, but as representatives of their respective groups. It is a group characteristic to make a profound distinction between members and nonmembers and to treat the two classes differently. This in-group and out-group consciousness has been prolific of misunderstanding and strife in all ages. Again, the differentiation of groups as primary (characterized by intimacy of contact) and secondary (characterized by casualness of contact) has recently been introduced into sociological literature. Primary groups include especially the family, the play group of children, and the neighborhood group of elders. Secondary groups take in all those various clubs, societies, associations, etc., into which individuals are attracted by common aspirations and interests. Types of social control are two in number: informal (public opinion, gossip, social ostracism: cf. Main Street, by Sinclair Lewis) and formal (government, police, and the courts). Undoubtedly the most influential of all groups in human society, in the development of personality, is the family. (c) Culture is best defined as the sum total of standardized behavior patterns which are transmitted by learning from generation to generation. Always confronting the child at birth is a ready-made culture and to its influence he is bound to submit in some measure. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, the first requirement for a society of any kind is a dwelling-place: communities must function in a definite geographical area (territory). Community life, moreover, is an important factor in the building of personality: the person naturally tends to resemble the community in which he lives. The three general community types existing today are the open country neighborhood, the village, and the great metropolitan area (the city and its suburbs). The last-named is the outstanding social phenomenon of our time. Statistics prove that present-day concentration of population in urban areas has been productive of the spread of vice and crime, neuroses, insanity and suicide. Urban centers also show an accelerated death rate, over rural areas. On the other hand, urban life does afford, of course, special advantages in the form of greater educational, artistic, and economic (cultural in general) opportunities. Geography always has much to do with the economic character of community life. The village has existed throughout all ages, from the earliest prehistoric "settlement" down to the present time. Associations are prolific disseminators of various phases of cultural life. An association is defined as a more or less casual and temporary, and strictly voluntary, grouping of persons on the basis of a common interest. They are frequently subsidiary agen-

cies which help to carry out specific function of a social institution. They may be intellectual, educational, artistic, economic, eleemosynary, or religious in function, or they may be merely social, fraternal, civic or recreational. The ideas and ideals of these associations certainly do exert great influence upon their members. Social institutions, on the other hand, are those which have existed from earliest times, and in the vast majority of cultures, simply because they have been found to be effective means of satisfying basic human needs. These basic needs have shown themselves historically to be the following: the need for self-preservation and for the propagation of the species; the need to make a living for self and family; the need for social organization (law and order) and some form of leadership; and the need for religious expression and worship, arising from man's awareness of his creaturehood and consequent dependence on higher Power or Powers. [The historians, Wallbank and Taylor, list the basic needs of man as follows: the need to make a living, the need for law and order, the need for social organization, the need for knowledge and learning, the need for self-expression (hence, art), and the need for religious expression.][5] Corresponding to these fundamental categories of human need, we may classify social institutions as follows: socio-biological (the family); economic (barter; then about the 7th century B.C., coinage and commerce; finally, the corporation and the guild or labor union); political (clan, tribe, nation, and today the national state); religious (the temple, the synagogue, and the church). Social change is brought about, of course, by many factors; in our day especially by the rise of technology and the corresponding Industrial Revolution.

Man's predilection for life in groups is more satisfactorily explained on the basis of need and habit than on the ground of a hypothetical gregarious "instinct." Civil society is a necessary complement of conjugal and domestic society. It is necessary to provide the division of labor sufficient to meet man's daily needs; no single family could be expected to turn out a farmer, a clothier, a groceryman, a schoolteacher, a lawyer, a physician, a clergyman, a dentist, and engineer, etc. With respect to the demands even of ordinary life, the family is no longer self-sufficient. Social intercourse is necessary also to bring out the latent powers of the human personality, and to provide an outlet for the higher activities of the human being—intellectual, esthetic, moral and religious. Indeed, is not progress to be defined by the totality of means provided by a given culture for the enrichment of the individual personality? And is not civilization to be measured by man's substitution of reason and law for brute force in the management of his affairs?

## FOOTNOTES

[1] A.E. Wiggam, The New Decalogue of Science, p. 42. (Bobbs, Merrill, Indianapolis, 1923.)

[2]J.B. Watson, Behaviorism, p. 82; see also pp. 74 ff. (Norton, New York, 1925.)

[3]Alexander Goldenweiser, Anthropology, p. 32. (Crofts, New York, 1946.)

[4]G.W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, pp. 48-50. (Holt, New York, 1937.)

[5]Walter Wallbank and Alastair M. Taylor, Civilization Past and Present, Vol. I, pp. 7-9. (Scott, Foresman, Chicago.)

## XI. Man is specified as man by his power of reason.

By "specified" is meant here set apart (i.e., from the lower animals) as a distinct species. By the phrase, "power of reason," is meant the thought processes of which a human being is capable. Biological science supports this proposition by its designation of man as homo sapiens (from the Latin homo, "a human being," "a man," and sapiens, present participle of sapio, "sensible," "knowing," "wise," etc.) It should be made clear at this point that in ethics we are studying (1) not the behavior of the lower animal (commonly called the brute) either as it is or as it might become by some process of self-development; (2) not the conduct of man as he may have been in dim prehistoric times but (3) the conduct of man as he is, that is, as he is known historically and personally. Nor does the study of mentally abnormal persons fall within the scope of the science of ethics: that study belongs primarily to abnormal psychology. Ethics proper deals only with the conduct of "normal" persons. Throughout this text we try to speak, as much as possible, in the language of common sense: by "normal" persons, therefore, we mean those who make up the everyday society in which we live—Mr. Average Man.

Man can be defined specifically only in the light of those operational concepts which have peculiar reference to him as man. Our scientific knowledge of the human being, writes Dr. Alexis Carrel, must be based largely on operational concepts, that is, concepts which depend for their preciseness on the operations by which they are acquired. (By "operation," "operational," etc., is meant a judgment, based on shared experience, not of what an entity appears to be, but of how it acts. In any area, of course, where only physical and chemical methods are employed, only physical and chemical results will be obtained.) Dr. Carrel then goes on to show that the operational concepts relating to man may be divided roughly into three classes as determined by the "levels of organization" in his being: namely, (1) those which are specific of him, that is, characteristic of man alone—the psychological concepts; (2) those which he shares with all living beings—the biological and physiological concepts; and (3) those of physics, chemistry, and mechanics, those which he shares with the inanimate creation—the physiochemi-

cal concepts. Dr. Carrel proceeds to show that an incalculable amount of error has crept into scientific thinking as a result of the unwarranted mingling of the concepts peculiar to one dimension of the human being with those specific of another. He concludes with the following wise counsel:

> Each system of concepts can be legitimately used only in the domain of the science to which it belongs. The concepts of physics, chemistry, physiology and psychology are applicable to the superposed levels of the bodily organization. But the concepts appropriate at one level should not be mingled indiscriminately with those specific of another. For example, the second law of thermodynamics, the law of dissipation of free energy, indispensable at the molecular level, is useless at the psychological level, where the principles of least effort and maximum pleasure are applied. The concepts of capillarity and of osmotic tensions do not throw any light on the problems pertaining to consciousness. It is nothing but word play to explain a psychological phenomenon in terms of cell physiology or of quantum mechanics. However, the mechanistic physiologists of the nineteenth century, and their disciples who still linger with us, have committed such an error in endeavoring to reduce man entirely to physical chemistry. This unjustified generalization of the results of sound experience is due to overspecialization. Concepts should not be misused. They must be kept in their place in the hierarchy of sciences.[1]

All this is equivalent to saying that man is to be interpreted specifically (i.e., as man) in the light of those concepts having reference to the powers which are characteristic of him alone, and not those having reference to the powers which he shares with the lower orders; in a word, that he is to be interpreted specifically in the light of those concepts which have reference to his psychical, and especially, his metapsychical, powers.

All the attempts which have been made in recent years to reduce man to a kind of "glorified brute" have ended—as all such attempts are bound to do—in complete failure, for the obvious reason that man is more than a mere animal. Even the most ardent evolutionist admits—at least implicitly—that man has evolved beyond the brute stage: that is to say, he is animal plus, and it is the plus that makes him man. A dog is considered "smart" when, at the command of his master, he goes out and brings in the evening paper, carrying it in his mouth; but no master would be silly enough to expect his dog to sit down and read the paper to him. An old eccentric or recluse might will her fortune to the establishment of a home for homeless cats, but she would not be so silly as to try to appoint her favorite Tom as the executor of the will, nor would the judge accept him as such. Carlyle once remarked that both Newton

and Newton's dog saw the apple fall: the necessary inference from this comparison is too obvious to be overlooked. Man is specifically mind, soul, spirit, etc., that is to say, that part of the organism is man which is essentially noncorporeal. Or, as one writer has put it: "Spatial predicates do not apply to minds or ideas."[2]

This tendency to look upon man as a sort of "glorified brute," which shows itself in so much of the popular literature of our day, is largely responsible for the confusion which exists in ethical theory and practice. Indeed it is frequently offered as an alibi for looseness in morals, especially sex morality ("erotic vagrancy"); we should not hesitate, we are told, to give "free expression" to our "natural" (by which is meant "animal") impulses and desires. And thus human morality is prostituted into "barnyard morality," which, if universalized, would destroy the race. Devotion to this cult of "self-expression" may explain why some of our modern writers have expressed themselves in such illiterate language, as, for example, Theodore Dreiser; it may explain, too, some of the terrible gobs hanging on the walls of our art galleries today. They are supposed to be artistic expressions, but one wonders, of what? We commend Oedipus' oracle to all those who still cling to this brute interpretation of man: "May'st thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art!" Precisely speaking, however, because man is specified by his power of reason, only those acts are to be regarded as "natural" to him which are sanctioned by his better judgment or right reason. That is to say, because man has advanced beyond the mere animal level (as the evolutionists would have it stated), he is obligated by his very nature to use his reason to keep his animal appetites and passions under proper control.

In relation to his present environment, man is set apart from the lower animals chiefly by his power of reason, that is to say, by his thought processes. This power of reason by which man is specified includes the following subpowers:

1. That of thinking logically, that is, in propositional terms. In the ascending order of their complexity, the operations of the intellect are, as we have noted heretofore, simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning (both inductive and deductive).

2. That of thinking in abstract terms, e.g., by means of symbols, such as letters, words, figures, etc., to which meaning is attached: and even by means of word-symbols such as "justice," "freedom," "truth," "beauty," "goodness," etc., those which have as their referents (to use the language of semantics) not concrete things, but various types of relations. Man's culture is the product of his power of symbolizing, as embodied in language, art, myth, and ritual. He is capable not only of perception, but of conception as well; his power of conceptualization raises him above enslavement to the space-time dimension in which he is now environed. [E.g., the word "horse," as such, as a combination of letters, is

only a symbol. But every symbol has its referent; every figure is a figure of something. Hence, the referent of the word-symbol "horse" may be an actual horse now being perceived by physical vision, i.e., the percept (the particular). Or its referent may be the totality of the essential characteristics (properties) of every individual of the class of horses that ever did or ever will exist, i.e., the concept (the universal). Thus human thought, by the process of conceptualizing, outruns experience and even transcends time and space.] Anthropologists generally agree, I think, that man's inherent ability to attach word-symbols to his concepts and thus to construct language for purposes of communicating thought is the one factor which, above all others, has enabled him to drive forward throughout the ages to his present level of being and culture. As Gillin writes, "By far the most ubiquitous type of symbol system used by human beings is spoken language." Again, "The ability to speak articulate language is, apparently, a feature in which the human species is unique."[3] Susanne Langer says:

> Language is, without a doubt, the most momentous and at the same time the most mysterious product of the human mind. Between the clearest animal call of love or warning or anger, and a man's least, trivial word, there lies a whole day of Creation.[4]

"Language," writes Sapir, "is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols." He then goes on to state that language is not exclusively a psychophysical phenomenon: the so-called "organs of speech" (lungs, larynx, palate, nose, tongue, and lips), he says,

> are no more to be thought of as primary organs of speech than are the fingers to be considered as essentially organs of piano-playing or the knee as the organ of prayer.[5]

In a word, these are organs of speech if and when the person (the mind or will) uses them as such. Sapir concludes:

> Hence, we have no recourse but to accept language as a fully formed functional system within man's psychic or "spiritual" constitution. We cannot define it as an entity in psychophysical terms alone, however much the psychophysical basis is essential to its functioning in the individual.[6]

Language is not only the medium by which conceptual thought is developed; it is also the means of making such thought communicable. Culture follows communication, and is enhanced by progress in facility of communication.

It is indeed unfortunate that so many American "go-getters" acquire contempt for abstract thinking: for all such persons figures exist only for computing profit and loss. They are prone

to overlook the fact that little or nothing ever exists in the concrete unless it has first existed in the abstract (i.e., in theory, as plans and specifications exist before they are embodied in the proposed building itself). Practically all scientific theories—including the more recent famous Theory of Relativity—existed in human thought before they were empirically verified. All scientists would improve their general approach to knowledge, and avoid a great deal of error and confusion, if they would only acquire in advance the discipline that is afforded by the study of metaphysics.

Incidentally, it is significant, I think, that no purely naturalistic theory of the origin of language has ever been formulated that is adequate to account for the complexity of the finished product. The onomatopoeic theory, for example, namely, that human language had its beginning in man's imitation of the cries of animals, is, on the face of it, absurd: obviously, the total number of words in any human vocabulary that are directly or indirectly traceable to animal sounds is exceedingly limited. Equally inadequate is the interjectional theory, that is, the view that human language originated in expressions of subjective feeling: equally few are the interjections (or any and all words that express emotion) in the totality of any language. Certainly language owes its origin in some inscrutable manner to the processes of the human mind. In the Biblical account, of course, the first use of language by man is attributed to divine inspiration (cf. Gen. 2:18-20).

Again, man's development of the science of pure mathematics is perhaps the most obvious example of his power of thinking in abstract symbols. The anthropological theory that man first learned to count (in terms of tens, of course) by using his fingers and thumbs as "counters" would appear to be a reasonable explanation. Indeed, "counters" are used in the classroom today to make young children acquainted with the number series. We can be sure, however, that "counters" (marbles, pebbles, etc.) were never used to multiply 999,999 by 999,999. Pure mathematics in its more complex forms must have been the product of human thought and of human thought in its most abstract form. Mathematics is, of course, like verbal speech, one of the sciences of communication. The same is basically true of music: as everyone knows, music has its foundation in mathematical relationships—a fact which the Greek philosopher-mystic, Pythagoras, discovered in the long, long ago. Man has what might be called indefinite (not infinite) power to think and live in mathematical, and hence metaphysical, terms.

In this connection, the following article by Clifton Fadiman is both interesting and pertinent:

> I should like to set before you what may seem a crackpot notion: that the best place to teach philosophy is not the university but the elementary school; and that the ideal student of philosophy is the child from 8 to 12. It is

he, not you or I, who wonders about the world: why it was made, who made it, what makes people different from animals, how we think, what it means to be brave or good or truthful, and so on. These are basically philosophical questions.

I am not asking that the child be turned into a philosopher at the age of 12. All I suggest is that somewhere along the route his fresh, active, inquiring mind be led to wonder about the universe, the world, his place in nature, and some of the statements that wise men have made about these matters. My conviction is that we have become a people who can do almost anything, but who are baffled when asked to consider the origins, meanings and consequences of our actions.

This national weakness in abstract thought is partly the result of our never having been confronted in our formative years with its content and its fascinations. The elementary school could do much to remedy this deficiency.[7]

As someone else has wisely remarked: Education should be something more than an adjunct to the production line.

3. That of thinking creatively, that is, in terms of the possible and of the ideal. Creative imagination lies at the root of practically all of man's achievements. It is popularly regarded, of course, as confined to the realm of art; that is, as finding its outlet in artistic productions. This it surely does: as G.K. Chesterton has put it, "Art is the signature of man." Commenting on the "myth" of the cave man that has been built up by the anthropologists, that is, the notion that this Stone Age creature devoted most of his time to the business of clobbering his wives, and, after them, his neighbors both male and female, says Chesterton, those who are responsible for this picture never ask, What did the cave man do in the cave? "People have been interested," he comments, "in everything about the cave man except what he did in the cave." He goes on to emphasize the fact that there is some real evidence on this point. What actually has been found in these caves is not the horrible gory club, not skeletons of slaughtered wives and neighbors, but quite the opposite, namely, polychrome paintings on the cave walls, handsomely carved batons, weapons and instruments for hunting and fishing. What has been found in these caves, says G.K., is evidence to show that the cave man "was not only an artist but a naturalist, the sort of naturalist who is really natural." The lessons to be learned from these facts, especially from the pictures that have remained, is that they testify

to something that is absolute and unique; that belongs to man and to nothing else except man; that is a difference of kind and not a difference of degree. A monkey does

not draw clumsily and a man cleverly; a monkey does not begin the art of representation and a man carry it to perfection. A monkey does not do it at all; he does not begin to do it at all; he does not begin to begin to do it at all. A line of some kind is crossed [from brute to man] before the first faint line [of art] can begin.

Again, Chesterton writes,

> . . . the simplest lesson to learn in the cavern of the colored pictures. . . is the simple truth that man does differ from the brutes in kind and not in degree; and the proof of it is here; that it sounds like a truism to say that the most primitive man drew a picture of a monkey and that it sounds like a joke to say that the most intelligent monkey drew a picture of a man. Something of division and disproportion has appeared: and it is unique. Art is the signature of man.[8]

Of course, art is the product of man's creative imagination. We must not overlook the fact, however, that this same creative imagination is equally as responsible for his science as for his art. The scientist, in his laboratory, envisions what might be, under such-and-such conditions; he proceeds to set up the conditions; then he performs the experiment and thus demonstrates whether his theory is true or false. Thus it is—by the trial-and-error method—that science has attained the level of achievement which it exhibits in our day. Moreover, man's creative imagination lies at the root of all his inventions; scarecely an invention (tool) is known which did not exist in theory before it existed in fact. We are right, therefore, in affirming that man's creative imagination lies back of all his technological advances.

4. That of thinking purposefully. Man has again and again demonstrated his ability to select ends or goals, the realization of which may lie far ahead in time, and to direct his activities unceasingly, and by the adaptation and utilization of means, toward the ultimate attainment of such ends. As for the lower animals, it is impossible to determine whether their activities are at times consciously purposeful or merely instinctive; but human activity is invariably purposeful.

5. That of thinking in terms of values. Because he is a rational and moral being, man has ever demonstrated his propensity to evaluate, hence to coin such words as "truth," "honor," "beauty," "justice," "goodness," and the like—words which have no meaning whatever for a lower animal. (Surely no man would be so foolish as to try to teach the Ten Commandments or the principles of calculus to old Dobbin or Rover!) There are many who hold that this sense of values is innate: Aristotle, for example, had this to say:

> It is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the

association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.[9]

Scholastic philosophers likewise have always maintained that the sense of right and wrong, of good and bad, is inherent in all men, whatever their condition in life or level of culture; that in fact no people ever existed lacking this elementary sense of moral discrimination. Other thinkers hold that, on the contrary, man's sense of values is strictly a product of his reason and derives from his own social experience. Be that as it may, man obviously is differentiated from the lower animals by his sense of values, that sense which lies at the base of all human society, morality, and law. As determined, moreover, by his appreciation or lack of appreciation, as the case may be, of the higher values of life, man has a range of potentialities, either for good or for evil, immeasurably greater than that of any other creature: he can wallow in the gutter like a pig, or he can walk up among the stars like a god: indeed according to religious thought, his potentiality for good stops nothing short of the ultimate attainment of holiness (i.e., wholeness or perfection) which is said to be his natural and proper ultimate intrinsic end. (It should be added, however, that his attainment of this end will depend upon his conformity to the necessary means of attaining it—the spiritual life here and now.)

6. The power of laughter, based on a sense of humor, is another characteristic of man exclusively, one which in a special sense distinguishes him from the lower animals. In this connection, the following from the pen of Richard Armour, written when Malenkov was presiding over the Kremlin oligarchy, is especially pertinent:

> An American fighter pilot, shot down behind the North Korean lines, imprisoned for two and a half years, starved until he weighed barely 100 pounds, and beaten time and again to the edge of unconsciousness, made three extremely revealing statements when he got home. The first: "I never saw any evidence of a sense of humor on the part of the Chinese and North Korean communists." The second: "One thing that made it possible for us to stick it out was our seeing the funny side of things." The third: "How about the fellows who couldn't laugh? They're dead."
>
> This ability to see the funny side of things isn't exclusively American. The British and French and Australians and Turks and Greeks and many others have it. But it seems to be more characteristic of those on our side than of those against us. The stern, unsmiling faces of Malik, Mao and Malenkov are the outward signs of an inner attitude toward life. The sourpuss is as much a trademark of Communism as the hammer and sickle.

> Dictators, whether communist or fascist, are invariably humorless men. And with humorlessness goes inflexibility, self-righteousness, cruelty, disdain for the less fortunate. One of the few pictures of Hitler laughing is the famous one showing him dancing his little jig in the Campeigne Forest after the French surrender in 1940. But his laughter, typically, was fiendish, self-gratifying laughter at the expense of others. Can you imagine Hitler splitting his sides at a joke of which he was the butt? Or Mussolini? Or Stalin? Or, today, Peron or Malenkov? Such laughter is self-critical, and dictators don't enjoy—and can't afford—criticism from any quarter, even from themselves.
>
> But if Malenkov never dies laughing, he may die being laughed at. For the sense of humor that sustained the American fighter pilot is useful not only for defense but for offense. The rapier of wit, as Abe Lincoln and Mark Twain and Will Rogers proved, may strike at vital parts that are out of reach of the bludgeon. Dictators fear laughter and know that people who keep their wit as well as their wits about them—as the Dutch did under the Nazis, and the Poles now do under the Communists—are hard to subjugate. A sense of humor may be the secret weapon of the democracies.
>
> Laughter is healthy, wholesome and civilized. Laughing at our sometimes desperate circumstances helps keep us sane. Laughter at our sometimes overproud, sometimes overpetty selves helps keep us down to—and up to—human size. After all, the ability to laugh is one of the distinctions between man and the animals. It may also be one of the distinctions between free people and slaves.[10]

Certainly, a well-developed sense of humor is, as we shall point out later, one of the marks of a mature mind. The sense of humor, and the power of laughter which accompanies it, seem to be lost only when men cease to be truly human and become fanatics crazed by the sense of their own indispensability.

RECAPITULATION: The powers which set man apart from the lower animals are, in particular, (1) his power of thinking in abstract terms, (2) his creative imagination, (3) his sense of values, and (4) his power of laughter.

Finally, by virtue of his power of reason, man's place in the natural order is that of lord tenant of the earth. (1) Reason has been defined as the "spark of the Infinite" in man; it is that power which impels him to seek to penetrate the meaning of the universe and of his life within it; it is the power which qualifies him for natural dominion over all the lower orders; it is the power which

has enabled him, little by little, to gain control over his natural environment. In the words of the Hebrew Psalmist:

> When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers,
> The moon and the stars, which thou hast ordained,
> What is man, that thou art mindful of him?
> And the son of man, that thou visitest him?
> For thou hast made him but little lower than God,
> And crownest him with glory and honor.
> Thou makest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands;
> Thou hast put all things under his feet:
> All sheep and oxen,
> Yea, and the beasts of the field,
> The birds of the heavens, and the fish of the sea,
> Whatsoever passeth through the paths of the sea.[11]

(2) According to Biblical teaching, this dominion was vested in man by the Creator Himself:

> And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them; and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the heavens, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.[12]

After all, what is the story of man's development of his science throughout the centuries—that science by means of which he has gradually "subdued" the forces of his physical environment—but his own natural spontaneous fulfillment of this divine command?
(3) "Astronomically speaking," said someone, "man is insignificant—hardly a speck on a speck of the totality of the cosmos." To which reply was made: "Yes, but astronomically speaking, man is the astronomer." Despite fulminations to the contrary, our world is definitely anthropocentric, that is, in the sense that every person is unavoidably the center of his own experienced world. Moreover, man apparently is the only being who strives to inquire into the mysteries of the world around him and of his own life in that world.
(4) History shows that man has, from the beginning of his existence upon earth, assumed proprietary right over all the subhuman orders and utilized them for preserving himself in physical existence. He has done this, moreover, naturally and by natural right. For if he has, by creation, the right to life, then surely he has also the right to the means of sustaining life; and what other means have "Nature and Nature's God" provided for his sustenance than the plant and animal orders? Again as Aristotle has put it: "The business of nature is to furnish food to that which is born."[13] The corresponding obligation (for with every right there is also an obligation) which has been placed upon man himself is, of course, that he shall eat his daily bread "in the sweat of his face" (Gen. 3:19), that is to say,

as the fruit of honest labor, mental or physical. For a man to fail in this obligation on his part is for him to become a parasite upon society. Again these are just matters of ordinary experience and common sense.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Alexis Carrel, Man the Unknown, pp. 32-34. (Harper, New York, 1935.)

[2]Isaiah Berlin, The Age of Enlightenment, p. 244, a volume of the "Mentor Philosophers" Series.

[3]John Gillin, The Ways of Men: An Introduction to Anthropology, p. 451. (Appleton-Century, New York, 1948.)

[4]Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 83. (A Mentor Book, New York, 1942.)

[5]Edward Sapir, Language, pp. 8, 9. (A Harvest Book, published by Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1949.)

[6]Ibid., pp. 9, 10.

[7]Clifton Fadiman, from The Instructor, as reprinted in Reader's Digest.

[8]G.K. Cheaterton, The Everlasting Man, pp. 1-44. (Doubleday Image Book, New York, 1955.)

[9]Aristotle, Politics, I, 2, 1253a. Jowett translation. (A Modern Library book, Random House, New York, 1943.)

[10]Richard Armour, The Saturday Evening Post, December 12, 1953.

[11]Psalms 8:3-8.

[12]Gen. 1:27-28.

[13]Aristotle, op. cit., I, 10, 1258a.

## XII. The appropriate specific designation for a human being is that of "person."

1. Personalistic psychology demands more attention than is given it in our day. Psychologists seem to have been blind to the fact in recent years that before there can be such a thing as behavior or adaptation there must be a something—an entity—capable of behaving and of adapting itself. Just as before there can be a thought, there must be a thinker; before there can be love, there must be a lover; before there can be a crime, there must be an entity capable of becoming a criminal: so before there can be activity of any kind, there must be a being who is capable of acting—activity is never carried on by a nonentity. In like manner, before there can be such a thing as "personality," there must be a person who is the carrier, so to speak, of the reflexes, habits, traits, dispositions, ideas, memories, etc., which go to make up personality. Personality is not something floating around in a vacuum—or in the stratosphere. Hence, one of the pressing needs today is a psychology which returns to the concept of man as a person and treats him as such—for the simple reason that man is a person. No sane human being ever speaks of a plant, bird, beast, or any individual of the lower orders as a "person." "Person" is the designation that is universally applied to human beings and only to human beings. As Dr. Glenn Negley writes:

> The individual is, then, both a Physical Man and a Social Man, and he cannot ignore either area of his existence. It is precisely the adjustment of these two factors into a harmonious unity that describes what is meant by personality, and the final category of the Individual aspect may be called Person.[1]

As we have learned, man is specified as man by his power of reason. Hence Boethius' classic definition of a person as "an individual substance of a rational nature" is perhaps the best that has ever been formulated.[2]

2. The person is the carrier of all those elements which go to make up his personality. Personality, like the organism, is a kind of hierarchical organization. The elements of which it is composed, named in the ascending order of their complexity, are reflexes,

habits, attitudes, dispositions, traits, etc. Back of all these interrelated and integrated elements, however, and subsuming them all, is the entity, the human being, the person. Dr. Gordon W. Allport writes:

> There is one law to which there are no exceptions: every personality develops continually from the stage of infancy until death, and throughout this span it persists even though changes.[3]

Allport summarizes the arguments put forward by personalists to support his interpretation, as follows:

> 1. Without the co-ordinating concept of Person (or some equivalent, such as Self or Ego), it is impossible to account for, or even to depict, the interaction of mental processes upon one another. Memory affects perception, desire influences meaning, meaning determines action, and action shapes memory; so on, indefinitely. This constant interpenetration takes place within some boundary, and the boundary is the Person; it occurs for some purpose, and the purpose can be represented only in terms of service to the Person. 2. The phenomenon of mental organization can have no significance unless it is viewed as taking place within a definite framework. Mental states do not organize themselves nor lead independent existences; their arrangement always constitutes part of a larger arrangement—the personal life. "Everything mental is a totality or a part of a totality." 3. Such concepts as function, adaptation, use, and adjustment are of no significance without reference to the Person. An adaptation must be the adapting of something to something; so with adjustment. Use and function likewise imply an interested personal agent. 4. Above all, it is in immediate experience that the case for a central co-ordinating agent becomes unanswerable. The central position of Self is implied in all states of consciousness. Descartes' dictum Cogito ergo sum can hardly be refuted. This argument, though cast in metaphysical terms, has psychological support in the vivid sense of the self present in experiences of strain, conflict, and choice. 5. Another argument stresses the creative properties of the Person or Self. Every system of thought originates with someone. The most objective of scientists, no less than philosophers, ultimately create or "will" the canons of their own science. Disagreements result in the last analysis from the individuality of their own minds. So too with psychologists. If they embrace a nomothetic positivism and empty the personality of all its bothersome individuality, they do so ultimately because they want to. Thus a prior act of volition is responsible for the austere limits they place upon their own speculation. We all build our scientific world from the symbols

taken from our own personalities. Which then is the prior fact, the creative person or the creed he creates?[4]

Personalistic psychologists, Allport continues, agree that

> psychology whose task it is to treat the whole of mental life cannot possibly discharge its duty without relating the states and processes it studies to the Person who is their originator, carrier, and regulator. There can be no adjustment without someone to adjust, no organization without an organizer, no memory without self-continuity, no learning without a change in the person, no knowledge without a knower, and no valuing without someone possessed of desires and the capacity to evaluate. Psychology must take seriously James's dictum that every mental operation occurs in a "personal form," and must take it more seriously than James himself did.
>
> The Person, like the Self, is persistent; changes as it develops; is unique; is many-sided; is the groundwork of all its own experiences; and is related to its physical and social environment.[5]

3. The essential properties of a person are self-consciousness and self-determination. (1) A property is defined as that characteristic without which a thing would not be what it is. Hence, lacking self-consciousness and self-determination, an entity or existent would not be a person but something else. (2) As a matter of fact, the person, however he is to be analyzed and defined, is self-evident, that is, evident to himself. To be sure, the animal is conscious; but the person is more—he is conscious of himself; he is at one and the same time subject and object, knower and the thing known. Only a person, therefore, is capable of originating and using what we call the personal pronouns, "I," "my," "me," etc. No matter how mysterious they may be in their applications, these are facts of ordinary experience and common sense. (3) The Self, of course, is a great mystery. Is the Self the same as the Person? Are "Self," "Ego," and "Person" all synonymous terms? Is the Self constituted of both body and mind, a body-mind (or spirit) unity? Or is it essentially mind or spirit having, or dwelling in, a body? Or is it, in the final analysis, to be equated with the Subconscious? Quoting again from Allport:

> To be sure, the sense of self is a peculiarly elusive datum for introspection. To catch it for direct examination in consciousness seems to James like trying to step on one's own shadow. In Brentano's terms, the Self, though ever present, is a matter of "secondary" awareness. Primarily I am conscious of the object to which I attend; a tone, a landscape, a menacing gesture; only secondarily am I aware that it is I who am apprehending, admiring, or fearing these objects.

> The situation becomes even more elusive when the Self is regarded not only as Knower (reflecting to itself somehow in a "secondary awareness") but also as the ground for that which is known. I not only know that it is I who perceive an object, but I feel that this object has some special significance for me. . . . The intimacy of the whole conscious process is baffling, a cause of consternation to philosophers and psychologists alike. The point is that this very intimacy is one of the chief arguments in support of personalistic psychology.[6]

(4) Again, self-consciousness involves freedom, or the power of self-determination—the intrinsic power of the Self to choose for itself, to determine its own acts. As J.R. Illingworth writes:

> Freedom of the will does not mean the ability to act without a motive, as some of its opponents still stupidly seem to suppose. But it does mean the ability to create or cooperate in creating our own motives, or to choose our motive, or to transform a weaker motive into a stronger by adding weights to the scale of our own accord, and thus to determine our conduct by our reason; whence it is now usually called the power of self-determination—a phrase to which St. Thomas very nearly approaches when he says, "Man is determined by a combination of reason and appetite, that is, by a desire whose object is consciously apprehended by the reason as an end to be attained, and he is therefore self-moved." For instance, I am hungry, and that is simply an animal appetite; but I am immediately aware of an ability to choose between gratifying my hunger with an unwholesome food because it is pleasant, or with an unpleasant food because it is wholesome, or abstaining from its gratification altogether for self-discipline or because the food before me is not my own. That is to say, I can present to my mind, on the occasion of appetite, pleasure, utility, goodness, as objects to be attained, and I can choose between them; nor is it to the point to say that I am determined by my character, for my character is only the momentum which I have gained by a number of past acts of choice, that is by my own past use of my freedom; and even so I am conscious that at the moment I can counteract my character, though morally certain that I have no intention so to do. This is briefly what we mean by free-will; and it is a fact of immediate and universal consciousness, that is, of my own consciousness, corroborated by the like experience of all other men. . . . For the sense of freedom is an immediate part of my consciousness. I cannot be conscious without it. I cannot tear it out. It lies at the very root of myself, and claims, with self-evidence, to be something sui generis, something unique. So obvious is this, that most even of those who regard it as

> a delusion are obligated to admit that it is a delusion from which there is no escape. Further, upon this sense of freedom all law and all morality depend. To deny this is to play with words. And law and morality abundantly verify the legitimacy of their basis by the progressive development in which they result. For you cannot gather figs of thistles, or a rational order of society from an irrational disease of mind. And, finally, the sense of freedom has maintained itself, from the dawn of history, against a spirit far more powerful than any which philosophy can raise—the spirit of remorse. What would humanity, age after age, have given to be free from remorse? Yet remorse still stares us in the face, overshadowing our hearts with sadness and driving its countless victims into madness, suicide, despair, and awful forebodings of the after-world. Men would have exorcised it if they could; but they cannot. And remorse is only a darker name for man's conviction of his own free-will.[7]

That is to say, no one can be prompted to feel remorse for something that he has done but by the conviction that he was free to act, in the given situation, otherwise than he did act. One who thinks himself to be necessitated (compelled) by factors internal or external (or both) in everything that he does, cannot logically feel remorse for anything that he does; under such a view he, the person, is simply not responsible for his deeds; in fact, they are not his deeds at all (except as performed, mechanically, by his body), but the deeds—if such a thing is thinkable—of those factors which necessitate them. This, of course, is not common sense—it is sheer nonsense. Hence, freedom of will is a necessary condition to moral action, a postulate essential to any system of ethical thought.

Forces of heredity and forces of environment do interact, of course, to develop the personality. But when some measure of maturity is reached the child begins to distinguish between the ME and the NOT-ME. This is the beginning of self-consciousness, the ability to say, "I," meaningfully: hence the personal pronouns. Moreover, when maturity is attained, and to the extent that it is attained, human action is determined not only by hereditary and environmental factors (all of which lie largely beyond the scope of empirical measurement), but also by the personal reaction. "The stronger motive always wins." Of course. But—why? Because the particular motive that turns out to be the stronger motive is the one which has the greater appeal to me. This is the power of choice in man: without this power, the power of the self to determine its own acts, there could be no morality, no democracy, no science as free inquiry. Personality is the most real thing in one's experience. and it attaches to the person (not to subhuman orders). The basis of all ethical thought is the conviction of the dignity and worth of the person.

Self-consciousness and self-determination are the essential properties of a person, that is, the characteristics without which a person would not be a person but an entity of inferior rank.

We conclude, therefore, as follows: (1) that man is specified (set apart as man) by his power of reason, his thought processes; (2) that he is appropriately designated specifically (i.e., as an individual of a distinct species) by the word "person"; (3) that a person is de facto the carrier of those elements which go to make up his personality. As stated above, personality is the most real thing in human experience: nothing can ever be quite so real to one as one's own thoughts, feelings, desires, and decisions. This again is simply a matter of experience and common sense.

We cannot emphasize too strongly that all ethical thought begins with the concept of the reality, dignity, and worth of the person, of the person as a person. As we have stated repeatedly, a man's theory and practice of morality is determined largely by his convictions regarding his own origin, nature, value, and destiny as a human being.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Glen Negley, The Organization of Knowledge, pp. 79-80. (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1942.)

[2]See Boethius, A Treatise Against Eutychus and Nestorius, III. Loeb Classical Library Edition, Boethius: The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy, p. 85. Translated by Stewart and Rand. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.)

[3]G.W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation, p. 102. (Holt, New York, 1937.)

[4]Ibid., pp. 550-551.

[5]Ibid., pp. 551, 552, 557.

[6]Ibid., p. 551, n.2.

[7]J.R. Illingworth, Personality, Human and Divine, pp. 33-35. (The Bampton Lectures for 1894, published by Macmillan, London, 1923. A small book, long out of print, but a classic in its field.)

## XIII. A person is a unity, a persistent unity, a unique unity, and a transcendent unity.

1. Every person is a unity. He is a unity in the sense that he is the product of the fusion of both corporeal and personal elements: of cells, tissues, organs and systems on the corporeal side; of reflexes, habits, traits, dispositions, attitudes, etc., on the personal side. As Illingworth writes:

> The fundamental characteristic of personality is self-consciousness, the quality in a subject of becoming an object to itself, or, in Locke's language, "considering itself as itself," and saying, "I am I." But as in the very act of becoming thus self-conscious I discover in myself desires, and a will, the quality of self-consciousness immediately involves that of self-determination, the power of making my desires an object of my will, and saying, "I will do what I desire." But we must not fall into the common error of regarding thought, desire, and will, as really separable in fact, because we are obliged for the sake of distinctness to give them separate names. They are three faculties or functions of one individual, and, though logically separable, interpenetrate each other, and are always more or less united in operation. I cannot, for instance, pursue a train of thought, however abstract, without attention, which is an act of will, and involves a desire to attend. I cannot desire, as distinct from merely feeling appetite, like an animal, without thinking of what I desire, and willing to attain it or to abstain from it. I cannot will without thinking of an object or purpose, and desiring its realization. There is, therefore, a synthetic unity in my personality or self; that is to say, not a mere numerical oneness, but a power of uniting opposite and alien attributes and characteristics with an intimacy which defies analysis.[1]

Some one hundred cases of so-called "dual personality" or "multiple personality" have been reported at different times in the history of man, the most celebrated of which perhaps was the case of Sally Beauchamp, as reported by Dr. Morton Prince, in his book, The Dissociation of a Personality. (The fictional counterpart is, of

course, the famous tale of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, by Robert Louis Stevenson.) Whatever significance these phenomena may have, they are no doubt best described as "instances of disconnected allotments of experiential data which only need reintegration to effect a restoration of the original unity."[2] (It will be recalled that Dr. Prince was himself successful in reintegrating the personality of Sally Beauchamp, largely by means of hypnosis.) Besides, for all we know, in all such cases the subliminal self may remain unified beneath the phenomenon of exterior dissociation. Moreover, we must not lose sight of the distinction between the person as an ontological being, and the personality which is constructed out of hereditary and environmental factors and the personal reactions thereto; the former is, in the nature of the case, one, whereas the latter may indeed exhibit lack of integration or even evidences of disintegration. There is many a person in our day who is truly a "civil war" interiorly. A typical person, however, is essentially a unity. Phenomena of dual or multiple personality belong, of course, to the area of abnormal psychology, and hence do not fall within the scope of the science of ethics.

2. Every person is a persistent unity. The "I" persists through all changes, physical and mental. As Illingworth goes on to say:

> This unity is further emphasized by my sense of personal identity, which irresistibly compels me to regard myself as one and the same being, through all changes of time and circumstance, and thus unites my thoughts and feelings of today with those of all my bygone years. I am thus one, in the sense of an active unifying principle, which can not only combine a multitude of present experiences in itself, but can also combine its present with its past.[3]

Memory is both the basis and the earnest or pledge of the persistence of personal identity. Remembering, as William James put it, is something more than the mere dating of events in the past—it is the dating of an event in my past. In the memorable words of Augustine, written centuries ago:

> I come to the fields and specious palaces of my memory, where are the treasures of innumerable images, brought in from things of all sorts perceived by the senses. . . . Nor yet do the things themselves enter in; only the images of the things perceived are there in readiness, for thought to recall. . . It is I myself who remember, I the mind. . . Great is the power of memory, a fearful thing, O my God, a deep and boundless manifoldness; and this thing is the mind, and this am I myself. What am I then, O my God? What nature am I? A life various and manifold, and exceeding immense![4]

One inescapable fact of human experience is, as we have noted heretofore, that personal identity persists through all changes in

the human organism, a fact which supports the faith of many that it will survive the last great change, the dissolution of the body. (For the elaboration of this view, see Butler's Analogy of Religion. Everyman's Library Edition of this book is recommended.)

3. Every person is a unique unity. Again quoting Illingworth:

> At the same time, with all my inclusiveness, I have also an exclusive aspect. "Each self," it has been well said, "is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious to other selves—impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue." Thus a person has at once an individual and a universal side. He is a unit that excludes all else, and yet a totality or whole with infinite powers of inclusion.[5]

And Allport writes as follows:

> An outstanding characteristic of man is his individuality. He is a unique creation of the forces of nature. Separated spatially from all other men he behaves throughout his own particular span of life in his own distinctive fashion. It is not upon the cell nor upon the single organ, nor upon the group, nor upon the species, that nature has centered her most lavish concern, but rather upon the integral organization of life processes into the amazingly stable and self-contained system of the individual living creature. . . . The person who is a unique and never-repeated phenomenon evades the traditional scientific approach at every step. . . Whether the scientist delimits his science as the study of the mind, the soul, of behavior, purpose, consciousness, or human nature—the persistent, indestructible fact of organization in terms of individuality is always present.[6]

Human nature is individualistic: we come into the world one by one, and we go out of it one by one; and while in it, each human individual is a unique individual. My potentialities, thoughts, memories, desires, decisions, likes and dislikes, all belong to me; in the very nature of the case they cannot belong intrinsically to anyone else. Otherness is the property of the person: every person is an other to all his fellows (even as God, who, in Biblical teaching, is pure Personality, is an Other to all intelligent creatures of His creation, Exo. 3:14). Nature's provision, moreover, is directed toward the welfare of the individual; even the state (civil society) exists to benefit the individual. These are all matters which no Marxist theory will ever change. Hence, said Jesus, one human soul is of infinitely greater worth in the sight of the Creator than the whole material world (Matt. 16:26). The reason for this high evaluation of a human being—a person—is obvious: he is the image and likeness of his Creator (Gen. 1:26-27).

4. Every person is a transcendent unity. As we have already noted, the person, both in his objective (mind) and in his subjective

(spirit) powers, transcends both space and time. A person, moreover, in knowing, evaluating, and utilizing material things, transcends the whole material order. Despite shallow and thoughtless observations to the contrary, the fact remains that our world is, and will always be, anthropocentric: that is, in the sense that every person is the center of his own world, the world of his own experience. And there is no evidence that any other creature of earth possesses the ability to reflect upon or to resolve the problem—for himself at least—of his place in, or relation to, the totality of things.

By his power of abstract thinking every person transcends all the limitations of sense and sensitivity. His physical senses relate him to his present environment, but he escapes from this environment into the real world by the processes of pure thought: this takes the form of the necessary truths of logic and mathematics. As a result of this power of abstract thinking, and especially of forming concepts, man lives in all dimensions of time, or, we may rightly say, in the realm of timelessness. He is essentially a creature of eternity rather than of time. Again we quote from Illingworth:

> Personality is the gateway through which all knowledge must inevitably pass. Matter, force, energy, ideas, time, space, law, freedom, cause, and the like, are absolutely meaningless terms except in the light of our personal experience.
>
> Now the significance of all this is that we are spiritual beings. The word spirit is indeed undefinable and may even be called indefinite, but it is not a merely negative term for the opposite of matter. It has a sufficiently distinct connotation for ordinary use. It implies an order of existence which transcends the order of sensible existence, the material order: yet which, so far from excluding the material order, includes and elevates it to higher use, precisely as the chemical includes and transfigures the mechanical, or the vital the chemical order. It is thus synonymous with supernatural in the strict sense of the term. And personality. . .belongs to this spiritual order, the only region in which self-consciousness and freedom can have place.[7]

To summarize: Every person is a unity, a mind-body or spirit-body unity; in psychiatry and medicine, a psychosomatic unity; in Biblical language, a living soul (Gen. 2:7). To be sure, this unity is, and will always be, a profound mystery, one that defies human intellection, but one that is confirmed by human experience and common sense.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]J.R. Illingworth, Personality, Human and Divine, pp. 28-29.

[2]See Carney Landis and M. Marjorie Bolles, Textbook of Abnormal Psychology, p. 98. (Macmillan, New York, 1947.)

[3]Illingworth, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

[4]See Augustine, Confessions, Pusey Translation, Everyman's Library, pp. 210-219. (E.P. Dutton, New York.)

[5]Illingworth, ibid., p. 30. The quotation is from Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, p. 216.

[6]G.W. Allport, Personality, etc., pp. 3, 5.

[7]Illingworth, ibid, pp. 25, 45.

## XIV. The higher reaches of man are exhibited historically in his intellectual, esthetic, moral, and religious activities.

"Man," writes Dr. Carrel, "consists of all his actual and potential activities."[1] This is a fact too frequently ignored in our age of ultra-specialization in the various sciences. Simultaneously with the involuntary (i.e., going on all the time, without any exercise of will) physiochemical, biochemical and general physiological processes, the human being has ever exhibited other activities which are voluntary on his part, which are commonly designated "psychical" or "mental." These higher reaches (perhaps it would be better to say outreaches) of the human being are directed toward the realization of the supreme values in life. These supreme values are traditionally listed as Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and Holiness.

1. Man's intellectual activity is his quest for Truth. According to the late John Dewey's "Instrumentalism," all thinking is instrumental to the person's adaptation to his environment; hence, thought is essentially problem-solving. Of course, this raises the question of the scope of man's environment, which is certainly greater than the family into which he is born, greater than the neighborhood in which he grows up, even greater than the boundaries of the national state of which he may be a citizen; which is, in fact, the totality of being: anything short of this is provincialism. Man is never fully adapted to his environment until he has achieved a satisfying World-View; that is, a constructive view of the meaning of the cosmos and of his own life in it. Moreover, as stated heretofore, man does not formulate Truth—he only discovers it. Electricity was here, and lightning was a form of it, long before Ben Franklin flew his kite; indeed, electricity is cotemporaneous with the cosmos itself. The same is true of the atom and its constituent elements: though cotemporaneous with the cosmos itself, only in recent years have they been discovered, and their power utilized, by physicists. So-called "natural laws," both physical and moral, are simply descriptions of those orderly processes by which Truth is expressed in the universe and its creatures; and science itself is but man's interpretation of the Truth that is embodied in him and in the universe around him. In the final analysis, Truth and Being are one—a thing is true to the extent that it is.

2. Man's esthetic activity is his quest for Beauty. (1) This type of activity manifests itself both in the contemplation and in the creation of Beauty. And the crude, but graphic, paintings on cave walls, uncovered in recent years by the archaeologists, prove the esthetic sense ("art for art's sake") to be inherent in the most primitive as well as the most civilized of men. (See the excellent book by William Fleming, Arts and Ideas: Holt, New York, 1955.) (2) Man's esthetic sense has manifested itself in all ages in hand-carvings, paintings, sculpture, architecture, music, poetry, etc. Art is as old as man himself; quoting Chesterton again, "Art is the signature of man." (3) The esthetic experience, however, must be distinguished from the religious experience. The esthetic experience may result from the contemplation and appreciation of nature, but religious experience occurs only in the contemplation of, and communion with, nature's God. (4) Finally, art in its various forms is proof that human thought is not always "instrumental" or problem-solving; that in fact in its noblest forms, it is contemplative.

3. Man's moral activity is his quest for Goodness, which is commonly identified with Justice, Order, etc. (1) The fact that all peoples, no matter how primitive their culture, have always been known to make distinctions of some sort between right and wrong, good and bad, in human conduct, can hardly be refuted. Even though anthropologists may designate such distinctions, in their most elementary form, as "customary law," the fact remains nevertheless that the distinctions are made and made universally. Moreover, although different reasons have been assigned for these distinctions, in diverse social structures, and by different systems of ethics, the fact of the universality of such distinctions is historically established. (2) The distinction between right and wrong, good and bad, seems to be a universal judgment of the human race: as one author puts it, "The feeling of obligation is an ineradicable element of our being."[2] Another writes:

> The laws of morality, whatever they be, impose no physical necessity; they are not like the laws of gravitation that execute their own decrees. . . .But we may seriously doubt whether anyone possessing in common with us the use of reason ever wholly extinguished the promptings and pleadings of conscience.[3]

(3) This fundamental distinction between what ought or what ought not to be done, has been found to be so general that, as we have noted previously, by many philosophers it is designated the Ethical Fact. Moral activity—the quest for Goodness, for the answer to the question, What is the Good Man?—is another manifestation, obviously, of the spirit that is in man (Gen. 2:7, Job 32:8). (4) Finally, this quest for Goodness, Justice, Order, etc., has been at the root of the progressive development of social and political order in human history, from family to clan, from clan to tribe, from

tribe to nation (a people, a specific ethnic group), from nation to national state (characterized by territory, independence, and government).

4. Man's religious activity is his quest for Holiness. (1) Religious activity in human history is just as prominent as esthetic activity, and probably more so. The religious consciousness of man has manifested itself in all ages, and among all tribes and peoples, in a great variety of forms (dependent for purity, of course, upon the standard of knowledge by which it was guided) from the crudest animistic beliefs and the ritualistic worship of gods who were but personifications of the forces of nature, up to that pure love for God and man which fills the heart of the spiritually-minded person for whom religion is the unbroken communion of the human spirit with the Divine Spirit on the basis of the Truth (John 4:24). (2) It is doubtful indeed that any people ever existed without some consciousness of their human frailty and consequent need of strength to be gotten from a source or sources higher than man himself, and without a sense of moral imperfection, a sense of the need of prayer, and a dim longing for, and expectation of, survival beyond the grave. (3) It has been rightly said that man learns to pray before he learns to reason; that he feels the need of supplication long before he begins to argue from effects to causes. This natural outreach of man toward Ultimate Reality seems to stem, not primarily from fear as some anthropologists have contended, but from his sense of his own creaturehood. This is the reason why imposed systems of atheistic "brainwashing"—a characteristic especially of the Leninist movement in our day—are doomed to fail: they will fail simply because they are unnatural. (4) Again, pure religion is not a form of barter: it is not saying to God, in common parlance, "You scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours." Unfortunately there is still too much of this, even in present-day religion, as expressed in the well-known lines—

> God and the doctor we alike adore
> Just on the brink of danger, not before;
> The danger past, both are unrequited—
> God is forgotten, and the doctor slighted.

In the purest form of religion, however, God is sought and loved, not for the sake of reward primarily, but solely for the joy of possessing Him, by means of intimate fellowship with Him. Truly righteous conduct flows spontaneously out of one's pure love for God and for one's fellows (Lev. 19:17, Deut. 6:5, Matt. 22:34-40). (5) Religious activity in man is the quest for Holiness. Holiness is, in essence, Wholeness of being (from the Greek holos, meaning "whole," "perfect," "complete"). According to religious thinking, the natural and proper ultimate intrinsic end to which man is ordered by his Creator is wholeness or fullness of being. Who knows, then, but that the creation of man "in the image of God" is still going on (as the French philosopher, Bergson, suggests[4]), and

will be achieved only in the righteous of earth when they shall have attained ultimate Union with God? (6) Primitive magic must not be confused with religion. Magic, says the late Sir James Frazer, perhaps the most eminent and erudite writer in the field of anthropology, is based on the presumption of the shaman (conjurer, "medicine man") to have the know-how, in the form of ritual (incantation), to compel the forces of nature (or higher powers of some kind) to do his bidding; hence, it is somewhat akin to present-day science. The former, to be sure, is superstition; the latter, however, resembles the former, Frazer contends, in that it, too, claims the know-how to reshape nature to serve man's own ends[5] (and so fulfills, whether wittingly or unwittingly, we might well add, the Divine injunction to man to "be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it," Gen. 1:28). Religion, on the other hand, says Frazer, is worship, petition, intercession: any attempt to coerce Deity is foreign to it. (In its noblest form, of course, it is faith, hope, and love: 1 Cor. 13:13. Cf. again Matt. 22:34-40.)

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Alexis Carrel, Man the Unknown, p. 119. (Harper, 1935.)

[2]George P. Fisher, The Grounds of Christian and Theistic Belief, p. 19. (Scribners, 1883.)

[3]See T.J. Brosnahan, S.J., Ph.D., Prolegomena to Ethics and with a Digest of Ethics, edited by Francis P. LeBuffe, S.J., Ph.D., pp. 3, 5. (Fordham University Press, New York, 1941.)

[4]See Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, pp. 245-246. Translated from the French by Audra, Brereton, and Carter. (Holt, 1935.)

[5]See Sir James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion, Part I: The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings, Third Edition, I, 220. (Macmillan, 1935.)

## XV. The marks of a mature person are, according to Allport, (1) extension of the self, (2) self-objectification, and (3) a unifying philosophy of life.

We are thinking here, not about physiological maturation, i.e., the maturing of somatic (chiefly glandular and neural) structures which takes place in the years following birth, but about the maturing ("ripening") of the person and personality. This is a very important subject, because, as Overstreet says, "The most dangerous members of our society are those groups whose powers of influence are adult but whose motives and responses are infantile." Again, says the same author,

> To grow up psychologically as well as physically is to mature along the line of what is unique in man and what he healthily shares with all his fellows, and to continue the maturing process throughout his life.[1]

Undoubtedly there are many persons in our society who grow old but never truly grow up. I think it was Carlyle who once remarked that most Englishmen die at the age of thirty-nine even though they are not buried until they reach seventy. (Cf. the Biblical account of the fourfold development of Jesus, Luke 2:52—"in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man."

Overstreet, in his excellent book, The Mature Mind, sets forth what he considers to be the significant criteria of personal maturity (he calls these "linkages" with the environment) as follows:

| The child is born | Maturing is a process of developing |
|---|---|
| 1. ignorant | 1. knowledge-linkages |
| 2. irresponsible | 2. responsibility-linkages |
| 3. inarticulate | 3. word-linkages |
| 4. self-centered | 4. empathy-linkages |
| 5. a creature of diffuse sexuality | 5. creative sexual relationships |
| 6. into a world of isolated particulars | 6. philosophical-linkages (wholes of meaning) |

Every parent knows—or surely ought to know—that the small child is utterly egocentric: nearly everything the child does is done to attract attention to himself. Maturation, in the sense we use the term here, is largely a matter of outgrowing this egocentricity.

Many persons, of course, never outgrow it: they continue to be childish from the cradle to the grave. (Note, in this connection, the distinction between childishness and childlikeness.) (Again, what is immaturity, strictly speaking? To what extent is it related to irrationality? To what extent are both of these terms related to the theological doctrine of depravity?)

Dr. Gordon W. Allport, in his great book on Personality, lists three marks of the mature person (which subsume, generally, all those suggested by Overstreet) as follows:

1. Extension of the Self. That is, the outgrowing of egocentricity; the projection of personal activity into interests and causes which have no direct reference to the self. Quoting Allport directly:

> . . . the developed person is one who has a variety of autonomous interests: that is, he can lose himself in work, in contemplation, in recreation, and in loyalty to others. He participates with warmth and vigor in whatever pursuits have for him acquired value. Egocentricity is not the mark of a mature personality. Contrast the garrulous Bohemian, egotistical, self-pitying, and prating of self-expression, with the man of confident dignity who has identified himself with a cause that has won his devotion. Paradoxically, "self-expression" requires the capacity to lose oneself in the pursuit of objectives not primarily referred to the self. Unless directed outward toward socialized and culturally compatible ends, unless absorbed in causes and goals that outshine self-seeking and vanity, any life seems dwarfed and immature.[2]

It seems to be a fundamental law of his very own being that the person who would enjoy the higher values of life, such as faith, hope, love, freedom, justice, and the like, can do so only by sharing them with others: indeed the appreciation of such values is enhanced in him only to the extent that he does share them with others. One who tries to appropriate these values to himself exclusively, will find himself losing them and his appreciation of them as well: as with light, when one attempts to box it in, one succeeds only in boxing it out. And what is true of individuals in this respect is also true of nations: we as Americans can expect to enjoy the blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, only by sharing them with other peoples. Of course, by this statement we do not mean to advocate the imposition of the "American way of life" upon other peoples by coercion, economic, political, military, or otherwise; we advocate only a policy of friendliness, helpfulness, and co-operation whereby other nations will be influenced to want to share the blessings of freedom which we ourselves enjoy. This is, so to speak, extension of the self on a national scale.

Extension of the self necessarily includes directionality of life, says Allport. This is obvious. When a life is not ordered toward some selected worthwhile goal, that is, when it has no clear directionality, and hence little or no meaning, it is bound to be an experience of continuous frustration. Statistical studies of would-be suicides prove that living tends to become intolerable to those who have nothing to aim at, no goal to seek. In short, for a man to live, in any rewarding sense whatever, he must have something to live for, some goal to lure him on "from glory to glory"; from which it follows that the more ennobling the goal is, the more the life will be filled with moral and spiritual excellence and happiness.

2. Self-objectification, that is, the ability to stand aside, so to speak, and take an accurate inventory of oneself. The opposite of self-objectification is, of course, self-deception, a form of self-indulgence, or perhaps just "wishful thinking," from which hardly any human being is ever entirely free. (A perennial example is the woman with a cracked voice who insists on leading the church choir.) Says Allport: Knowledge of oneself—that is, understanding oneself as one really is—is insight; an unfailing correlate of insight is the sense of humor; and these together lie at the root of self-objectification. The child, Allport goes on to say, lacks both insight and humor; he laughs, to be sure, but seldom if ever at himself. The adolescent is so intensely serious that he lacks perspective. It is only in maturity that "the sensitive and intricate balance is attained. . .between caring and not caring, between valuing and recognizing the vanity of value"; hence, to achieve humor as well as insight requires a high level of intelligence, because "it is only the most intelligent who prefer their humor objective and realistic, based on the exact relationships obtaining in their lives."[3] (I am reminded here of a statement by one of the characters in a well-known novel about another: "When she learns to laugh at herself, she will begin growing up.")

Perhaps it should be pointed out that the ability to stand aside, to contemplate, and to chuckle over the follies and foibles of men, without growing bitter, distinguishes the true humorist (as, e.g., Chaucer, Sterne, Jane Austen, or the late Will Rogers) from the mere "comedian." (See the essay on "The Comic Spirit" by the British novelist, George Meredith. This essay is usually to be found at the forefront of his novel, The Egoist.) The humorist who, on the other hand, allows himself to be embittered by such follies and foibles (as, e.g., Jonathan Swift, Mark Twain, and others) turns into a satirist and so largely dissipates the effectiveness of his humor. All men should take themselves seriously enough, of course, to realize their own dignity and worth, yet at the same time not too seriously—not so seriously, for instance, as to think themselves indispensable; "indispensable" men are prone to turn out to be tyrants. There is always hope—and a future—for a people who possess a sense of humor. Those who lose it are apt to grow into a self-styled "superior folk" with delusions of a "manifest destiny"

of some kind. The self-evaluated "indispensable" man or nation is one that must be closely watched at all times. [Note the Biblical references to "the Laughter of God" (Psa. 2:1-4; cf. the irony in Job 41:1).]

3. A Unifying Philosophy of Life, or, as the Germans would put it, a constructive Weltanschauung. Although there are other unifying philosophies, writes Allport, in which, though less embracing in their scope, all interrelated details are gathered together under some fundamental concept of value, still and all, the most comprehensive unifying World-View takes the form of a religious faith and practice:

> Religion is the search for a value underlying all things, and as such is the most comprehensive of all the possible philosophies of life. A deeply moving religious experience is not readily forgotten, but is likely to remain as a focus of thought and desire. Many lives have no such focus; for them religion is an indifferent matter, or else a purely formal and compartmental interest. But the authentically religious personality unites the tangible present with some comprehensive view of the world that makes this tangible present intelligible and acceptable to him. Psychotherapy recognizes the integrative function of religion in personality, soundness of mind being aided by the possession of a completely embracing theory of life.[4]

It has been rightly said that three factors necessarily enter into every person's life, namely, a self to live with, a goal to live for, and a faith to live by. In religious thinking, the Value underlying all things is the Highest Good, the Summum Bonum, Holiness, God, the attainment of Union with Whom is held to be man's natural and proper ultimate intrinsic end. In the memorable words of Augustine: "Thou awakest us to delight in Thy praise; for Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it repose in Thee."[5]

We repeat at this point that man's environment is the whole cosmos, the totality of being; that as to its character this environment is not only physical but moral and spiritual as well. How, then, can any man claim to be "adapted" ("adjusted") to his environment, and hence a mature person, short of having worked out for himself a constructive understanding of the meaning of the world and of his own life in it?—short of a satisfying answer to the three greatest questions that man ever faces: Whence came I? What am I? and Whither am I bound? Specifically, the problems of the origin, nature, and destiny of man? (As stated by the German philosopher, Kant, the problems of God, freedom, and immortality are the three problems which go to make up the subject matter of philosophy.)

## FOOTNOTES

[1]H.A. Overstreet, The Mature Mind, Text Edition, pp. 44, 41. (Norton, New York, 1949.)

[2]G.W. Allport, Personality, etc., p. 213. (Holt, New York, 1937.)

[3]Ibid., pp. 223-224.

[4]Ibid., p. 226.

[5]Augustine, Confessions, Pusey Translation (Everyman's Library), I, 1.

## XVI. Motivation is the directive of the course of personal life.

This might well be called a "psychological axiom." The word "motive" is from Latin, moveo, infinitive movēre, meaning "to move," "to incite to action," etc. Hence, a motive is that factor within a person which impels, stirs, moves him to act in a selective manner; it may be an organic drive, an emotion, a need, an idea, an ideal, or even a combination of these: anything, generally speaking, which engenders a desire. To the extent, moreover, that the desire is brought under rational direction and control, to that extent is the course of the action likely to be right and good.

Because human action is purposive, it follows that the ultimate end-in-view, which is the last thing in actuality, becomes the first thing in motivation: as Aristotle put it, the final cause is the first cause. For example, a student matriculates in college with the end-in-view of preparing himself to establish and to provide adequately for a family; this is, obviously, in accord with the nature of things. The end-in-view—the establishment of, and provision for, a household—is actually realized, however, at the terminus of this purposive course of action; nevertheless, it is that factor which, envisioned long beforehand, starts him on the course of action designed to attain it: hence, the factor which comes first in his motivation. In a word, it is that motive which prompts him to matriculate and to continue in college from four to six or eight years. Thus it becomes clear that the last thing in actuality is the first in motivation.

Before the human act occurs, the intellect presents something to the will (to the person) as desirable, or as more desirable than an alternative something, and the personal choice follows which terminates in the human act. That is, the human act is an act that proceeds from motives and leads to consequences. Motives are of first importance, both in ethics and in jurisprudence: in a court action, for instance, the state's attorney, in prosecuting a person on a criminal charge, must establish the motive which prompted the alleged criminal act. In all such cases, the determination of the motive or motives is almost a matter of necessity in proving the state's case. Motivation is a matter of prime importance in all personal activity.

In all adult motivation there is, back of the will-act and prompting it, a combination of idea and desire; that is, knowledge of, and desire for, the particular end-in-view. Moreover, the more mature the personality is, the more elevating will be the determined end or ends toward which the self sets the self, and consequently, the more refined will be the motives which direct the course of personality development and indeed of the entire personal life. Human action is free conative action (striving) toward a predetermined end through the means necessary to the attainment of that particular end.

The "River of Life" flows into the newborn babe from its parents, just as it once flowed into them from their parents, and so on and on, as one may trace its flow regressively. The life which I enjoy seems never to have been created, that is, in the primary sense of the verb "create" (bringing into existence, without the use of pre-existing materials, that which has never existed before). (Even if the life principle existed potentially in certain relationships within the atom or the molecule, prior to its actualization in the first cell, still we must admit that it existed potentially, just as, for example, the powers of the adult person existed at one time potentially in the embryo.) In fact, every indication is that this River of Life which we experience as human beings, and into the flow of which we are caught up as individuals, emanates originally from the self-existent (unoriginated) Source and Ground of all being, Who is in the nomenclature of philosophy Pure Act, the First Cause, the First Principle, etc., and in the nomenclature of theology, I AM, HE WHO IS (Exo. 3:14, Gen. 2:7, Rev. 22:1).

Obviously, Something is. This no sane person would deny. Hence, only one of two explanations is possible: either (1) there is a First Cause that is without beginning or end (sui generis) or (2) somewhere along the line nothing created this Something which is. Logic supports only the first alternative. That nothing could have created this Something is inconceivable (as the ancients put it, ex nihilo, nihil fit, "from nothing, nothing comes to be"). And it is equally inconceivable that this Something which is, could be reduced to nothing (annihilated). The question, "Where did God come from?" is hardly a legitimate one: it is more meaningfully stated, "Why is there Something instead of nothing?" and, "How did this Something come to be?"

What, then, are the factors in the newborn babe which set this stream of personal life or activity into motion, and what are the factors in the developing adult which direct it thereafter until it either lapses or changes? Are these factors unconscious (unknown to the person) and the corresponding acts therefore involuntary (not willed by him)? Or, are they conscious (known to the person) and the corresponding acts therefore voluntary (willed by him)? Or, are both unconscious and conscious factors more or less intermingled throughout the entire natural life? Or, does one set of

factors—the unconscious—dominate through infancy and childhood, and then give way to the other—the conscious—in youth and adulthood? One thing, of course, is certain: If unconscious factors exclusively operate throughout the entire life, then the person does not have freedom of will; that is, he never acts voluntarily and is therefore not responsible for what he does. All this is involved in the problem of motivation. There is no problem in psychology more difficult to handle: nor is there any phase of psychology that is of greater significance to the science of ethics.

Motivation is the primary directive of the course of personal life. It is determinative of human actions. If such actions are unconsciously determined, that is, by impersonal factors, of course they are involuntary and hence amoral. If, on the other hand, human actions are consciously determined, that is, by the person himself, they are voluntary and hence have significance morally. The will-act proceeds from conscious motivation; without conscious motivation, no will-act occurs. Our thesis is that throughout most of his life, a person's acts are for the most part consciously determined by him; that a person usually becomes, in character and in conduct, what he consciously wills to become; that, furthermore, he can in most cases become what he sufficiently wills to become. We are surveying this problem, in this and subsequent chapters, largely from the viewpoint of psychology; we shall look into some of the current theories of motivation that are put forward by different psychological "systems."

1. Unconscious motivation seems to predominate throughout the years immediately following birth.

(1) The newborn infant is almost wholly a creature of heredity. If normal, he has the necessary powers and capacities for the development of personality, but this development must come about through the postnatal dynamic interaction of structure and environment. The mature adult personality must wait upon the processes of growth—physical, mental, social, moral and spiritual.

(2) The neonate comes into the world with certain "givens" as follows: (a) his physique and physiology; (b) his temperament (emotional tone, i.e., range and intensity of emotions; sometimes described as glandular and chemical tonicity); (c) general intellectual endowment (intelligence, which is mysteriously connected with the neurosensory system, and which in many instances includes special mental aptitudes and abilities that may later be translated into skills); (d) segmental patterns of movement, mass actions involving large parts of the body (squirming, twisting, slashing of arms and kicking of feet, continuous movements of hands, feet, fingers and toes, etc.); (e) specific reflexes or adaptive responses (breathing, sneezing, swallowing, sucking, grasping, movement of eyes toward a light, urination, defecation, etc.); (f) adaptive neurosensory mechanisms or types of modifiability inherent in the nervous system which serve as instruments of growth (through processes of variation, differentiation and integration).

(3) The random mass movements and specific reflexes of the newborn babe or young child are, however, essentially "mechanical," that is, unconscious and involuntary. Indeed the common sense of man recognizes this fact: no society holds the infant or young child morally responsible for what he does, until he is said, in common parlance, to have "reached the age of accountability." Certain newspapers carried the story not so long ago which illustrates this fact clearly. As the story went, a certain young father and mother were accustomed to sleeping with a revolver under the father's pillow. Their oldest child, a boy about five years old, slept in the room with them, in a small bed against an opposite wall; and their youngest, a baby girl some four months old, slept in a cradle at the side of the parents' bed. One morning, while eating breakfast, the young couple were startled by a shot in the adjoining bedroom. On rushing into the bedroom they discovered that the little boy had gotten the revolver, unwittingly cocked it, and in a spirit of play had put the barrel to the baby's head and pulled the trigger, killing the baby instantly. Now this was a tragic happening, to be sure. But no man or group of men—no court in the land—would hold that five-year-old boy morally responsible for what he did. By no stretch of the imagination could he rightly have been called a murderer. He had no realization of the tragedy which he was causing; he certainly did not consciously will to take the life of his baby sister; as a matter of fact, he was not old enough to know what murder is; therefore his act was amoral in that it was stamped with the character of involuntariness. It was not a human act, that is, in the sense in which that term is used in ethics. Human acts are not attributed to children under accountable age any more than to insane persons. The child has to grow into responsibility as he matures; that is to say, as he develops in knowledge and in conscience.

(4) The Conditioned Reflex, (the "dog-and-drool" psychology), probably the most rudimentary form of "learning," is but another kind of involuntary, hence amoral action: per se it is essentially a physiological act. This—the "conditioned reflex"—is a term which has been given widespread currency in recent years (without much justification) as a result of the experiments reported by the Russian biologist, Pavlov (died in 1936). Pavlov performed his experiments on dogs. Having first made sure that the visual perception of food (stimulus A) would elicit a flow of saliva (for which he contrived a measuring apparatus) from the dog's salivary glands and that the sound of a bell (stimulus B) would not, Pavlov then presented bell and food together, either in immediate sucession or with some temporal overlap, for a number of times, and found that presentation of the bell (stimulus B) alone would then cause salivation. A similar technique has been used many times with human subjects and it has been found that responses can be "conditioned" in the same way. This is especially true of infants. As a matter of fact, conditioning is perhaps the most elementary

form of learning. It is now realized, however, that a conditioned reflex, although established by many repetitions of both the original and conditioning stimuli, is soon lost. Moreover, it should be noted that whatever may be the stimulus that produces it (i.e., whether the original or the conditioning stimulus) the response is not altered by the conditioning. This means that conditioning is simply the extension of the range of stimuli that will arouse the same response: hence it is at most only a theory of afferent ("bearing inward") learning. And by no stretch of the imagination can this type of conditioning rightly be regarded as accounting for anything but a small fraction of the learning process in man. It is obvious that the process of learning as a whole involves not only an extension of the range of effective stimuli (afferent learning), but also conscious alteration of response to the same stimulus (efferent—"bearing outward"—learning). This alteration of response, moreover, must come from within the individual and involves personal choice: indeed man is distinguished from the brute by his power of varying his responses, and even of delaying his response, to the same stimulus (e.g., eating a steak to satisfy an immediate demand of appetite, or refraining from eating the steak for the sake of health). Variability of possible responses to any given stimulus necessitates personal choice. The mature individual does not respond to the same stimulus in the same manner as he responded as a child or as a youth; his responses are more refined, that is, more precise, perhaps more effectively adaptive. Of course all learning partakes of the character of what might be called "conditioning," provided that word be used as a kind of omnibus term, but the "conditioning" of acts by the introduction and association of ideas takes place at a much higher level than the conditioning which produces the essentially physiological conditioned reflex (such as that of Pavlov's experiment). Alteration of response at this higher level brings into play the conscious and voluntary activity of the person. Finally, it is doubtful that conditioning as a theory of learning (and hence of motivation) is any improvement upon its predecessor, the venerable doctrine of association. In Pavlov's experiment, for example, did the dog salivate because of the sounding of the bell or because of its own continued association of that sound in its own "memory" with the reception of food? Surely common sense supports the latter view as the true one. Conditioning, therefore, of the type of Pavlov's experiment, although probably accounting for the rudimentary beginnings of the learning process, in infants and young children, falls far short of accounting for the more mature phase of that process which begins with accountability and extends throughout the rest of life.

2. The endocrine glands and their hormones apparently play a minor role in human motivation through their effects upon individual temperament.

(1) That a correlation exists between chemical conditioning in the body, on the one hand, and human temperament and person-

ality on the other hand, has been recognized from most ancient times: it is implicit in the "humoral psychology" which dominated "science" down to the time of Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood. Empedocles of Sicily (5th century B.C.) put forward the cosmic theory of the four elements, inert substances (earth, air, fire, and water), plus two active forces, love (attraction) and strife (repulsion): all material objects, said he, are combinations and recombinations of these four elements. Hippocrates, the "Father of Medicine" (also 5th century B.C.) postulated what he called the four "humors" of the body and their corresponding personality types, correlating these with the Empedoclean "elements" and their respective properties, according to the following table:

| The "Elements" | The Humors | Personality Types |
|---|---|---|
| Earth (cold, dry) | black bile | melancholic (sad, pessimistic) |
| Air (warm, moist) | blood | sanguine (optimistic) |
| Fire (warm, dry) | yellow bile | irascible (hot-tempered) |
| Water (cold, moist) | phlegm | phlegmatic (stolid, apathetic) |

In this theory we have the first indications of the knowledge of the effects of internal body fluids on temperament: a forerunner of modern endocrinology and its hormones. (See the works of Hippocrates; Galen, On the Natural Faculties; Chaucer, Nun's Priest's Tale; Ben Jonson, Every Man in His Humor, Every Man Out of His Humor, etc.)

(2) The endocrine glands (from the Greek endon, "within," krinein, "to separate") are so named because they secrete specific chemical compounds directly into the blood and lymph channels (and not through ducts, such as, for example, the liver, salivary glands, lachrymal glands, etc.); hence they are popularly known as the "glands of internal secretion" or "ductless glands." The secretions of the endocrine glands are called hormones (from the Greek verb hormao, "arouse," "excite," "set in motion"), because they impel the different parts of the organism to carry on their functional (physiological) activities. (A brief study of the glands—the thyroid, parathyroids, pituitary body, adrenals, thymus, pineal body, the glands of the pancreas, stomach, and intestines, and the sex glands—the ovary in the female and the testicles in the male—might be helpful at this point. It is important, for health purposes, that every person should inform himself fully regarding the endocrine system and its functions. Hyperthyroidism, for instance, produces exopthalmic goiter, and a speeding up of vital activity, in some cases to such an extent that the patient becomes subject to explosive emotional outbursts, suffers hallucinations, and may finally die; as a matter of fact, hyperthyroid psychosis can hardly be distinguished from schizophrenia. Hypothyroidism slows both body and mind, and may produce simple goiter, myxedema in adults, and cretinism and idiocy in infants. The pituitary body is known as the "master gland" of the organism; it has much to do

with the proper functioning of all parts of the body, especially that of the reproductive organs; and it largely controls the functioning of the entire endocrine system. One of its hormones, prolactin, is definitely correlated with the "maternal instinct." Cortin, an adrenal hormone, is correlated with sex precocity in adolescents; adrenalin, another product of the adrenal glands, with manifestations of the coarser emotions, such as fear and rage. Insulin (from the pancreas) is protection against diabetes. The female hormone estrogen (after the name of the German goddess of fertility, Oestra) has been found helpful in preventing involuntary melancholia during the menopause in women. Grave dysfunctions of the glands can produce, of course, many physical and even mental abnormalities. Let me repeat that every person should familiarize himself with the basic facts of endocrinology as a matter of protecting his own health.

(3) Homosexuality may result from glandular dysfunction. Homosexuality of this type is said to be of two kinds, namely, hormonal (that which is produced by disproportion of the secretion of masculine and feminine hormones: every person is to some extent bisexual), and structural (that which is caused by the presence of the glands of both sexes in the same organism). It is generally held, however, that homosexuality is of psychological origin in most cases, deriving from habit formed in adolescence: such habits of perversion usually so vitiate the will that they are difficult to overcome later in life.

(4) What are we to conclude regarding the relation between endocrine activity and human motivation? Simply this: that glandular activity does have some effect directly upon individual temperament, and hence indirectly on motivation. There can be little doubt that temperament is tied up in some mysterious manner with the chemistry of the body: indeed this is what makes it so important and so baffling, i.e., in relation to personality as a whole. Temperament is correlated physiologically with general chemical and glandular tonicity, and psychologically with emotional potential (with both range and intensity of emotions in the individual). (Emotion, however, is something which per se has never been defined precisely; to say that it is a "feeling state" is not to define it, but only to give a synonym for it: what is a "feeling state"? It simply defies precise definition: it can only be experienced. Moreover, what is the difference between an "emotion" and an "affect" or "affection"?) We may conclude that body-chemistry does, to a large degree, condition (and in the normal person stabilize) individual temperament. The effects of endocrine dysfunction exhibit themselves chiefly in abnormal mental states and in extreme sexual aberrations, all of which are cases that for the most part lie wholly outside the scope of ethics. Ethics is a subject which has to do only with normal, or at least relatively normal, personality and conduct. Persons who detect in themselves symptoms of glandular imbalance should immediately consult a reputable physician.

(5) Although we may rightly conclude that endocrine activity does have some effect directly on individual temperament, to speak of the endocrine glands as "regulating personality" is going too far. Endocrinologists, in the usual exuberance of devotees of a newly-found science, have been prone to adopt the biological interpretation of personality exclusively and hence to fall into two grave errors, namely, that of making an omnibus term of the word "personality," and that, consequently, of confusing personality with temperament. As a matter of fact, only a person can rightly be viewed as the carrier of personality. Moreover, as Allport points out, endocrinology (like psychoanalysis, psychiatry, psychosomatic medicine, physiognomology, phrenology, etc.) provides only a segmental method for studying the constitution of personality. Allport writes,

> Current emphasis upon "glands regulating personality" is an article of faith wholly in keeping with an over-simplified biological theory of personality; but it is psychologically far too narrow a conception. . . .Tensions produced by glandular activity are absorbed into the more integral tensions that comprise personal motives. Suppose, for example, that there is a marked secretion from the adrenal glands. A vague emotional excitement probably will ensue; but the way in which this excitement is handled is a matter of deep-seated habits and attitudes, even of one's underlying philosophy of life. Chemical changes induced by disease or age, the menopause, adolescence, even hyperthyroidism and castration, are all handled by the individual in ways characteristic of his own pre-existing personality.[1]

(6) It is a matter of general agreement now, I think, that the over-all function of the endocrine system normally is that of maintaining organic homeostasis (i.e., the relatively consistent internal environment maintained by the co-ordination of the physiological processes). By themselves the glands manifest little or no potency for bringing about significant differences in personality. Moreover, the failure of adolescents to handle properly the moral problems so characteristic of that particularly crucial period in life is to be attributed in large part to their lack of parental instruction and supervision: all too frequently adolescent youngsters are simply turned loose to grow up on the streets and highways. Finally, the biochemical basis of human individuality does not obviate the fact that all normal persons still live and act within a framework of moral responsibility.

3. As the person attains maturity, and to the extent that he attains maturity, unconscious motivation gives way to conscious motivation. Conscious motivation, moreover, produces the essentially human act.

(1) The child grows into moral responsibility as he develops in knowledge and conscience. During the formative years of child-

hood, it is the duty of parents to provide him with the knowledge, accompanied by wise discipline, that will enable him to form adequate responsibility-linkages with his world. Parents who fail in this obligation to their children send them out into society as potential criminals. Nature has provided one place above all others for the child to learn respect for properly constituted authority: that place is the home, under the wise direction of parents. There never was, never will be, any adequate substitute for the home in the preparation of human offspring for the complex business of living in this complex age. Society's most tragic misfit is the individual who has never learned to discipline himself—he becomes the "beatnik," "beatle," "bugger," etc., of our offbeat rising generation. No amount of genius can compensate for lack of parental training; as a matter of fact, the genius oftentimes is a person who cannot adjust to the discipline of society and hence finds himself of all men the most miserable.

(2) Basic organic drives—hunger, thirst, and sex—continue throughout life, of course, but as the child grows into adulthood they become incorporated into more complex systems of motivation and thus come under the control of reason and conscience. Even the sex urge fades into the background for the growing youth who channels his energy into healthful sports, athletic contests, and other higher interests; and with maturity sex fades into relative insignificance, either through the normal satisfactions of marriage or redirection of interest into higher intellectual and spiritual channels. The man who is governed by basic organic drives all his life lives on a level not too much above that of the brute. Of course, we must have food and drink: one cannot live very long without either. However, there is no record anywhere of any man having died of sex frustration: sex simply does not belong in the same category of necessity with hunger and thirst.

(3) Learning enlarges the area of possible motives. Through learning new ends or goals are presented to the intellect and may be chosen by the person as more desirable than previously envisioned ends, and in this manner the direction of personal life may be altered, sometimes gradually, sometimes suddenly. The transformation of motives takes place through learning. Learning, says Allport, is perhaps best explained by the doctrine of insight. "Insightful behavior," he writes, "presupposes that intelligent effort and evaluation underlie the phenomena of change in personality."[2]

(4) A final word of caution: Educational psychologists who identify all learning with "conditioning" are begging the question. They assume that the complex learning process which requires the operation of the thought processes is properly called "conditioning." But this is the point to be proved. The Conditioned Reflex (of Pavlov) has reference to reflexive conditioning, as the name indicates: reflexive conditioning is physiological in character (like all animal training). But the processes of simple apprehension, judgment and

reasoning are not reflexive (in the Pavlovian sense of the term): they belong in a different category (which might be correctly designated ideational conditioning, but certainly is not reflexive). To put these higher processes in the category of reflexive conditioning is not only to beg the whole question, but also to propagate a fallacy that does no credit to human intelligence.

FOOTNOTES

[1] G.W. Allport, Personality, etc., p. 120.

[2] Ibid., pp. 154-155.

## XVII. Psychological theories of instincts account only in part, if at all, for human motivation.

According to the instinct theory, the newborn babe brings into the world a system of innate (though latent) forces which serve to direct the course of his personality development and personal life. By analogy from the behavior of lower animals, these forces are called "instincts."

1. The fundamental question here is: Just what is an instinct? Perhaps the best definition is that which was formulated by the psychologist, William McDougall: instinct, said he, is an internal force which operates "prior to experience and independently of training."[1] McDougall proposed to find primary motivation in instinct, and in instinct alone; hence he designated his system "hormic psychology." Obviously, instinct is an inborn force; obviously, too, it is not habit. It is more than reflex, but much less than habit. It has been called "the Great Sphinx of Nature." Instinctive behavior seems to attain its highest degree of complexity in Insecta. The life of many insects moves through three successive stages of egg, larva, and moth; yet the insect remains the same individual. If man's activity were confined to grooves of instinct, he surely would be far inferior to what he is: in fact, it is intelligence in man which, proceeding by the trial-and-error method, enables him to rise far above any of the subhuman orders of being. (For an interesting work on the subject of instinct, see the book by Ruth Crosby Noble, The Nature of the Beast.) The varieties of instinctive behavior in all the lower orders are, and always will be, a perennial source of amazement to the human biologist, indeed to any student of nature and her creatures.

2. The instinct psychology, as elaborated by McDougall, is to be found in his Introduction to Social Psychology, an informative and fascinating book. McDougall postulated seven primary instincts, each of which he correlated with a primary emotion, as follows: flight (to get away from a dangerous situation) with fear; repulsion (withdrawal from something obnoxious) with disgust; curiosity ("the investigative instinct") with wonder; pugnacity (aroused by frustration of any other instinct) with anger; self-abasement (positive submission to an object of love) with subjection ("negative self-feeling"); self-assertion (tendency to dominate in any situation)

with elation ("positive self-feeling"); and the parental instinct, with tenderness. McDougall also postulated a number of secondary instincts, such as those of construction (to build something), acquisition (hoarding, from the small boy with stuffed pockets up to the sophisticated bibliophile), the gregarious ("herd") instinct, the reproductive instinct (impulse to mating), etc. He devoted considerable attention also to what he called "the instinct of laughter." In addition to the primary and secondary instincts, he lists a number of what he calls "tendencies" and "sentiments," the latter being facets of love and hate, of which patriotism is an example. His discussion of the sentiments constitutes one of the most fascinating sections of his book.

3. McDougall's Definition of Happiness is one that is well worth keeping in mind: Pleasure, he says, is a thing "of momentary duration or, at most, of a fleeting character"; it "arises from some mental process that involves but a mere fragment of one's whole being." Joy, he goes on to say, has "a greater persistence and continuity, and a deeper resonance," and "is more intimately and essentially a part of oneself." Happiness, therefore, is not a mere sum of pleasures: rather, it arises "from the harmonious operation of all sentiments of a well-organized and unified personality."[2] From the foregoing analysis it will be seen that in McDougall's system, the instinctive and emotional elements in man are closely connected; as a matter of fact, the emotional turns out to be "the unchanging core of instinctive behavior." The system itself—a form of so-called "depth" psychology—is basically anti-intellectual in that it allows little or no room for the operation of reason in determining personal conduct. This, of course, is our chief objection to all theories of instincts, urges, drives, impulses, etc., especially in relation to adult motivation; in a word, to all "depth" psychology. Instead of helping man to overcome his basic irrationality of action, they encourage him in this irrationality by undue emphasis upon it: they encourage him to think he is caught in the grip of relentless forces which he is helpless to overcome.

4. McDougall's Doctrine of Three Levels of Conation is also a well-known and interesting doctrine. "Conation" means "striving," with or without a conscious end or goal. Cosmic conation is the universal Will to Live (to resist extinction) characteristic, apparently, of all living creatures. In human beings, conation (purposeful striving) takes place, says McDougall, on three successively higher levels, namely, the child level (on which instinctive impulses are regulated by anticipation of rewards or punishments); the civilized level (on which instinctive impulses are controlled by social approval or disapproval); and the ethical or religious level (on which instinctive impulses are controlled by the person's own constructive ideals of conduct). For illustration, suppose the case of a man proposing to steal a loaf of bread: if he responds on the child level, he does so because he is restrained by the fear of imprisonment; if his response is on the civilized level, even though knowing that no dan-

ger of prison is involved, he refrains from stealing because he knows the act is socially disapproved; if his response is at the ethical or religious level, he refrains from stealing simply because he believes that stealing is wrong. However, it must be remembered that for McDougall even the origin and acceptance of social and ethical restraints had their roots in the alleged primary instincts.

4. The instinct psychology is generally rejected today, for the following reasons:

(1) The equivocal, almost omnibus, use of such terms as "instinct," "instinctual," "instinctive," etc., makes it difficult to reduce their meaning to the exactness which is required by science. Take, for example, the sentence, "The night was instinct with beauty": here "instinct" simply means "permeated." Again, it was frequently said during the first World War that Italians "instinctively hated" Austrians. But this, obviously, was not true: no baby ever brought hate into the world with it. Again, a person will say, "So-and-so has an instinct for discarding irrelevant details." But what conceivable arrangement of genes could produce such an "instinct"? Or, one might say, "So-and-so instinctively grabbed for his hat when it blew off." But a baby does not grab for its hat when the hat blows off: "instinctively" here means only "spontaneously." Or again, "So-and-so has the instincts of a gentleman." But we know that gentlemanliness is not innate—it is the product of training. L.L. Bernard, the sociologist, once collected some seven hundred to nine hundred different uses of the word "instinct," and concluded by asking, Can such a word be useful for scientific purposes? Obviously, it cannot.

(2) Advocates of the instinct theory have never been able to agree as to the number or identity of alleged instincts in human beings. As Symonds says: "Because the lists of specific instincts became longer and longer, the elaborate theoretical structure finally broke beneath its own weight."[3] William James, for instance, listed some thirty to forty "instincts," among them the following: to seek food, to seek shelter, to mate, to fight, to live with our fellows, to point to what we want, to grasp what we want, to imitate, to construct, to move about, to avoid dark places, to avoid high places, to avoid open spaces, etc. Common sense, I think, would say that this is carrying the instinct theory to the point of the ridiculous. (James held, however, that many of these "instincts" fade out because they are sooner or later inhibited by habit.) McDougall, as we have seen, professed to find some ten or eleven primary and secondary instincts in man, together with a number of "innate tendencies," "sentiments," etc. Many thinkers have held that there are two fundamental human instincts, namely, those of self-preservation and race—(or species)—preservation: indeed the Will to Live seems to animate all living things. The "instincts" of gregariousness and curiosity have had many champions. The same is true of the postulate of an innate "moral" sense. [The question as to whether moral sense (the "sense of justice") is innate has always been a subject of

debate, as has also the question of an innate religious or mystical sense.] Dr. O.L. Reiser has written recently of "the instinct to survive, the instinct to reproduce, and the instinct to worship the unknown source of all life."[4] It will thus be seen that even general agreement among thinkers as to the number and identity of instincts in man has never yet been reached.

(3) That for a force properly to be designated as instinct it must be innate or inborn is a matter of universal agreement; innateness is implicit in the word "instinct." It is difficult, however, to conceive of any human act, at least after infancy, in which acquired factors (i.e., acquired by the learning process) do not play the leading role. (Of course there may be occasional exceptions, as, for example, in times of extreme emergency when the whole organism seems to muster its forces spontaneously to preserve life, etc.) Hence, a careful analysis of the manifold forms of human activity will prove that the acts attributed to hypothetical instinctive forces are more logically explained as conscious and voluntary acts of the whole person designed to secure satisfaction for his needs and aspirations. Take, for example, hypothetical food-seeking, eating, home-building, and mating "instincts"; surely these are better explained as acts of the whole person reaching out for the necessary and natural satisfactions of the vital needs of the organism; such organic cravings as hunger, thirst and sex are the provisions of Nature for the preservation both of the individual and of the race, and are better understood as drives than as instincts. Again, are not so-called "instincts" of pugnacity, flight, etc., essentially conscious reactions of the person to dangerous situations, or, at most correlates of the instinct of self-preservation? Is not the so-called "gregarious instinct" in fact the concerted action of two or more persons to meet their common needs; surely gregariousness is more reasonably explained on the basis of need than on that of instinct. And so on, with reference to the many alleged "instincts." It seems to me, however, that a legitimate case can be made for the venerable instinct of self-preservation; all nature seems to resist extinction; the fear of death has been rightly called the lust for life. The instinct of self-preservation seems to be but another name for the human aspect of the cosmic Will to Live. And the human quest for truth, beauty, goodness (order), and wholeness, together with the hypothetical instinct of curiosity (the seemingly spontaneous desire to know something about the as-yet unknown, about the More Beyond), are perhaps better explained as phases of the universal human drives for adequacy and security, drives which are in turn but facets of the venerable Will to Live.

(4) The common sense of man testifies that although instinct is a concept which has meaning for the interpretation of animal behavior, it is wholly inadequate for the interpretation of human behavior. Allport sums up as follows:

> The question of instincts in animals should not confuse the issue, for there is so much flexibility in learning, in making

and breaking habits, and so much insight, foresight, and delay in response, that human goals must be viewed as different in kind from the stereotyped objectives of lower animals.[5]

And Symonds writes:

> The instinct theory saw all instinctive behaviour as having four characteristics: it served the purposes of individual and race survival; it was innate and unlearned and given in a state of primitive perfection through biological inheritance; it was universal, being found in all races of men and in all cultures; each separate instinct was accompanied by a characteristic emotion. The opposing view, and the one which psychologists favor today, is that the direction of a drive which gives the drive its specific behavior qualities is determined by experience based on learning. . . . This change in point of view is based largely on the results of intensive observation and experiments which have demonstrated how behavior develops, and how a process of learning seems to be operative from the moment of birth. As the natural history of the development of behavior is better understood, the tendency to describe it as preformed and innate grows less. Even drives—although we recognize that fundamentally and primitively they satisfy organic tissue needs—soon become adapted to the culture, and the particular forms that the many drives of an individual take, are determined as much, if not more, by the culture and the society into which he is born and grows up, as by the tissue needs themselves. Marriage is not merely a matter of satisfying the sex drive, but is also an institution which has been determined in the long process of social evolution to take care of basic needs of men and women.[6]

(This writer protests the last sentence above: marriage cannot be proved historically to have been a long process of social evolution; as a matter of fact, it has existed from the beginning of human history; there is no evidence that any people, primitive, prehistoric, or historic, ever practiced complete sexual promiscuity.)

For the reasons that have been listed above, in more recent times the theory of instincts as springs of human activity has given way to the theory of drives.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Wm. McDougall, Outline of Psychology (1923), p. 110.

[2]McDougall, An Introduction to Social Psychology, Fourteenth Edition, p. 161. (John W. Luce, Boston, 1921.)

[3]P.M. Symonds, The Dynamics of Human Adjustment, p. 21. (Appleton-Century, New York, 1946.)

[4]O.L. Reiser, Nature, Man, and God. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951.)

[5]G.W. Allport, Personality, etc., p. 113.

[6]P.M. Symonds, op. cit., p. 22.

## XVIII. Psychological theories of drives account only in part for human motivation.

The terms "motive" and "motivation" are used ordinarily to indicate specific mental factors which arouse persons to action. In common parlance when we speak of a human act as having been prompted by a "motive," the word "motive" has reference to the conscious (envisioned and planned) end which is sought in the act, rather than to any unconscious need that might be demanding satisfaction by it. In the present context, however, we are using the terms "motivation" and "motivate" in their broader sense, that is, to indicate the springs of action generally, whether physiological or psychical, unconscious or conscious.

As we have learned, the word "instinct" has reference to innate or unlearned (i.e., biologically inherited) behavior. The word "drive," however—a recent and more technical term, derived by analogy from present-day technology—is used to describe an impulsion to action which is aroused by a need. As Symonds writes,

> Drive is complementary to need—it is the expression of a need. It is the term to indicate the dynamic or irritating qualities of need, and the translation of these dynamic qualities into action.[1]

(An urge is practically the same thing as a drive, although the latter term carries the connotation of greater stability and persistence.) Moreover, because the need exists within the organism itself, it follows that the drive must also proceed from within the organism. Indeed, this is the essential characteristic of a drive: by definition it is a pushing power from within: it is not a pulling or attracting power from without the person, but it may be a conscious pushing power from within engendered by personal response to a pulling power from without. It is admitted by advocates of the drive theory, however, that whereas the drive itself springs from within the organism, the direction it takes is usually a product of the learning process. Hence some will contend that the word "motive" is more specific than the word "drive" in that the former embraces not only the drive itself but also its direction.

Obviously the word "need" can be extended into an omnibus term. It can be used to "cover a multitude of sins." It can be used

legitimately, in the first place, to indicate certain conditions of the body tissues with their accompanying irritations; that is, the basic organic needs. It is by means of these physiological needs and their corresponding drives that the organism achieves the two main ends of its purely physical existence, namely, self-preservation and the perpetuation of the species. In the second place, the word "need" can be extended to take in human goals which, even though they may have their root in biological factors, are themselves essentially psychical, that is, consciously realized and sought. (Hence the frequent dualistic categories of viscerogenic and psychogenic drives.) It is my contention that there are mental and emotional processes and modes of behavior which serve specifically to prepare the way for higher-than-organic satisfactions; that is to say, for the satisfactions (esthetic, moral, religious, etc.) of the human spirit. Our contention is that the word "organic" should be confined strictly to the physical or physiological aspects of the human being.

There can be no question that basic organic drives proceed from internal tensions requiring food, drink, sleep, elimination, equalization of temperature, etc. Another drive, characteristic especially of infants and young children, is the drive for unimpeded freedom of each organ and limb; indeed children manifest craving for almost continuous muscular exercise during waking hours. The evidence seems to be that the sex urge, on the other hand, manifests itself only with maturation, at that time in life at which the onset of puberty occurs (legally set at fourteen for boys and at twelve for girls); the maturation of this fundamental urge is the factor which makes adolescence such a critical period in the life of the growing person. Its importance after that, however, will depend on the role played by the mind, either in accentuating its intensity (by lasciviousness, that is, constant thinking about, or envisioning, sex indulgence) or in controlling it, or even in subordinating it altogether. It is well known that those persons who concentrate their attention on the pursuit of higher values find the sex urge receding in intensity, to such an extent that even a celibate life presents little or no difficulty for them. The issue depends in this case, of course, on whether the individual mind is centered on the things of the flesh or centered on the higher values of life ("things of the spirit"). And this depends in turn on the person himself: he can fill his mind with whatever kind of material he may choose, and can therefore be, in most cases, what he chooses to be. No human being is compelled (necessitated) to fill his mind with trash; if he does so, it is of his own volition. (Marcus Aurelius: "Our life is what our thoughts make it.") As basic organic drives are properly channelized in adulthood they recede in importance and give way to the higher pursuits of the person—the pursuit of truth, beauty, goodness, wholeness, etc.

It is generally agreed, I think, that the fundamental human drives (to meet fundamental human needs) are drives for adequacy and security. Adequacy is realized through achievement of satis-

factions; this sense of adequacy follows one's mastery of his environment. Adequacy takes in the continuous enrichment of the personality through the acquirement of special skills and through the enhancement of artistic appreciation; in a word, through the products of one's creativity and of the creativity of others. It necessarily includes independence, self-respect and self-esteem, and the respect and esteem of one's fellows. (For example, an employee wants to be treated by his employer, not as a mere tool, but as a fellow human being; not as a mere means to an end but as an end in himself.) Security has reference not alone to physical security, but to emotional security as well: the need to "belong," to be loved, etc., is a vital one in the human being: "One never grows away from the need to be loved by others." Moreover, the drives for adequacy and security are but facets of the universal human drive for eudaimonia (well-being).

Man has always persisted in seeking ultimate ends consistent with his conception of his own dignity and worth as a person. Hence he has always been prone to carry his fundamental goals of adequacy and security far beyond physical satisfactions into the realm of the spiritual; that is to say, into the realm of faith—in the hope of a future life which will embrace perfect security (from both moral and physical evil—moral evil being sin, and physical evil suffering—and even from mortality itself), and perfect adequacy (in the form of a natural and proper end that is in keeping with the dignity and worth of the person, namely, union with God). (We all know, of course, that neither security nor adequacy can ever be fully realized in this world; perfect security and adequacy would add up to perfect happiness.) It certainly is a moot question, however, whether these higher reaches and goals have their source in anything organic or biological; that is, whether conation stimulated by personal values can properly be included in the category of drives. Certainly it is evident that man is born with a capacity for evaluating, that is, with a sense of values. Man has ever proved himself attracted toward truth ("truth for truth's sake"), beauty ("art for art's sake"), goodness ("virtue for virtue's sake") and wholeness (or holiness) on attaining concepts of these values. It strikes me therefore, that the urge or drive, if such it can rightly be called in this case, is set up by apprehension of the concept, rather than by anything organic; that is, by the attraction of the value embodied in the concept (which, of course, is mental); and that the infilling of the human spirit with truth, beauty, goodness and holiness takes place in proportion to the individual's response to the lure of these values as goals. I define a motive, then, as anything—physical or spiritual—which impels to action. It may be an organic tension, a need, an emotion, an idea, or a combination of these; it may proceed from within the person as a pushing power, or it may come from outside the person as a force luring him on to the higher satisfactions of the spirit. I see no reason for clothing the subject of

human motivation in dramatic, esoteric, or any other than common-sense language. Again quoting Allport:

> The doctrine of drive is a rather crude biological conception often employed as a factotum by psychologists with a simple mechanistic outlook. The hypothesis herewith offered is that the doctrine, while inadequate to account for adult motivation, does none the less offer a suitable portrayal of the motives of young infants, and for that reason serves very well as the starting point for a theory of motivation. After the level of infancy is passed primitive segmental drive rapidly recedes in importance, being supplanted by the more sophisticated type of motives characteristic of the mature personality, and commonly represented by such terms as interest, sentiment, value, trait, ambition, attitude, taste, and inclination. Obviously none of these motives are found full-fledged in the new-born child.[2]

ADDENDUM: Especially pertinent at this point in our course is the following United Press International story of excerpts from a Commencement address delivered by Dr. Will Durant at the Webb Preparatory School, Claremont, California, in June, 1958. The syndicated press story appeared in The El Paso Times, El Paso, Texas, issue of June 13, 1958, as follows:

> A task has been assigned to me, and I propose to go through with it as modestly as its inherent immodesty will permit.
>
> If now I dare to address you, it is not as one white with wisdom, or practiced in the ways of the world, but as a fellow student handicapped with senility, yet as eager as ever to learn something between every rising and setting of the sun.
>
> You must season my platitudes with a grain of doubt, and grant me the tolerant allowances that youth must always make for age.
>
> My first request to you is—be healthy. It is mostly within your will.
>
> In many cases sickness is a crime; you have done something physiologically foolish, and nature is being hard put to it to repair your mistake. The pain is the tuition you pay for your instruction in living. Care of the health should be a required course, for at least an hour each week, in every year from kindergarten to Ph. D.
>
> Such a course would include thorough instruction in diet. Our bodies are what we eat, plus what our ancestors ate. Don't let restaurants tempt you; they are the

vampires of the stomach; they will burden your flesh in proportion as they lighten your purse.

One of the cardinal errors of our time and land is to continue in a warm and sedentary life the diet that once served to provide necessary muscle and heat. Let us keep our inners clean.

The hospitals are littered with people who have put too great strain on their digestive organs and have allowed an excess of imports over exports to disturb their internal economy.

Do some physical work every day. Nature intended thought to be a guide to action, not a substitute for it. Thought unbalanced by action is a disease.

Cut the lawn, clean the car, paint the house rather than the town, help with the dishes after the evening meal. Help your wife with her work, and let her help you with yours. Husband and wife should be helpmates. Marriage disintegrates when it is only a partnership in sex, play, and conspicuous expense.

Sex, after hunger, is our strongest instinct and greatest problem. Nature is infatuated with continuance, and dolls up the woman with beauty and the man with money to lure them into propagation; and so it gives to us males such sensitivity to the charms of woman that we can go quite mad in their pursuit.

Sex then becomes a fire and flame in the blood, and burns up the whole personality—which should be a hierarchy and harmony of desires.

Our civilization has unwisely stimulated this sexual impulse. Our ancestors played it down, knowing that it was strong enough without prodding.

We have blown it up with a thousand forms of incitation, advertisement, emphasis, and display, and have armed it with the doctrine that inhibition is a mistake—whereas inhibition, the control of the impulse, is the first principle of civilization.

Don't let indoctrination determine your desires. Marriage was probably developed, not only for the better care of children and property, but to save us from the tyranny of sex. In marriage that instinct is given abundant freedom, but it is channeled within limits consistent with social order.

By submitting to marriage we can take our minds off sex and become adult.

Marry as soon as you can keep the wolf from the door. You will be too young to choose wisely, but you won't be much wiser in these matters at 40.

There's no fool like an old fool in love. We parents should help you to get started in wholesome married life: help you with money, and—if you will permit us—with counsel.

Don't let your choice of a mate be determined by the accident of association at a time of physiological needs: don't buy a grab bag in a coma. Let at least three months intervene between acquaintance and betrothal, and between betrothal and marriage.

The difficulties of marriage are far less than its rewards. One touch of a woman's hand can be a paradise, if the touch is not for too much. Napoleon said that the only happiness he had ever known was in loving his children; and I hope you won't have marriage without children.

Note the statement in the foregoing that the control of the sex impulse "is the first principle of civilization"; that is to say, it marks the first step away from, and above, the life of the barnyard. (The foregoing is used by permission personally of Dr. Will Durant. This permission is hereby gratefully acknowledged by this author.)

FOOTNOTES

[1]P.M. Symonds, The Dynamics of Human Adjustment, p. 49. (Appleton Century, New York, 1946.)

[2]G.W. Allport, Personality, etc., pp. 113-114.

## XIX. Freudian psychology has contributed certain practical insights into the processes of human motivation.

According to Louise Saxe Eby, we are indebted to Sigmund Freud (Viennese physician-psychiatrist, 1856-1939) and the psychoanalytic school for three discoveries which have bearing upon ethical thought, as follows: (1) that of the potent, though unconscious, influence of the sex factor in human life (i.e., the erotic drive, from Eros, the Greek god of love), designated by Freud the libido (the Latin word for "desire") and regarded by him as the spring of all human motivation; (2) that of the ways in which these hidden urges (impulses) all emanating from the libido, manifest themselves in human motivation and conduct; and (3) that of the now generally acknowledged fact that persons "suffering from compulsion neuroses, fixations, and traumata (emotional shocks) cannot by volition control their behavior in the areas affected by these disorders," and consequently that "such behavior lies outside the sphere of moral responsibility."[1]

Freud never wavered from his original thesis, that all human motivation is to be traced ultimately to the physical sex factor in the organism. His theory, however, underwent modification at the hands of his pupils, Alfred Adler (1870-1937), who substituted the self-assertive impulse, the individual's drive for mastery of self and circumstance; and Carl Jung (1875-1961), who held that the elemental spring of human motivation is a general vital urge which manifests itself in the drive for individuation, that is, the drive to be a complete individual ("self-realization"). Jung postulated two "parts" of the Unconscious in men—the Personal Unconscious and the Collective Unconscious: the latter he defined as a "vast reservoir of blind wisdom" which contains the "instinctive foundations of mental life." Later psychologists (usually designated "sociological" psychologists) have put the chief emphasis on the role of cultural factors as the causes of mental conflicts and personality disorders. Neurotic disorders, they hold, are to be traced primarily to disturbances in human relationships. Karen Horney, for example, makes what she calls basic anxiety the primary source of the "neurotic personality of our time." Sullivan finds the determinants of personality development in interpersonal relations (social interactions occurring from birth onward throughout life). Erich Fromm finds the source of all difficulties in what he calls "escape from

freedom," that is, from the child's newly won liberation from the control of parents and other social groups: this acquired independence separates him emotionally from others, and he seeks escape from it by entering into productive relations with other persons and groups; whether this effort toward security and "belonging" is beneficial or detrimental will depend, in the long run, on the nature of the society to which he adapts; obviously, such a reaction could result in attempts to gain security through unwarranted submission to authority and through excessive comformity to the demands of society. Maslow revives and emphasizes the drive for self-actualization, the maximum realization of one's potentialities. He conceives of five levels of needs, arranged "ladder-like" from "lower" to "higher" needs, as follows: physiological needs (to satisfy hunger, thirst, etc.); safety needs (for security, order, stability, etc.); belongingness and love needs (for affection, identification); esteem needs (for success, prestige, self-respect); and need for self-actualization. H. Murray lists a great number of what he calls psychological needs as basic motivational energies. These various theories are sufficient to prove that Freud's libidinal psychology does not have the widespread acceptance that it once had. However, we shall present the system at this point in our study, as briefly as possible, under the following captions:

1. Motivation. According to Freud, human motivation is instinctual in nature (Freud himself used the word "instinct" rather than the word "drive"); tensional; for the most part, unconscious; and persistent (motives manifest themselves again and again in the different facets of the person's behavior). In Freud's system the primary source of all human motivation is the libido; hence, the system is properly designated libidinal psychology.

2. The Psychic Structure. This according to Freud, consists of three "parts"—the Id, the Superego, and the Ego. These must be understood as streams of psychic energy, even though they do have quasi-physiological roots. (1) The Id, (id is the Latin neuter pronoun, the English it). This is described as the energy by which man's animal and racial heritage of lust, gluttony, vanity, violence, and the like, is represented in the psyche. (2) The Superego. This is defined as the energy by which the repressive forces of the environment are represented in the psyche. The most potent of these repressive forces are, of course, those of parental discipline; indeed, according to Freudianism, the "parent image" is the specter which pursues "Everyman" from the cradle to the grave. The Superego is regarded as the source of the so-called "guilt complex"; it is said to embrace both the ego ideal and conscience. (3) The Ego. This is perhaps best described as the energy by which the developing Selfhood is represented in the psyche. (These are all forms of psychic energy, and though having physiological sources, as a rule, are to be interpreted in psychological terms.) (4) The Pleasure Principle. This is the name given to the alleged normal demand of the forces of the Id for immediate gratification regardless

of consequences. All the impulses of the Id are said to be "primitive, blind, irrational, brutish." They are divided into two categories: those concerned with survival, known as the "life instincts" (hunger, thirst, and sex especially), and those concerned with destructive impulses, and therefore designated the "death instincts." The "death instincts" are said to manifest themselves in various forms of aggression. (5) The Reality Principle. The Ego is said to be the I, the executive part of the psyche which regulates the Id in the interest of adjustment to reality. This regulation is designated the reality principle and is in effect the control acquired by the Ego over the pleasure principle. The Id is sometimes labeled the "I want," the Superego, the "I ought" or "I ought not," the Ego, the "I will." It has been rightly said that in Freud's system the person finds the Christian eschatology within himself: his Superego is his Heaven, his Id is his Hell, and his Ego is the creature caught "in a strait betwixt the two." On this point, incidentally, Omar Khayyam anticipated Freud by many centuries:

> I sent my Soul through the Invisible
> Some letter of the After-life to spell:
> And by and by my Soul return'd to me,
> And answer'd, I Myself am Heav'n and Hell:
> Heav'n but the Vision of fulfill'd Desire,
> And Hell the Shadow from a Soul on fire.

(It should be made clear at this point, I think, that Freud never promulgated any Rousseauean doctrine that a man should not discipline his impulses. Whatever faults we may find with his system, it must be emphasized that he never advocated libertinism. According to his view, in any situation the intellect will have its say: the trouble with human beings is that they do not need its admonitions; rather, all too often they follow their emotions, inclinations, passions, in a word, their irrational powers.)

3. The Libido. This is the name which Freudians give to the energy by which the erotic drive is represented in the psyche. Freud's own definition of the libido is as follows: "The energy regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not at present actually measurable) of those instincts which have to do with all that is comprised under the word love."[2] (It should be noted clearly that the libido is not the physiological sex drive per se, but the energy by which the physiological sex drive is represented in the psyche. Obviously, it is thought of as being practically the same activity as that which is designated by the Apostle Paul the "carnal mind," or "mind of the flesh." (The libido being the energy by which sex is represented in the mind, it must follow that the man or woman who thinks about little or nothing but sex satisfaction—and their name is legion, depending of course on how far in daily living each has succeeded in getting out of the barnyard—has a well-developed libido.) The libido is said to manifest itself in infancy homosexually (thumb sucking, fist sucking, etc.); in early childhood heterosexually (cf.

the oral stage, the anal stage, the phallic stage—all said to be pregenital; cf. also "incest feelings," the Oedipus Complex, the Electra Complex); in late childhood, homosexually (masturbation, actual homosexuality, male "gangs," "female gangs," etc., the age in which girls who run with boys become known as "tomboys," and boys who run with girls are called "sissies," that is, the age in which each sex seeks the association of its own kind); and in adolescence and youth, again heterosexually (relations with the opposite sex for which marriage is the socially accepted outlet). The Oedipus Complex (named after Oedipus of Greek legend, the Theban prince who unwittingly slew his own father and married his own mother) is the designation given to the alleged preference of the child for the parent of the opposite sex, but precisely speaking, for the affinity of the small boy for his mother. The Electra Complex (from the Electra of Greek legend, who goaded her brother Orestes into the slaying of their mother to avenge the murder of their father, Agamemnon) is the designation given to the alleged preference of the daughter for her father. The libido can manifest itself in such extreme phenomena as narcism or narcissism (abnormal self-love: after Narcissus, the lad of the Greek myth whom Nemesis caused to fall in love with his own image as reflected in a fountain and to pine away out of sheer desire for it, until the gods out of compassion finally changed him into the flower which bears his name): sadism (the procurement of "sexual" satisfaction by the infliction of pain upon others, especially upon the loved person; after Count de Sade, 1704-1814, who exhibited the perversion); masochism (the procurement of "sexual" satisfaction by infliction of pain upon oneself; abnormal pleasure enjoyed as a result of being abused by oneself or one's associate; after L. Von Sacher-Masoch, Austrian novelist, 1835-1895, who described the phenomenon).

4. The Unconscious. According to Freud, beneath all the consciously present or available material in the psyche, there is the content of what he calls the Unconscious: of this material we have no direct knowledge. The Unconscious is described as a vast storehouse of unremembered experiences, continuously seething with an activity all its own (in the form of purposes, strivings, desires, passions, and tensions replete with emotional potential) and continually trying to break through consciousness into normal channels of expression. Moreover, the laws which govern the Unconscious are said to be altogether different from those which govern ordinary consciousness. There is little consistency, we are told, in the content of the Unconscious; contradictory attitudes and impressions may flourish there side by side without modifying each other in any way; hence the activity of the Unconscious is said to be characterized by irrationality. In the Unconscious, fantasy is often indistinguishable from reality; the strange content of this quasi-fairyland is exhibited especially in dreams; in fact, Freud contended that a dream is only a disguised satisfaction for a desire which has been repressed during the waking life: dreams are of the character of

wish fulfillment. From all this it will be obvious that Freudian motivation is properly termed hidden motivation. (Incidentally, we must distinguish here between the Freudian Unconscious and the Subconscious of the metapsychical dimension of man. Whereas the former is psychophysical in content, the latter is wholly psychical or without corporeal connotation.) [Freudians differentiate the Conscious (that which is present in consciousness), and the Preconscious (that which is subject to recall), from the Unconscious (as described above): in Freudian theory and practice, however, these terms are characterized by a certain measure of ambiguity.]

5. The Role of Conflict. The Freudian picture of the human person is that of a self, if such it can rightly be called, basically in a state of civil war. Continuous unconscious conflict between the forces of the Id and those of the Superego is the concept which is dominant in Freud's system. This conflict is said to be the cause, not only of psychoses themselves (forms of "insanity") but also of those personality disorders which are designated "neuroses" (including complexes, anxieties, phobias, hysterias, obsessions, ties, and the like). E.g., the case of the great Dr. Johnson who felt an overpowering impulse as he walked along the street to strike with his cane every lamppost he passed. Do you feel an impulse when walking down the street to put your foot down (or perhaps to avoid doing so) on every seam in the sidewalk?

6. Childhood Conditioning. No system of psychology ever put more stress on the power and permanence of childhood impressions than Freud's system does. This is, in my opinion, its primary contribution to human thought and life. The decisions and acts of a person's life are said to be influenced, if not actually determined, by events which occurred in his infancy, events of which he, as a baby, was wholly unconscious; events, that is to say, which took place prior to his development of self-consciousness. And of greatest importance of all these events of infancy and early childhood, Freud tells us, are those in which sex relationships are involved. And thus it is that the parent-image is said to hover over the personality throughout life, like a specter; that of the mother-image over the male child, and that of the father-image over the female child. (For instance, a son, it is said, will usually select for a wife a young woman whose personality traits parallel those of his own mother; similarly, a daughter will select for her husband a young man whose personality traits resemble those of her own father.)

7. Fixation is a Freudian thesis which deserves special attention. It is defined as a condition in which the psychological (especially the emotional) development of the person remains at a behavioral level which was appropriate only at an earlier period of that person's life. Thus we say of certain individuals that their behavior shows them to have "stopped growing" at a certain stage in their lives; they act, we say, "like children," at times "positively

babyish." Fixation means that patterns set at an early age become stereotyped and inflexible. Common examples of such hang-overs of childishness into adulthood are procrastination, sulking, temper tantrums, bullying, boasting, self-indulgence (especially that which is commonly called "keeping up with the Joneses"), negativism (a rebellious spirit: unwillingness to accept counsel or direction), deliberate waywardness (the strutting of one's self-assumed "independence," as, for example, the person who lights a cigarette in the church vestibule just to show off his resentment of opposition to smoking by some of the church members), indulgence in casual flirtations ("affairs," "episodes") by middle-aged married persons, etc., etc. Fixations are usually the result either of parental neglect on the one hand, or of parental over-protection on the other, during the formative childhood years. "Smother love" is all too common: hence unconscious mother-fixations lie at the root of many major and minor neuroses. Fixations manifest themselves in childish dependence, in adulthood, on parents, on a friend, on some person with a more aggressive personality, such as one who occupies a superior position in the business establishment, in the factory, etc. Fixations are manifestations of a weak ego: such persons never learn to "make up their minds," to form convictions and to "stand up" for them; they have never learned to depend on themselves. (Cf. the young woman in the musical play, Oklahoma, who "just cain't say, No.") Fixation is essentially arrested emotional development. In everyone's personality there are two conflicting urges: the urge to grow up, to mature, and the counter-urge to revert to the infantile. All parents should realize that the attainment of maturity by their offspring must involve courage on the part of the latter to take risks, willingness to accept responsibilities, and the acceptance of the techniques of self-discipline. It is far better for one to learn respect for authority in the high chair, as J. Edgar Hoover is reported to have said recently, than to have to learn it too late—in the electric chair. Life is never—for any human being—simply that of a grasshopper floating downstream. Children should learn—early in life—wholesome respect for work. (Regression is a temporary reversion to childish behavior.)

8. Defense Mechanisms, i.e., "compromise-formations," or "systems of ego defense." These are devices set up by the Ego, with varying degrees of unconsciousness or consciousness, to resolve the inner conflicts. Resort to such devices occurs, we are told, when self-esteem is threatened. Among the more common and more significant of these "defense mechanisms" are the following: (1) Rationalization ("psychological aspirin"): accounting for, or "justifying" to ourselves and possibly to others, certain ideas, feelings or acts which are per se not rational or not sanctioned by the individual conscience. Rationalization is, of course, a form of self-deception. (2) Projection, the device of attributing to another person the rejected or unpleasant ideas, feelings, motives or actions which really belong to oneself—of blaming someone

else for one's own shortcomings and mistakes. This exceedingly human business of "passing the buck" is as old as the race itself. According to the well-known Biblical story (which is as true to life as it can be), when Father Adam was confronted with the fact of his own transgression of the moral law, his immediate "alibi" to the Almighty was: "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat." That is to say, "The woman you gave me, God—it was she who got me into this mess." And Mother Eve, when confronted in turn with the fact of her own disobedience, resorted to the same device. "The serpent beguiled me," was her excuse, "and I did eat." (See Gen. 3:9-13.) And from that day to this, man, persistently refusing to face up to the fact of his own derelictions, has gone his way leaning on the crutches of fatalism, determinism, predestinarianism, and the like, blaming either the Unconscious, or the Subconscious, or the endocrine glands, or a "mental block," or an unpleasant childhood, or even "blaming Adam"—"it was the old Adam in me." (One of Man's favorite devices is that of blaming God for his troubles.) (3) Identification, the reverse of projection, is the unconscious moulding of one's own Ego after the pattern of some other person whom one has taken as an ideal or as a model. Adults often use this mechanism to fortify themselves against their own inner reproaches by behaving in the same fashion as they believe someone who has strength of character and is well-adjusted would behave or does behave. In such cases identification becomes a form of compensation. (4) Sublimation. This is the unconscious substitution, for overt expressions of sexual desire, of other types of behavior which are socially or ethically approved. (E.g., the composition of sonnets by the young man who is in love.) In Freud's thinking all the higher forms of love—parental love, brotherly love, even the mystic's love for God—are sublimations of the sex drive. (5) Fantasy. Unconscious fantasies, we are told, not only modify and determine much of our daydreaming, but also make their appearance as fragments in everyday consciousness. For example, the inclination to be ill may be derived from the unconscious fantasy that if one is sick, one will get attention and care which would not be obtained as long as one is in good health. Fantasy is correlated with (6) Symbolization, the unconscious association of two objects whereby one comes to represent (symbolize) the other through some characteristic which the two have in common, accompanied by the taking over of the emotional value attached to the original idea or object of its symbol. For example, it is said that a person's exaggerated fear of fire might be a symbolization of his own fear of the consequences of some overt sexual act: "Playing with fire is dangerous." According to Freud, a dream is an abstraction of a repressed conflict disguised in symbols borrowed from the happenings of the day. (7) Compensation (achieving satisfaction in one area of personal experience to balance a frustration in some other area). This is a form of ego defense which permeates practically all defense mechanisms. Generally speaking, compensation has its origin

in some form of childish inadequacy or frustration. Most antisocial behavior, for example, is compensatory in nature; the boy who has suffered cruelty and privation at the hands of parents will compensate by becoming a bully himself and venting his spleen on society in general. Many persons will compensate for their own self-realized lack of religious faith by belittling and castigating those who do sincerely profess religious faith. Fantasy is a common type of compensation: the boy who is physically handicapped may daydream of his exploits on the football field; the girl who is homely may compensate by imagining herself the most glamorous of film stars; the young man who has a formidable rival for the affections of a young woman may compensate for his lack of physical prowess by enacting again and again in imagination the sound thrashing he would like to inflict on the other. There are several resources for compensation, in addition to antisocial behavior, fantasy, and the like: among such might be mentioned one's vocation or avocation, one's recreation, one's possessions (a common means of compensation by the new-rich for lack of culture or of the social graces), even one's world-outlook or philosophy of life.

9. Catharsis deserves special mention as an important factor in the psychoanalytic cure. This is the procedure in which the patient is induced to "unburden" himself; that is, to relive the distressing situation which has been repressed, by "talking it over" with the psychoanalyst. "Confession" thus serves to drain off the pent-up emotional tension which has been built up in the psyche by the inner conflict (of which the patient up to the time of catharsis probably has been unaware). [Aristotle was the first to make use of this word catharsis: this he did in constructing his general theory of tragedy. This theory was that, in sharing emotionally the tragic experience of the noble protagonist who is stricken down finally by an unrecognized "fatal flaw" in his own character, the spectator finds the empathic experience helpful as a means of draining off the pent-up emotions in himself. Aristotle's theory of tragedy (see his Poetics) was that only a personage of high character and estate could be a proper subject of tragedy, the tragedy being brought about ultimately by the fatal flaw in his own character. The hot temper of Oedipus was an excellent example of the case in point. Shakespeare followed this formula to the very letter: Hamlet, "sweet prince," became a victim of tragedy through his indecision; Othello, the "noble Moor," through his inordinate jealousy; Macbeth, the Scottish princeling, through his ambition (or perhaps too much wife); and King Lear, through his sheer conceit that his family could do no wrong, a conceit which blinded him to the true character of his daughters. In Aristotle's view, of course, a consummate bourgeois materialist like Willy Loman (in Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman) could never be a proper subject for tragedy, simply because he came from "the wrong side of the tracks."] Catharsis has long been recognized, of course, as an efficacious means of removing emotional strain and thus preparing the way for a constructive

outlook on life; every clergyman and every physician is fully aware of its therapeutic value.

10. Freud's psychology has been criticized generally on the following grounds:

(1) Freud does what psychologists have been doing from earliest times: he divides personality into three arbitrarily conceived "parts." Plato, for example, wrote of the three "parts" of the soul (that is, the three categories under which the powers—"faculties"—of the soul are to be classified or differentiated), namely, the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. Aristotle divided the psyche into rational and irrational parts or powers, holding that the emotional part partook of both rationality and irrationality, and might be dominated by either, depending on the individual's measure of self-control. Psychology generally has always separated the mental processes into the intellectual, emotional, and volitional (intellect, feeling, and will). Thus Freud's Id, Superego, and Ego, may roughly be translated as Emotional Impulse, Conscience, and Selfhood, respectively. Freud simply dramatizes what psychology has emphasized from time immemorial.

(2) Freud's concepts were derived almost exclusively from the study of neurotic and pathological cases; hence, their applicability to normal personality is in many respects questionable, to say the least. Freud himself, however, never doubted that minor obsessions, phobias, complexes, tics, etc., were, so to speak, embryonic neuroses.

(3) Freud greatly exaggerates the role of unconscious conflict in the development of personality. Most of our conflicts are conscious ones in all essential particulars: normal persons are aware of their conflicts, both external and internal: that, to be sure, is the reason why they are normal persons. Every normal person, moreover, will resolve his conflicts in terms of his own pre-existing personality (attitudes, traits, interests, values, etc.). I see no valid reason for resorting to such an esoteric (or histrionic?) portrayal of the role of conflict in personal life as that indulged by Freud and his disciples. Indeed, I am convinced that many persons utilize the esoteric lingo of psychoanalysis for the purpose of "rationalizing" their own inherent meanness: some even escape the justice of the courts by hiding behind such specious devices. (How many court trials take place in which psychiatrists of equal eminence in their profession are evenly divided in the character of their evidence? Just how reliable is their testimony, after all?) (Incidentally, this role of conflict has been carried to such extremes that "tension" has come to be the foremost psychosomatic affliction in our time; "sedatives," "tranquilizers," etc., have become the universal panacea for human ills; and barbiturates—someone has aptly said—have become "the ball bearings on which present-day society revolves.")

(4) Many psychoanalytic terms are simply dramatizations of long-recognized facts: old wine, so to speak, poured into new linguistic wineskins. Take, for example, the so-called pleasure principle and the reality principle: these are but pompous terms for facts of life which psychologists and ethicians have recognized for centuries: as far back as Socrates and Plato, man has been taught that he should use his reason to direct his will into the control of his appetites and passions. The reality principle has been aptly described as "a shorthand designation of the enormously complex process of the maturing of personality, of its fitting into a socialized and civilized setting."

(5) Again, take the Freudian concept of sublimation. What does it mean, in the concrete? Does it have proper reference to some organic tension, such as hunger, thirst, physiological sex desire, etc.? Hardly: to talk of "sublimating" thirst, hunger, or an overactive sex gland, would be absurd. Does the word have reference, then, to diversion of attention and interest from a lower to a higher objective in the scale of values? If so, sublimation becomes simply a name for one's redirection of attention and interest (as Allport points out). It has long been recognized by psychologists that one corrects bad habits only by substituting good habits for them. Even if "sublimation" means one's foregoing of some specific gratification for the sake of other satisfactions which are socially and morally sanctioned, the fact still remains that the exchange is largely a matter of voluntary redirection of interest: the person has chosen to disregard inferior segmental satisfactions ("apparent goods") in the interest of an alternative plan of life that satisfies him, not in part, but as a whole man ("real goods"). He has simply chosen a richer, more satisfying kind of life on the whole, and is living it to the best of his ability.

(6) In the use of the term "sublimation," do not Freudians perpetrate the fallacy common to many of the so-called "pure sciences," namely, that of "begging the question" (petitio principii), that is, the fallacy of taking for granted the very thing that is to be proved—the fallacy of assuming in the premise, the very proposition which they profess to establish in the conclusion? (We have already noted that educational psychologists commit this fallacy in their treatment of the Conditioned Reflex.) When Freudian psychologists extend the meaning of the word libido to take in all higher forms of love (as attraction to an object), such as parental love for children, brotherly love in general (good will), a citizen's love for his country, and even the believer's love for God, by explaining them as sublimations of the physiological sex drive, they are assuming the very thing that needs to be proved. It simply cannot be proved that parental tenderness, brotherly love, love of country, love for God, etc., are "sublimations" of sex. Thus the very proposition that is taken for granted is precisely the one that cannot be proved and that must be proved if the Freudian theory of "sublimation" holds good.

(7) Again, consider the parent-image of the psychoanalysts: there is little in the idea that is really new. We all know that the prime factor in the development of any personality is the influence of the parental personalities; there can be no doubt that the most lasting impressions of all are those which are made in the home, in the formative years of the child's life. These are long-recognized facts of life. Again, what about identification? What is this so-called "defense mechanism" but imitation occasioned and highly colored by emotional content? Does not history prove that man is seldom if ever without the inclination to hero worship? And has not imitation long been recognized to be a potent factor in the learning process? I can see no valid reason for resorting to subtleties to account for these well-known phenomena of personality. The same is true of such pehnomena as rationalization (a practice of which every human being is guilty at some time or times in life), projection, fantasy, and the like. The history of catharsis goes back to the cult of Asclepius, as practiced in the temples of that deified healer throughout the ancient Greek and Roman world. Incidentally, many of the psychological subtleties hypothesized by Freud were clearly exhibited in the dramas of the Greek tragic poet, Euripides, in the fifth century before Christ. Euripides "out-Freuded Freud" over twenty-five hundred years ago.

(8) The Oedipus Complex is one of the foundation stones of the whole Freudian structure. The fact remains, however, that empirical investigation does not support the concept; psychological studies have failed to turn up any significant tendency of the part of children to prefer the parent of the opposite sex. Havelock Ellis, McDougall, Sears, Horney, and others, hold that the Oedipus Complex is rare, if indeed it exists at all; as a matter of fact, the pattern of emotional attachments of child-for-parent depends upon the kind of family situation in which the child is reared. Malinowski, Margaret Mead, and other anthropologists, find no evidence of this "complex" among primitives. The evidence accumulated from many sources seems to refute Freud's contention that man's sense of guilt is primarily derived from an Oedipus complex.[3]

(9) In the final analysis the Freudian libido is an omnibus word that is made to embrace all life-serving impulses and powers of the human being. For all practical purposes, then, it certainly differs very little, if at all, from the venerable Will to Live, the dynamic and nonspecific "power" that has been a persistent postulate of thinkers in all ages. (Cf. Plato's treatment of "Eros" in his Symposium; Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea; the Elan Vital of Bergson's Creative Evolution; G.B. Shaw's "Preface" to his Back to Methuselah, etc.)

(10) The Freudian all-embracing concept of psychosexuality is, to say the least, an exaggeration of one aspect of human life to the disparagement of all other aspects. The prime fallacy of Freudianism is that of assuming that any form of thought or behavior

which is found to be connected with sex in any life is invariably found to be connected with sex in every life. This simply is not true. Every person is unique: hence, every person handles his individual problems, that of sex included, in terms of his own pre-existing personality. Indeed, his manner of handling problems of sex especially will be influenced by his moral standards and in particular by his religious convictions or lack of them as the case may be. Obviously, many of the vicious sex crimes of our day are motivated, not by physical lust, but by personality wounds: that is, they are compensations for emotional traumas suffered in childhood or early youth, at the hands of a cruel, neglectful, or deceitful mother, sister, sweetheart, etc. They are acts designed to wreak vengeance on womankind in general when the opportunity presents itself. This is the only adequate explanation—it seems to me—of the viciousness which usually characterized these assaults. The sum and substance of all this is, that sex never plays the same role in any two personalities. As Allport writes:

> Personality is not a system of formations within the matrix of sex. . . . Human motives are highly individual affairs. It misrepresents them to say that they are only changes rung upon universal themes. Motives are always dynamic formations of minds-in-particular, and they can only be understood if the course of their individual transformations is known.[4]

Unfortunately, the manner in which contemporary over-zealous disciples of Freud present his system, especially to college students, gives it the appearance, as someone has rightly remarked, of a kind of "highbrow pornography."

(11) Drs. Stella Chess, Alexander Thomas, and Herbert G. Birch have recently put out a book (published by The Viking Press) in which they present the conclusions which they have reached from a ten-year study at New York University, of the daily activities, recorded from infancy, of 231 children from a wide variety of familial and cultural backgrounds. The book is titled, Your Child is a Person. Jessica Mitford reviewed this book recently in Life, under the caption, "Raising Kids without Fear or Freud," and among other things wrote as follows:

> Those of us who have struggled for 25 years to bring up our children without kowtowing to the weird, jargon-steeped counsel of post-Freudian pop psychology—who have worried if our children deviated from some mythical norm—have at last a friend in Your Child is a Person. True, kindly Dr. Spock and clever Dr. Gesell—while concentrating on the similarities—hinted to us that all children can differ. But Drs. Chess, Thomas and Birch—concentrating on the differences, in their new book—go much further and challenge the underlying premises of most of today's experts. In a statement that

is sure to provoke yelps of rage and a chorus of huzzahs from coast to coast, they declare: "Both the published evidence and our own experience have convinced us that prevailing psychoanalytically-based theories of child care are wrong."

We do not have the space here to state the conclusions specifically which these doctors reached, but we do urge interested students to procure the book and read it for themselves.

(12) Undoubtedly there is some merit in Dr. Louis Berman's view that the Unconscious of Freudian psychology might well be identified with the chemical conditioning of the endocrine hormones.[5]

(13) The more I study the contemporary scene the more convinced I am that by constantly reading and hearing about phobias, complexes, stresses, tensions, tranquilizers, etc., many persons today are literally thinking themselves into pseudo-neuroses. There seems to be more truth than fiction in the remark made by some wag recently that it has become a mark of sophistication to have to spend a few weeks occasionally in a hospital "mental ward." As Rube Goldberg puts it:

> Neuroses, hypnoses, taboos and repressions,
> Schizophrenia, anemia, psychotic obsessions;
> Rejections, dejections, and sexual perversions,
> Paranoia by Goya, Narcissus inversions—
> Which, according to Freud,
> To make it simple and quick,
> Seems to mean very briefly,
> "You're sick, boy, you're sick!"[6]

The following lines written in like facetious vein (author unidentified) are also pertinent:

> I never get mad; I feel hostile;
> I never feel sad; I'm depressed.
> If I sew or I knit and enjoy it a bit,
> I'm not handy—I'm merely obsessed.
>
> I never regret; I feel guilty.
> And if I should vacuum the hall,
> Wash the woodwork and such, and not mind it too much,
> Am I tidy? Compulsive, is all.
>
> If I'm happy, I must be euphoric;
> If I go to the Stork Club or Ritz
> And have a good time making puns or rhyme,
> I'm manic, or maybe a schiz.
>
> If I tell you you're right, I'm submissive,
> Regressing aggressiveness, too.
> And when I disagree, I'm defensive, you see,
> And projecting my symptoms on you.

I love you, but that's just transference
With Oedipus rearing its head.
My breathing asthmatic is psychosomatic,
A fear of exclaiming, "Drop dead!"

I'm not lonely—I'm simply dependent;
My dog has no fleas, just a tic.
So if I seem a cad, never mind—just be glad
That I'm not a stinker—I'm sick!

I am inclined to think there is more truth than fiction also in the statement one hears frequently nowadays, that all too many psychiatrists need psychiatry themselves. I call to mind here the case of a man now approaching middle age—a personal acquaintance—who early in his life suffered emotional trauma as a consequence of a somewhat chaotic home environment. Instead of living in the present and asserting his mastery of all such disturbing circumstances, what has this man done? He has used the remembrance of these childhood personality wounds as an excuse for indulging a lifelong orgy of self-pity. Obviously, there is too great a tendency in contemporary psychiatry to fasten the blame for these personality wounds on parents, early play groups, factors of environment, or what not, rather than on the "suffering" person's lack of will-power to make "the dead past bury its dead." I am convinced that in the vast majority of cases, a person can be whatever he wills to be, i. e., in terms of his personality.

It is evident that Freudian psychology is essentially descriptive in character, and from this point of view many of its concepts are indeed helpful. The system, however, like every system build on a basic theory of instinct or of drive, is fundamentally anti-intellectual. Still and all, the most orthodox Freudian is never willing to dethrone reason altogether as a factor in human motivation: the intellect, he will admit, will have its say in every situation, but, he will add, very few persons heed its counsel. I might ask: How can we expect persons to do this if we constantly encourage them to look upon themselves as helpless puppets in the grasp of irrational interior forces. (I should like to add, in passing, that the "depth" psychologists have finally caught up with the theologians—what difference is there, after all, between the current psychological doctrine of human irrationality and the traditional theological doctrine of human depravity? As a matter of fact, I fail to see any difference.)

I still contend, despite Freud et al., that men can be rational in their responses if they try to be; that they are not necessarily slaves of their "urges" and "drives"; that human thought and will can and should shape impulse. As one eminent contemporary thinker has said, this kind of "irrationalism" is "logical suicide"; that is, if the "depth" theory be true, "then it is itself the product of nonrational impulse and has no more claim to truth than any other product of unreason."[7] In short, if the theory be true, then Freud-

ianism itself is but the product of human irrationality and is therefore of no practical value—as a matter of fact, of little consequence even—to humankind.

A final suggestion: The key to an unbiased evaluation, and to the avoidance of unjustifiable emphases on particular concepts—one might well say, shibboleths—of Freud's system, is rigid adherence to the fact that so-called sex habits, attitudes, adjustments, etc., are actually personal habits, attitudes, adjustments, etc. The human being—the person—is infinitely more than sex.

(The influence of Freud's libidinal system on the modern drama, from Ibsen to Tennessee Williams, has been set forth instructively in a book entitled Freud on Broadway, by W. David Sievers, published in 1955, by Hermitage House, New York. We are reminded, in this connection, of the comment attributed to a professor of English in one of our universities, that most contemporary literature—including the novel as well as the drama—is either neurotic, erotic, or tommyrotic.)

FOOTNOTES

[1]Eby, The Quest for Moral Law, pp. 184-185. (Columbia University Press, 1944.)

[2]The Works of Freud, Vol. XVIII, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 90. Translated from the German under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey and Alen Tyson. (Hogarth Press, London, 1955.)

[3]See Wayland F. Vaughan, Personal and Social Adjustment, p. 247. (Odyssey Press, New York, 1952.)

[4]Gordon W. Allport, Personality, etc., pp. 187-189.

[5]Louis Berman, The Glands Regulating Personality, Second Edition Revised, Ch. IX. (Macmillan, 1938.)

[6]Rube Goldberg, I Made My Bed, published by Doubleday, quoted in a press review in the El Paso Herald-Post.

[7]Brand Blanshard, Preface to Philosophy: Textbook, by Hocking, Blanshard, Hendel, and Randall, p. 117. (Macmillan, 1947.)

## XX. Personal values play the dominant role in adult human motivation.

1. "Depth" psychology takes in those systems which put chief emphasis on motivation, on the unconscious factors in motivation, and hence on human irrationality. So much stress has been placed on "drives" in recent years, both in academic and in popular literature, that many persons have come to believe they are "driven" by these hypothetical forces against their will. But this is not true. It is not true theoretically, nor is it true practically: the courts of the land would hardly accept the specious plea of "unconscious motivation" as justification for the commission of a crime. Common sense still holds Mr. Average Man responsible for his acts. [Human irrationality is, of course, a fact. Plato tells us that a "wild beast" lurks in the depths of every human being. Aristotle writes frankly of the "rational" and "irrational" parts (powers) of the soul, and of the tremendous range of man's moral potential—from walking up in the milky way, so to speak, down to wallowing in the gutter. Man all too frequently blindly follows inordinate desire rather than intelligent deliberation. But it need not be so. Reason is present to guide him if he will but listen to its dictates.] As we have stated before, the theory of drive may, and probably does, hold good for the early formative years of life, but as persons attain maturity, and to the extent that they do attain maturity biological drives give way to control by the self in the interest of higher personal motives: stimulus-response motivation gives way to personal-choice motivation. The man who is dominated by organic drives in his adulthood lives on a level little above that of the brute.

2. Structural psychology is that system which places primary emphasis on "structural" units of personality, notably personality traits. (1) A personality trait is a fusion of habits which has power in itself to initiate behavior. The garrulous person, for example, will hunt out a victim in order to bombard him with conversation about sheer trivia (an affliction that has been named "verbal dysentery," or in more sophisticated terms, "logorrhea"); the introvert, on the other hand, will cross the street in order to avoid conversation with an approaching acquaintance. (2) A personality trait may be defined as a fusion of habits which has become per se a motivational system in the total structure of the personality. Habits no longer dominate the trait; on the contrary, the trait is sufficiently

potent to force the forming of new habits serviceable to itself. (3) It is admitted, of course, that culture plays the dominant role in the development of personality traits. Geneticists are agreed, however, that there is no feature of personality that is devoid of hereditary influence; that this is true of personality traits seems obvious. (Think of persons whom you have met who seem to have inborn traits of persistence, vacillation, dominance, submissiveness, strong emotions, weak emotions, etc.) Personal observation would seem to indicate that every child comes into the world with at least a set of tendencies toward certain personality traits: two children, for example, who manifest entirely different temperamental traits, may be born to the same parents. Traits do not only initiate behavior, they even stylize or canalize it. Personality traits can be modified, of course, by personal effort.

3. Personality traits may be classified roughly as psychosomatic, expressive, and attitudinal. (We shall follow here, in part, the general classification of traits as given by Allport, in his excellent book, Personality, etc.)

(1) Under psychosomatic (Allport uses the term, psychobiological) traits may be listed those of temperament (with reference to emotional range, broad emotions, as opposed to narrow emotions; with reference to emotional intensity, strong emotions as opposed to weak emotions: intensity of emotion seems to be a different dimension altogether from emotional spread); those of motility (including speed of movement): impulsion-inhibition (some persons are always "quick on the trigger" in their movements, whereas others seem to have inertia to overcome); emphatic-unemphatic movement (some persons seem to apply more "psychological pressure" than others in speaking, writing, gesturing, etc.).

(2) Common traits of personality that are characteristically expressive are the following: (a) Ascendance or dominance (i.e., always pushing to the forefront, overcoming obstacles, taking leadership) and submission (a modus vivendi of gaining one's point by yielding, agreeing, placating, following). (b) Expansiveness and reclusiveness: the garrulous person, in contrast to the "human clam," who is, under any set of circumstances, hard to pry open. These traits are closely related, of course, to those of talkativeness and gregariousness. H. Cason, in his study of several hundred causes for personal annoyance, has listed about a dozen that were selected by a large group of persons as being particularly irritating. Of these, six are all closely related to the trait of expansiveness: habitual arguing, putting hands on unnecessarily ("pawing"), crowding in front in a line, speaking in a dictatorial manner, boisterousness, attracting attention in public, and continual criticizing. The student is asked to think of the persons whom he dislikes most: How many of them are quiet-mannered, habitually attending to their own business? (c) Persistence (having "grit" or marked strength of

will, dogged determination) and vacillation (changeableness, irresolution, opportunism). These are usually spoken of by psychologists as "habits of will."

(3) Common traits of personality that are characteristically attitudinal may be listed in the following four categories:

(a) Those attitudinal traits that are of a general character. In this class belong the well-known traits of extroversion and introversion (according to William James, "toughmindedness" and "tendermindedness," respectively). These traits (named and given widespread currency by Jung) are firmly rooted in the psychologist's store of concepts and have also found their way into common parlance. The extrovert is usually described as one whose chief interest is in the world around him, the world of practical affairs; one who is greatly interested in his own work; one who tends to be expansive, even garrulous; one who either is incapable of, or deliberately avoids, self-analysis and self-criticism; one who, generally speaking, is toughminded, that is, "thick-skinned" in his attitude toward the opinions of others. The introvert, on the other hand, is described as one who lives largely in his own rich and creative imaginary world; one who tends to "interiorize" conflicts and to resolve them in fantasy; one who indulges in a great deal of self-analysis and self-criticism; generally speaking, a "tenderminded" person, one characterized by delicacy of feeling, prone to take all things personally, sensitive to criticism, and usually idealistic in outlook. "The extrovert usually considers the introvert a sick soul; the introvert is often of the opinion that the extrovert is a Philistine and a bore."[1]

(b) Those attitudinal traits directed toward the self; (i) Self-objectification and self-deception. Self-objectification involves insight (the ability to see oneself as one really is) and humor (the ability to laugh at one's own foibles and follies, without growing bitter or cynical). These are characteristics only of the mature personality; unfortunately, however, very few persons seem to be able to go through life without deceiving themselves in some respects. And there are some persons who take themselves too seriously. The man who becomes obsessed with the idea that the future of the race rests upon his shoulders is liable to be a dangerous man. The "indispensable" human being simply never did and never will exist. As Robert Burns has put it: "Oh, wad some power the giftie gie us, to see oursels as ithers see us!" (ii) Self-assurance and self-distrust. One man, though able, lacks self-confidence; another is self-disparaging; still another is not only sure, but cocksure, of himself. Some persons characteristically set their goals above, some below, their abilities.

(c) Those attitudinal traits directed toward others: (i) gregariousness (desire to belong, to be present in social groups) and solitariness (aversion to social groups). (ii) Altruism and egoism (self-seeking). Some persons consistently do, some do not,

modify their own conduct to accord with the interests of others. (iii) Tact or tactlessness. The former is also designated "social intelligence," and is defined as "the ready power of appreciating and doing what is required by social circumstances." Obviously, tactlessness could be the product of ignorance of convention or of an antisocial attitude. Still and all, there are persons who seem to have the unhappy "faculty" of always saying or doing the wrong thing at the wrong time. (Tact has been described—somewhat cynically—as the ability to lie to the other fellow as you would expect him to lie to you: in the political arena it is called "diplomacy.")

(d) Attitudinal traits directed toward values. Perhaps the best suggestion put forward in this field was that of the German school as represented by Dilthey, Spranger, Jaspers and other German scholars, who postulated certain ideal personality types, with their corresponding traits, corresponding to patterns of value ("directions of striving") that unify any personality capable of following one of them consistently. The various authors of this school each presented a list of ideal types, the best known being the six suggested by Spranger. Spranger's view was that personalities should be categorized on the basis of master-sentiments ("motivational value-traits" and "interests") which serve as unifying philosophies of life. The six ideal types suggested by Spranger were the following: (i) the "theoretical man," his dominant interest being the pursuit of truth; (ii) the "economic man," one who characteristically is interested in what is useful; (iii) the "esthetic man," whose chief interest is beauty, (i.e., form and harmony): (iv) the "political man," who is interested primarily in power; (v) the "social man," for whom the highest value is love of people; and (vi) the "religious man," who seeks to comprehend the mystery of the cosmos and of his place within it, and for whom the highest value is wholeness (holiness) or unity. [Dr. A.H. Compton, the distinguished physicist, once said in substance, in a public address at Washington University, St. Louis (this writer was in the audience at the time): the business of science is to teach one how to do the things one wants to do; that of ethics is to teach one to choose the better things to do; and that of religion is to impel one to lose oneself in the greater Good.]

(4) Other probable personality traits are the following: (a) Dramatic tendency. Some persons, we say, are "natural-born actors." The liking for make-believe and for display ("dressing up") seems to be present in some measure in almost every human being, but in many it is distinctive enough to be characterized a trait. (Cf. the propensity of human beings for parades, lodge and club rituals, amateur theatricals, and all forms of showmanship, preferably in costume. Isn't it true that most of us are professional "joiners"? How many lodges and clubs would long survive if their formal dramatic rites and ceremonies were dispensed with?) (b) Radicalism and conservatism: those who would alter social conventions and institutions in ways never before tried, and those

who would preserve the status quo under all circumstances. Some persons "constitutionally" are "rebels." Others "constitutionally" are opposed to innovations of any kind. (Cf. the current argument between the advocates of "free enterprise" and the proponents of the "welfare state.") (c) Co-operative imagination (empathy), i.e., putting oneself into another's stream of activity, as, for example, laughing when one hears others laughing, even when one does not know what has occasioned the laughter. Some individuals sit unmoved through a football game; others are trying desperately to help the home team push the ball over the goal line, etc. (d) Suggestibility and negativism: tendency to believe everything—or nothing—that one hears, reads, etc. Some persons, we say, are "born in the objective case"; they are opposed to everything that comes along, like the old woman "down in Arkansas" who said she "didn't know nuthin" about the League of Nations but she was "agin it" anyway. (e) Orderliness and disorderliness. As Dr. R.J. Williams writes:

> Some women are naturally good housekeepers and take pleasure in having the household shipshape. Others are indifferent as long as they can successfully make their way from one room to the next without mishap. Men also have a divergence of traits in the same manner, and when a man who is extremely meticulous and old maidish about such matters marries a woman who is slipshod in her housekeeping, the marriage can end in shipwreck. A man who is fussy about having everything just so, cannot endure having the baby's pot left on the dining-room table.[2]

(f) Devotion or loyalty. Jealousy is usually a compound of egoism and devotion, and is often to be observed in very intense form among very young children and among animal pets as well. Devotion is a trait which varies in depth from one individual to another. (g) Masculinity and femininity. The extensive work of Terman and Miles on this variable yielded the following interesting results: (i) that many items yield a significant sex difference; (ii) that, given a high degree of culture and education, the scores for men and for women are brought closer together; and (iii) that male homosexual prostitutes have markedly feminine scores. (h) Among other variables upon which work has been and is being done, and which seem to fulfill the criteria laid down for the identification of common traits, are the following: annoyability, art appreciation, carefulness, cooperation-competition, depression-elation, emotional maturity, fair-mindedness, honesty, inhibition, militarism-pacifism, money-mindedness, nervous mannerisms, originality, punctuality, race prejudice, studiousness, superstitiousness, susceptibility to monotony, etc., etc.

4. Personalistic psychology is the system which studies the person as a whole, as an entity. Although making room for unconscious motivation in infancy and early childhood, "personalists" in

psychology hold that as the person matures, and to the extent that he matures, the unconscious factors give way to the conscious factors in motivation. Personal values play the dynamic role in human adulthood.

(1) By "personal values" is meant ends or goals which are desired and striven for, because they are believed to be of value, by persons. It naturally follows that the more mature the person is, the more refined will be the values which he selects as objectives of his striving. These consciously chosen values, moreover, may become very dynamic in determining the directionality of one's life. The man who lives only to satisfy his physical appetites practically lives at the level of the brute creation. The art of human living is essentially that of identifying and pursuing those ends which have real value in themselves, in the sense that they contribute in the greatest measure to a man's enrichment of his personality and to his attainment of his natural and proper ends.

(2) Personal motives undergo more or less frequent tranformations as the person grows into adulthood. (a) That is to say, as one "grows up," the organic drives characteristic of childhood are superseded by more refined ("sophisticated") types of motivation which are peculiar to the mature personality and which are designated by such terms as attitude, taste, inclination, sentiment, trait, interest, value, etc. These new motives come into the personality, completely supplanting prior motivations and functioning in their own power and right as directives of the course of personality development. If and as the person really matures, biological drives recede into the background. This is simply a matter of personal experience and observation. (b) Personal interests and values, especially, play the dynamic role in adult motivation. By "personal" we mean, of course, not essentially biological; the word "personal," as used here, connotes a value selected by the person, and not forced upon him. That personal values do determine adult motivation is true regardless of the moral level on which the life is lived. The man who lives only to "eat, drink, and be merry," that is to say, only to satisfy his physical appetites, does so because he chooses to do so; his sense of values is either uncultivated or distorted. He could live at a higher level, he could enjoy the good grain rather than the slop of the world, if he would only choose to "put first things first." The person who matures properly soon learns to do this: early in life he passes beyond the purely biological (or crass hedonistic) stage into that of the ethical (the realm of values). Newly acquired interests become well established in him and exert a determining effect upon his conduct. This has been proved again and again by persons whose interests have been centered in such fields especially as those of science, esthetics, or religion; in fact, in any of the fields corresponding to Spranger's "directions of striving" previously mentioned. (Of course, love of money or lust for power could hardly be called a "refined" motive.) (c) Many persons have, by sheer force or will, overcome great

physical handicaps and attained distinction in their chosen fields. (For example, Demosthenes and his speech defects; F.D. Roosevelt and infantile paralysis; Helen Keller, and both deafness and blindness; Fanny Crosby, the blind hymn writer, etc.) It is not necessarily the adversity itself which matters in such cases, but rather the manner in which the adversity is handled by the person in terms of his own pre-existing personality. (d) We all know that the transformation of motives is a common occurrence. For example, a mother may bear her child unwillingly, yet after the child is born may develop a love for it that transcends every other interest in her life. Or, a workman may start out on a job solely for the pay check he is to receive, only to become so vitally interested in the work that this newly acquired interest directs the whole subsequent course of his life. As R.S. Woodworth sums up:

> The fundamental drive toward a certain end may be hunger, sex, pugnacity, or what not, but once the activity is started, the means to the end becomes an object of interest on its own account.
>
> The primal forces of hunger, fear, sex, and the rest, continue in force, but do not by any means, even with their combinations, account for the sum total of drives activating the experienced individual.[3]

It is simply a matter of ordinary common sense that personal interest and values are the dynamic factors in adult motivation. (e) People can—and do—change. They change, both as individuals and as groups. They change as a result of the impact of relationships with other people, as a result of the impact of unforeseen events and especially of great ideas. As Dr. Archie Bahm writes:

> Individuals are affected by their philosophies in their day-to-day lives. One's choices are motivated, not only by his hunger and weariness, heredity and glands, habit and stimuli, but also by his philosophy, by his beliefs about what is good or best or bad or worst.[4]

Indeed it has been recognized from most ancient times that as a man thinks in his heart, so he is and does.

(3) Sudden reorientation of life occurs in many instances as a result of the transformation of motives. Ordinarily the process of growth is gradual, but there are innumerable instances in which abrupt shocks have changed the whole course of life and consequently of personality development. In infancy, there is the possibility of a birth-trauma, of accidents, of illnesses which leave permanent effects on personality. In early childhood, and especially in adolescence, any one of several "shocks" may occur, such as the death of a parent or parents; unpleasant incidents of home life, "gang" life, or school life; the experience of "leaving home" and becoming weaned from parents; so-called "puppy love," and the experiences attending sex maturation; experiences of success or failure, of

jealousy or wounded pride, etc. In adult years, swift and profound alterations of personality, and of the course of personality development, may occur as a result of business failure, of divorce, of illness, of the death of loved persons, of religious conversion, or of "the descending crisis." (As a rule, however, critical and abrupt changes in the directionality of life do not occur as frequently after the age of thirty as in adolescence: adolescence is, in many respects, the most critical period of life for personality development. No person can foreknow—and it is a blessing that he cannot foreknow—what catastrophic changes he may have to meet in the course of his life or what their impressions upon him will be. Some life histories have pivoted on one decisive event: notable examples are Gibbon's decision, late in life, to write The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the conversion of Saul of Tarsus on the Damascue road, the illness of Francis of Assisi, Tolstoy's profound "religious" experience, etc. Human biography is replete with such instances of sudden reorientation of life. As William James writes, in his usually pungent manner: "However closely physical changes may conform to law, it is safe to say that individual histories and biographies will never be written in advance, no matter how 'evolved' psychology will become."[5] Let us not forget that personal interests and values play the dynamic role in adult human motivation.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Gordon W. Allport, Personality, etc., p. 420.

[2]R.J. Williams, The Human Frontier, p. 142. (Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1946.)

[3]R.S. Woodworth, Dynamic Psychology, pp. 201, 104. (Columbia University Press, 1918.)

[4]Archie J. Bahm, Philosophy: An Introduction, p. 26. (Wiley and Sons, New York, 1953.)

[5]William James, Principles of Psychology (1890), Vol. II, p. 576n.

## Some pertinent questions for students to consider at this point in our study.

Do you just live? Or, do you have the right to life?

If you believe you have the right to life, on what do you base this conviction?

If a human legislature cannot give you life, how can it give you the right to life?

Can a human legislature create a right?

Does the fact that a custom is group-sanctioned necessarily prove that it is a good one?

Are morality and legality necessarily identical?

Are morals and mores necessarily identical?

If all customs are "equally valid," why do people of all generations insist on "bettering" their lot?

Are moral power and physical power identical?

Can you have the physical power without the moral power to do something? Conversely, can you have the moral power without the physical power to do something? Give examples.

Robinson Crusoe, as the story goes, lived for many years on an island uninhabited by man. Under such conditions, did Crusoe have any rights and duties? How is this question answered by the Declaration of Independence?

Why do we say that ethical theory and practice is based ultimately on the dignity and worth of the person as such? If a man does not respect the dignity and worth of the person as a person, how can he have any self-respect?

# PART THREE

## BASIC ETHICS

## XXI. The principles of a human act are (1) knowledge, (2) freedom, and (3) voluntariness.

The subject-matter of ethics is exercised liberty (i. e., human conduct or voluntary activity). (Note again the distinction between "conduct" and "behavior.") Ethics has to do with conduct. The sequence (or aggregate) of a person's acts, from the point of view of good and bad, right and wrong, constitutes a person's conduct. The fact that ethics has to do only with conduct implies (1) that it is a science having to do exclusively with man and his acts: it has nothing to do with animal (instinctive) behavior; it takes cognizance only of one kind of act and one kind of law, namely, the human act and moral law. (2) That in having conduct as its subject-matter, it has to do with deliberate acts, that is to say, with acts that proceed from and are under the control of reason (whether in a given instance rationality is exercised or not). Conduct has been defined as

> activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and reflection before an overt action is entered upon. [1]

(Note that this definition expressly asserts the necessity of deliberation prior to action in conduct.) (3) That the science of ethics has to do primarily with actions, not with states of mind. It is our actions that fall directly under our control, that are more or less "deliberate." Ethics is therefore properly defined as the science of conduct as that conduct is directed by reason.

By the "principles" of a human act, we mean the factors which combine to produce the act [from the Latin principium, which derives in turn from princeps, the designation, in Roman military science, for the soldier who stood at the head of the line when the Roman "century" (company) "numbered off".] These principles are usually given as three in number, as follows:

1. Knowledge, or prior deliberation. (1) Only a sentient and rational being can truly be moral. (2) By the moral nature of man is meant those powers which fit him for right or wrong action, namely, intellect, feeling, and will, together with that unique power of discrimination called conscience. In order to produce moral action, man has intelligence to discern the difference between right

and wrong; sensibility, to be moved by either of these; and freedom of will, to do one or the other. Conscience applies the moral law to particular cases in personal experience. The doctrine that the brute is imperfect man is logically connected with the doctrine that man is a perfected ("glorified") brute: both are equally dangerous to morals. (3) Will is properly designated a "psychic appetite." It can desire only what is known and what is presented to it by the intellect as desirable. The will simply cannot choose as an end anything with which the intellect is unacquainted; that is to say, freedom of choice is necessarily limited to that which lies within the circumference of one's acquaintanceship. (A Hottentot, who has never heard of ice, could hardly choose to go skating.) Intellect, desire, emotion—all converge in the volition which is essentially the human act. The human being is a unitary whole and acts as such. (4) The activity of the intellect consists in discovering, presenting and evaluating possible ends; in weighing the reasons for and against a certain course of conduct or in evaluating alternative courses of conduct in terms of their desirability (as determined largely by their consequences); and in weighing the suitability of alternative means to the accomplishment of the chosen end. Thus the exercise of the will is the terminus of the prior activity of the intellect (prior deliberation) as the latter may or may not have been modified by desire. Hence a certain measure of knowledge (a) of the end selected, and (b) of the means of attaining it, is necessary to the human act. (Note here the difference in degree of guilt usually recognized by law between the crime passional and the premeditated crime.)

2. Freedom, i. e., the power or choosing to act or not to act, or to act in one way instead of another, in a given situation.

(1) Note that freedom is the power, but not necessarily the right, to act or not to act, etc. Right is moral power. One may have the right to elicit an act, but may lack the power to do so; conversely, one may have the power, but may lack the right to elicit the act. This distinction between physical power (might) and moral power (right) must always be kept in mind: basically this is the distinction between expediency and morality, between the activities of the jungle and moral order.

(2) The following simple illustration is all that is required to explain what freedom is, essentially. To what extent is a man "in charge of himself" when he is falling from a twenty-story building? Obviously, he is not in charge of himself at all; rather, he is helpless in the throes of sheer physical force (gravity). On the other hand, to what extent is the same man "in charge of himself" in solving a complex mathematical problem? Obviously, this is a mental process, in which he is in charge of himself throughout. Freedom means that, in some measure, the person is in charge of himself when he acts.

(3) A free act is a self-determined act. An act of will which is necessitated in the will by forces of the inner nature, or one which is forced upon it by violence from without (if that were possible) is plainly not under the control of the "I"; therefore such an act is not a human act. Such acts as those of a madman, or those done in sleep, are not human acts, because in such cases the will is not free. Freedom to act in one way implies prior power of the will (person) to have acted in another, even in the opposite, way.

(4) Freedom attaches only to a person. As Negley writes,

> I suggest that Liberty is the concept most appropriate to Person. As a value principle, Liberty means, briefly the guarantee to individuals of as much freedom of thought and action as is consistent with the exercise of an equal freedom by other men. [2]

(Liberty, as stated heretofore, is personal freedom exercised in relation to other persons. In political thinking, liberty means, of course, absence of external restraint.)

(5) Freedom of will is not action without motive, i. e., the ability to deliberate or choose without motives. If the will were free in this sense, we should never exhort a person to do this or that: we should realize that such exhortations would accomplish nothing. But because the will is free, we do urge and exhort, and by exhortation we present to it motives. (We do not exhort the winds to blow in this or that direction: we realize that the winds are not influenced by motives.) Free will means, not that the will is undetermined, nor that it is fully determined by some other power than itself, but that it is self-determined. In connection with the forces of heredity and those of environment, there is always a third factor, namely, the personal reaction, the activity of the "I."

(6) Freedom of will, negatively defined, is immunity from necessity. Natural physical law is indeed stamped on the lower nature of man and governs all those movements of man which are not ordinarily subject to his volitional activity (e. g., metabolism, digestion, circulation of the blood, etc.) Nevertheless man is physically free in his will; at the same time, however, he is morally bound, that is, bound by the moral law which determines his relationships and their corresponding rights and duties. Free will, then, is immunity from necessity within the framework in which choice can be made; immunity from necessity (a) of choosing this instead of that object or end, and (b) of making any choice at all. Any normal person realizes, even when deciding upon a wrong course of conduct, that he is capable of choosing the right course; in other words, that his choice is not necessitated. This is just common sense.

(7) Determinism is denial of freedom of initial action in man ("free will"): it is the view that all actions, as effects, are due to antecedent causes. Theoretically, determinism is of various kinds,

namely, (a) physical (that all natural events are reducible ultimately to physiochemical action: thus the human individual is defined as "a locus in the movement continuum, constituting a relatively permanent electron-proton aggregate—the atoms, molecules, and tissues of the body—interacting with the electron-proton systems not within the body,"[3] etc.); (b) biological (that gene combinations determine all physical, temperamental, and mental characteristics, and hence all human behavior); and (c) psychological, which finds the sources of necessitarianism in unconscious forces and factors.

(8) The issue raised here is: Can a mental state be other than conditioned? Probably not: but "free will" means simply that the mental state resulting in the will-act is conditioned by the "I." As Dr. Will Durant has written:

> The determinist will recall the conservation of energy; the organism cannot emit more energy than it has received. Which is to forget that life itself is energy, visibly transforming the forces and materials brought to it into combinations that aim at the mastery of environment by thought, and occasionally succeed. What issues from action may be no more in quantity than what entered in sensation; but how different in quality! This transforming power of life is the highest energy we know; it is known to us more directly and surely than any other energy in the world; and it is the source and promise of our modest freedom. The determinist supposes that freedom is illusory because the "stronger" motive always wins. Of course this is a vain tautology; the motive that is strong enough to win is stronger than those that fail. But what made it stronger if not its harmony with the will, with the desire and essence of the soul?—"Yet there cannot be any uncaused actions." Verily; but the will is part of the cause; the circumstances of an action must include the forward urgency of life. Each "state" of mind follows naturally from the total preceding state of all reality; but that state and this include the transforming energy of life and will. —"The same effect always follows the same cause." But the cause is never the same, for the self involved is always in flux, and circumstances are forever changing. —"If I knew all your past and present I could infallibly predict your response." You could if you knew also the nature and power of the life-force within me; you could, perhaps, if you abandoned mechanistic principles and asked yourself, for your guidance, what you—i. e., life—would do in this complex of circumstance. Probably you could not predict successfully even then; probably there is in life an element of incalculability and spontaneity which does not accord with our categories and our "laws," and which gives peculiar zest and character to organic evolution and human affairs. Let us pray that we shall never have to live in a totally predictable world. Does not the picture of

such a world seem ridiculously incongruous with life mechanism in life being, as Bergson said, a passing jest? —"But all action is the result of heredity and environment." Not quite; the determinist modestly fails to take account of himself. He supposes once more that life is the passing product of external forces; he neglects (if we may use a pleonasm) the very vitality and liveliness of life. We are not merely our ancestors and our circumstances; we are also wells of transforming energy, we are parts of that stream of directive force, of capacity for adaptive choice and thought, in which our forefathers also moved and had their being. These ancestors are in truth living and acting within us; but the will and the life that were once in them is in each of us now, creating the "spontaneous me." . . . Will is free in so far as life is creative, in so far as it enters, with its remoulding energy, as one of the determining conditions of choice and action. There is no violation of "natural law" in such a freedom, because life itself is a natural factor and process, not a force outside the varied realm of nature. Nature itself, as its fine name implies, is that living power through which all things are begotten; probably throughout the world this spontaneity and urgency lurk which we have claimed for life; how else could life have acquired it? To say that our characters determine our actions is true. But we are our characters; it is we, then, that choose.[4]

(9) The common sense of man uniformly supports the voluntaristic view, the view that man does have and does exercise freedom of will. Coming down now from the "ethereal mansions" of philosophy to the earthly plane of practical thinking, what is the testimony of man's common sense with respect to his own freedom of action? To ask this question is to answer it: common sense has never yielded to deterministic theories. Commonsense thinking has always held as facts (a) the substantial existence and personal identity of the self; and (b) freedom of will in human conduct. To think, or at least to act otherwise would be to manifest incipient insanity and in all probability to run afoul of the civil law. Observation, introspection and experience in general, all point in the direction of these two facts of human selfhood and self-determination. It is freely admitted, of course, that human action takes place within a framework of hereditary and environmental factors. But the commonsense view is that in addition to these two sets of factors there is, in every human act, the personal equation; that is, the reaction of the self as a unitary whole, reaction which terminates in the will and in the overt act. I am convinced that I do choose between motives, and every sane man has the same conviction. As Illingworth writes:

We ground our belief in freedom, then, on two things—its immediate self-evidence in consciousness and its progres-

> sive self-justification in morality—the way in which its moral results approve themselves to the universal reason of mankind; and we are confident that no contrary argument can be constructed without surreptitiously assuming what it attempts to disprove. Lucretius was obliged to allow his atoms the power of swerving. And when Hobbes defines the will as "the last appetite in deliberation" he concedes by the latter word what he intends to deny by the former. And so with the later necessitarians. Their analysis is more elaborate and possessed the attraction for certain minds of any attempt to explain the primary aspect of a thing ingeniously away. But they have been convicted again and again, either of ignoring the point at issue, or begging, in one phase or other, the question to be proved; while their success, if it were possible, would only land them in the old dilemma, that by invalidating consciousness they invalidate all power of reasoning, and with it the value of their own conclusions. [5]

Life and personality are not amenable to mechanistic laws; the stronger motive is stronger because it is in greater harmony with the desire and will of the person making the choice (and in many cases, unfortunately, in greater harmony with his desire than with his reason or better judgment). Life and thought surge on and function qualitatively—far above the mere quantitative mechanistic level. Perhaps this is the reason why the conviction of personal freedom is innate and unshakable in man. His ideas, institutions and laws are all predicated upon it. If any one of the theorists who deny free will were to commit a crime, certainly he would be treated by society—that is, indicted, tried, and maybe convicted and executed—as if he were free to act and were therefore responsible for his deeds. His deterministic theory would avail him nothing before the civil law, nor would it avail him anything before the moral law. Imagine a man being tried for murder, and putting forward the defense that he was compelled to do the deed by forces of heredity and environment over which he had no control!—he would make himself the laughing stock of the community! Those who preach determinism know, while they are preaching it, that it is false; they never treat themselves or their children as mere machines. As C. D. Broad has written:

> If a man referred to his brother or to his cat as "an ingenious mechanism," we should know that he was either a fool or a physiologist. No one in practice treats himself or his fellow men or his pet animals as machines; but scientists who have never made a study of speculative philosophy seem often to think it is their duty to hold up in theory what no one outside a lunatic asylum would accept in practice. [6]

It was this writer who once remarked in substance that the theory of determinism is so absurd that only a very learned man could have conjured it up.

(10) Kant held that freedom is not a natural inheritance of man; that in order to have freedom we have to create it for ourselves. If man, he says, were simply to follow his natural bent, he would not strive for freedom; rather, he would choose dependence. It is much easier to depend on others to think, judge, and decide for us, and so man is inclined to look upon freedom as a burden rather than a privilege. "Here the totalitarian state and the political myth step in" (Cassirer). (Obviously, if this view of man is the true one, there can be little hope for the future of democracy.) But freedom, as we use the word here, means that power in human nature to choose between alternatives which is called self-determination.

(11) Man knows from immediate experience that he possesses this power of choice. Against determininism is set "the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action . . . I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose" (Sidgwick). As William James vigorously contends, our consciousness of freedom and the fact of regret for wrongdoing are the immediate facts of human experience; the world must have moral coherence as well as logical coherence. And Bergson argues with great eloquence that life is basically a flow in which the free spirit of man is constantly emerging as a victor, expressing itself in art, in science, in religion, and in free political institutions.

(12) Freedom of will is indispensable to moral action. As Dr. Rhine puts it: "Without free volition there can be no morality, no real democracy, not even any science itself as a free inquiry."[7] The deterministic argument is, after all, an academic one: in actual life, man has always held his fellows responsible for their misdeeds; hence the whole history of the development of jurisprudence.

To sum up: If man does not have freedom of will, at least within a certain framework, then he is not responsible for anything that he does; and if not morally responsible, then all his laws (customary or statutory) and all his courts and other mechanisms of enforcement, are but pompous vanities. If man does not have and exercise free will, then Might makes Right, and a science of ethics is impossible, for the simple reason that there is no such thing as ethical or moral action. This would mean, of course, man's abandonment of all pretension to social order and his adoption of the ways of the jungle. We conclude, therefore, by affirming with Robert E. Brennan, that

> no power outside of will—either material force or physiological reflex, or instinctive urge, or even intellect itself—can so determine the human will as to leave it trapped and helpless in the face of superior agencies.[8]

3. Voluntariness, i. e., the actual exercise of freedom. Human action differs from natural movement in that the former is individual, deliberate, purposive, and methodical. As Negley writes:

> The argument that men are in the grip of conditioned behavior-patterns from which there is no escape rests upon a description of experience which is simple to the point of simple-mindedness.[9]

To summarize: the act of choice is the act of the person, an act stemming from the interaction of thought and desire, and accompanied by the set of the self toward the end-in-view. This is what we mean by the human act: the act which involves prior deliberation, freedom, and voluntariness. The person does choose between motives, always, however, within a framework of hereditary and environmental factors.

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 209. (Holt, 1908.)

[2]Negley, The Organization of Knowledge, p. 85. (Prentice-Hall, 1942.)

[3]See A. P. Weiss, A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior, pp. 390-392. (R. G. Adams Company, Columbus, Ohio, 1925.)

[4]Will Durant, The Mansions of Philosophy, pp. 100-102. (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1929.)

[5]J. R. Illingworth, Personality, Human and Divine, Shilling Edition, pp. 35-36.

[6]C. D. Broad, in Muirhead, Contemporary British Philosophy, p. 98.

[7]J. B. Rhine, The Reach of the Mind, p. 9.

[8]Robert E. Brennan, O. P., Ph. D., Thomistic Philosophy, p. 220. (Macmillan, 1941.)

[9]Negley, op. cit., p. 20.

## XXII. The natural tendency in human motivation is toward happiness as man's natural and proper end.

By "happiness" is meant well-being in a general sense: the word derived originally from the Greek eudaimonia, which meant literally, "well-being." This was the term used by Aristotle in his well-known text on ethics; hence the theory that man's natural and proper intrinsic end is happiness is what we designate eudaimonism in this text.

By the phrase, "natural end," is meant the end determined by a nature in and of itself, hence that which fulfills its natural potentialities. Indeed the "natural end" of any entity is that which is indicated by its natural impulses, that which actualizes its inherent potencies.

By the phrase, "proper end," is meant that end which belongs to man alone, to which he is fitted by his specific nature: hence, not proper to what he has in common with an oyster, with an oak tree, with a horse, with a chimpanzee, etc., but proper to that which specifies him as man, that by virtue of which he belongs to his particular species.

That is to say, man's "natural and proper end" has reference to that particular end which is proper to man (from proprius, "one's own,") as man is specified (set apart from the lower orders) by his power of reason (thought processes); that is, the end which is proper to man's specific nature as a rational being (a being possessing reason, hence scientifically designated homo sapiens, in essence a person).

This view has been challenged by some on the ground that human nature is constantly "changing." That man is by nature a mind-body (psychosomatic) unity is too obvious to be called in question. It follows, therefore, that if his nature were to change, he would no longer be this psychosomatic unity, that is, he would no longer be man. This objection is a good example of the carelessness with which the academic mind tosses the word "nature" around. A man may, and does, change in character, but not in nature; were he to change as to nature, he would no longer be man.

1. Human activity invariably exhibits directionality. The fact has been demonstrated experimentally many times that those persons who have no goal in life, nothing to live for, become potential suicides. (Incidentally, animals do not commit suicide. Man alone does so because he alone is capable of poignant consciousness of frustration, of disillusionment, of seeming futility, lack of incentive, etc.) Personal life—if it is worth the living—has purpose, directionality, goals.

2. Directionality of life embraces a system of ends and means. Most human actions are in a chain, so to speak: we do something in order to secure something else, and so on and on, in a sequence of purposes, objectives, ends; ends, on being attained, often become means to further ends, and so on. For example, a man learns to play football, in order to gain a reputation as an athlete, in order to pay his tuition, in order to get an education, in order to make a living for himself and his family, etc. (1) An end is that for the sake of which something is done; the terminus of a continued operation; the goal of an action; the result, foreseen before achievement, of conative activity; the mental representation of this result as desirable and hence as inducing to action. (That which is last in realization is the first in motivation.) (2) Ends are classified as proximate (that which is nearest the agent, the person); ultimate (the terminus and goal of the action); and mediate (those in between). Proximate and mediate ends are thus seen to be means in relation to an ultimate end. (3) An absolutely ultimate end is defined a priori as that which leaves nothing further to be desired, that which is desired and sought for itself alone, and that which perfects (actualizes the potentialities of) a man's nature. In this last-named sense it is man's Highest Good (in Latin, the Summum Bonum). Ethics, in the final analysis, deals with the person's absolutely ultimate ends. (4) Ends are also classified as intrinsic (the end realized by the existent within itself, the fulfillment of its natural powers), and extrinsic (the end or ends served by the existent outside itself, in the totality of being). For example, the ultimate intrinsic end of a stalk of wheat (the terminus of its natural powers and acts) is to produce fertile seed, and hence to reproduce its kind. Most wheat, however, does not get that far in its development, but becomes devoted to its extrinsic end, namely, to serve as food for man and beast (which, of course, does not add to the perfection of the wheat at all). (By perfection, from per, "thorough," and facio, facere, "to make," hence, "to make thorough," we mean completeness, wholeness.) Every nature attains certain ends which are the fulfillment of its natural powers, and beyond which it cannot go; this is true, whether one accepts or rejects the (teleological) view that all this is by the conscious design of an intelligent Creator. Within the sub-human orders, extrinsic ends do not add to the perfection of natures; they are more important, however, than intrinsic ends, because they serve the interests and ends of natures that are higher in the scale of being. If a calf fails to grow up into a cow and produce new calves, the purpose of the calf has not been frustrated; the extrinsic

end served by it, namely, veal for man to eat, is more important. Man, however, is the exception: in the area of human relationships, the intrinsic end of the person takes precedence over, or is at least equal to, his extrinsic end; that is to say, every human being is an end in himself (insofar as his own species is concerned, there is no higher end for him to serve extrinsically except that of the glory of God); hence no man may ever be used rightly by another human being merely as a means. (This principle was recognized long before Kant, but Kant usually gets the credit for it: indeed it is the implicit in all Biblical teaching.)

3. The natural and proper end of man is evident from his nature as man, that is, from all his natural powers as converging in the will-act. (1) All sub-human orders live out their natural life-cycles and die. The same is true of man physically; but as for man as a rational being, capable of thought, that is, man as man, he never attains mental completeness. He lives and dies with this sense of incompleteness hovering over him. Hence he is incapable of attaining wholeness (perfection) in this life. (2) Free will does not mean (a) an effect without a cause, (b) a motiveless cause, or (c) a creation of energy. The only prerequisite of the power to choose is motives for alternative choices. The will must have motives presented to it (or the person must have motives presented to him), and these motives and alternatives are presented by the intellect. In human activity, ends appear first as motives. (3) The natural tendency or final activity of human nature is manifested by the will, not by the sex or other appetites, because the will directs to unity. Reason presents motives to the will, and the will (i. e., the person directively unified) acts; the terminus of the prior deliberation is the will-act. (4) Acts of will are either elicited (completed in the will itself), in which case the consequences are in the individual order, as a rule; or commanded or imperate (performed by mind or body at the direction of the will, in which case the consequences often fall in the social order). Imperate acts are internal (involving use of mental powers only, such as remembering and reasoning), and external (involving the use of the bodily powers also, such as acts of the physical senses and movements of the body). For example, Mr. A may go to the airport fully intending to kill his enemy, Mr. B, who is due to arrive by plane at a certain hour, only to discover that Mr. B has changed his plans and is not aboard the plane as anticipated. In such a case, Mr. A has committed the will-act (elicited) of murder, whether he is able to translate it into the overt (imperate) act or not. Cf. Matt. 5:28—"Every one that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his own heart." 1 John 3:15—"Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer."

4. Introspection (and observation of others) proves that the human will does not act toward unhappiness as man's absolutely ultimate intrinsic end. No sane person ever sets out deliberately on a course of action designed to make himself permanently miserable;

to do so would be contrary to the human nature itself. This, we believe, is a generalization to which no exception occurs. (1) In every deliberate act we intend some particular good. A thirsty person drinks water to assuage his thirst; a sick person may deliberately do without water to regain his health; each, in his choice, seeks a particular good. (2) Man does not (can not)? deliberately choose what is not good for him, except under the influence of the appearance of a superior good. One may have a choice between a cup of coffee and a bottle of coca-cola; he chooses one and rejects the other, because the one which he chooses has the appearance of superior good; or, he may reject both, in order to show his self-control; in any case, he will be choosing what appears to be a particular good. (Of course, through lack of knowledge, he may be deceived by appearance, and hence confuse an apparent good with a real good, a type of error which is the cause of the vast majority of human ills.) (3) A man may, of course, choose a temporary evil as a means to an ultimate good. The martyr, for instance, who gives his body to be burned, does so because he envisions a future bliss as his ultimate reward. The human will seems to be incapable of choosing unhappiness as an ultimate end. (4) Every particular good is a sort of installment toward an ultimate good. When we build a house, we build it brick by brick, or stone by stone; each brick or stone is useful, suitable, and good, but only so as an installment toward the whole structure. So it is with human acts. (5) Human happiness is the envisioned goal of all human activity, according to both psychology and sociology. The drives for adequacy and security are but facets of the universal human drive for happiness or well-being. (6) Human happiness is the envisioned goal of all just social and political order. (Cf. present-day emphasis upon "security," "the abundant life," "the welfare state." "a chicken in every pot, and an automobile in every garage," etc., Cf. the world-old struggle between the "have" and the "have nots." Cf. the phrases in our Declaration of Independence, "life, liberty and the pursuit of Happiness"; also "as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Cf. the phrase, "promote the general Welfare," in the Preamble to our federal Constitution.) That human happiness is the goal of a democratic society is implicit in every significant American political document. (There have been those, of course, who have contended that moral value does not attach to the pursuit of happiness. Kant, for example, held that morality never attaches to acts performed through personal inclination, but only to acts performed from a sense of duty. The fact remains, however, that the natural tendency in human motivation is toward happiness or well-being.)

(It seems to me that an adequate understanding of man—and this means an understanding of all his powers and outreaches, not just some of them—is necessary as a proper introduction to the study of human relationships and hence of the study of the ethical principles inherent in these relationships. Therefore, to ignore any of the powers and outreaches which are, by experience, found to be char-

acteristic of the human being would be to deprive the student of just such a comprehensive understanding.)

(May I repeat my conviction here that the phrase "academic freedom," which is bandied about so carelessly in our day, means not the "right" of an instructor to say and do anything he pleases; that it means, rather, the right of the student to have presented to him the best thought of the past and the present on all aspects of a moot question, in order that he, the student, may resolve the question intelligently and to his own satisfaction. Erroneous conclusions are bound to result from failure to have at one's command all the available evidence pertaining to any given subject. It is this conviction which has prompted me to present herein a brief treatment of the materialistic and spiritualistic views of human life and destiny, designating the former the "short-range" view and the latter the "long-range" view. I shall try to present these two views as we proceed with our study, and thus to point out how, judging from observation and experience, the adoption of one or the other of these views profoundly influences a man's outlook on life and consequently his theory and practive of morality. In doing this, to be sure, I shall need to present certain tenets characteristic of religious thought of the past and present. I take this method to be the essence of "academic freedom," and hence make no apology for it.)

5. It is well-known that two general views of human life and destiny are possible to man (indeed no third view is conceivable); these are commonly called the "materialistic" and "spiritualistic" views, which, for the purposes of this course, we shall designate the "short-range" and "long-range" views respectively.

(1) The materialistic or short-range view is, of course, that the only life which the person lives is this present earthly and temporal life; that with the dissolution of the body at death, the entire man—mind, soul, spirit, personality, everything—perishes, that is, passes off into various forms of primal physical energy; in a word, that the career of every human being terminates in the grave. According to this view, the human individual, his life processes, his thought processes, his subconscious powers, his higher reaches, all are but the by-products ("epiphenomena") of his basis physio-chemical processes, and hence come to an end with the dissolution of his body. Advocates of this view are wont to say, "We have only one life to live," meaning, of course, this present terrestrial life. They stake their case chiefly on empirical instances (physiological phenomena) which seem to prove that a definite relationship exists between the brain and certain mental processes, concluding therefrom that body and brain are the ultimate cause of all those events which we are accustomed to describe as "mental." The opponents of materialism, however, point out that, in order to validate it, it will have to be proved that man's higher thought processes are all in some way identifiable with the cellular processes of the brain and the entire neurosensory sustem. But the evidence on this point thus far seems to be wholly to the contrary, namely, that the

higher thought processes in man transcend his bodily processes altogether, transcend even the whole space—time continuum. (See the discussion of epiphenomenalism, supra, Prop. VIII.) Hence, as stated heretofore, the common sense of the average man leads him to think today as in all preceding ages that, while he is housed in a body, he himself is not exclusively body, but vastly more than body. In a word, the principal weakness of materialism is its unconvincingness. As one author puts it:

> The more closely we inspect conscious experience, the more difficulties emerge for materialism. We experience personal identity, unity, memory; materialism offers no account of these facts that explains their characteristic features. We experience purpose; materialism has to try to explain purpose away. We experience values and ideals; materialists also experience them and often are loyal to them, but their philosophy renders the very experience of ideal value unintelligible and offers no theory of obligation. In short, materialism, based as it is on exclusive preference for sensations, cannot in the nature of the case give a coherent description of experience as a whole, and cannot even include sensations themselves in the domain of matter.[1]

(2) The spiritualistic or long-range view of human life and destiny is, on the other hand, that the person, although dwelling in a body in this present state, is himself essentially incorporeal; that the spirit which is in the man is the man, that it exists as an entity in its own right and will therefore live on after the dissolution of the body. This, as we all know, is the traditional religious view of man and his destiny. The ethical religions for the most part hold that this life is largely a period of probation; that the after-life of the spirit (the real person) is conditioned by the righteousness or unrighteousness, as the case may be, of the life that has been lived on earth.

(3) Generally speaking, there are three views—and only three insofar as this writer knows—of the destiny of the person, namely, (a) annihilation, the materialistic view as stated above, that when the body dies, the person and personality die with it; (b) additional stages of probation, as envisioned in theories of transmigration and reincarnation (the former the view that rebirth may take place either in human or in animal form, the latter the view that rebirth takes place only in human forms); (c) the Biblical, that at death the righteous spirits of mankind experience Union with God (Heaven), that the unrighteous experience the Loss of God (Hell). It is the conviction of this writer that only the last-named view is supported by logic, by morality, by faith, and by human aspiration and need.

(4) Common objections to the doctrine of transmigration of souls may be listed as follows: (a) There is no evidence in nature of the possibility of the incarnation of a person in a plant or in a

brute animal body; on the contrary, it is empirically known that these subhuman orders cannot afford vehicular expression for the potencies of a person. Or, if the theory means that the personal principle is transmuted into the mere vegetative or animal principle, or vice versa, again there is no evidence to support such a notion. (b) Continuance of personal identity is dependent on the persistence and functioning of individual memory; therefore, to validate reincarnationism, conscious personal identity must clearly persist through all the metempsychoses postulated by the theory: mere "flashes of familiarity" do not suffice. Such a long-drawn-out sense of personal identity has never been claimed by anyone. If I have passed through this world before, I must be fully aware of the fact that I was the same person then as I am now; lacking this conscious sense of personal continuance in being, I simply cannot be the same person. (c) To the alleged "logical" assumption that a man needs more than one probationary state in order to attain ultimate holiness (wholeness), it can be replied that no evidence exists to prove that he would fare any better in a number of reincarnations than he does in the one present existence. (d) To the notion frequently advanced by transmigrationists that the number of souls in the universe must always be constant, otherwise the law of the conservation of energy would be nullified, it can be replied that there is no ground for the application of these laws to the personal realm; that, in fact, spirit is never quantitative, but is always qualitative; that the essential property of spirit is inexhaustibility (hence, immeasurability), and that therefore the powers of spirit may be distributed among individuals even to infinity, without exhausting the original source of supply. (e) The doctrine of reabsorption is definitely not a doctrine of personal survival; as a matter of fact, the only way of attaining Nirvana, according to these cults, is by the complete extinction of personal desire; and in the final attainment, Nirvana itself, the person is said to lose his identity completely in the over-all impersonal Absolute. This, obviously, is a doctrine of the ultimate extinction of the person. (f) Transmigrationism, therefore, from the ethical point of view, involves a self-contradiction. As one eminent writer states the case:

> the protagonist of this view puts himself in the plight of him who undertakes to preach a gospel of moral aspiration and teach a doctrine of moral attainment and who begins his spiritual enterprise by taking leave of personality,

or, in other words, he

> appears engaged in the difficult task of undertaking to nourish moral enthusiasm and to justify moral effort, while conceiving of the goal of moral endeavor as the irrevocable cessation of all possibility of moral or any other action.[2]

Or, as one of our most eminent living philosophers has written about Buddhism:

> . . . although it prescribes a universal benevolence (which extended even to prohibiting the slaughter of animals and to a compulsory vegetarianism), almsgiving, pardon of injuries, and non-resistance to the wicked, its motive was not love of one's neighbor as such, whose positive good and (by implication) existence we are bound to will, but to escape suffering to oneself by extinguishing all action and energy in a kind of humanitarian ecstasy. Buddhism is, therefore, a proof that gentleness and pity, when they are not regulated by reason and dictated by love, can deform human nature as much as violence since they are then manifestations of cowardice, not of charity. This doctrine of despair. . . is an intellectual plague to humanity, because it proceeds from the negation of reason.[3]

(g) Such a view of the ultimate goal of life cannot possible engender any profound hope in man, if indeed any hope at all. Survival is here regarded as being no more than an alleviation of this doom. Life is simply to be endured as a penance, to obtain a better rebirth. As Dr. John Baillie writes: "The thought of an endless succession of lives is not a hope but a nightmare."[4] Oriental transmigrationism is in fact pure fatalism: the most it has to offer man is final deliverance from the inexorable Wheel of Fate into a state of some kind of impersonality. Obviously, however, if there is any form of survival in store for man that has, or will have, any meaning for him, it will have to be some kind of a conscious existence and therefore personal. (h) Nor can such a view inspire man to deeds of altruism and service; on the contrary, it has been for centuries the chief bulwark of the Hindu caste system and in some instances has given rise even to degrading forms of animal worship. It is a known fact that the ideal of service is conspicuously absent from all these Oriental mysticisms: they are basically ways of escape from the world and from all the natural obligations of man to his fellows: they substitute the ignoble concept of life as illusion (maya) for the character-building view of life as man's greatest good.

(5) The following are the grounds on which man generally has persisted in—and hoped for—a life beyond the grave, as against the notion of annihilation. (a) His sense of the incompleteness of his life on earth. Creatures of the subhuman orders apparently live their respective life-cycles through, eating, drinking, sleeping, reproducing their kind, and then dying, without any consciousness of more to be achieved or enjoyed. But not so with man. With him there is always more beyond, more to be known, more to be done; and awareness of the insufficiency of the average life-span to meet the aspirations of the human spirit becomes more and more poignant as he approaches the inevitable end. He is therefore driven to the

commonsense conviction that if there is any goodness in the scheme of things at all, there must be a hereafter for the full actualization of his powers and realization of his aspirations. (b) His sense of the widespread injustice which characterizes his life on earth. As he looks about him he sees that as far as this present world is concerned, the wicked often do prosper while the righteous do suffer, that honesty frequently appears not to be the best policy, that a Nero or a Judas oftentimes fares better than a Socrates or a Paul, he is at times overwhelmed by the manifest injustice that seems everywhere to abound. Thus man can hardly help coming to the common sense conviction that since many persons are not, in this world, adequately punished for their evil deeds, there must be a life to come in which the moral law will be fully vindicated and the unrighteous will be made to suffer punishment (probably through the operation of their own guilty consciences) for the injustices which they have perpetrated while in the flesh. (c) His consciousness of the persistence of his own personal identity leads him to the reasonable conclusion that, since he continues to be the same person through some fifteen or twenty cellular transformations in this present life, he—the same person—will in all probability survive the last great change—death. (d) His more recent, and hence more mature, high evaluation of the person and personality. This is a heritage of our Western tradition especially, deriving largely from Biblical teaching that man was created "in the image of God," and hence that the most precious entity in the whole universe is a human soul, a person. Even the common sense of man per se refuses to accept the dictum that he is no more than a brute, born only to eat and drink and reproduce his kind, and then to die, that is, to perish altogether. (e) Western man has come to believe that the person is an end in himself, and that for anyone, even the Creator Himself to treat him as a mere means, would be to contradict fundamental morality. It should be made clear, however, that the Christian doctrine is based, not so much on philosophical grounds, but uniquely on the historicity of the resurrection of Christ. (f) It might be well to add here that pure natural science is not in possession of any evidence pointing to the extinction of the human spirit at death: indeed it is difficult to imagine how science could hope ever to attain such negative evidence; the techniques of natural science are not designed to reach out beyond the world of sense and flesh. Hence, the attitude of science on this question is, quite properly, non-dogmatic. The individual scientist, like any other person, may reflect, infer, speculate, and even draw conclusions (for himself) from the information he has in his possession, but if he is a true scientist he leaves the dialectic of the problem to theology and philosophy, where it belongs. Unfortunately, however, there are all too many "half-baked" teachers in our time, especially at the lower echelons of instruction, who, largely by the use of sarcasm and innuendo, venture out into these extra-scientific fields; and in most instances, they succeed only in demonstrating their own ignorance of what they are talking about. Their fulminations would be

ridiculous, if they were not so tragic in their effect on young impressionable minds. (g) To those who would argue that the views stated above are but cases of "wishful thinking," the reasonable answer would be that their universality would prove them to be "natural" to the human mind.

6. Under the "short-range" (materialistic) view of human life and destiny, man's intrinsic end is conceived to be temporal happiness or well-being, that is, happiness in the "here and now." This would necessarily include (1) adaptation to environment, (2) physical health (although many persons have achieved a large measure of happiness in this life in spite of great physical handicaps), (3) a framework of social order, (4) relative social justice, including a measure of economic security (surely the man who does not know where his next meal is coming from can hardly claim to be free), (5) in general, opportunities for self-realization of one's potentialities, etc. However, it must be understood that happiness is never dependent entirely on external circumstances. In the final analysis, it is an interior state: an internal state, as perhaps best defined by McDougall, arising from the harmonious operation of all the sentiments of a well-organized and unified personality. A unified personality, moreover, is one essentially in which reason is on the throne. The truly happy person knows that life is not always a bed of roses, and hence is properly adjusted to meet adversities when they come into his life, instead of resorting to a self-destructive orgy of self-pity. Finally, it will be admitted universally, even by the most ardent advocates of the "short-range" view of human life and destiny, that perfect happiness is not to be attained in this present world. Adjustment, maturity, security, justice, happiness, etc. —these are to be achieved only relatively or imperfectly, in this earthly life. This is simply a fact of universal experience.

7. Under the "long-range" (spiritualistic) view of human life and destiny, since obviously perfect happiness is not possible in this present life, man's absolutely natural and proper ultimate intrinsic end is Union with God, Beatitude. (Beatitudo is the Latin word for happiness, corresponding to the Greek eudaimonia.) Beatitude, that is, Blessedness, is Perfect Happiness, also designated Seeing God Face to Face, Life Everlasting, etc. This is the religious view of the Highest Good (Summum Bonum).

(1) Entities act as they do because of their innate tendencies. Experience shows that man, by virtue of a tendency within him, acts invariably in the direction of (or at least of what he considers to be) well-being or happiness. Hence, it follows that the natural tendency of man is toward complete happiness as his Highest Good. The absolutely ultimate intrinsic end of man is that end for which he is fitted by his nature, that which is supremely suited to him as a person. By the constantly elicited desire for happiness characteristic of all his acts (even though he does often pursue only apparent goods rather than real goods), he shows that he is suited for Perfect Happiness as his ultimate intrinsic end.

(2) As noted previously, in Oriental systems Union with God is conceived to be reabsorption into Brahma, into the ocean of primal energy, a state named Nirvana. It is difficult to see how this concept could be interpreted as personal survival and immortality in any sense. In striking contrast, Biblical teaching is that Beatitude is to be attained by the union of the human person (spirit) with the Divine Person (Spirit) after the death of the body. This Union is further described as the Union of the human mind with the Mind of God in Knowledge and the Union of the human will with the Will of God in Love (cf. Matt. 5:8, 1 Cor. 13:9-12; 1 John 3:2, 4:7-21). This kind of Union does not involve the extinction of personality, but rather the full and free fellowship of the righteous human spirit with the I AM, HE WHO IS. [Otherness is the property of personality; hence, the God of the Bible (Exo. 3:14) is an Other to all other persons (intelligences) in the totality of being. ]

(3) The characteristics of a state of Perfect Happiness, it is said, must be the following: (a) it must include all Good; (b) it must exclude all evil; (c) it must be consciously possessed and enjoyed by the creature; (d) it must be perpetual, and known by the creature to be perpetual; that is, it must be a state of illumination which includes the sense of its own everlastingness. This, to be sure, is personal survival and immortality in the fullest sense of these terms. A thing has to be possessed in some manner in order to be enjoyed: thus one who likes diamonds comes into the enjoyment of them by carrying them on jewelry or in one's pocket; one comes into the enjoyment of fresh country butter by eating it, etc. In like manner, one comes into the enjoyment of God by possessing Him in Knowledge and in Love. It is inconceivable that Ultimate Goodness could consistently have ordained man to any other ultimate intrinsic end than Perfect Happiness.

(4) The person's attainment of this proper ultimate intrinsic end, however, is conditioned: that is, he must freely seek it, and by the proper means: here, as elsewhere, ends and means are inseparably joined together. Otherwise, God would be forcing it upon him, and this would not be dealing with him as a man. The wisdom of God demands that possession of Himself through Beatitude should not be forced on human beings, as if it were a thing of little or no value, but rather that it should be bestowed as a natural reward for proper volitional activity. The infilling itself, moreover, will be in proportion to the spiritual capacity cultivated in this present life. That is to say, the necessary means to ultimate Union with God is the Spiritual Life which, according to Christian teaching, begins here and now in Union with Christ the Word (Logos) and possession by the indwelling Holy Spirit. This Spiritual Life is described as embracing three phases, namely: (a) the purgative (the purificatory phase, proper to beginners); (b) the illuminative (the phase of growing in spiritual grace and knowledge, the life with the Holy Spirit, proper to proficients); and (c) the unitive (the phase of ultimate Union with the Divine, proper to the perfected saints, which is

described as being crowned "with glory and honor and incorruption." Cf. Rom. 2:4-11). According to this general view, the present natural life can rightly be understood and utilized only as the means of preparing for, and living, the Spiritual life, which in due time blossoms and fructifies into the Life Everlasting.

(5) This absolutely ultimate intrinsic end—Union with God—is only for those who set out to attain it and continue steadfastly in that purpose; those who, by conforming to the eternal Moral Law and the Law of Love, and by cultivating the fruits of the Spirit, prepare themselves for it and for the appreciation of it. For example, it would be useless to expect a soul ignorant of music and unattuned to its delights to appreciate a great symphonic composition; it would be equally useless to expect a soul unawakened to the charms of literary beauty to appreciate a great epic or lyric poem; so it would be contrary to the very nature of things for a soul steeped in spiritual ignorance and rebellion ever to experience the Beatific Vision. Hence, the natural sanction (punishment) of the Moral Law awaiting those who, through rebellion or neglect, fail to make the necessary preparation in the way of moral and spiritual development, is simply the Loss of Beatitude (of God and all Good) altogether and forever. In the strictly secular or temporal point of view (world-outlook), Death is the Ultimate; in the Christian world-outlook, however, the Ultimate is Life. The Christian view is that only when one has something to die for does one truly have something to live for. Insofar as this present life alone is to be considered, the grave is the ultimate in human frustration; to the saint, however, it means only the beginning of an infinitely richer life.

(6) According to Biblical teaching, the saint's ultimate Union with God will include the putting on of immortality. Immortality must, of course, be distinguished from mere survival: immortality has reference exclusively to the destiny of the body. On this point, three views have been advanced in the past, as follows: (a) the ancient Egyptian view, that the physical body would be revivified and united with the soul after the judgment of Osiris (hence mummification, also the burial of food, flowers, ornaments, and even a few slaves, with the corpses of the nobility: the hoi polloi, to be sure, were not considered of sufficient importance to rate such attentions); (b) the Oriental notion of survival in some kind of bodilessness, as absorbed into what has been called the ocean of undifferentiated primal energy; and (c) the Biblical doctrine that the physical bodies of the righteous shall ultimately be transmuted into spiritual (ethereal?) bodies adapted to their needs in the heavenly world (cf. Rom. 8:18-24, Phil. 3:20-21, 1 Cor. 15:35-37, 2 Cor. 5:1-10). In Biblical teaching the doctrine of immortality has reference strictly to the redemption of the body.

(7) In the human being his intrinsic end takes precedence over his extrinsic end; that is to say, every human being is an end in himself and may never be justly used by another human being as a means. Since, obviously, there is no other being in the universe

higher than man who could be man's extrinsic end, except God Himself, the traditional view has always been that man's natural and proper extrinsic ends are (a) the love and service of his fellows, and (b) pure love for God, or, as usually stated, the glory of God. (Cf. the Two Great Commandments of the Law: Deut. 6:5, Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:34-40). The "brotherhood of man" presupposes the Fatherhood of God. The whole American social and political philosophy is built upon the conviction of God's existence. (Cf. the phrases of the Declaration of Independence: "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," etc.).

(8) The foregoing is a presentation in brief of the spiritualistic view of the Summum Bonum for man. There is no subject of greater importance in ethics. For the quality and worth of a man's life—to himself and to society in general—depends greatly on what he conceives to be his natural and proper ends in life. And let us never forget that the real worth of a human life is not to be measured by its quantity (the number of years lived), but by its quality (in faith, hope, love, service, etc.). It seems evident, from observation and experience, that the majority of persons who adopt the short-range view of human life and destiny, naturally drift into pure hedonism, that is, pursuit of the pleasures of the moment. If this is the only life, one may well ask himself, just why should he deprive himself of any of its pleasures: why should he not take whatever he may desire? Now anyone can see at a glance that if this attitude were universally adopted by mankind, the result would be the destruction of social order and in all probability of the race itself. For in the final analysis, this view actually boils down to the theory that Might makes Right.

(9) There seems to be a widespread tendency in our day, not only to deny outright the survival of the human spirit beyond the death of the body, but to adopt the strange attitude that the prospect of a future life is not even desirable. Religious believers cannot conceive of any attitude that so clearly expresses the moral and spiritual bankruptcy of our century as this one does. The self-sufficiency of man has become so inflated that he is now willing, in the interest of what he calls "this-worldliness," not only to abandon faith, but, most frightful of all, to abandon hope and love as well, for undoubtedly this attitude, in its ultimate aspect, is the abandonment of both. In one of Hugh Walpole's novels, one of his characters is made to say to another: "There is a kind of stuff of immortality about our love for another."[5] That is to say, one who truly loves another could not possibly desire the extinction of the object of his love: to do so would be to repudiate love itself. Hence, writes Baillie:

> I do not see how it is possible to escape the conclusion that eternal life is something which it is the duty of us all to desire for ourselves and for those we love and honor. To be complacent about the prospect of extinction spells baseness and disloyalty.[6]

The prospect of a future life, advocates of the spiritualistic view contend, is the one thing which above all others gives meaning and interest to the time process itself.

(10) In view of all these considerations, common sense testifies that the good life is the one in which a proper relation is maintained between this-worldliness and other-worldliness. Certainly to the one who believes that happiness hereafter is contingent ethically on right conduct here, the matter of right conduct becomes, or should become, doubly important; indeed this life becomes to him the means to the attainment of what he believes to be his ultimate intrinsic end—fellowship with God. To the one who, on the other hand, adopts the view that he has only one life to live—that which he lives here, in the flesh—right conduct cannot possibly mean too much. We feel sure that personal observation of the conduct of individuals who follow these respective views of life would, on the whole, bear out these conclusions. We repeat, therefore, that one's theory and practice of morality is, wittingly or unwittingly, determined by one's view of man's origin, nature, and destiny.

I am reminded here of the story of the young man who visited the Dean of a Law School to make arrangements to enroll for the study of jurisprudence. The Dean expressed his personal delight that the young man had chosen law as his profession. Then he "got down to cases." "Young man," said he, "when you shall have enrolled in our school and have become well inducted into our law curriculum, what do you plan to do?" "Of course," said the prospective student, "I expect to master the science of law. I do not intend to enroll here for social ends. I want to learn law." "Excellent," answered the Dean, adding, "We would not want you to come to our school for any other purpose than to acquire knowledge of the law. But when you shall have completed this study and shall have received your diploma—what then?" "Oh," replied the young man, "I expect to find a promising field and to put out my shingle there and begin practising law." "Naturally," the Dean replied, "that is what we should expect you to do. But, after you shall have put out your shingle, as you say, and shall have acquired a clientele of some proportions—what then?" "I suppose," said the young man, "that by that time I shall have persuaded some young woman to share life with me and together we shall be engaged in establishing a household." The Dean replied: "Indeed we should be disappointed if you should do otherwise, because such is the way of this life for all who expect to achieve fulfillment of personality. But, after you shall have established this household and shall have continued building up your clientele—what then?" "I intend," said the young man proudly, "to make a success of my chosen profession." "A very laudable ambition indeed," answered the Dean, "provided, of course, that you do it by ethical means. We want you to be a credit to our school. But after you shall have made your mark in your chosen field and shall have earned and received the respect of your fellows—what

then?" There was a pause. Then answered the young man: "By that time I suppose I shall be going down the declining path of the years. Naturally, in my mature years I should like to write a book or two to perpetuate my name and to be of service to those in my profession." "Again a laudable ambition," was the Dean's comment; "if you have something to say to the world, by all means you ought to say it. But after you shall have written this book or two—what then?" Again there was a pause, until finally the young man said, "It seems inevitable that I shall be growing old, eventually." No doubt of it," said the Dean; "but, having grown old in years, what then?" This time there was a long pause. Finally, the young man answered, in subdued tones, "Then, eventually, I suppose, I shall die—such is the way of all flesh, it seems." No doubt of it," again said the Dean, "for as a matter of fact it is appointed unto man once to die. But—what then?" The nature, origin, and destiny of man! These are the real problems, compared with which global war, profit, economic systems, political systems, taxes, standard of living, and the thousand-and-one questions which men ordinarily worry about, are patently trivial.

To sum up, from the philosophical point of view: Man is by nature a composite being, namely, that of the sensitive appetite (which subsumes the vegetative) and that of the rational appetite. He hungers for intellectual (spiritual) as well as for physical food. The sensitive appetite he shares with the lower animals. The rational appetite (intellect and will) is characteristically his own, that which specifies him as a man. Hence, according to the spiritualistic views; the Summum Bonum for man must be that which satisfies the rational appetite. Who, then, but God alone, as absolute Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and Holiness, is that proper Object? In the inimitable words of Augustine:

> Great art thou, O Lord, and greatly to be praised; great is Thy power, and Thy wisdom infinite. . . . Thou awakest us to delight in Thy praise; for Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee.[7]

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, pp. 399-400.

[2]R. A. Tsanoff, The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value, p. 222. (Macmillan, New York, 1924.)

[3]Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, see pp. 30-42. Translated by E. I. Watkins from the eleventh French edition. (Sheed and Ward, New York.)

[4]John Baillie, And the Life Everlasting, p. 137. (Scribners, 1933.)

[5]Walpole, Hans Frost, p. 341.

[6]Baillie, op. cit., p. 65.

[7]Augustine, Confessions, I,' (I), 1. Pusey Translation, Everyman's Library.

## XXIII. Circumstances which affect the voluntariness of a human act are (1) ignorance, (2) violence from without, and (3) passion from within.

There are three kinds of "appetites" in creatures: (1) the natural desires of inanimate matter and of plant life (man shares with the mineral, tendencies to gravitate to the earth, to reflect light, etc., and he shares with the plant, growth by intussusception and assimilation of nutriment); (2) the sensitive desires of animal life which are grounded on cognitions of sense (man shares sensible actions with brute animals, such as seeing, hearing, smelling, suffering bodily pain, etc.); (3) the intellectual desires of human life, which proceed from rational insight, the property by virtue of which man is specified as man. It follows, therefore, that only those actions are specifically human which proceed from man's rational nature, that is, from his intellect and will.

Physiological acts of the organism which, for the most part, take place below the threshold of consciousness (e.g., digestion, assimilation, biochemical and glandular processes, etc.) are not voluntary. Nor are purely reflex activities, unconditioned or conditioned, to be considered voluntary acts. (Man was never designed to be confined to the grooves of instinctive behavior; his intelligence allows him to make progress by means of trial-and-error.) Human acts are voluntary acts: voluntariness presupposes freedom; a free act is any self-determined act.

1. Kinds of Voluntariness: (1) Simple voluntariness (in which the will has no repugnance to the thing done or has voluntarily put repugnance aside), and conditional voluntariness (the thing is done, but with a certain measure of repugnance, e.g., when, under maritime law, the captain of a ship tosses his cargo overboard in the midst of a storm, to save his ship and crew, he does so with a certain measure of repugnance: in all such cases the right to life takes precedence over property right). (2) Direct or indirect voluntariness. The former terminates in the object willed as an end, or as a means to an end. The latter terminates in an object which is not willed as an end or as a means to an end, but which is foreseen as a possible accompaniment of a directly volitional act. Thus the man who tosses a bomb at a tyrant, foreseeing that it may kill some of the attendants, wills indirectly the death of those attendants. Our country may call upon its citizens to go to war in defense of

human rights: it does not declare war in order to bring about the death of its soldiers on the battlefield, although such an eventuality is foreseen as a very great probability. (3) Positive (the willing to do a thing) and negative (willing not to do a thing) voluntariness. The man who voluntarily neglects his business is properly regarded as responsible for its failure as well as the man who destroys his business by positive bad management.

2. Indirect voluntariness is productive of some difficult problems, for the solution of which the following general principles are suggested: (1) If a man knows that certain bad consequences will likely attach to his act, whether he may like those consequences or not, the production of them must be regarded as a voluntary act. (2) Since acts are morally good or bad as the objects of the will are good or bad, it is always wrong to wish or to will evil directly. When may an act be done, then, in spite of foreseen evil consequences, and when is it strictly forbidden on account of such consequences? (a) If the consequences are all evil, the act may not be done. (b) The bad effect must not be desired in itself—it must merely be permitted. (c) There must be a sufficient cause for the doing of an act from which evil consequences are foreseen as a concomitant. The directly willed good must far outweigh the probability of evil, in order to validate the act ethically. This is known as the Principle of Double Effect.

3. Ignorance is simply the lack of knowledge in a being who is capable of knowing. It may be (1) ignorance of the law, or (2) ignorance of the fact. E. g., one who makes a contract with an insane person, not knowing that by law such a contract is invalid, acts in ignorance of the law; one who makes such a contract, not knowing that the person is insane, acts in ignorance of the fact. Ignorance is of two kinds: (a) vincible, and (b) invincible. Vincible ignorance is ignorance that can be overcome; invincible ignorance is ignorance that cannot be overcome, i. e., unavoidable ignorance. (How easy is it, in a given set of circumstances, to overcome one's ignorance? What obligation rests upon one to overcome it? It seems to me that there are two matters upon which every human being should be informed, namely, his ultimate intrinsic and extrinsic ends and the means of attaining them.)

4. Invincible ignorance is of two general kinds: (1) the physically invincible, absence of knowledge of matters which lie beyond the range of human activity; no man, for instance, can put himself in a position from which he can count the number of the stars. (2) Morally invincible, absence of knowledge under such circumstances that the attainment thereof would require a greater effort than prudence would oblige one to put forth under the circumstances. (Discuss here the mysteries of our world—energy, matter, life, mind, consciousness, self-consciousness, etc.)

5. Vincible ignorance is a matter of degree, and may be so classified as follows: (1) willful (affected, studied, deliberate)

ignorance: in short, deliberately produced ignorance. If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into a ditch. (Cf. Wm. James' celebrated essay, The Will to Believe). (2) Supine or crass ignorance: ignorance "taken lying down"—ignorance that simply is accepted without doing anything about it. (3) Simple ignorance, ignorance that could be overcome if the person would only make sufficient effort to overcome it. This is the kind of ignorance characteristic of the human race. Someone has said that most people are physically lazy part of the time, mentally lazy most of the time, and spiritually lazy all the time. We are responsible for allowing ourselves to remain in ignorance. To the one who knows to do good, and does it not, to him that is sin.

6. Violence destroys voluntariness in him who suffers the violence, for an act done under coercion is not caused by the one who suffers the violence but by the one who inflicts it. Violence, however, cannot determine the will; even when the violence cannot be resisted, the will retains the power of determining itself. I can will to be shot rather than to yield up my wallet to thugs. The will always remains free in its action, even though physical violence may be inflicted upon body.

7. Passion. Passions are movements of the irrational powers: those of concupiscence, the passions which impel one toward an object; those of fear, which impel one away from an object. (a) Concupiscence is also known as lust. Rage is lust for blood. Non-volitional concupiscence is spontaneous; that is, it arises prior to any deliberation; it is thought that it may render one temporarily incapable of reason. A man may plead, under certain conditions, that he lost his temper: society, however, demands that he control his temper, at least to the extent of avoiding such acts as assault with intent to kill or actual murder. Society demands that men restrain their passions in the interest of the whole, for the achievement of social order. Volitional concupiscence is deliberately stimulated concupiscence. (Cf. "lasciviousness.") (b) Undoubtedly there are instances in which fear may unseat reason. (c) Does not society, as a rule, distinguish the crime of premeditated (first degree) murder from the crime passional?

## XXIV. Good, in ethics, is correlated with suitability (to a nature); right, with directionality (of conduct and life).

1. The word "good" is a robust, virile word; unfortunately, however, it has fallen into bad company. Not infrequently it is associated with "goody-goodiness" (connoting piosity rather than piety). Again, when we speak of a man as a "good sport," a "good fellow," etc., we usually mean, as someone has remarked, that he is "splendidly nil." Obviously, anything, to be good, must be good for something. (1) It was Socrates who introduced into philosophy the question, What are the characteristics of the good (just) man? (the theme of Plato's Republic). In a way, this question might be said to be the very essence of the science of ethics. It must be remembered, of course, that long before Socrates, this question was the primary concern of Moses and the Hebrew prophets (cf. Deut. 6:5, Lev. 19:18, Isa. 1:16-17, Micah 6:8, etc.). (2) Generally speaking, a good is something that is valued and desired by a person. (Axiology is the technical term for the study of values.) In ethics, however, we use the word "good" as signifying suitability to a nature, just as "bad" signifies unsuitability (that which violates a nature, that which is essentially unnatural). As a matter of fact, this is true of good in any sense: a circle that does not have all the points on its circumference equidistant from its center is not a good circle, but a bad one; indeed to the extent that it lacks this property it is not a circle at all. (3) A perfective good is one that is suitable to a nature, one that actually confers a perfection or fullness of being. The mind, for instance, learns one more truth and thus adds to its store of knowledge: this is a perfective good. To a table having three legs, a fourth is added, and then the table is varnished: each act adds to its fullness of being as a table. A perfective good either supplies an absent perfection or removes a present imperfection (e.g., surgery removes a diseased appendix). A useful good is the means to the attainment of a perfective good. Thus physical health is a useful good in that it is a means to man's attainment of his natural and proper intrinsic and extrinsic ends: "that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: then that which is spiritual" (1 Cor. 15:46). A delectable good is the pleasure accompanying the attainment of a perfective or useful good. Such a good may come even from solving a difficult problem in mathematics: it accompanies constructive achievement in any field. (4) Real goods

versus apparent goods. A real good is an act that is in conformity with the extrinsic and intrinsic ends of man's nature as a whole. A good, however, suitable only to a faculty taken in isolation may not be a good to man's nature as a whole: such is an apparent good. E. g., drinking of intoxicating liquors, or the taking of narcotic drugs, or even over-eating, may satisfy a baser appetite of man's nature, but does not perfect his nature as a whole. This is true of all sensual pleasures: if over-indulged they become apparent, not real, goods. It has been said rightly that apparent goods give only the "alcoholic illusion" of well-being. Most of the confusion in morals comes from the confounding (a) of apparent goods with real goods, and (b) of means with ends. This confusion usually takes the form of elevating mere means to the status of ends, as, for example, making health, getting an education, earning a living, etc., ends in themselves. It takes a great deal of moral discernment to put first things first; that is, to select out and value those things in life which are of real value in themselves. Ethics is just such a discriminative science. In the final analysis, only those deliberate actions which are really good are morally good. This is equivalent to saying that only those actions which are really good are natural; actions contrary to man's nature as a whole are morally bad because they are unnatural.

2. Right has reference to the direction in which the action tends. In common parlance, we call that action right which is in conformity with what is commanded or permitted by authority, and we call an act wrong which is forbidden by authority. We say it is "right," for instance, in the United States, to drive on the right side of the road, but that in England it is "right" to drive on the left side of the road. "May I do this?" asks a pupil. The teacher replies, "That is all right," that is, it is permitted. Right, in ethics, however, means going in the right direction, leading to one's natural and proper end, whereas wrong means going in the opposite direction, away from one's natural and proper end. Thus it will be seen that in ethics much—indeed everything—depends on what one conceives the natural and proper end of man to be. Richard Cabot (The Meaning of Right and Wrong) says that we have to consult the structure of the universe for guidance in determining right and wrong. This was Aristotle's position: man is a special structure within the whole; therefore it is suitable for him to act according to his structure (Form): the good man is one who does what he is built to do. We look at a thing and ask, For what was it made? What is its function within the scheme of things? Aristotle would say that a man should act as the human being that he is. Chesterton says somewhere: If you see a man wallowing in the gutter, your inclination is to help him to his feet and say, "Stand up now—be a man!" But if you were to see a crocodile on the verge of devouring a missionary you would not try to pat it on the head and say, "Be a crocodile!" For that is precisely what it is doing—it is being a crocodile. We read in Genesis that when God finished His creative work

He looked upon it and pronounced it all "good" (Gen. 1:31). That is, every created thing was performing the function it was ordained to perform in the total scheme of things. By doing this, every created thing achieved the actualizing of its potencies (in Aristotelian terms, its entelechy). Similarly, we are told that the Creator said, "It is not good that the man should be alone" (Gen. 2:18). That is, he could not have realized his potentialities in the scheme of things without the woman; hence the woman was created to be a helper meet for his needs. Generally speaking, right and good are natural; wrong and bad are unnatural.

3. Characteristics of the Absolutely Ultimate Intrinsic End. As stated heretofore, (1) it must be that end which is sought in and for itself, and never as a means to something else; (2) it must be that end which leaves nothing further to be desired; and (3) it must be the end which perfects (completes) our human nature, and which, in this sense, is therefore the Highest Good, the Summum Bonum. Moreover, because human nature is specifically rational (that is, man is endowed with the power of thought, whether he uses it or not), it follows that the absolutely ultimate end must be of the character of Perfect Knowledge and Perfect Love.

4. The view of man's ultimate intrinsic end which we are presenting here, as the one warranted by human experience itself, namely, that man is ordained by nature to happiness (or at least what he believes to be happiness), is designated eudaimonism (from the Greek eudaimonia—eu, "well," daimon, "being," hence, literally, "well-being"). The term derives, of course, from Aristotle's Ethics. Eudaimonism has been by far the dominant view of man's natural history of his progressive development of ethical thought. (Let us recall here McDougall's distinctions between pleasure, joy, and happiness: see under Proposition XVII supra.) Happiness presupposes, to be sure, satisfactions for man's fundamental needs, such as his needs for food, drink, sleep, work, play, friends, etc. True happiness, however, is a harmony of the inward man; it is not to be equated with pleasure per se; as stated previously, the genuinely happy man knows that life is not always a bed of roses, and hence knows how to meet adversity without resorting to orgies of self-pity. Generally speaking, too, happiness is derived from giving, from sharing, rather than from getting. Some psychologists would define happiness as the proper balance between impulse and inhibition. Certainly true happiness is the antithesis of "personality rot"—it is personality growth and fulfillment. Moreover, the mood of happiness changes as the person matures, and to the degree that he matures: the eventide of the life of faith and hope and love should be that of the greatest measure of happiness possible to man in this present world. In short, however men as individuals may define happiness or well-being, the fact is obvious that all men seek it; it would be unnatural for any person to set out to make himself permanently miserable. Even the hypochondriac derives a kind of happiness from his condition because it procures

for him the attention which he would not otherwise receive. ( I remember reading the following somewhere; Mrs. Blank will always feel guilty about something: she wouldn't be happy if she couldn't. ) And the martyr who gives his body to be burned may do so because he envisions future bliss as his reward; or indeed his sacrificial act may be a sheer labor of love, in which case the joy that is experienced is simply that of unalloyed devotion by which the act is motivated.

5. Other views of the ultimate ends of human activity may be listed in four categories (with a certain amount of overlapping) as follows:

(1) Hedonism, the view that the end of all human activity is pleasure.

(a) Positive hedonism holds that because satisfaction of physical desires brings more intense pleasure than mental satisfactions, the "good" life is the life of indulgence of the pleasures of the body. This view originated with Aristippus (fl. 370 B. C. ) of Cyrenaica (a province on the north coast of Africa directly across the Mediterranean from Crete). This kind of hedonism is expressed perfectly in The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam (translated by Fitzgerald): "Take the Cash, and let the Credit go." Hedonism of this type is most often expressed in the old cliché, "Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow ye die." This has been parodied to read—with an uncanny touch of realism, one might well say: "Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow ye go down with locomotor ataxia, cirrhosis of the liver, or delirium tremens." (Incidentally, libertarianism is the system that not only upholds the doctrine that man has free will, but also stands for the preservation of liberty of thought and action in all legitimate kinds of human activity. Libertinism, on the other hand, is the doctrine that men should be allowed to give free rein to their impulses and lusts; it is, in effect, the substitution of license for liberty. )

(b) Negative hedonism, which originated with Epicurus (342-270 B. C. ), is the view that virtue is essentially the proper evaluation of pleasures; that the chief end of man is the avoidance of pain and fear; that is, the life of the more refined pleasures. Happiness, he taught, is not sensual enjoyment, but tranquility of soul (peace of mind), the reward of the man of culture who finds greatest pleasure in the satisfactions of the mind over which he has control as by way of contrast with the satisfactions of a more material or sensual character. Epicureanism has been identified popularly with gluttony, luxury, high living, etc. , but nothing could be farther from the truth: Epicurus was emphatic in repudiating inordinate indulgence of the baser physical appetites.

(c) Objections to the doctrine of hedonism are obvious: (i) the fact of the matter is that in indulging physical appetites there is a point at which satiety is reached, beyond which, pleasure gives

way to pain (as indeed Plato himself pointed out centuries ago): [1] even such a seemingly trivial indulgence as over-eating will produce indigestion; (ii) anyone knows that uncontrolled indulgence of the pleasures of the body can lead only to pain, disease, and death; that a certain measure of self-discipline (asceticism) is necessary to any life that is worth living in this present world.

(2) Stoicism. The word derives from the name stoa, a street-side portico in ancient Athens, walled at the back, and with a colonnade in front, the kind of building from which Zeno, the founder of the system (fl. about 300 B. C. ), was accustomed to proclaim its tenets to assembled groups of Athenians. (a) Ancient Stoicism, as proclaimed by Zeno and his successors, held that man's chief end in life is virtue, and identified virtue with one's attainment of mastery over self and circumstances, a mastery that is essentially complete independence of all things both internal and external, and that is well expressed by the term imperturbability (ataraxia). (Hence the meaning of the expression, he "endured stoically.") The Greek and Roman Stoics carried this doctrine to the extreme of avowing independence of life itself; hence, suicide was common among them. Among the distinquished ancient Stoics were the Senecas, the slave Epictetus, and the emperor, Marcus Aurelius. [2] (b) Modern Stoicism. This is the name we give to the ethical ideal of the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant held that duty is the sole norm of morality. There is no necessary connection, he said, between morality and inclination: an act has moral significance only if performed out of a sense of duty. (c) In opposition to these views, it could be maintained, I think, that virtues and habits (and even duties) are not ends in themselves, but means, rather, to ultimate ends.

(3) Utilitarianism, the view that, in one way or another, makes utility the ultimate end of human activity. Utilitarianism takes various forms, namely, egoistic, racial, altruistic, etc.

Egoistic Utilitarianism may take different forms, as the following: (a) Spinoza (1632-1677) held that the chief end of human activity is self-preservation. However, he describes the highest form of human knowledge as "the intellectual love of the mind toward God." "This intellectual love of the mind toward God," he says, "is the part of the infinite love with which God loves himself." Spinoza's system was a pure pantheism. (b) According to others, the end of human action is the development of the free personality. This is the Cult of Self-Expression (cf. "Progressive Education," etc. ) Devotion to this Cult may explain why some of our modern writers have expressed themselves in such illiterate literature (e. g. , Dreiser); it may explain, too, some of the terrible gobs hanging on the walls of our art galleries today (they are supposed to be artistic expressions—but of what?). This theory is frequently used as an alibi for looseness of morals; we are told that we should not hesitate to give free impression to our biological desires and impulses. etc. Thus human morality is prostituted into barnyard mo-

rality. (The following "take-off" on Ultra-Progressive Education is offered for what it is worth: At breakfast one morning The Child pushed her cereal away, announcing pettishly that she wouldn't eat any of the stuff. Not only that, she wouldn't eat any of the breakfast! "Well, my dear, what would you like?" coaxed the Progressive Mother. "I want a worm," whimpered the kid. Progressive Daddy, who would not deprive her of her slightest wish, went out into the yard and soon returned with a nice fat worm, which he laid on little Daughter's plate, saying, "There you are, my dear." But I want it cooked!" sobbed The Child indignantly. So it was sent out into the kitchen, rolled in batter, cooked golden brown, and brought back. "I want Daddy to have half of it." Obediently, Daddy divided the worm, pulled himself together, and managed to get his portion down. Again sobs and howls rent the air. In desperation Mother and Daddy sought to calm The Child. "Please, please, tell us what is the matter now!" they implored. "I want the half that Daddy ate!" howled The Offspring, etc., etc.)[4]

Racial Utilitarianism. (a) According to Nietzsche (1844-1900), life is struggle; all life is characterized by the will to power, and this will to power provides for the race the only acceptable foundation for values. The present world was made for mediocrities who set up codes of morals to prevent superior men from despoiling them. Law is just a trick of the many to keep the Supermen from exercising their legitimate rights. But life itself functions by exploiting and annihilating, a conflict in which, naturally, only the masters survive. In the final analysis, therefore, only Might makes Right; the natural and proper end of human action is the assertion of mastery by those who constitute the super-race. This master morality is the true morality; Christian morality is but a slave morality. (Yet Nietzsche was a timid little fellow who, because he fainted at the sight of blood and could not stand military life, was put in hospital work in the Franco-Prussian War. Subjected all his life to a domineering mother and sister, he compensated, it would seem, by evolving the philosophy of the Super-race. He finally died in an insane asylum. Why do people make so much fuss over a crazy man?) (b) In this category, perhaps, we should put adaptationism, the view that the proper end of human activity is the better adaptation of the race as a whole to its environment. The individual perishes; the race survives. The individual exists to preserve the race. This was the view of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Spencer recognized the conflict between egoistic and social utilitarianism, and tried to effect a harmony of the two views by the application of the evolution hypothesis to the history of culture. This conflict between individual and society, he contended, will ultimately resolve itself as man attains cultural perfection. But when is this going to happen? Spencer answers that private interest will become identified with the common good only when we achieve universal "socialism." (Spencer's Cultural Evolution Theory—that every day and in every way the race will get better and better as

time goes on, that men will continue to progress morally to the point that ultimately they will do good spontaneously—is generally rejected in our day; no evidence exists for the inevitability of progress either in culture or in morals. Likewise his theory that all cultures have developed from savagery, through barbarism, to civilization, is quite generally rejected today.) One is reminded here of the man who was asked to do something for posterity, and who replied by asking, "What has posterity done for me?" Perhaps this is why not one of the great ethical religions takes for its objective communal salvation or salvation en masse, but all seek rather the salvation of persons as individuals. Nature obviously is individualistic: we come into the world one by one and we go out of it in the same way. (c) Specific racial utilitarianism, the view that the end of human activity is to serve the interests of a given master race, is in fact a form of race worship. Gobineau, the French aristocrat, was perhaps the most dogmatic and blatant proponent of this kind of thinking. For him it was not what a man does but what he is that gave him moral value; hence, since only the superior race—and for Gobineau this was the white race—can give us the true values, it follows that all other races and ethnic groups can find their fulfillment only in serving the interests of the "totalitarian" (white, Aryan) race. Of course, this was the theory exploited by Hitler in the more restricted form of alleged "Nordic supremacy." We are all aware of the consequences (the most excruciating kinds of torture, and even attempted genocide) characteristic of the Nazi regime in Germany.

Altruistic Utilitarianism. This is the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873),[5] that the proper end of human action is the social good, as expressed in the oft-repeated cliché, "the greatest good of the greatest number." Under this view every person is morally bound to do that which promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest number of persons. (a) Obviously, this view is implicit in the democratic concept of majority rule. However, history is replete with evidence that the verdicts of majorities have often been overturned, and that to the betterment of the people involved. The fact that a practice is group-approved does not necessarily mean that it is a good one; the history of human slavery in the United States is an excellent example of the case in point. (b) This view has reference only to temporal felicity; hence, it is always a popular theory. There is something alluring to intellectuals and idealists in the notion of temporal utility. Let us consider human beings as they are, shout the Humanists; everything which is human is good. In the first half of our century it was an avocation of intellectuals to try to deify man (a la John Dewey) in the name of self-styled humanism. As Swinburne once said, "Glory to man in the highest, for man is the master of things." Or as the protagonist of one of Compton Mackenzie's novels puts it, "I believe in man!" But that was several years ago—prior to the cruelties of the Second World War and to the terrifying

possibilities of thermonuclear warfare in the hands of ambitious "little colonels on horseback," unscrupulous tyrants who have abandoned morality for expediency. Surely the nobler kind of humanism is that which recognizes that man's dignity and worth, and his potential for good, are the by-products of his having been created in the image of God; and that once the rational and spiritual powers of man are neglected, he is apt to sink to the level of the brute. True humanism is, necessarily, seasoned with humility and faith, and is set forth in the two great Commandments of the Law, namely, love for God and love for one's fellows (Deut. 6:5, Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:34-40, Mark 12:28-31, Luke 10:27). These Commandments embody the highest type of humanism possible. As one writer has put it:

> The humanist does not seek to dethrone God: instead, through the moral discipline of humanitas, he aspires to struggle upward to the Godhead.[6]

(c) What, after all, is "the greatest good of the greatest number"? What man or group of men is competent to determine just what this would be in a given set of circumstances? Is it to be determined by "counting noses"? Suppose three or four thugs were to hold you up on a dark street some night and demand your pocketbook and money. Would you say, "Now, gentlemen, I have just learned in my study of philosophy that the norm of morality is the greatest good of the greatest number. I suggest, therefore, that we sit down on the curb and talk this matter over and decide by vote what the greatest number would be in this particular case." Of course, you would be outvoted. Would the fact, then, that the thugs outnumber you four to one, give them a right to your pocketbook and its contents? I hardly think so. Again, we can envision some two or three hundred thousand "noble" Romans in the stands, waiting to enjoy seeing a dozen martyrs thrown to the lions in the arena below. If the greatest good of the greatest number is equivalent to the sum total of the sadistic pleasures of the two hundred persons in the stands, then, to be sure, there would be nothing wrong in tossing the twelve Christians to the lions. Obviously, however, to interpret "the greatest good of the greatest number" by such a standard (that of sheer number alone) would be ridiculous. Again, if ten men owned ten acres of land each, and one of the ten cultivated his acreage, working hard throughout the year, and the others did nothing with their land, what would happen when winter comes? Would it be just to take a vote and distribute the fruits of one man's labor to the entire ten? Of course not. Since the man who worked hard is made of better stuff, he probably would be willing to share. But this would not give the lazy nine men any right to the products of his toil. Thus it is evident that this principle—"the greatest good of the greatest number"—becomes ridiculous in application to specific cases, local groups, etc. On this principle any tyrant could "justify" almost any kind of cruelty he might devise to perpetuate his tyranny (e.g., Hitler and Lebensraum, "Nordic supremacy,"

etc., or Mussolini and his Mare Nostrum). (d) As a matter of fact, it seems obvious that the morally good is bound to be socially useful. That which is in conformity with human nature adequately considered (in itself and in its essential relationships) is morally good, and is at the same time socially useful. The morally bad is bound to be socially disintegrative. "The greatest good of the greatest number" is, not infrequently, a satisfactory norm of conduct "on the whole and in the long run" (as perhaps William James would have put it). There is some truth in every ethical (and theological) system: a system that is all error would soon perish.

(4) Skepticism. This is the complete denial of purpose or design in nature: all is mere chance, a "fortuitous concourse of atoms." Life is meaningless: it is only frustration and futility. Nature, "red of tooth and claw with ravine, shrieks" against any such creed as Love.[7]

(a) Skepticism may take the form of agnosticism. Agnosticism is the notion that no one can ever know what the natural and proper ends of human activity are, or indeed whether there are any such ends at all. The agnostic claims simply to be without knowledge—he does not know, he says, and cannot know. Thus, by presupposing that he cannot know, he rationalizes—justifies to himself—his lack of effort to seek and find knowledge (just as a self-styled fatalist usually is a person who falls back on what he calls "Fate" or "Destiny" because he is too lazy to try to change conditions that need to be changed). Agnosticism is a form of escapism.

(b) Again, skepticism may take the form of positivism. Positivism is a more sophisticated form of skepticism: indeed it is a kind of willful ignorance. According to this view, as first promulgated by Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the Frenchman, who wanted to be known as the founder of the science of sociology, all knowledge is necessarily confined to observable and (statistically) measurable facts. We can know only what may be apprehended empirically (with the naked eye, or with the naked eye implemented by microscope, telescope, etc.) and hence is amenable to statistical verification. Therefore, there is no point in reaching out to the extra-physical, the extra-mundane, the metaphysical, because all such areas lie beyond the range of sense-apprehension. D. Elton Trueblood rightly designates the onslaught of positivism as "vigorous and even arrogant": the proponents of the theory are not only sure—they are cocksure. Objections to this view are many and obvious to any thinking person: (i) it overlooks the ambiguity of the word "fact." Just what is a "fact"? Etymologically, the word derives from the Latin facio, facere, "to make" or "to do"; hence "facts" are "things made or done." Now things "done" include those events which take place in the area of human relationships as well as in other areas of the space-time continuum, and hence include relations and acts that are valued; that is to say, values (such as truth, beauty, goodness, freedom, justice, and the like) are facts

as truly as the union of two atoms of hydrogen with one atom of oxygen to form a molecule of water is a fact. If truth has no real existence, why should the scientist go into the laboratory? (ii) The positivists by their limited methodology rule out whole areas of experience which have been common to man from the very beginning of his existence, areas such as the purely intellectual (e. g. , pure mathematics), ethics, esthetics, religion, etc. (iii) Few philosophers, I think, would agree with the positivist presupposition, namely, that, because the questions of philosophy are not amenable to dogmatic solutions, they should not even be raised. Thus Trueblood concludes:

> It [positivism] involves a signal impoverishment of human thought. It may be described as a form of extreme poverty of the intellect, not a poverty forced upon the philosopher from the outside, but one which is self-inflicted. [8]

Positivism is, in effect, the rejection of all aspects of human experience except sensation, and this, as any unbiased person knows, is contrary to experience itself. It strikes me that the positivist cannot consistently admit the existence of his own thought (hence, of his own theory), for the simple reason that his own thought, and especially that element of it that is known as meaning, can be neither observed nor measured. Positivism is indeed a willful impoverishment of human thought and experience. (iv) Finally, in this connection, it should be noted that the view presented here, namely, that man's natural and proper end is well-being or happiness, is derived exclusively from our experience of human tendencies and impulses both in ourselves and in other persons. It strikes me that this approach to the subject should be sufficiently empirical to please the most exacting positivist.

(c) Again, skepticism is, almost without exception, attended by pessimism: the notion that the cosmos is meaningless (a view that is, in most cases, the by-product of some emotional trauma) is almost certain to breed the corollary view that life is not worth living. As mentioned before, Clarence Darrow is reported to have made such an assertion: it is to be noted, however, that he lived out his life to its natural end. Perhaps the arch-pessimist of philosophy was Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). [9] For him, the entire world of events (phenomena), including the human body, is objectified will. This universal will is simply a blind striving on the part of all organisms to perpetuate themselves in existence, but to no purpose whatever other than just to "keep on keeping on" as long as possible. Schopenhauer was also the arch-woman-hater of history. Does this mean that failure to appreciate woman is a necessary feature of pessimism? Or, were Schopenhauer's views simply a reaction from his own mother's repudiation of him?

This notion that the world is meaningless, that life is futility, etc. , has persisted throughout all history. It has found expression

oftentimes in dramatic representations of human life as nothing more than a stage play, a good show, a Vanity Fair: as echoed and re-echoed in the motif of the ancient book of Ecclesiastes: "Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher; vanity of vanities, all is vanity." (Cf. Christian's experiences in the town of Vanity Fair on his pilgrimage to the Celestial City, in Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress; also the title of Thackeray's greatest novel, Vanity Fair.) Thus Shakespeare caused Antonio, in pensive mood, to say

> I hold the world as but the world, Gratiano—
> A stage where every man must play a part,
> And mine a sad one. [10]

And the doomed Macbeth to soliloquize in the famous lines:

> Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
> That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
> And then is heard no more: it is a tale
> Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
> Signifying nothing. [11]

James Thomson, a third-rate poet of the nineteenth century, authored these verses:

> The world rolls round for ever like a mill;
> It grinds out death and life and good and ill;
> It has no purpose, heart or mind or will. . . . [12]

About a century ago Matthew Arnold wrote:

> Most men eddy about
> Here and there—eat and drink,
> Chatter and love and hate,
> Gather and squander, are raised
> Aloft, are hurl'd in the dust,
> Striving blindly, achieving
> Nothing; and then they die. [13]

And our old friend Omar has this to say:

> Myself when young did eagerly frequent
> Doctor and saint, and heard great argument
> About it and about: but evermore
> Came out by the same door where in I went.
>
> With them the seed of wisdom did I sow,
> And with my own hand wrought to make it grow;
> And this was all the harvest that I reap'd—
> "I came like water and like wind I go." [14]

In similar vein, Montaigne has written of life as

> a noble farce, wherein kings, republics, and emperors, have for so many ages played their parts, and to which the whole vast universe serves for a theatre. [15]

Bertrand Russell introduces his well-known essay, "A Free Man's Worship," with the dramatic scene in which Dr. Faustus, sitting in his study, hears the story of the futility of the Creation, as it is told him by Mephistopheles, the prince of devils; and then Russell himself goes on to say:

> Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. . . . How, in such an alien and inhuman world can so powerless a creature as Man preserve his aspirations untarnished?[16]

The most tragic thing about this statement—tragic especially in the effect it has had on immature minds—is that it simply is not true. This alleged meaningless world is not the kind of a world that is described for us by present day science. As a matter of fact, the very existence of science presupposes the cosmic order that makes science possible. And surely order and conscious purpose do not dwell very far apart!

(d) This concept of the futility of living has dominated both fiction and drama for many decades, and no doubt accounts for the fact that contemporary literature, on the whole, has very little humor in it. Both writers and their writings are so ponderously earthy, so deadly serious: shall we admit, "realistic"? Beginning with Ibsen, we find the Cult of Futility either explicit or implicit in the dramas of Eugene O'Neill, Arthur Miller, Edw. Albee, Tennessee Williams, and other lesser lights, the playwrights who have dominated Broadway for half a century. (Williams has done about as good a job of outFreuding Freud as Euripides did twenty-four hundred years ago.) Saturated with the same motif are the novels of Thomas Hardy, Dreiser, Maugham, Lewis, Steinbeck, Faulkner, Hemingway, Caldwell, Farrell, James Jones, Salinger, Mailer and others of like outlook: these are the men who have produced most of the fiction with which the literary markets of the world have been deluged in recent years. (It will be recalled that Cronshaw's carpet, in Maugham's Of Human Bondage, is offered as an explicit analogy of the purposelessness of life.) I suppose, however, that the last word in pessimism has been spoken by the self-proclaimed atheistic existentialist, Jean Paul Sartre, in his terrible confession that life is only a vacuum with no exit signs. What a terrible world this would be if this view were to prevail everywhere!

(e) To summarize: The student should note well that many—if not all—of these proposed ends of human action (the life of refined pleasures, personality development, adaptation to environment, the common good, individual or general utility, self-mastery, obedience to duty, etc.) are, after all, envisioned by their protagonists as contributing ultimately to human happiness. (This is true even of the gross hedonist: pleasures of the body become to him a means to happiness—indeed he identifies happiness with sheer physical pleasure, and thus elevates only an apparent

good to the status of a real good.) J. S. Mill, in his Essay on Utilitarianism, admits that utility is not something distinct from pleasure, but is pleasure itself, especially absence of pain. Schlick, in his book, Problems of Ethics, takes it as his thesis that human action is always in the direction of that which appears to be the most pleasant, which is equivalent to saying that the ultimate of human activity is happiness, just as we are contending here. It follows, therefore, that all these proposed ends, as listed above, are in fact means rather than ends. The ultimate end that man seeks is happiness, no matter how he may define the term, or what the mood of happiness may be in his particular case.

6. The Summum Bonum: the Highest Good. If the Summum Bonum is Perfect Happiness, or indeed Happiness of any appreciable kind, in what does this Happiness consist?

(1) Can Perfect Happiness be realized in the possession of material goods? (a) By material goods we mean created goods, which are usually classified as the goods of fortune (wealth, fame, etc.), goods of the body (health, strength, beauty, etc.) and goods of the mind or soul (potencies, acts, etc.) [Note Plato's three classes of goods: (i) those desired for themselves alone (sports, recreations, art for art's sake); (ii) those desired both for themselves and their rewards or benefits (health, knowledge, vision, hearing, speech, etc.); and (iii) those desired for their rewards alone (wealth: money has no value in itself; its worth is determined only by what it will buy; and let us not forget that one of the commodities which wealth can buy is power, and power sub rosa). See the Republic, Bk. II.] (b) As stated previously, sensual pleasure cannot bring Perfect Happiness, for the simple reason that one reaches satiety in the pursuit of pleasure, at which point pleasure becomes repugnant (a pain). Sense wants recur, and if indulged, multiply and gather momentum; sense appetites grow in their enslavement of a person in proportion as they are indulged by him. The individual who satisfies all his sense desires degenerates. Hence, a certain amount of asceticism is necessary to any normal life. (c) Fame cannot bring happiness. Fame does not exist in the given person, but in the opinions of others about him; hence it is most fleeting. People crown their heroes today and crucify them tomorrow. (d) Wealth is never an end in itself, but always a means (to comfort, luxury, power, etc.) Of course, as Aristotle points out, the possession of a certain quantity of this world's goods naturally contributes to happiness; a man can hardly be happy when he does not know where his next meal is coming from. Poverty is a prolific source of vice and crime. But wealth cannot in itself give happiness; more rich people commit suicide in normal times than poor people. Besides all this, wealth is as evanescent as fame; no monetary system is sure fire against inflation; and there are so many other ways of losing money—by poor investment, fire, flood, etc. No firm grasp on earthly possessions is possible; one can never be sure of holding on to them. Nor can anyone take

these possessions with him when he dies—death is always frustration insofar as this world's goods are concerned. With respect to material possessions, there is one place indeed where all men are equal—and that is on the brink of the grave. "You can't take it with you." (e) Power is also fleeting. Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown. "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword," said Jesus (Matt. 26:52); that is, the individual or the nation that makes the use of force the ruling principle of life will sooner or later encounter superior force. Of necessity empire-builders must keep on "building"; otherwise their empires go to pieces. (f) Nor is physical beauty permanent; the freshness and beauty of youth inevitably fade away in senescence. (g) Even such endowments as intelligence, artistic sense, learning, etc., are not necessarily to be correlated with happiness. For instance, one may have these endowments but lack funds for their cultivation and realization. Intelligence may be abused, too, as when directed toward a life of crime. Oftentimes geniuses are of all persons most miserable because of their inability to adjust socially: they become social misfits.

(2) There are several reasons why created goods cannot give Happiness. (a) They cannot give happiness, not because they lack in quantity, but because they lack in quality, to do so, i. e., because of the kind of goods they are. A man may have ten suits of clothes and still not be happy: so he goes out and buys fifty or one hundred more—but he cannot possibly use them all. A man could not live in more than four or five houses, even if he wanted or had them; nor could he eat more than four or five meals a day. The mere quantity of such goods does not make for any great degree of happiness. (b) Such goods do not give happiness because there is a limit to the quantity that can be used: in the possession of such goods, one can reach the saturation point and still not be happy. (c) Again, many of these goods exclude one another in the possession of them. One who is trying to build up a healthy body may find that he has not enough time left to make a living; or one, in an effort to acquire physical beauty, may have to leave the mind undeveloped; or one who desires an education may find that he lacks the necessary funds to acquire it. (d) Created goods, therefore, may be used as a means, but they never suffice as ends in themselves. Hence, not everyone elicits desire for sensual pleasure, fame, wealth, education, etc., but all people elicit desire for Happiness, because Happiness is man's natural and proper intrinsic end: the only end, theology would say, to which he could be ordained by a good Creator.

7. Characteristic Views of the Summum Bonum are the following:

(1) Aristotle (384-322 B. C.): The Summum Bonum is the Life of Contemplation, which for Aristotle meant the life of intellectual activity. His argument is as follows: (a) The desire for pleasure is bound up with the desire for life. (b) Pleasures differ in kind (i) since activities differ, and (ii) activities have their own

pleasures which stimulate them, but at the same time impede other activities (in a contest between two activities, one chooses the more pleasant), and (iii) activities differ in moral value according to their ends. (c) The sense activities themselves differ in purity, and the activity of the intellect is always of a higher order and consequently more pleasant than the activities of sense. (d) Different species have different pleasures, and so do different individuals of the human species. (e) The ethical inference is that the pleasures of the good man, whose activities constitute happiness, are good or real pleasures and distinctively human. (f) Happiness is activity chosen for its own sake, but it must be activity manifesting virtue (excellence), not pursued merely for amusement. Therefore Perfect Happiness is that activity which exercises the highest virtue (sophia, or speculative wisdom), viz., Contemplation, because this activity is (i) that of the intellect, the highest power in us, (ii) the most continuous, (iii) the most pleasant, (iv) the most self-sufficient, (v) an end in itself, (vi) the most leisured, and (vii) the activity of the Divine in man.

> Such a life as this will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and the mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may do to live in accordance with the highest thing in him.[17]

Aristotle goes on to say that the Life of Contemplation needs few external goods, is the sole activity conceivable in God, and distinguishes man from the animals.

(2) Confucius (551-479 B. C.): The Summum Bonum is harmony of the inner self with the order of nature as a whole, in the here and now. This personal union with the central harmony of the universe produces an inner sense of poise and unity in a man's life which manifests itself in all his social and moral conduct, a disciplined and well-ordered life that shows itself in the life of the family and in that of the state as well. The primary virtues are filial piety, moderation, humility, dignity, and self-respect. Education is the means to the development of these virtues. Such is the life of the superior man—the typical Chinese gentleman of "the old school." Confucian ethics is a pure humanism: it has no theological implications.[18]

(3) Epicurus (342-270 B. C.): The Summum Bonum is the life of refined pleasures, those consistent with intelligence and moderation. In effect this is the life of the avoidance of pain and

fear, of stress and strain, etc. Epicureanism, as we have stated heretofore, is a kind of negative hedonism. It strikes me that a reasonable measure of Epicureanism might benefit the present-day American. (Cf. the teaching of Jesus on the subject of anxiety: see Matt. 6:24-34.)

(4) Gautama, the Buddha (563-483 B. C.): The Summum Bonum is Nirvanà (quasi-annihilation).[19] In classical Brahmanism, Nirvana was the union of atman (the individual soul) with Brahman (the Cosmic Absolute), a state of perfect tranquility in which one "knows naught without or within." This is also the Buddhist Nirvana. (The Oriental title Buddha means "The Enlightened one," and designates a progressive self-discipline in the mystical life. In the view of this cult, life is to be endured as a penance in order to gain higher and higher rebirths. By way of contrast, the Hebrew Messiah, the Greek Christos (transliterated into the English Christ) means "The Anointed One," and is strictly authoritarian in content. Under the Oriental systems, man is supposed to achieve "salvation" by tugging at his own bootstraps, so to speak; under the Biblical system, salvation is the reward of faith in, and obedience to, the will of Messiah, Christ. The difference of view here is, I should say, irreconcilable.)

(5) Plato (427-347 B. C.): The Summum Bonum is achieved in the final ascent of the soul to the eternal world of Pure Forms. According to Plato, the soul, which is an eternal being, originally came from this "region above the heaven," bringing with it absolute knowledge of the eternal Essences. This knowledge, however, was rendered latent temporarily by the soul's immersion in matter (the body: "the body is the tomb of the soul," said Plato.) Hence, learning is largely a matter of the revivification of this premundane, but now latent, knowledge: that is to say, knowledge is recollection. The process of recollection is initiated by the soul's contact on earth, by sense-perception, with the visible images of the eternal Forms (Ideas). After successive re-incarnations, each characterized by the soul's advancement in knowledge and virtue, the soul ultimately regains its pre-mundane habitat, that is, takes its place again in the realm of the pure Essences. This is a philosophic version, of course, of what in religion is termed "union with God."[20]

(6) Spinoza (1632-1677): The Summum Bonum is intellectual love of God. The human mind being in itself a part (share) of the Divine Mind (pantheism) necessarily has knowledge of God. Because God in His pure essence is the object of this knowledge, it is the highest form of knowledge of which the human mind is capable. From this knowledge of God arises intellectual love of God. This intellectual love (attraction) of the mind toward God is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself. Because God is eternal, this intellectual love of God (i. e., love for God) is likewise eternal. (It is impossible to determine whether Spinoza is affirming personal immortality here or not.)[21]

(7) Christian (Biblical) teaching: Perfect Happiness is Beatitude, to be attained by the union of the human soul with God after the death of the body. Beatitude is Blessedness, consisting in the union of the human mind with the Mind of God in knowledge and in the union of the human will with the will of God in love. This conception is stated explicitly in the New Testament, and was developed philosophically by Scholasticism. (As the student will note, this concept has been fully treaded supra, Proposition XXII.)

FOOTNOTES

[1]See Plato, Republic, Bk. IX.

[2]See the Discourses of Epictetus, and the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.

[3]Spinoza, Ethics, Proposition XXXVI.

[4]This "take-off" on "Progressive Education" appeared some years ago in a publication entitled The Vagabond.

[5]Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, first published in 1789. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, first published in 1863.

[6]Russell Kirk, Introduction, p. ix, to Oration on the Dignity of Man, by Pico della Mirandola. (A Gateway Book, Regnery, Chicago, 1956).

[7]Tennyson, "In Memoriam," 56.

[8]See D. Elton Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion, pp. 190-202. (Harper, New York, 1957.) See also Auguste Comte, Course on the Positive Philosophy, first published 1830-1842.

[9]See Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea.

[10]The Merchant of Venice, I, 1, 77-79. (Cf. As You Like It, II, 7, 139ff.)

[11]Macbeth, V, 5, 19 ff.

[12]Thomson, The City of Dreadful Night.

[13]Matthew Arnold, "Rugby Chapel."

[14]"Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam"

[15]Montaigne, Essays, "Of the Most Excellent Men" (Bk. III. ch. 36).

[16]Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Worship."

[17]See Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. X.

[18]See The Wisdom of Confucius, Modern Library Edition, edited and translated by Lin Yutang.

[19] For a treatment of Buddhism, see any authentic work of Comparative Religion, especially The World's Great Religions, by the editors of Life. See also the opening pages of Maritain's Introduction to Philosophy, Sheed and Ward, New York.

[20] See the Myth of the Phaedrus; the Socratic account of beauty, in the Symposium; the Myth of Er in the Republic, etc.

[21] Spinoza, Ethics. See Spinoza: Selections, in the Modern Student's Library Edition, published by Scribners.

## XXV. Moral obligation is obligation placed upon the human will by some law.

(1) It is obligation placed upon the person. In the person, however, thought, feeling, desire, conscience, all converge in the will-act. Hence we say that moral obligation is obligation placed upon the human will.

(2) The matter of ethics is human conduct; the form is oughtness or duty. Oughtness, in ethics, means that there is an obligation placed upon the human will to elicit acts that are right and good, and to refrain from acts that are wrong and bad. "Oblige" and "obligation" derive from the root, lig, which means "binding" or "bound." Cf. such words as ligature, ligament, religion (from religo, religare, meaning to "bind back" or "bind anew" man to God). (Note also the kinship of this root with the root, leg, meaning "law"; e. g. , in legal, legislate, legislature, etc. ) What, then, is the nature of this obligation which we call moral obligation?

(3) It is not physical compulsion or necessity. This book must fall, if I hold it up and let go of it: it is physically compelled. But the will is always free from physical compulsion. I can choose to risk my life rather than to hand over my pocketbook to a thug. I can choose to go to jail rather than to obey a tyrant. (Is "brain-washing" a kind of coercion?) When we say that we ought not shoot the old and the maimed and the blind, we do not mean that we are physically restrained from shooting them, or that we are physically unable to shoot them, or that to shoot them would not be good for the state: we mean absolutely and categorically that we ought not to shoot them: that there is an obligation placed upon us not to will to do this thing. What is the source of this obligation?

(4) It is not mere custom or convention, as when we say, for instance, that John ought not drink coffee out of his saucer. Obviously, if John should drink coffee out of his saucer, no one would have him put in jail for the act. Moral obligation has not been imposed upon us by a Lord Chesterfield or by the late Emily Post. There is no moral obligation on anyone to conform to rules of etiquette, to adhere to social conventions, or to move in any certain stratum of society. Oughtness as moral obligation is neither custom nor convention.

(5) It is not mere expediency or advantage ("enlightened self-interest"—a hypocritical phrase), as when we say that John ought to remain in college until he is graduated. We mean simply that it is to his interest or advantage to do this.

(6) The obligation considered in ethics is neither physical nor conventional: it is an obligation placed upon the will, by some law, insofar as the will is free. When we say that a man ought not kill another man solely on his own authority and with malice aforethought (commit murder), or when we say that a man ought not kidnap a child and collect a ransom and probably kill the child in the course of his act, surely in such matters as these we are in an entirely different area from that of mere convention or expediency. Moral obligation means that one can choose a wrong course of action, but that one may not do so; that one is under an obligation not to do so. This kind of obligation stems from a law of some kind—a moral law. Note especially this phrase, by some law. Why this phrase? Because law, with the power of enforcement to actualize it, binds, in the sense that it provides sanctions in the form of rewards and punishments. Law, by its very nature, imposes a penalty for its violation: law would not be law without a penalty. People may deny moral obligation but they keep on thinking in terms of moral obligation just the same. They realize, whether they will admit it or not, that there is a profound difference between doing right and merely being careful. They are—tacitly at least—aware of the fact that the bond placed upon them by mere social convention is wholly different from the bond which, say, restrains them from murder, rape, kidnaping, theft, etc. The bond placed upon the will by duty is the demand of a clear and unconditioned dictate of reason—one which has its existence and legitimacy in the very nature of things; the bond which commits the will to elicit the good and to refrain from the evil. This unconditioned dictate, however, leaves the will physically free to obey or to disobey. Hence, we say that the will, though physically free, is morally restricted or bound by oughtness or duty. At all times we must keep clear in our minds the fundamental distinction between moral power and physical power. Moral power is right. There are many instances in which a man has the moral power to do something but lacks the physical power. Conversely, there are many instances in which men have the physical power to do something but lack the moral power—the right—to do it. The identification of moral power with sheer physical power is the world-old doctrine that might makes right. This we reject in toto.

XXVI. The elements of law-in-general are (1) a law-giver or authoritative will, (2) a prior exercise of reason, (3) subjects toward whom the will is directed, (4) a general command or expression of the authoritative will (promulgation of the law), (5) power of enforcing the command, and (6) a penality for the violation of the law. (By "law-in-general" we mean any and every kind of law.)

Abraham Lincoln: "Law is the expression of the will of the lawgiver." In a tyranny, of course, law is the expression of the arbitrary will of the tyrant (dictator); in an oligarchy, it is the expression of the will of the governing few; in a democracy, it is the expression of the will of the people (the majority), etc. By analogy from our own experience, thought presupposes a thinker, love presupposes a lover, behavior presupposes a being to behave, personality presupposes a person, etc.; hence, law presupposes a lawgiver. Dr. A. H. Strong: "Physical science, in her very use of the word law, implicitly confesses that a supreme Will has set general rules which control the processes of the universe."[1] It must be remembered that science has borrowed the word "law" from jurisprudence, not jurisprudence from science. It seems obvious that moral obligation and moral law must have their ultimate origin in an authoritative Will. (It is basic in theology, of course, that the Will of God is the constitution—that which constitutes—the cosmos: Cf. Gen. 1:3, 6, 9, etc., Ps. 33:6, 9; Heb. 11:3; Ps. 148:1-6; John 1:1-3, etc.)

Aristotle: "The law is reason unaffected by desire."[2] Law that is the product of calm deliberation will be just, as a rule, but law that is the product of prejudice, emotion, passion, etc., is almost sure to be unjust. Thomas Aquinas: Law is "the ordination of reason for the common good by him who has the care of the community, and promulgated."[3]

Kinds of law.

1. As to its effects, law is (1) affirmative (law of command), or (2) negative (law of prohibition), or (3) permissive (allowing a thing to be done, and carrying with it the prohibition against anyone's interfering with the doing of it), or punitive (providing a penalty for violation).

2. As to its mode of promulgation, law is either natural (embodied in the nature of things: physical, in the external world; moral, in human nature and relationships), or positive (promulgated in some external sign, either oral or written). Positive law in the early history of man was customary, that is, handed down by

tradition from generation to generation. In the late prehistoric and early historic periods, law became statutory: engraved upon tables of stone, on stone pillars, or on a pillar of black diorite (as in the case of the law of Hammurabi, in Babylon, about 1800 B.C.); later, inscribed on parchment or papyrus; and in modern times, printed in law books. Ignorance of the law excuses no one, for the obvious reason that the law has been promulgated; it is assumed that if one does not himself know what the law is in a given case, he can consult an attorney. Natural physical law is that which is embodied in the natural processes of the external world; natural moral law is that which is embodied in human nature and human natural relationships: traditionally it is viewed as the expression of the Will of God. Man is born with the capacity and the tendency to form universal moral judgments and to announce to himself certain universal moral obligations. Reason, having this innate tendency, will formalize these judgments, such as: Good ought to be done, Evil ought to be avoided, Order ought to be maintained, etc. As a rule men do not doubt that murder, adultery, theft, perjury, rape, lying, contract-breaking, etc., are bad, both for themselves as individuals and for the race. The difficulties arise, of course, in applying the law to concrete cases: for example, it is not always easy to decide whether certain cases of homicide are cases of murder (e.g., self-defense, war, capital punishment, etc.)

Sanctions. (1) Law must have sanctions, otherwise it is not law; and back of the law there must be legitimate authority (moral power or right to use force) and actual power sufficient to enforce the sanctions. Law is more than mere wish; it is more than mere precept which may or may not be heeded. Law carries with it—if it is law—its own reward for obedience and its own punishment for disobedience. Sanctions, in ethics, mean etymologically to make holy or sacred; hence, to sustain the majesty of the law, or to render the law inviolate (unimpaired). Violation of the laws of the physical world invokes directly their respective corresponding sanctions: one who jumps off a high building, thus defying the law of gravity, will break his neck; one who picks up a live coal will burn his fingers; one who over-indulges the pleasures of the body, will sow disease in the body; whatsoever a man sows, that shall he also reap. If the laws of physical nature inflict their own penalties when violated, as we know surely that they do, on what ground does any man presume to think he can flout the natural moral law with immunity forever? (2) Purpose of sanctions. Primarily, to secure the observance of the law. (A fine of ten dollars is imposed for parking by a hydrant—to keep people away from hydrants which firemen may need to use in emergencies.) Secondarily, to uphold moral order, or to restore moral order which has been disturbed.

Penal sanctions are either medicinal (remedial) or vindicatory. (1) Medicinal sanctions are prospective (prophylactic) for the individual. (I need money. I think, Shall I break into this store and steal what I find in the cash register? Then I think, But if I do that, it may cost me a term in jail. And so I do not break into the store.)

Medicinal sanctions are also instructive (to teach that crime does not pay) and exemplary or deterrent (taking note of what happens to criminals may be the chief influence in restraining others from a life of crime). Remedial sanctions are designed to bring about the reformation of the antisocial person and thus to make him a decent member of society. (2) Sanctions, however, are not exclusively medicinal or remedial. It irked me to hear a well-known broadcaster say, not so long ago, that the sole function of punishment is to achieve the reformation of the criminal. But is this true? Why is it that the final paragraph in any law is the one which assesses the penalty for the violation of the law? For the reason, obviously, the law would not be law without a penalty, the primary purpose of the penalty being to uphold the majesty of the law. The function of punishment is first and foremost vindicatory, that is, to secure obedience to the law and hence to make its operation effective; basically, to vindicate the ends of justice sought by the will (lawgiver) who ordained it. Vindication must be distinguished from vengeance: whereas vengeance (revenge) is personal and emotional, vindication is impersonal and juridical. Law that seeks revenge as its object cannot be true law; the very essence of true law is its vindicatory character.

(3) Vindicatory sanctions are designed to sustain the majesty of the law, to vindicate the will of the lawgiver (in the fact that his will ordained the law for the good of his subjects) to restore order that has been broken and hence to re-establish the equilibrium of justice. For example, a hardened criminal machine-guns a man in cold blood, a man who is probably the father of a family. The criminal has taken something out of the totality of being which cannot be restored, namely, the victim's greatest good (his life) and he has, at the same time, robbed the victim's family of their means of material sustenance; hence the state (society acting through its government, the public authority), in order to restore the balance of justice (according to which every person is to receive that which is his due), takes the criminal's greatest good (his life) in retaliation (reciprocity). Again, man is a person by virtue of the fact that he is a rational being (a fact which remains a fact no matter how irrationally he may act). Hence, by heinous crimes which are offenses against the law of reason, he recedes from—falls far below—the order of reason, and as such a diseased member, he is corruptive of the whole social order of which he is a part, and may be put to death—but only by the public authority—for the common good. These, incidentally, are the grounds on which capital punishment has been justified throughout the ages. But someone is saying, "Two wrongs do not make a right." True—but the answer is, that this is begging the question, that two wrongs are not involved here; that there is just one wrong involved, namely, that perpetrated by the criminal. If the state (the public authority) has the right to call upon thousands of its citizens to put in jeopardy, on the battlefield, the exercise of their right to life, in defense of the entire society

against aggression, surely the society has the right also to protect itself against heinous capital crimes by depriving the perpetrators of any possible opportunity to repeat them. (I can only recall here the "crocodile tears" that were shed over the notorious Chessman case. In contrast, the fact stands out so vividly that there was no disposition on the part of the public to shed any tears at all over the awful crimes perpetrated by this man on his victims!) To be sure, it will be argued that life imprisonment will, in all such cases, accomplish the same results as those sought by means of capital punishment. I should agree, I think, that the thought of life imprisonment might be a greater deterrent to crime than the prospect of capital punishment, if it were actual life imprisonment or at least a penal tenure approximating life imprisonment. However, life imprisonment, when vitiated by a parole system which allows the criminal to go scot-free after only a few years in prison, is apt to become an encouragement to the repetition of criminal acts rather than a deterrent of them. It is the conviction of this writer that the laxity of judicial procedure in the United States is threatening to become an open scandal.

(4) In primitive cultures capital punishment took the form of the blood feud, or blood revenge (lex talionis), as it was often called, according to which the elders of the tribe would authorize the victim's relatives to punish the murderer by tracking him down and putting him to death. This was the only method possible, under patriarchal or tribal government, of preventing (or at least controlling) murder. Take, for example, the story of Cain. Gen. 4:14—"It will come to pass that whosoever findeth me will slay me" (that is, in retaliation for Cain's killing of his brother Abel). As population increased, however, and tribes grew into peoples (nations), and nations into states, this method of punishing for murder was delegated by families to the state itself, that is, to the public authority: hence, today, it is "the People versus John Doe," etc. (5) It is interesting to note, in this connection, that Aeschylus, the first of the great Greek tragedy writers—the other two were Sophocles and Euripides—resolved this problem of repeated killings occasioned by the modus operandi of the blood feud, in the same manner as history shows that mankind resolved it. In the Orestean trilogy, in the Agamemnon, the first play, we see Agammemnon murdered by his wife Clytemnestra and her paramour Aegisthus (she hated Agamemnon for his sacrifice of their daughter Iphigenia at Aulis, on the way to Troy); in the second play, the Choephori ("Libation Bearers"), we see Orestes, the son, executing vengeance by killing Clytemnestra and Aegisthus; but Orestes is guilty now, not only of homicide, but also of matricide, and so, in the third play, the Eumenides, we see Orestes beset by the Furies, the instruments of vengeance; that is, he has gone insane. In this condition, he has made his way into Athens. But how much longer is this killing to go on? What must be the fate of Orestes? At this point, Aeschylus resorts to the deus ex machina: he brings Athena, the goddess of wisdom, down from

heaven. The Furies insist that justice demands vengeance. To their amazement, Athena replies that the matter is not so easily resolved. There must be a trial, she says, an examination into motives, attendant circumstances, the degree of punishment already suffered by Orestes, the consequences of his act, and all other matters that might be relevant. This the Furies cannot understand: to them it seems an overthrow of Justice. And so the debate goes on between Justice and Mercy, until Athena herself resolves it by casting the vote for Mercy. In the end, the Furies themselves become the "Benevolent-minded Ones," and accept a prominent role in the administration of Athenian justice. Thus, writes Gilbert Murray, "the vengeance that blindly smites has become the law that protects." In this trilogy, writes Murray, Aeschylus emphasizes

> the deeply felt doctrine of the validity throughout the world of the Law of Justice, and yet the existence in Heaven of a will or an Understanding that is supreme even over the Law. [4]

That is to say, there is the Ultimate Source of Justice, who tempers it with Mercy, if the motives, circumstances, and consequences of a human act combine to justify such an amelioration. This distinction between Justice and Equity is a fundamental of jurisprudence in our day.

(6) Penologists generally, I think, hold the view that capital punishment is a greater deterrent of crime than life imprisonment. The former is the only method by which balance can be restored to the moral order: obviously this end can be achieved only by a penalty that fits the enormity of the crime. In all such cases, however, the individual or family must hand over the right of vindication to the public authority. We must always remember that vindication is not vindictiveness: it is simply a form of justice. (7) We do not deny the fact that in contemporary criminology, the remedial function of punishment is recognized as the end, in the long run, most of all to be desired. Nevertheless, the remedial function of punishment does in no wise exclude its vindicatory function.

Sanctions in the Individual Order. In the human individual, order is achieved as long as appetites are controlled and the will is directed by right reason. Rewards for excellence in this order are tranquility of conscience, integrity of both body and mind, and serenity of soul. Penal sanctions in this order take the form of remorse and despair, disease of mind and body, bondage to lust, and consequent sufferings. Fear, despair, and hate—the opposites of faith, hope and love—impose their own sanctions in both physical and mental distress, bitterness, disintegration of personality, and sufferings of all kinds.

Sanctions in the Social Order. Social justice is that ideal state which prevails when every individual part is receiving that which is his due. In such an order, obviously individual merit plays an important role. Premial sanctions in the social order are general

contentment, peaceful enjoyment of the goods of life, well-being in both domestic and public relationships, the fruits of moral integrity, social concord, and economic opportunity. Penal sanctions in this order are the by-products of moral laxity and of consequent social disturbance, loss of the real goods of life and of the enjoyment of them, general discord, ill will, strife, and war.

Sanctions in the Universal Order. (The universal order subsumes both the individual and the social. An immoral act in the individual order is an injury—that is, to the one who commits it; in the social order, it is known as a crime; and in the universal order it is designated a sin.) (1) Sanctions in the universal order are only partially actualized in this present life. There is no reason for assuming, however, that "natural" is a term that applies only to this life. A man may commit one murder, and suffer some remorse; but after he has "gotten away with" several murders, his conscience is deadened, and he suffers no remorse whatever. (Surely, there is such a creature as the "hardened criminal"!) Remorse is something that does not grow, but actually is dissipated, with the repetition of crime. Truly,

> Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
> As to be hated needs but to be seen;
> Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
> We first endure, then pity, then embrace.[5]

Shall this man, then, keep on "getting away with it," or will he inevitably meet justice somewhere? Is there no sanction in such cases? Another person may, on the contrary, give up his life for what he believes to be truth and right: when and where will he receive the due reward for the virtue of fortitude? Good people suffer misfortune (indeed they often suffer persecution because they refuse to violate the moral law) and wicked people often live (at least apparently) in luxury and ease. Is there no ultimate reward for the righteous and punishment for the wicked? Every form of ethical religion answers in the affirmative. (2) As stated in a foregoing Proposition, on the basis of the "long-range" view of human life and destiny, sanction in the universal order consists in the attainment or in the loss of Beatitude. Premial sanction in this order is the experience of Beatitude (Blessedness, Life Everlasting), perfect Union in fellowship with God and all Good. Penal sanction in the universal order is the loss of Beatitude, eternal separation from God and all Good, unending remorse and despair occasioned by the sense of complete loss, in the penitentiary of the moral universe (Gehenna or Hell).

## FOOTNOTES

[1] A. H. Strong, Systematic Theology, One-volume Edition, p. 533. (Judson Press, Philadelphia, 1907).

[2]Aristotle, Politics, III, 16, 1287a. Jowett Translation, Modern Library Edition.

[3]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1, 2, q. 90. a. 4.

[4]Gilbert Murray, Aeschylus, p. 183. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1940).

[5]Alexander Pope, "An Essay on Man," Epistle II, line 217ff.

## XXVII. The objective norm of morality is human nature itself including all essential human natural relationships.

By "norm" of morality is meant the standard by which human acts are to be adjudged right and good, or wrong and bad, as the case may be. By "objective" norm is meant the norm or pattern outside the evaluating person; by "subjective" norm is meant the norm within the person. By the term "human nature," we mean literally the human being—the psychosomatic unity—the creature specified by his power of thought. Obviously, if ethics can claim to be a science, its content must be derived from the study and experience of human nature itself considered in all its essential (that is, belonging to the very essence of man) relationships.

1. Human natural relationships are of two kinds, namely, (1) internal, and (2) external.

Natural internal relationships are those which prevail within the structure of the person as such: the relationships that follow from the interplay of thought, feeling, will, conscience, etc. In this area, obviously, morality consists essentially in the use of reason to control the baser emotions and appetites and to direct the will. The convergence of these powers in the will-act leads to what is commonly designated the overt act. The student does not leave the classroom until something within him—and what better designation can we give this mysterious power than "will"?—moves his feet toward the door. The pitcher in a baseball game throws the ball, if he has proper control, when and where he wants it to go, in relation to the batter's body. As stated above, how this connection is made between the psychical and the physical is an "absolutely insoluble riddle," and no pompous academic psychological terms and phrases serve to clarify it one iota. That an internal inter-relationship does prevail among intellectual, emotional, and volitional processes in the human being, is hardly open to question.

Natural external relationships are those into which every human being enters at birth and indeed enters by virtue of having been conceived and born. Man did not, man does not, create these relationships; every person finds them here when he arrives in the world; he is born into them; they are the "givens." Not only does man have nothing to do with their being here—they are a part of the structure of the cosmos and its myriad forms of life; it is equally

true that he cannot change them in the slightest particular. It is the over-all thesis of this entire course that from these human natural relationships arise all human rights and obligations. No man has any basic rights except those derived from these natural relationships, nor can any man justly ignore or avoid the obligations entailed upon him by these relationships. These relationships, with their accompanying rights and obligations, constitute the framework of the social and moral order—the Order of Justice. Rights and obligations are inseparable: for every natural right which a person has, he has a corresponding obligation—the obligation, at least, of acknowledging and respecting the same right in all other persons. Rights and obligations are the Siamese twins of the Order of Justice. It seems to be a human weakness, however, for the average man to be more zealous for the recognition of his rights than for his own proper discharge of his obligations. The basic rights and duties stemming from these natural relationships are natural rights and duties. All this is affirmed either explicitly or implicitly in our Declaration of Independence.

The first of these external natural relationships into which everyone enters at birth is that of dependence upon "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" (to use again a significant phrase from the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence). Man is a creature: no getting around this fact. Either as a species or as an individual, he has nothing to do with his being in the world, and little or nothing to do with his going out of it; and while he is in the world, if a beneficent Providence did not furnish the food that he eats, the water he drinks, the air he breathes, and indeed the very ground he walks on, he simply could not exist. Man is, and always will be, whether in this world or in the next, a creature; he is not, can never be, self-sufficient. He has neither omnipotence nor omniscience. The very life he enjoys in this present world is not a creation, but a gift, and throughout it is saturated with contingency. From this relationship of dependence or creaturehood, moreover, stem his rights of religion as defined in our American Bill of Rights, the right of every man to worship his God according to his private convictions, or as commonly stated, "according to the dictates of his conscience." True it is, that by creation the person has been endowed with the mental power to become an atheist; but in view of this natural relationship of dependence, it surely can be affirmed legitimately that he lacks the moral power (right) to be an atheist. (According to the long-range view of our subject, it follows that the person is obligated to render the external and internal worship that is due the Creator from the creature.)

The second relationship into which every person enters at birth is that of equality with his fellows. But what does "equality" mean? Surely it means just what the Declaration declares it to mean, that all men are created equal. Note well the word "created" here. Not born equal, mind you: we know that no two babies come into this world with exactly the same potentialities; on the contrary, it is the

property of every person to be unique, that is, never to be duplicated. Not born equal, therefore; hence, not equal in strength, not equal in weight, not equal in intelligence, not equal in moral outlook, etc.; not born equal, but created equal. That is to say, all persons are equal by virtue of the fact that the same Creator constituted them to be persons; equal by virtue of the fact that all possess the same human nature and enter into the same natural relationships at birth. Because all human beings are persons by creation, not by human legislation, all are equal in the sight of the God who created them: in His sight one man's soul is worth as much as another's. All are the handiwork of the same Creator, created in His image, hence possessing the same rights that attach to personality as such. As Dr. Henry Alonzo Myers has written:

> The idea of equality has its source in the private man's sense of his own infinite worth. (All immortal souls are equally precious in the eyes of God.)[1]

Again:

> History regardless of the personal views of historians, reveals on endless pages the bad consequences of the doctrine of superiority. It stands exposed as the ruling principle of a divided world. In the divisive moral codes of tyrants, in the specious but equally dangerous pretensions of the self-righteous and the intellectually presumptuous, men can never find the formula for one world, the universally acceptable standard which is needed to establish standard justice. The anarchy of conflicting claims inspired by the doctrine of natural inequality and the sorrows of a world in which natural might is right are enough to turn all men toward the standard of equality. And men who have every reason to believe that good consequences will follow their acceptance of a principle can easily find the will to believe that the principle is true.[2]

(Men are equal, moreover, in Christian teaching, by virtue of the truth that Christ died for all men alike, and so provided Atonement for all men alike, and thus mediated the grace and love of God to all men alike.) The only equality possible among men is spiritual in essence. Finally, in view of all these truths, that God loves all men alike, that Christ died for all men alike, and that all are equal in the sight of the Father of spirits (Hebr. 12:9), it follows, as the night the day, that all should have equality of educational opportunity, of economic opportunity, and equality before the civil law. All this is implicit in the theology of the Declaration of Independence.[3]

On this rather difficult subject, Harold J. Laski has written with great clarity as follows:

> Equality does not mean identity of treatment. There can be no ultimate identity of treatment so long as men are

different in want and capacity and need. The purpose of society would be frustrated at the outset if the nature of a mathematician met an identical response with that to the nature of a bricklayer.' Equality does not even imply identity of reward for effort so long as the difference in reward does not enable me, by its magnitude, to invade the rights of others.[4]

The third natural relationship into which every person enters at birth is that of proprietorship over the subhuman orders. The right to a given end presupposes the right to the means of attaining that end; hence, if a man has the right to life, he has the right to the means of preserving his life, in order, of course, that he may use this physical or natural life as the instrument for the realization of spiritual and eternal life, and his natural and proper ultimate intrinsic end as a person, namely, union with God. Man has the right to use, and historically has always exercised his natural right to use, the products of the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms for food, shelter, clothing, medicines, and so forth. These products are necessary to meet his everyday needs. [According to Biblical teaching, all this was explicit in the divine injunction to the human race at the Creation: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the heavens, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth" (Gen. 1:28). Again, according to Biblical teaching, God is the Owner of all things: "The earth is Jehovah's, and the fullness thereof; the world, and they that dwell therein" (Ps. 24:1). God Himself is the Owner of His Creation, but man, although literally only the possessor and user of created goods for his brief span of life on earth, is, nevertheless, by divine decree, the lord tenant of the earth, the proprietor, under God, of all lower orders, and so obligated to utilize their products for the purposes for which they are providentially designed.] From this relation of proprietorship, all property rights originate. Property right, moreover, is a human right. The true intrinsic value of labor is in its function or end, and the natural function of labor, mental or physical, is a livelihood, or living wage. The world does not owe me a living, but society owes to every man, who is willing to give honest labor for it, the opportunity of making a living.

To summarize: From these natural human relationships of dependence, equality, and proprietorship (stewardship), arise all human rights and duties. These relationships and their respective complexes of rights and duties are integral parts of the totality of being. Hence, these rights and duties are truly natural rights and duties, and the law—the promulgation of the Will of the Creator—upon which they are based, is rightly designated the Natural Moral Law. To reject this doctrine is to accept, either implicitly or explicitly, the totalitarian state, the wholly secular state, the state in which morality is repudiated for expediency, and hence, in the final analysis, the state in which might alone makes right.

2. A Suggested Definition of Morality: Morality is the relation of man's free deliberate acts to the standard to which they must conform in order to be suitable to man as such, to confer on him the perfection of which he is capable and to bring him to the ends for which he exists.

3. Secondary Norms of Morality (not constitutive norms like human nature and human natural relationships, but norms which are both corollaries of, and experiential proofs of, the constitutive or objective norm). (1) General utility or injury from general observance. When the vast majority of people consider an act wrong, it probably is wrong; at least it bears investigation. Common convictions are pretty generally reliable. Human nature, speaking in general terms, is sane rather than self-destructive; otherwise man would have perished long ago. (2) Kant's Imperatives. According to Kant (1724-1804), the most important principle of life is that a man should will the good: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." The good will is that which acts solely out of reverence for duty; it is the will (motivation) that is directed solely by reason, not by desire; hence, its dictates are absolute (unconditional). This will is, in fact, the moral law: this moral law is not imposed upon man by some external power; rather, it is the law which man imposes upon himself, the rule of autonomous reason and the sense of duty which comes from within, the expression of the true higher self. This moral law embraces two Imperatives—the Categorical and the Practical. (i) The Categorical Imperative: "Act in conformity with that maxim, and that maxim only, which you can at the same time will to be a universal law." Moral acts spring not from inclination or desire, but only from principles that can be universalized. Kant uses here the example of a man who, after a sequence of misfortunes, contemplates suicide as a welcome relief. But when he attempts to universalize such behavior, he realizes that it cannot be warranted; that is, if everyone were to commit suicide, the ultimate result would be the destruction of the race. It should be understood, of course, that Kant had in mind the universalizing of a general type of conduct, not the particular human act under a particular set of circumstances. (ii) The Practical Imperative: "Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person, or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means." That is to say, persons as beings specified by the power of reason are ends in themselves, and should never be used as means. We may use subhuman things as means, but when we use a person as means, as in slavery, prostitution, or the many forms of social exploitation, we degrade him, and so we violate his dignity and worth as a person. (3) Principle of Universalization. In the main, this is the Categorical Imperative, but from the individualistic point of view. If I contemplate a certain act, I ask myself: What would be the result if everyone, under similar circumstances, should do what I am about to do? It takes no great amount of per-

spicacity to see that certain human acts, if universalized, would destroy both domestic and civil society (e.g., murder, lying, theft, adultery, etc.): indeed the universalizing of murder would destroy the race itself. This is a commonsense norm which is very reliable. ("What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.")

(4) Value-judgments, that is, judgments of the race, especially of more advanced peoples culturally, based on human experience, as to what human acts are good and what are bad, both for man as an individual and for society in general. The sciences of ethics and jurisprudence, as sciences, have "grown up" progressively from age to age, out of human experience. (5) The Mosaic Decalogue (Ten Commandments): vs. polytheism (no other gods); vs. idolatry (no graven image); vs. false swearing, private or public "taking the name of God in vain" (that is, invoking the authority of God without warrant); the principle of one day of rest in every seven days; respect by the young for parents and elders; vs. murder; vs. adultery (for the protection of the family); vs. theft (a recognition of private property right); vs. lying or false witness (slander, libel, perjury, etc.); vs. covetousness (See Exodus 20:1-17). These norms are all subsumed under the two Great Commandments, love for god and love for one's fellows (Deut. 6:5, Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:37-39). Surely it takes no great measure of discernment to realize that if men the world over could be induced to take seriously, and seriously to try to incorporate in their everyday living, the moral principles of this great Code, the world we live in would be a much better world than it is today. Indeed the Ten Commandments and the Christian Beatitudes (Matt. 5:1-12) together have constituted the moral foundation of our Western culture for many centuries. We can ill afford to surrender them now to any specious "philosophy" or cult that would seek their abandonment or even their modification. (6) The Moral Commandments of Buddhism: prohibitions of destruction of life, of stealing, of lying, of unchastity, and of the use of intoxicants.

(7) Aristotle's Golden Mean. Virtue, said he, is at the middle (mean) between excess and deficiency. Thus, the virtue of courage is at the mean between foolhardiness (its excess) and cowardice (its deficiency); the virtue of liberality is at the mean between sheer prodigality (tossing out ten-dollar bills without regard to the merit of the recipient) and stinginess; greatness of soul is at the mean between braggadocio on the one hand, and mere pettiness or paltriness, on the other, etc.[5] This is one of the most influential ideas that have come down to us from the past. It is the embodiment of the well-known Principle of Moderation. (Aristotle did modify his theory to fit the facts: certain human acts, he says, are of such a character as to exclude any possibility of a mean between excess and deficiency. To put this thought in modern terms, one cannot season life, for instance, with just a touch of murder or of adultery, or of pregnancy, as one would "spice up" a salad with a touch of garlic.)

(8) The Golden Rule, as stated positively by Jesus: Whatever ye would that men should do unto you, so do you also unto them. (Cf., in this connection, the Iron Rule, called the Pagan Rule: Do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you. Do whatever you please to do, if you can get away with it, or as stated by Thrasymachus the Sophist in Plato's Republic: "Justice is the interest of the stronger."[6] Also the Brass Rule, called the Human Rule: Do unto others as they would do unto you: reciprocity in kind, good for good, and evil for evil; if someone growls at you, you growl back, etc. Also the Silver Rule, called the Rule of Civilization: The Golden Rule stated negatively, as in the Analects of Confucius: Do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you, etc. Note the superiority of the Golden Rule.)

(9) The Christian Ethic of Love, which in its broad sense is perhaps best defined as good will. "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you" (Luke 6:27-28). "Love worketh no ill to his neighbor; love therefore is the fulfillment of the law" (Rom. 13:10).

3. Other Suggested Norms. (In this connection, review hedonism, stoicism, utilitarianism, etc. See under Proposition XIV.) (1) Adaptationism: the norm of human activity is that which successfully adapts one to his environment (Herbert Spencer, 1820-1903). (2) John Dewey's Instrumentalism, that thought is the instrument by which man adapts to his environment. I have never been able to understand why this doctrine was so widely exploited: there are few persons, I should say, who would not approve it. However, thought is not always problem-solving: there are times when it is contemplative; otherwise, esthetic appreciation and its product, art, are nothing but fictions. (3) Pragmatism: the norm is that which "works," and works "on the whole and in the long run." This concept originated with the Canadian, Charles Peirce (1839-1914), and was fully developed by William James (1842-1910); thought functions properly as a guide to action, and truth is to be tested, and determined, by the consequences, in real life, of one's belief. This "pragmatic test" theory is explicitly developed in James' well-known essay, "The Will to Believe," in which the argument is as follows: Men often find themselves in crucial situations in which, lacking adequate empirical evidence to resolve the issue, they should will to accept certain beliefs (such as, for example, belief in God) and put them to the test in everyday living; if they lead to favorable consequences, they should be accepted as valid whether empirically warrantable or not. For, said James, life is infinitely more than theory: its real values are to be found only by being tested in the crucible of human experience. (Recall Pascal's famous dictum: "The heart has its reasons which the reason can never know.") The good, and the true, is that which "works," says the pragmatist, But—"works for what or to what end? If I want to drive from El Paso to Austin, Texas, and I procure a map from a filling station attendant, and by following this map I do reach Austin without diffi-

culty, then, on the basis of the pragmatic norm, the map is "true" and "good," etc. But it can certainly be argued legitimately that the map had to be "true" and "good" in itself, or it would never have guided me to Austin. Hence I repeat, "works" for what? On the basis of a rather limited application of this principle, Hitler could rightly have called "good" anything that worked for the building up of Naziism, or the men in the Kremlin could rightly call "good" any act that works for the spread of Leninism. Pragmatism makes truth individualistic, relativistic, and always futuristic. No wonder the theory has been dubbed a "monstrous confusion of ends and means." In the words of C. E. M. Joad: "It is not the fact that a belief works that makes it true: what we mean by a true belief is a belief that squares with the evidence."[7]

(4) Pessimism. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860): the only felicity possible in this life of blind striving consists in resignation, the surrender of the very will to live (not to be confused with an urge to commit suicide), the renunciation of individuality as the person becomes one with Cosmic Will. (5) Moral sensism, the view that the distinction between good and bad derives from a certain innate moral sense (faculty of intuition) within the person (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Reid). Herbert (1776–1841) assumed a certain "moral taste" as the norm of morality, thus making ethics a part of esthetics. This hypothetical special moral sense was identified with conscience, by Bishop Butler, in his Analogy. (6) Authoritarianism: the good is that which is prescribed by accepted authority. In Dostoievsky's greatest novel, The Brothers Karamazov, the Grand Inquisitor is pictured as meeting Jesus of Nazareth walking one evening on a dark street of the Spanish city of Seville. In the long discussion which follows, the Inquisitor tries to prove to Christ that the latter was wrong in resisting the temptations set before Him by the devil: "Command that these stones be made bread," "Cast thyself down" from the pinnacle of the Temple, and "All the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them. . . all these things will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me" (Matt. 4:1–11). These gifts proffered by Satan—bread, miracle, and authority—are precisely the things men want, argues the Inquisitor. Especially is man happy when entirely subject to external authority. He has "no more pressing need than the one to find someone to whom he can surrender, as quickly as possible, that gift of freedom which he, the unfortunate creature, was born with." Thus the Inquisitor, who has the power to back up his own authority, presents this deceptive argument for giving men the chance to be as little children and to live as political sheep "led down a painted pasture to the happy ending of still waters." Is it true that men want to rid themselves of the burden of responsibility which freedom necessarily places upon them? If so, truly the future of democracy in this world is precarious.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Henry Alonzo Myers, Are Men Equal? An Enquiry into the Meaning of American Democracy, p. 160. (A Great Seal book, paperback, Cornell University Press, 1955).

[2]Ibid., p. 159.

[3]There can be no doubt that these were the convictions of the Founding Fathers. E.g., see the recent work by Norman Cousins, In God We Trust, published by Harpers, 1958.

[4]H. J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, Yale University Press, 1925. Published in the anthology of "modern political ideas," Man and the State, edited by William Ebenstein, pp. 87-108. (Rinehart and Company, New York, 1947).

[5]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 2.

[6]Plato, Republic, Bk. I.

[7]C. E. M. Joad, Guide to Philosophy, p. 454. (Dover Publications, 1936).

## XXVIII. The subjective norm of moral action is what is commonly designated "conscience."

By "subjective" we mean the norm that is within each person (as distinguished from "objective," which designates all being that is external to the person or that exists independently of mind).

1. What is conscience? Many and varied are the suggested definitions, as, for example, "The echo of God's voice in the soul," "The still small voice," "The voice of God telling us what to do and what not to do." (However, man has been endowed with reason for this purpose; hence, conscience may be designated the voice of God only indirectly; if conscience is the voice of God speaking directly, we can only conclude that God has, from time to time, told the race many erroneous things.) "A special faculty in man for a special purpose." (This is moral sensism, and there is no evidence of such a faculty dealing exclusively with matters of morality.) Hume: not an act of judgment, but a work of the "heart." Hegel: the objective voice of the Universal Spirit. Clifford: the voice of the tribal self (whatever that "Self" may be). According to Schleiermacher, conscience is God Himself. Butler, in his Analogy, argues that conscience carries its own authority. Newman, Grammar of Assent, undertakes to prove the existence of God from the fact of conscience. Milton, Treatise on Civil and Ecclesiastical Matters, makes conscience more or less identical with religion itself.

Socrates, it will be recalled, claimed to be guided by an inner voice ("oracle"), which, however, made itself heard only to restrain him from doing the wrong thing, but remained silent as long as he kept on doing what he ought to do. This raises the question: If a person could always do what he has been "brought up" to believe to be the right—a truly superhuman "if"—would he be aware of having a conscience? According to Freudian psychology, the Superego is made up of two subsystems of psychic energy, namely, the ego-ideal, which corresponds roughly to the child's understanding of what his parents consider to be morally good, and conscience, which corresponds to the child's conceptions of what his parents consider to be morally bad. As someone has put it: "Ego-ideal and conscience are opposite sides of the same moral coin." Obviously, however, the entire cultural milieu would be involved in determining the child's understanding of right and wrong.

2. Conscience is defined here as the ultimate practical judgment of a person's reason with regard to the rightness or wrongness of an act here and now to be performed by him. (Theoretical judgment: the sum of the squares of the two sides of a right-angled triangle is equal to the square of the hypotenuse. Practical judgment: I must eat if I would go on living.) A practical judgment is essentially a product of training. The notion that human beings know "instinctively" what is right and what is wrong is unnecessarily mystical and obviously erroneous. Conscience is what it is educated to be. Human acts once approved by "public sentiment" (conscience), such as ritual prostitution, phallic worship, human sacrifice, infanticide, homosexuality, slavery, etc., are no longer so approved. Conscience remains quiescent when one does what one has been "brought up" to believe to be the right, but conscience chides when one does what one has been "brought up" to believe to be the wrong. Conscience is a "creature of education."

3. It is the function of conscience to apply broad ethical principles to the concrete life situations in which the person finds himself. This is true even of such broad principles as the Golden Rule: in each instance, I must decide what I would want the other person to do to me, before I can decide what I ought to do to him. It is true of every one of the Ten Commandments: think of the many different ways of idolizing, killing, swearing, stealing, lying, coveting, etc. (Suppose you are deep-sea fishing, and you pull up a thousand-dollar-bill; certainly to keep the bill would not be stealing, provided, of course, ownership cannot be determined. Suppose, on the other hand, that you are on a train and you see a thousand-dollar-bill hanging out of the coat lapel pocket of the man sitting in front of you, and you reach over surreptitiously and take the bill: in any moral or legal system, that would be stealing. In between these two extremes there is an indefinite range of situations as it becomes less evident that the specific person is rightly connected with the object acquired. Conscience is the ultimate practical judgment of one's reason in all such cases.) Hence it follows that conscience is the subjective norm of morality.

4. If one's conscience is untrained or misdirected, one has the obligation of training it or correcting it, as the case may be, that is, to the extent that the truth is attainable by him. There is such a thing as a "deceived" conscience: cf. Plato's "lie that is in the soul," that is, error that is propagated through sheer ignorance. There is such a thing as a "seared" conscience—one that is burned by the pursuit of vice into a state of complete insensitivity. Is there such a thing as a "dead" conscience? as a completely "hardened" criminal? One might recall in this connection the famous Loeb-Leopold case: Loeb, even in prison, perpetrated criminal acts and died by violence; Leopold, on the other hand, is now a respectable citizen and a servant of humanity, in a hospital in Puerto Rico. Again, conscience can be sensitive to some things, and insensitive to other things, in the same person. There are persons,

for example, who would regard a deck of cards as anathema, who, at the same time, would not hesitate to destroy their neighbors' characters by idle gossip. I am reminded here of the college professor who berated his colleague as "unethical" because the latter was careless at times in meeting his classes, yet this same professorial critic failed to restrain his libido in his relationships with pretty girls in his classes. Consistency truly is a jewel! But in the realm of individual conscience inconsistency is not infrequently the rule rather than the exception. If there is anything the American people need in our time, it is an awakening of conscience to the evils of dishonesty, licentiousness, alcoholism, sheer lawlessness, and many other destructive trends. One has always the duty of seeking the truth and following it: the majority of persons are basically at fault in failing to make the effort sufficient to overcome their vincible ignorance. And there are multiplied thousands who simply do not "care": these, like the poor, we have with us always. Still and all, conscience is the human individual's subjective norm of conduct. The woman who tosses her baby into the sacred river to appease the wrath of the river god, is following her conscience. What else can she do, unless and until she comes into contact with a culture that inculcates higher ideals? Her tradition tells her that she is duty bound to give her most precious possession to this god: it is not her faith per se that is at fault: it is the object of her faith that is false and powerless. It does not follow, therefore, that in practising human sacrifice she is doing right. It takes little moral discernment to realize that if this practice were universalized, the degradation of mankind by the grossest of superstitions would be the consequence; hence, having become aware of these facts, the race as a whole has abandoned it. As stated above, history shows us that many human acts once approved by "public sentiment" (conscience) are pretty generally abandoned in our day.

5. On the basis of respective states of mind with regard to a proposed truth, the judgments of conscience may be classified as follows: (1) As certain or absolute. In the objective order things are as they are or are not at all: certitude (or certainty) is in the mind only. A judgment is certain—the mental assent is absolute—when the mind adheres to one side of a practical issue without any fear whatever of the probability (or possibility) of the truth of its opposite. (Note the difference, however, between being sure and being cocksure: the latter is a disease which might properly be called "Menckenitis." The intellectual snob ("smart Aleck") is among the most repulsive of human beings.)

(2) As probable, when for sufficient reasons the mind adheres to one side of a practical issue, but with a certain fear that the truth just might lie in a different direction. In all cases of probable judgment, the premise is that one might be wrong. Hence, there are degrees of probability: highest, greater, equal, less. The highest degree of probable certitude is usually designated prudential certitude. Prudential certitude is that measure of certitude

in regard to which error is not absolutely impossible, although it rarely happens: it is the judgment of a wise (prudent) man who is acting with regard to a matter of recognized importance. (The laws of science, so-called "natural laws" or "laws of nature," on being properly appraised, will be found to be statements of very great probability. For example, two atoms of hydrogen unite with one of oxygen to form a molecule of water: thus far no exception to this law of chemical affinity has been discovered. This does not prove, however, that an exception will never occur: for any man to make such a claim would be for him to outrun experience; actually it would be for him to claim omniscience. And man does not have omniscience. We can regard these "laws" which we find in our textbooks of physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, psychology, genetics, etc., only as statements of very great probability. In the final analysis, probability is the law of life; moreover, to be guided by probability, no matter how great or how small the degree thereof, is to be guided by faith. Two matters of knowledge concerning which every human being is obligated to achieve prudential certitude, that is, if the dignity and worth of the person mean anything, are (a) his own natural and proper ultimate intrinsic and extrinsic ends, and (b) the means necessary to the attainment of them. One can afford to be mistaken about all other matters, but never about these.

(3) As doubtful, if between two sides of a proposition, the mind gives no assent to either; in this case no judgment is formed at all. A rule that is generally valid, in this connection, is this: One ought not act with an uncertain conscience. To do so is to expose oneself to the possibility of doing evil and thus violating the moral law. "When in doubt, take the safe course," is the old maxim; this usually means, do not act at all. It should be noted, however, that in certain areas of human theory and practice, "forced options" ("decisions of indecision") are unavoidable; that is to say, doing nothing cannot be justified. As D. Elton Trueblood writes:

> The man who refuses to decide whether he will let his weeds go to seed has already decided. It is accurate to say that every living person adopts some attitude toward God, because even neglect is an attitude. Failure to decide is already a decision.[1]

One cannot serve God and Mammon at the same time. In such cases as these, we are faced with "either-or" situations.

It should be kept in mind that certitude (including probability) is always subjective, that is, in the mind. We may rightly assume, however, that the objective order remains what it is irrespective of our human judgments. Truth is basically in the correspondence between the judgment (mental assent) and the external thing or relation. Although even this correspondence theory of truth presents problems, still and all it is necessarily the commonsense view, the view that man has to follow in everyday life.

5. Prudential certitude is sufficient for right action. Prudential certitude is very great probability with respect to a concrete situation. Suppose that I approach an intersection driving my car and I find that the green light is on; I drive on through the intersection as a result of prudential certitude (high degree of probability) that I shall go through safely; but there is always the remote possibility that another car may appear unexpectedly "out of the nowhere into the here," and crash into me. Still, it would be utterly foolish for me to climb out of my car and walk three blocks to the left, and then three blocks to the right, to see if there are approaching cars which might hit me; by this procedure I would never get across the intersection. In ethics, moral certitude is prudential certitude. This is about the only kind of certitude that can be had in matters of morality, excepting only those human acts which are intrinsically good or bad as the case may be.

6. One is obliged to follow the dictates of his conscience even if it be invincibly erroneous. ("Invincibly" means without means or opportunity of correcting one's ignorance.) (1) Suppose the revival of an ancient Indian law according to which parents required their sons to put them to death at seventy years of age so that they—the parents—would not have to suffer the vicissitudes of a nomadic environment. The Indian son is "conditioned" to believe this to be his duty, and, having no opportunity of contact with a culture that would inculcate a higher pattern of behavior, is therefore obliged to follow his conscience; to fail to do so would, in his view, be an act of dishonor to his parents. His error is invincible; objectively, we should say that he is all wrong, for two reasons: (a) to universalize such an act would work great harm to the race in general, and (b) the fact that the practice is almost universally abandoned is proof that it is fundamentally not natural to man. In view of the fact, however, that the customary law is the only law this Indian son knows, he is obliged by his reason to follow it. See again, Paul, in Rom. 2:14-16: "When Gentiles which have not the law do by nature the things of the law, these, not having the law, are the law unto themselves: in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith," etc. (2) An uncertain law does not certainly oblige. A law may be uncertain either in its existence or in its application: in either case, the presumption is usually in favor of the liberty of the individual. Generally speaking, we do not presume a law prohibiting something unless there is clear indication of it.

Try as he may to do right, man always has conscience—testifying, binding, accusing, reprehending, condemning, bringing remorse, pointing an accusing finger at every inconsistency and misdeed. From the moment that Adam and Eve used their freedom of will to choose the wrong, man's history has been written in terms of good versus evil, of innocence versus guilt. The greatest of all conflicts—the conflict that never ceases—is that of right against wrong.

## FOOTNOTES

[1] D. Elton Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion, pp. 26-27. (Harper, New York, 1957).

## XXIX. The obligating norm of morality is what is traditionally designated the Natural Moral Law.

This concept, as it has come down to us from early times, goes as follows:

1. Law may be considered in its threefold aspect, namely, (1) as something in the mind of the lawgiver (law actively considered); (2) as something in the mind of the subject toward whom the law is directed (law passively considered); and (3) as something promulgated, that is, as sounding in a voice, engraved on stone tablets or pillars, or printed in a book (law manifestly considered).

2. Moral obligation is, as we have learned, obligation placed upon the human will by some law. (1) Law alone binds, in the sense of providing sanctions; the force of the law must be back of that which obligates. [Physical law—the "laws of nature"—expresses the Will which constitutes and upholds the physical world (inanimate or subhuman or both). Violation of these laws exacts their respective sanctions. He who plunges from the top of the Empire State Building will plunge to his death; he who picks up a live coal will burn his finger; he who lives for the satisfaction of physical desires only will sow disease and suffering in his body, etc. If this be true of natural physical law, why should it not be equally true of the Natural Moral Law, the Law that determines and governs relationships among moral beings (persons)?]. (2) Moral obligation being obligation that is placed upon the will by some law, just what law is meant? The law of the tribe or that of the state—the civil law? Customary or statutory law? Or is there a law embedded in human nature and human natural relationships that is more basic than any law or laws established by a human legislature? We have now arrived at the most fundamental concept of the American credo, indeed of our entire Western culture; at the basic issue in the social and political thinking of our day, the issue which, in fact, separates the democratic world from the totalitarian world.

(3) The Moral Law as actively considered, that is, as existing in the Mind and Will of the Divine Lawgiver, the Creator, is what is generally designated the Eternal Law. This is the Law which directs the motions of all created existents, both irrational and rational, to their appointed ends in the scheme of things; the Law which constitutes all things to be what they are, including human nature and human relationships. This Eternal Law, looked at passively, is embodied in the nature and relationships of man; in this

sense it is called the Natural Moral Law, which is generally defined as "the participation in the Eternal Law by the rational creature." This Eternal Law, manifestly considered, is said to be human reason itself; it is described by Aquinas as "the light of intellect given to us by God, in virtue of which we know what must be done and what must be avoided"; hence the undercurrent of unanimity among all peoples, prehistoric, primitive and historic, that certain human acts are good, and certain others bad (e. g. , murder, incest, perjury, etc. ) both for the individual and for society. Thus the Natural Moral Law is rightly defined as "a rule of action, mandatory in form, which reason itself discovers, as having been established by the Author of man's nature and promulgated by being embedded in the nature of man." [1]

As Nathaniel Micklem, onetime Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, has written:

> The Source of our being and the Artificer of our nature is God Himself. That "law of nature," which, as the Apostle held, is written on the hearts even of the heathen, is an expression of the Reason which of itself is a reflection of the wisdom and "eternal law" of God. First, then, comes the "eternal law" of God; second, as reflecting it, the "law of nature," and, third, the customary and statute law of men, which has no validity except as an approximation to the "law of nature." [2]

(See again Paul, in Romans 2:14-16). That is to say, in the light of the concept of the Natural Moral Law, all customary or statutory law of man is to be regarded as just only to the extent that it approximates the Natural Law which it is presumed to amplify and clarify: as Aristotle put it, "the law is reason unaffected by desire."

For many centuries the view has been dominant in Western thought that the Natural Moral Law is the ultimate ground of the rightness or wrongness of the relations among human beings; that, just as there are natural physical laws expressing the Sovereign Will, laws which determine relations among the physical (or physiochemical) entities which go to make up the cosmos, laws susceptible to formulation by human reason, so there is a Natural Moral Law, the expression of the same Sovereign Will, the Law which is embedded in human nature and human relationships themselves, which determines proper relations among rational beings, and which likewise is amenable to interpretation by "right reason" (that is, reason unvitiated by emotion, passion, prejudice, pride, greed, and the like). Again, to quote Aristotle: "The law is reason unaffected by desire." This concept has prevailed in Western thought for centuries, as enunciated, with only an occasional minor variation, by Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, Bacon, Grotius, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Blackstone, and many others. One of Kant's most famous passages, it will be recalled, is that in which he affirms the supreme evidences of God in

the world to be "the starry heavens above and the moral law within." According to these thinkers; the Natural Moral Law is common to all men, for it can be deduced from common human nature; basic ethical truth is rooted, therefore, in the common experience of mankind.

(4) Obviously, there must be a law somewhere that is of higher obligatory power than the law of the state; a law superior to the will of one man, or of a few men, or even of a majority of men. There must be a law that is binding alike on the ruler and on the ruled; otherwise, the ruler could never do wrong, the majority could never enact an unjust law, and such rights as the right of individual conscience and the right of the minority would become mere fictions. If there is no law anywhere superior to the civil authority, to the will of the ruling regime, then the will of that ruling regime, backed as it always is by physical coercion, becomes the absolute source of law from which there is no appeal. This is simply the age-old doctrine that Might makes Right. In our Western culture we have acted according to the conviction that there is a Natural Moral Law, the expression of the Will of the Creator, which is superior to, and which is indeed the ground of, all civil authority and positive law. The Eternal Law is that Law which constitutes human nature and human natural relationships to be what they are. It is the Law which constitutes you and me, and every human being, a person. As embedded (promulgated) in personal nature and personal relationships this Law is known as the Natural Moral Law. And because law of any kind is the expression of the will of the lawgiver, it follows that the Natural Moral Law is the expression of the Will of God—that Sovereign Will which is the constitution of the whole universe, both physical and moral. (Cf. Gen. 1:3, 6, 9, etc.; Psa. 33:6, 9; Psa. 148:1-6; Heb. 11:3.) Human reason itself is said to be a "reflection" of the Wisdom and Will of God (the Eternal Law); man, it is believed, was created in the image of God; hence this "image" is, in a sense, the Natural Moral Law itself. Reason may therefore be said to be the Natural Moral Law promulgated in human nature, and conscience the principle of moral obligation in the rational creature. And positive or civil law is just—that is, it is really law—to the extent it accords with our fundamental nature and relationships as persons; that is, to the extent that it approximates the Natural Moral Law. Here we encounter for the first time in our study the vastly significant distinction between law as the expression of reason and law as the expression of arbitrary will.

(5) That is, Law must be either (a) the expression of arbitrary will, or what selfish and willful men choose to make it; or (b) the enunciation by Right Reason of eternal principles of right and wrong which have their basis in the Wisdom and Will of God. The American people will have to decide which of these two concepts they will adhere to, and upon their decision hinges the future of the Republic.

That the latter concept was the conviction of the men who signed the Declaration of Independence is not open to question. We are

reminded here of a brilliant young Frenchman who came to this country in the year 1831 to study the ideals and institutions of the then newly established republic known as the United States of America. Upon his return to Europe, this young Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, wrote one of the most accurate and penetrating analyses of our American system that has ever appeared in print. In this book, Democracy in America, he wrote, among other things, as follows:

> Upon my arrival in the United States, the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed there the more did I perceive the great political consequences resulting from this state of things, to which I was unaccustomed. In France I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom pursuing courses diametrically opposed to each other; but in America I found that they were intimately united, and that they reigned in common over the same country. . . .

Again:

> Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but nevertheless it must be regarded as the foremost of the political institutions of that country; for if it does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates the use of free institutions. Indeed, it is in this same point of view that the inhabitants of the United States themselves look upon religious belief. I do not know whether all the Americans have a sincere faith in their religion, for who can search the human heart? but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion is not peculiar to a class of citizens or to a party, but it belongs to the whole nation, and to every rank of society.[3]

All the available evidence in re the American tradition which took shape even as early as the Colonial Period corroborates De Tocqueville's conclusions.

(6) The earliest human expression of this concept of Natural Moral Law (apart, of course, from the literature of the ancient Hebrew people), occurs in the Antigone of the tragic poet, Sophocles, a production usually dated before 450 B. C. In this great drama, we are given a picture of a young girl, Antigone, standing before Creon, tyrant of the ancient city of Thebes, pleading her right to have buried the corpse of her slain brother, Polyneices. Polyneices had led an army against his native city (Thebes) and Creon had issued an order that his corpse should be left unburied in order that it might be devoured by scavenger birds and beasts, as a final act of humiliation. Antigone, the sister, pleads that while this may be a law of man or of the state, there is a higher law of Heaven which takes precedence over all human law. Creon asks if she dares to

bury her brother's corpse in violation of his decree. Antigone defiantly answers:

> Yea, for these laws were not ordained of Zeus,
> And she who sits enthroned with gods below,
> Justice, enacted not these human laws.
> Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man,
> Could'st by a breath annul and override
> The immutable unwritten laws of Heaven.
> They were not born today nor yesterday;
> They die not; and none knoweth whence they sprang.
> I was not like, who feared no mortal's frown,
> To disobey these laws and so provoke
> The wrath of Heaven. . . .[4]

Here we have a Greek poet, some four centuries and more prior to the beginning of the Christian era, insisting that there is an Eternal Law, the Law of Heaven—an immutable Moral Law—which is superior to all human law, and on which all human law, in order to be just, must be based. All just human law, declared Sophocles, through his protagonist, Antigone, must have its origin in the Moral Law of Heaven (Zeus being, of course, the supreme deity of the Greek pantheon). This shows that from earliest times, the reason and conscience of men have recognized the fact of the Natural Moral Law as having its foundation in the Wisdom and Will of the Creator.

(7) The ancient Hebrew people, of course, in times much earlier than the age of the Greek tragic poets, never doubted for one moment that man is a creature of Moral Law and that their Decalogue was the revelation of the Eternal Law through the mediatorship of Moses. Nor is there any valid ground even in our day for doubting these convictions. As H. A. Overstreet has written:

> The Decalogue remains for us the first great insight of our culture into man's moral nature. There had been other "codes" before this one, but they had lacked the consistency of moral insight conveyed in the Decalogue. One and all, they had been class codes, making arbitrary discrimination between human beings; assigning more rights to some than to others. Thus, they were not yet moral because they failed of moral universality. They belonged to cultures that had not yet emerged from the stage of many gods and many different truths: one truth for the high-born, another for the lowborn. The Decalogue was the first statement of the oneness of all who are human: oneness in rights and oneness in obligations.[5]

(8) Plato taught that law is the expression of the Divine Reason (The Form of the Good), and that because human reason is a spark of the Divine in each person, reason alone should be relied upon in the making of the law. Aristotle taught that it is the essence of man to be a rational and social being, a person; that this power of reason is the divine element in man; hence, that acts which are in har-

mony with man's essential nature are good, but that acts which are not in harmony with his essential rational or personal nature are bad, not because law makes them so, but because human nature itself makes them so; that basically therefore, because man is specified as man, set apart as a species, by his power of reason, the law is reason—it is the rule of reason in and for rational creatures. Aristotle's exact statements are as follows:

> He who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire.[6]

(9) The Stoics held that individual human reason—reasoning power in all men—shares the Divine Reason or Logos; hence they prided themselves on being "citizens of the world." This, incidentally, was the only approximation, in early pagan thought, to the doctrine of human equality.

(10) Cicero, in his De Legibus, described Law as the rule of Right Reason as follows:

> . . . Law is the highest reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in the human mind, is Law. . . . Now if this is correct, as I think it to be in general, then the origin of Justice is to be found in Law, for Law is a natural force; it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man, the standard by which Justice and Injustice are measured.

Again he writes:

> But what is more divine, I will not say in man only, but in all heaven and earth, than reason? And reason, when it is full-grown and perfected, is rightly called wisdom. Therefore, since there is nothing better than reason, and since it exists both in man and God, the first common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is Law, we must believe that men have law also in common with the gods. Further, those who share Law must also share Justice; and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth.[7]

"Of all the things respecting which learned men dispute," Cicero concludes, "there is none more important than to clearly understand that we are born for Justice, and that Right is founded not in opinion but in Nature." To this he adds: "There is indeed a true Law, Right Reason, agreeing with Nature and diffused among all, unchanging, everlasting."[8]

(11) Cicero's enunciation of this concept profoundly influenced all subsequent jurisprudence. To Justinian, who codified existing Roman law, and to all thinkers of the Middle Ages, jus naturale was a set of principles of reason and justice which all men could rationally comprehend. Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle and all the leading minds of the West, taught that law is "an ordination of reason, for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community"; that the Natural Law is Divine Law revealed through natural reason (participatio legis aeternae rationali creatura); and than man's need to conform to the Natural Law is merely his need to conform to his own nature as a rational creature. The essence of the Thomistic definition is that Law is Right Reason (that is, as I have stated heretofore, pure reason, reason not vitiated by emotion, passion, personal bias, etc.)

(12) John Locke, English philosopher of the seventeenth century, in his treatise entitled, Of Civil Government (from which, incidentally, Jefferson and the Founding Fathers drew extensively), elaborated the concept of Natural Law as follows:

> The state of nature has a law to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. . . . In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men. . . . A criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed on one, declared war against all mankind.[9]

And Blackstone, in his Commentaries (on which Abraham Lincoln was nurtured), writes as follows:

> Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his Creator. . . . This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.[10]

Coming down to our own time, we hear the late Justice Robert H. Jackson, in his opening address before the International Tribunal at Nürnberg, in which he was setting the stage for the prosecution of the Nazi war lords on the charge of "crimes against humanity," speaking as follows:

> Must such wrongs either be ignored or redressed in hot blood? Is there no standard in the law for a deliberate and reasoned judgment on such conduct? The charter of this tribunal evidences the faith that the law is not only to govern the conduct of little men, but that even rulers are, as Lord Chief Justice Coke put it to King James, "under God and the law."[11]

And even more recently, the late Supreme Court Justice Cardozo had this to say, as quoted earlier in this text:

> What really matters is that the judge is under a duty, within the limitations of his power of innovation, to maintain a relation between law and morals, between the precepts of jurisprudence and those of reason and good conscience.[12]

This means simply that when the court—any court that seeks to render justice—is faced with the problem of adjudicating an issue for the solution of which there is no precedent in customary ("common") or statutory law, there is only one course the court can pursue, namely, that of resolving the problem in the light of reason and good conscience. Thus it will be seen that all true jurisprudence has its source in ethics, that is to say, actually in human nature and human relationships themselves. In all the excerpts which I have quoted this concept of the Moral Law is either explicit or implicit.

Is the same concept to be found in our Declaration of Independence? It certainly is—indeed the concept is the basis of the political philosophy set forth in the first and second paragraphs of that great document. Listen to the first paragraph of the Declaration:

> When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

Language could hardly be plainer. Note well the phrase, "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," as used here; that is to say, the Natural Moral Law. The second paragraph of the Declaration is an elaboration of this basic concept.

Yet we have eminent jurists in our land today, and a host of lesser fry in public office, who reject in toto this doctrine of the Moral Law. (They are known, of course, as legal positivists.) And by entirely too many of our educators it is either openly repudiated or completely ignored. Indeed, many of our "neo-pedagogues," those who blindly follow the secularistic "philosophy" of John Dewey,

seem never even to have heard that there is such a thing as the Moral Law, other than the fashion of a particular time or place, of course. It is granted that the concept of Natural Moral Law is not one that can be "proved" in a scientific laboratory. But it can be proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt, proved from the testimony of human history and experience, that the nation which rejects this concept, this article of faith—and all totalitarian regimes do reject it—is on its way to every form of injustice and cruelty imaginable, which it may find expedient to perpetrate under such specious pretexts as "Lebensraum," "Manifest Destiny," "Sphere of Influence," "the dictatorship of the proletariat," "Nordic supremacy," and the like.

Your rights and mine emanate either from the law of the state, or from a law that is of a higher order than that of the state. If they emanate from the law of the state, they are hardly rights at all—they are simply gratuities bestowed upon subjects by the charity of a ruling majority or a ruling bureaucracy (oligarchy). If the Natural Moral Law does not constitute human rights (and duties) to be what they are, then Might and Might alone must constitute (create) what we have traditionally regarded as "rights" (and duties). In the latter case, how can they be called "rights" at all. Basic human rights (unalienable) rights either have their ground in the structure of the universe and of man, hence ultimately in the Wisdom and Will of the Creator—or they simply do not exist as such. This credo has, from the very beginning, been the very essence (the very core) of American political theory and practice.

Legal positivism is the view that the ultimate source of "right"—and hence of "rights"—is the customary or the statutory law (as the case may be); that is, the law of the tribe or that of the state. Some of our so-called "liberal" jurists of recent years have been positivists in the sense of denying (or at least of questioning) anything more basic in ethics and jurisprudence than the human law of the given time, place and culture. (Incidentally, it is a matter of great difficulty for me to understand how any jurist can be called a "liberal" who would reject the doctrine of natural law and natural right, the doctrine that is the very heart of the Declaration of Independence and hence of our entire political philosophy.)

We may rightly ask at this point: Will legal positivism stand up, under either logical or empirical scrutiny, or even under the scrutiny of common sense? This author thinks it will not. Consider, for example, the following:

Is an enactment of a state legislature or of the national Congress necessary to create the division of sex into male and female—the division which lies at the root of all forms of society and upon which the continuity of the race depends? I think not. This is a provision of the laws of Nature and of Nature's God. (One is reminded here, perforce, of the old English doctrine that "parliament can do anything it pleases except make man a woman.")

Is an enactment by a human legislative body necessary to ordain that parents shall have children, and shall provide for and protect their children, or that children shall respect their parents? Is not parental authority a natural—and not a juridical—authority? Indeed these obligations inhere in the very nature of the world and of man, and were more scrupulously observed in primitive society than in many modern cultures.

Is a legislative enactment necessary to establish the Golden Rule as a principle of human conduct—the principle that every man shall do unto others as he would have them do unto him? I think not. This principle is as old as antiquity itself, and, in all likelihood, co-temporaneous with homo sapiens.

Some years ago the faculty and staff of Columbia University celebrated that institution's Bicentennial. The over-all theme was "the right to knowledge." We ask therefore: Must man have a legislative enactment to give him the right to knowledge? Of course not. Does not his natural capacity for knowledge—by virtue of his having been created (constituted) a person—give him the natural right to knowledge? Is not the natural right to knowledge a necessary means to the exercise of the right to life in its growing fullness—a necessary means to personal self-realization and to social adjustment as well? This brings us, of course, to the ultimate question: Does man simply live, or does he have the right to life? Must we quit thinking in terms of ultimates and simply adopt Popeye's philosophy (which is, incidentally, that of Positivism), "I yam what I yam"? Do not all these rhetorical questions evoke a stern negative?

Is any human legislature the begetter of any human being? Can any human legislature bestow the gift of life on any human being? Every form of life is a gift—not a creation by any man or group of men. Has man been constituted a person by any act of any human legislature? Of course not. By creation, not by governmental action, man has been constituted a person. No scientist would question the fact that man had a beginning; that he is the product—the creation, if you please—of an Efficient Causality antedating, and external to, himself. Either this is true, or he created himself: in the latter case, he must have existed before he existed, which is sheer nonsense. Man is a person, with the right to personality, by virtue of having been created a person. Concerning this right to personality, Dr. Ernst Cassirer has—I think—penned "the conclusion of the whole matter," as follows:

> There is at least one right which cannot be ceded or abandoned: the right to personality. . . . If a man could give up his personality he would cease being a moral being. He would become a lifeless thing—and how could such a thing obligate itself—how could it make a promise to enter into a social contract? This fundamental right, the right to personality, includes in a sense all the others. To

> maintain and to develop his personality is a universal right. It is not subject to the freaks and fancies of single individuals and cannot, therefore, be transferred from one individual to another. The contrast of rulership which is the legal basis of all civil power, has, therefore, its inherent limits. There is no pactum subjectionis, no act of submission by which man can give up the state of a free agent and enslave himself. For by such an act of renunciation he would give up that very character which constitutes his nature and essence: he would lose his humanity.[13]

Thus we can see what is meant by the phrase, "unalienable rights," as it appears in our Declaration of Independence. Unalienable rights are rights which men have simply because of having been created persons: they are rights which cannot be alienated from the person; they attach to his nature simply and solely because it is his nature to be a person. These are rights which have their roots in the very nature of the world and of man. Why should we not acquaint our children and youth with these facts—for they are facts. The denial of natural right and natural law is a by-product of superficial thinking, and this in turn not infrequently is the consequence of a will on man's part to deny anything more ultimate in the moral realm than man himself. The plain truth is that no human being, no group of human beings, can create a right.

I have observed that in most cases those who are inclined to legal positivism sooner or later will be found making concessions which modify their view. Attention has been called herein, under a previous Proposition, to the anthropologist Margaret Mead's admission of certain constancies in practically all human cultures, namely, the prohibition of murder, and of incest, and the existence of private property right. She goes on to say:

> "Natural law" might thus be defined as those rules of behavior which had developed from a species—specific capacity to ethicalize as a feature of those examples of such ethicalizing that appear in all known societies.[14]

The late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has written (studiously avoiding, it would seem, any positive commitments) as follows:

> No doubt it is true that, so far as we can see ahead, some arrangements and the rudiments of familiar institutions seem to be necessary elements in any society that may spring from our own and that would seem to us to be civilized—some form of permanent association between the sexes—some residue of property individually owned—some mode of binding oneself to specified future conduct—at the bottom of all, some protection for the person.[15]

(Note the use of the word "seem" in this excerpt. The vagueness of the language here reminds one of Darwin, in whose two principal works the phrase, "we may well suppose," occurs over eight

hundred times, not to mention the frequent occurrence of such words as "apparently," "probably," etc., all of which indicate that the eminent scientist was indulging in conjecture.)[16] Holmes concludes the paragraph from which the foregoing excerpt is taken, with the following uncertain note—the earmark per-se of legal positivism:

> But without speculating whether a group is imaginable in which all but the last of these might disappear and the last be subject to qualifications that most of us would abhor, the question remains as to the Ought of natural law.[17]

In the light of the testimony of experience and common sense alone, it seems too obvious to be questioned that any people lacking the minima of principles of social order conceded, albeit grudgingly, by Holmes, in the foregoing excerpt, would be back to the life of the barnyard or that of the jungle, regardless of what anyone might think. The four principles enunciated in the excerpt are a great deal more than just "glittering generalities."

Carl Becker, in his notable work on the Declaration of Independence, although suggesting that faith in the "higher law" background of American political philosophy "could not survive the harsh realities of the modern world," nevertheless pays tribute to the practical effects of this faith on American social and political theory and practice. He writes:

> In different times this higher law has taken on different forms—the law of God revealed in Scripture, or in the inner light of conscience, or in nature; in nature conceived as subject to rational control, or in nature conceived as blind force subjecting men and things to its compulsion. The natural rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence was one formulation of this idea of a higher law. It furnished at once a justification and a profound emotional inspiration for the revolutionary movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Founded upon a superficial knowledge of history it was, certainly; and upon a naïve faith in the instinctive virtues of human kind. Yet it was a humane and engaging faith. At its best it preached toleration in place of persecution, goodwill in place of hate, peace in place of war. It taught that beneath all local and temporary diversity, beneath the superficial traits and talents that distinguish men and nations, all men are equal in the possession of a common humanity; and to the end that concord might prevail on the earth instead of strife, it invited men to promote in themselves the humanity which bound them to their fellows, and to shape their conduct and their institutions in harmony with it.[18]

[The following two books are recommended for reading in this connection: The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, by E. S. Corwin, a Great Seal book (paperback), published by

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York; Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel, by Huntington Cairns, a 583 page book, published by The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1949. ]

Someone may be thinking, at this point, just what is this Natural Moral Law that is under consideration? How is it to be defined? Or can it be defined with any degree of preciseness?

It must be admitted, of course, that abuses of the doctrine of Natural Moral Law have occurred at different times in history. For example, for many centuries the concept was utilized to support the theory of the "divine right" of kings, as in more recent times it has been invoked to support the notion of the "divine right" of the people. (Biblical teaching is very clear on this point, namely, that civil authority is exercised, not by "divine right," but by divine permissiveness: cf. Jer. 18:7-10, Rom. 13:1-7.) The concept of Natural Moral Law has been invoked in recent years to justify absolute free enterprise and its inevitable corollary, the doctrine of laissez faire. It has even been seized upon to justify the concept of liberty as the right to do whatever one pleases to do, without limitation or restraint. This, however, is not liberty; it is, rather, the prostitution of liberty into license. By no stretch of the imagination can appeal to the Natural Moral Law be made to warrant such extreme views, in which, invariably, the wish is father to the thought, on the part of those persons who champion such views.

The following interesting paragraphs appeared on the editorial page of the Saturday Review not so long ago. They are excerpted from an article, under the caption, "True Law," contributed by former United States District Judge Robert N. Wilkin (retired) of the Northern District of Ohio. They read as follows:

> Our most eminent legal historian and philosopher, Roscoe Pound, in a book just recently published, has correctly criticized the all-too-common impression that the "rights of man" were created by famous documents of legal history like Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution. Milestones these great charters certainly are, but they did not, and could not, create rights. They are, on the contrary, only formal acknowledgments of rights that have always existed by virtue of a Higher Law—what we may term "true" law.
>
> True law exists without legislation. Men did not create it; they were created subject to it. It is law, as was said twenty centuries ago, "which we were not taught, but to which we were made, which we were not trained in but which is ingrained in us." This idea of universal, "true" law was advanced by the early Greek philosophers. They accepted human nature as a part of universal nature. It followed that the law and justice on which social life and trade depend exist by nature, not by convention or

promulgation. The Romans called it vera lex, true law, or ius naturae, natural law. And their rule over many different countries, and their administration of justice for foreigners in Rome, led to the discovery of law common to different peoples, which they called ius gentium. Some jurists and publicists refer to it as "common right and reason" or "equity and good conscience."

True law is necessarily stated in broad and general terms. To apply it to the varying circumstances of life, it must be supplemented and restated more specifically. Its practical application is established first by custom, then by decision (judgment in special cases), and subsequently by promulgation or legislation. . . .

The most important and immediate need (in our time) is that the people and their leaders understand that sovereignty is not in any man or party or nation, but in True Law. That is so because the Creator made the Universe according and subject to law, and endowed mankind with the ability to learn and apply the law.[19]

The following is perhaps the clearest statement of what is meant by Natural Moral Law that I have ever come upon anywhere. It is from the pen of the distinguished anthologist of detective fiction and essayist on theological subjects, Dorothy L. Sayers. She writes as follows:

The word "law" is currently used in two quite distinct meanings. It may describe an arbitrary regulation made by human consent in particular circumstances for a particular purpose, and capable of being promulgated, enforced, suspended, altered, or rescinded without interference with the general scheme of the universe. In this sense we may talk of Roman "law," the "laws" of civilized warfare, or the "laws" of cricket. Such laws frequently prescribe that certain events shall follow upon certain others; but the second event is not a necessary consequence of the first: the connection between the two is purely formal. . . .

In its other use, the word "law" is employed to designate a generalized statement of observed fact of one sort or another. Most of the so-called "laws of nature" are of this kind: "If you hold your finger in the fire it will be burnt"; "if you vary the distance between an object and a source of light, the intensity of light at the surface of the object will vary inversely as the square of the distance." Such "laws" as these cannot be promulgated, altered, suspended, or broken at will; they are not "laws" at all, in the sense that the laws of cricket or the laws of the realm are "laws"; they are statements of observed facts inherent in the nature of the universe. Anybody can enact that murder shall not

be punishable by death; nobody can enact that the swallowing of a tumblerful of prussic acid shall not be punishable by death. In the former case, the connection between the two events is legal—that is, arbitrary; in the latter, it is a true causal connection, and the secondary event is a necessary consequence of the first. . . .

Much confusion is caused in human affairs by the use of the same word "law" to describe these two very different things: an arbitrary code of behavior based on a consensus of human opinion, and a statement of unalterable fact about the nature of the universe. The confusion is at its worst when we come to talk about the "moral law."

The tendency among uncritical writers to use the term "moral law" to designate "an arbitrary code of behavior established by human opinion," says this author, is a cause of great confusion. She continues as follows:

There is a universal moral law, as distinct from a moral code, which consists of certain statements of fact about the nature of man, and by behaving in conformity with which, man enjoys his true freedom. This is what the Christian Church calls "the natural law." The more closely the moral code agrees with the natural law, the more it makes for freedom in human behavior; the more widely it departs from the natural law, the more it tends to enslave mankind and to produce the catastrophes called "judgments of God." The universal moral law (or natural law of humanity) is discoverable, like any other law of nature, by experience. It cannot be promulgated, it can only be ascertained, because it is a question not of opinion but of fact. When it has been ascertained, a moral code can be drawn up to direct human behavior and prevent men, as far as possible, from doing violence to their own nature. No code is necessary to control the behavior of matter, since matter is apparently not tempted to contradict its own nature, but obeys the law of its being in perfect freedom. Man, however, does continually suffer this temptation and frequently yields to it. This contradiction within his own nature is peculiar to man, and is called by the Church "sinfulness"; other psychologists have other names for it. . . .

Miss Sayers refers to the well-known pronouncements in Exodus 20:5-6, "I Jehovah thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate me, and showing loving-kindness unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments." She then concludes as follows:

Here is a statement of fact, observed by the Jews and noted as such. From its phrasing it might appear an arbitrary

> expression of personal feeling. But today, we understand more about the mechanism of the universe, and are able to reinterpret the pronouncement by the "laws" of heredity and environment. Defy the commandments of the natural law, and the race will perish in a few generations; cooperate with them, and the race will flourish for ages to come. That is the fact; whether we like it or not, the universe is made that way. This commandment is interesting because it specifically puts forward the moral law as the basis of the moral code; because God has made the world like this and will not alter it, therefore, you must not worship your own fantasies, but pay allegiance to the truth. [20]

The necessary implication of the foregoing excerpts is simply this, as Miss Sayers clearly indicates: the moral code—what we call here "positive law"—does not necessarily accord at all times with the moral law, the Natural Moral Law.

Again, however, just how is the Natural Moral Law to be defined? Augustine has defined the Eternal Law as "the intellect and will of God, commanding the observance of the natural order and forbidding its disturbance." Aquinas defines it as "the plan of the Divine wisdom, according as it is directive of all acts and motions." Aquinas defined the Natural Moral Law as "the participation in the External Law by the rational creature"; again as "an ordination of reason for the common good by him who has the care of the community, and promulgated." Cathrein writes: "It is essential to the Natural Law that it should be a manifestation of the Eternal Law, inseparable from the existence of man, a divinely impressed, natural, innate inclination toward the acts proper to him." [21] Dr. Vernon J. Bourke writes of the meaning of the idea of Natural Moral Law in Thomistic thought (i. e., in the teaching of Thomas Aquinas himself) as follows:

> True, St. Thomas speaks of natural law as a "participation" in the divine law. Yet I have the strong conviction that this participation does not mean a privileged communication, coming directly by divine inspiration, but rather the process of working out rules of human behavior from the data of human experience, using the ordinary rules of logic and scientific method. Such procedure is a natural approach to law, moral or civil, because its data are the presentations of natural experience, its method is as natural as any other type of practical reasoning, and its results are as good as the admittedly imperfect nature of the human mind permits. [22]

Incidentally, Walter Lippmann is one of the most recent writers to come to the defense of the Natural Law doctrine as "the answer to the irresponsibility of self-government and excessive freedom." [23]

All this adds up to the fact that the Natural Moral Law may be defined (described) from different points of view. I should like to suggest the following definition: The Natural Moral Law is the expression of the Sovereign Will that determines (1) human nature to be what it is (personal, and therefore moral), and (2) human natural relationships to be what they are (internal relationships of thought, desire, emotion, and will; and the external relationships of dependence on "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," equality with our fellows, and proprietorship over the subhuman orders). As such, this Law is held to be the ultimate obligating norm of human action.

There are certain points at which ethical thought cannot avoid consideration of ultimates—those matters which lie beyond the pale of full apprehension by the human intellect. Just such a point is that at which the ultimate (obligating) norm of morality is to be found. There are those who think that this point lies somewhere in the accumulated human wisdom of the centuries. The writers of the Declaration of Independence, however, thought it could not be located this side, so to speak, of the Will of the Creator. I see no reason for abandoning this fundamental conviction which has contributed so much to the rise and spread of democracy in this part of the world.

Ultimates are unavoidable, and they are not to be found in human history and experience alone. People will deny moral obligation, but they keep on thinking in terms of moral obligation just the same. "Why should I not cut off people's heads and eat their bodies, if I choose to do so?" Would one answer, "Because it is unconventional"? But what if the reply is, "But I don't care a hang about conventions"? Suppose a man were to say to you: "If I want to kidnap your child, collect a huge ransom, and perhaps kill the child in the process, and can get away with it, I'll do it." Suppose you answer: "But society has decreed that you ought not, and may not, do these things." "But what right has society to say that I ought not, and may not, do these things?" You answer: "Society ought and must say so in order to maintain social order." "But why ought society to maintain social order?" You answer: "It ought and must do this in order to protect itself." "But why ought society protect itself?" "Obviously, society ought, and indeed must, protect itself in order to exist." "But why should it exist? Why ought not men destroy themselves if they choose to do so?" And so—where are we now? We are in the realm of ultimates. What is man and why is he here in the first place? Is there any reason for his existence? Or—are we all here just because we're here, and that's all?

To those who would find the source of moral obligation this side of the Sovereign Will which is the constitution of the universe, I recommend the following story. Once upon a time, two traveling men—"drummers," as they were called—in days gone by boarded a passenger coach standing in line with other coaches as the engineer was shuffling parts of his train around in such a way as to make up the section that was going on to a given destination. These two

men, after boarding this particular coach, disposed themselves and their suitcases comfortably and entered into a conversation about the various aspects of their businesses. By and by, the brakeman thrust his head in at the door, and said, "What are you fellows doing here?" Surprised, one of the salesman replied, "Of course we are going on up to the next town, the county seat." "Not in this coach you ain't," said the brakeman. "What are you trying to say? Why not?" asked the other salesman, a bit nettled. "For the simple reason," the brakeman answered, "that it ain't coupled onto anything that'll take you anywhere." So it strikes me that any system of ethical theory and practice must be attached to something that will take the person somewhere: in a word it cannot be dissociated from his very nature, origin, and destiny.

"The greatest good of the greatest number," shouted Bentham, Mill, et al, and lesser lights are still parroting it. "But I am not interested in that," says someone, "I don't care about the Common Good." "But you ought to be interested. You ought to care about it." "Why ought I to be interested? Why ought I to care about it?" "Because it's the interest of the Common Good to be interested in the Common Good," etc. The foundations of moral law are laid deeper than in "the greatest good of the greatest number." A creature is always subject to the Law which upholds the universal order.

Psychology treats of the human act as it is in its immediate origin and nature; ethics treats of the human act as it ought to be, that is, in relation to the ends and purposes of human freedom.

Why do educators, jurists, dramatists, novelists, literateurs in general, etc., insist on bootlegging the notion of custom or convention into the area of moral obligation? They ought to know better.

We repeat here for the sake of emphasis that the rejection of Natural Moral Law is the cornerstone of the totalitarian state of our own time—the state which openly repudiates morality and substitutes expediency for it. In his debate (at Cincinnati, 1829) with Robert Owen, the British Socialist (today he would no doubt be known as a "Communist"), Alexander Campbell, the distinguished theologian, had this to say with respect to the theories of the ethical positivists and indeed of all other persons who would—from whatever internal motivation, whether directly or indirectly—give aid and comfort to the advocates of the strictly secular totalitarian state:

> In their estimation a colony of bees co-operating in the building of storehouses and cells, and afterward stowing them full of the necessaries of animal life, humming from flower to flower while the sun shines, and in its absence sucking the juices which they have collected, is the grand model of what man would be, and what he would do, were he under the benign influence of just knowledge and philosophy. . . . As to morality, it is just a due regard to

utility. Bees are moral as well as men; and he is the most moral bee which creates the most honey and consumes the least of it.[24]

The following clear statement is in order here:

> Mankind has depended too long on naturalism, the forces of custom, pride of race or the authority of some local state to provide the Law. These have failed us. No theory of law which does not acknowledge the sovereignty of God and which aims at less than binding men together as brothers will prove adequate.[25]

This is certainly the American tradition and the most vital element of the American heritage.

Someone has remarked that man must decide whether he belongs with the apes or with the angels. Like Disraeli, this writer chooses the angels. As Edgar Ansel Mower writes: "Because men are still incapable of being angels is no good reason why they should be ants."

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Ignatius W. Cox, S. J., Liberty-Its Use and Abuse, Third Revised Edition, pp. 56-65, (Fordham University Press, 1946.)

[2]Nathaniel Micklem, The Theology of Politics, p. 60. (Oxford University Press, 1941.)

[3]See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Reeve Translation, Ch. XVII. (From The World's Classics, Oxford University Press.)

[4]Sophocles, Antigone, Loeb Classical Library Edition, p. 349, Translation by F. Storr (Harvard University Press, Cambridge).

[5]H. A. Overstreet, The Mature Mind, Text Edition, p. 96. (Norton, New York, 1949.)

[6]Aristotle, Politics, Jowett translation, III, 16, 1287a, (Modern Library Edition, p. 163. Modern Library, New York.)

[7]Cicero, De Legibus, VI. Loeb Classical Library, Keyes Translation.

[8]Cicero, ibid.

[9]John Locke, Of Civil Government, Bk. II, ch. 2. Everyman's Library Edition, pp. 118 ff, (E. P. Dutton, New York.)

[10]Quoted in art., "Human Rights and the Law," by Justice Edward S. Dore of New York, in Life, July 1, 1945. Used by personal permission Justice Dore.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State, Doubleday Anchor paperback, p. 219. This book is now a paperback put out by the Yale University Press, the original publisher.

[14]Margaret Mead, "Some Anthropological Considerations Concerning Natural Law." Natural Law Forum, 1961, p. 54. Published by the Notre Dame Law School.

[15]The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, edited by Max Lerner, p. 396. (Modern Library, 1954).

[16]See W. J. Bryan, In His Image, pp. 90-91. (Oliphants, Ltd., London and Edinburgh, and F. H. Revell, New York, 1922. Also Herald and Presbyter, Nov. 22, 1914).

[17]Holmes, op. cit., p. 396.

[18]Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence, A Study in the History of Political Ideas. pp. 278-279. (First printed in 1922; reissued by Knopf, New York, 1953).

[19]See Saturday Review, issue of April 26, 1958.

[20]Dorothy L. Sayers, The Mind of the Maker, pp. 20-26. (A Living Age book, published by Meridian Books, New York, 1956. Original copyright, 1941, by the author).

[21]Ignatius W. Cox, S. J., Liberty, Its Use and Abuse, pp. 56-65. See this text also for quotes from Augustine and Aquinas, and from Cathrein, Philosophia Moralis. Fordham Press, 1946).

[22]Vernon J. Bourke, Professor of Philosophy, St. Louis University, art., "Two Approaches to Natural Law," in Natural Law Forum, 1956, pp. 92-96. (Notre Dame Law School).

[23]See Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy. (Now published as a Mentor Book, by New American Library, New York, 1956.)

[24]A. Campbell, The Campbell-Owen Debate, published under the title, Evidences of Christianity, pp. 17-18. (Standard, Cincinnati).

[25]Robert Bruce McLaren, art., "Law: Inspired, Natural or Contrived," in The Christian Century, February 21, 1962.

[26]Mowrer, art., "Return to Integrity," Saturday Review, February 5, 1955.

# PART FOUR

## APPLIED ETHICS

## XXX. Positive law serves the twofold purpose of enlarging and clarifying the Natural Moral Law.

(Beginning with this Proposition, I shall present the subject matter to follow in broad outlines only, that is, with not too much regard to details, largely because the material does not demand a great deal of accompanying illustration. –C. C. C. )

1. Positive law, speaking in general terms, is what is called the civil law, the law of the tribe or of the state; i. e. , humanly enacted law. Positive law is either customary (handed down by word of mouth from generation to generation: cf. what is called "common law" in our day), or statutory (embodied in a stereotyped code). The earliest promulgation of statutory law took the form of a code engraved (or painted) on wood or stone tablets, or on stone pillars which were set up in the marketplace. For examples, the laws of Solon (fl. 600 B. C. ) for the Athenian state; the two tables of stone of the Mosaic Law (Exo. 31:18); the codes of Minos and Rhadamanthus (perhaps about 1800 B. C. ) in ancient Crete; that of Lycurgus (fl. 840 B. C. ) at Sparta; that of Numa Pompilius (about 690 B. C. ) in early Rome; the ancient Roman Law of the Twelve Tables; the Code of Hammurabi (about 2000 or 1800 B. C. ) in Babylon, engraved on a pillar of black diorite (may now be seen in the Louvre, Paris). Later legal codes came to be indited on parchment or papyrus. One of the most famous of these was the Corpus Juris Civilis of the Emperor Justinian, who ruled over the Roman Empire at Byzantium (later, Constantinople), A. D. 529–565. In our day, of course, legal codes are printed and make up the huge tomes and libraries of statutory law.

2. Positive law is necessary to clarify concrete cases with their varieties of detailed circumstances. E. g. , the mass of traffic legislation that has necessarily grown up with the advent of the automobile, legislation designed to protect man's natural right to life; the various codes formulated in recent years to govern labor and industry relations, especially to protect the public from irresponsible leadership in the economic field. No doubt the next few decades will bring about codes designed to regulate traffic in outer space. Positive laws develop as human needs require, and do so for the purpose of protecting human natural rights.

3. Positive law is needed to provide what are called tertiary principles. E. g., primary principles of the Natural Moral Law are such as the following: Good ought to be done, and evil avoided (that is, regardless of the setting in which the words "good" and "evil" are used); social order must be maintained; the law-abiding must be protected against the lawless; crime must be punished, injustice must be prevented, one should do as he would be done by, etc. Conscience is as old as homo sapiens himself. Secondary principles of the Moral Law are such as are embodied, for example, in the Ten Commandments: Do not commit murder, Do not lie, Do not steal, etc. Tertiary principles are those which derive from the primary and secondary principles, such as those mentioned above, traffic regulations to protect man's right to life, etc. Tertiary principles, of necessity, are clarified by positive or civil law.

4. Positive law also provides the sanctions necessary to maintain social order: in every community there are those persons who will not play the game according to the rules. For the protection of the orderly (law-abiding) those who are lawless must be segregated—incarcerated in penal institutions so that they cannot harm their fellows. Hence law, to be truly law, must always specify a penalty for its violation.

5. The binding force of positive law derives ultimately from the Natural Moral Law. Laws that are contrary to human nature simply cannot be enforced. Because of the very nature man has, society is necessary to his existence and to the realization of his potentialities, and society is made possible by the social order established and maintained by the positive law.

6. The prerequisites of positive law are the following: (1) There must be legitimate power on the part of the legislator; this is justly determined by the "consent of the governed"; and consent of the governed can be determined only by plebiscite in which either consent or protest can be freely registered. (2) The law must be just with respect to the matter (content) of it: it must function to promote the general welfare, not just the welfare of some segment or segments of the population. Law that is manifestly contrary to the Eternal Law is no law at all; no one on earth is bound by such a law as, "Do not worship God." Law which places burdens on men to satisfy the stupidity, cupidity, or ambition of an individual, a group or a majority; is simply not valid. (3) With respect to the matter (content) of the law, it must decree only that which is possible: no man is bound to do the impossible. (4) As to its form, the law must be properly promulgated, that is, so that people can know what it is, at least by consulting an attorney. Hence, "ignorance of the law excuses no one."

7. Human law ceases to be binding usually in one of three ways, namely, (1) by abrogation (when it is expressly repealed by the legislator), (2) by obrogation (when another law contrary to it is decreed by the legislator), or (3) by disuse (as when the ends for

which it was originally enacted cease to exist. There are many "laws" on our statute books today which are completely outmoded.)

The principle of equity should probably be mentioned here. It is based on the premise that the law exists for man and not man for the law. It is defined by H. S. Maine as "any body of rules existing by the side of the original civil law, founded on distinct principles and claiming incidentally to supersede the civil law in virtue of a superior sanctity inherent in those principles."[1] Equity is the introduction of that "quality of mercy" (of humanitas) which may justifiably be resorted to, under certain circumstances, to alleviate the harshness of the letter of the civil law.

## FOOTNOTES

[1] Quoted by G. W. Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, Second Edition, p. 45. (Oxford University Press, England, 1951.)

## XXXI. The traditional Cardinal Virtues are prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.

"Virtue," from the Latin virtus, designates essentially an excellence. The corresponding Greek word, arete, as noted heretofore, had the same signification. Hence, a moral virtue is an excellence of character. (Faith, hope, and love are traditionally designated the "theological virtues.")

Virtues are defined as good operative habits; hence, vices are the opposite—bad operative habits.

Virtues (and vices) are properly defined as habits. A habit is a strengthening of man's natural powers making it possible for him to perform an act more readily and effectively. Suppose that a bank teller had to stop and fight within himself, every time he received money to deposit, to decide whether he would put the money where it should go or put it in his pocket—obviously, he would not have the virtue of honesty. Virtue is ingrained. The same is true of vice: one can pursue a course of vice to the point where conscience becomes seared, even dead.

A virtue is a good operative habit; that is, it exerts a force or influence in its own right, and thus becomes a co-principle of a human act. "A virtue adds a certain strength to a potency which already exists, whereby the potency is enhanced and is inclined to a readier performance of its proper acts." Virtues are habits which operate toward the good. Vices are habits which operate toward the bad. The great need of our time is a return to the cultivation and practice of the everyday moral virtues.

Traditionally, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice have been held to be the Cardinal Virtues (Moral Excellences). This is a doctrine which goes all the way back to Plato, and even beyond (in some of its aspects, to Pythagoras, Solon, and others). It has become a commonplace in our Western culture. (Cf. the Seven Deadly Sins: pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy, and sloth. For personifications of these, see Spenser's The Faerie Queene.)

Prudence is defined as practical wisdom (i. e., good judgment) with respect to the right choice of things to be done and to the right methods of doing them. (The word derives from the Latin prudens,

prudentis, meaning "acting wisely, judiciously," etc. Such words as "prude," "prudery," etc., are unfortunate distortions of the Latin original.) Prudence is not good judgment with respect to things to be made, because all such things involve matter external to the doer; it is, rather, good judgment with respect to things to be done, hence involving only the thought, desire, and will of the doer.

Fortitude is traditionally defined as that virtue which enables one to control the irascible passions—those that dethrone reason; those that arouse fear or impel to rashness in the presence of dangers; those of fear, flight, over-boldness, anger, rage, aggression, and the like. Fortitude is the ability to meet with a certain measure of equanimity (internal poise) the vicissitudes of life.

Temperance is defined as the virtue which orders and controls the concupiscible passions (the sense appetites, the lusts of the "flesh," etc.)

Justice is the social virtue: it has reference to one's dealings with his fellows. It is the habit according to which one renders to another that which is the latter's right or due. The Order of Justice is defined ideally as that order in which every part is continually performing that which is its proper duty and hence receiving that which is its proper due. It should be noted well that such refined qualities as love for one's enemies (as well as for one's friends), and compassion for all men, are conspicuously absent from these Moral Excellences. (Cf. the transcendent qualities of the fruit of the Spirit as enumerated by the Apostle Paul, Galatians 5:22-23: "love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control." Note here also the enumeration, vv. 19-21, of the works of the flesh: "fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousies, wraths, factions, divisions, parties, envyings, drunkenness, revelings, and such like.")

Character embraces the totality of habits, good and bad, that distinguishes a person (or class of persons) from all others. Morally good habits, those that impel to right action, to proper performance of duties, are known as virtues. Morally bad habits, those that impel to bad action, to neglect or to violation of duties, are known as vices. Character means, etymologically, a significant mark impressed (stamped or cut) upon a hard substance. Hence, in ethics it refers to the totality of habits, good and bad, that are stamped on the person and personality. Character is an ethical, not a psychological, term. It signifies personal behavior as judged or evaluated from the standpoint of a moral code. It is therefore properly defined as an integration of habits of conduct evaluated on the basis of their conformity or non-conformity to the provisions of the Moral Law. Character is therefore good to the degree that it is an integration of those virtues which make for a man's faithful performance of his duties toward God, toward himself, and toward his fellows, as the necessary means to his ulti-

mate attainment of his natural and proper ends. Human nature is the universal (personal); character is the particular (individualistic).

## XXXII. The Order of Justice is the Order of Rights and Duties.

The Virtues of prudence, fortitude and temperance perfect the person in those qualities which are good for him especially as an individual. Justice, however, has to do with his relations to others, and is therefore evaluated on the basis of external acts; that is to say, the Order of Justice is objective, not subjective.

The Order of Justice is that arrangement of things as a whole such that each part will receive and have what rightly belongs to it—that which is its due (on the basis of ability and merit). The Order of Justice is based entirely on the natural equality and dignity of human beings as such, as persons, and ultimately on the Natural Moral Law which ordains such equality and dignity. The objective norm of morality is human nature considered in itself and in its natural relationships, one of which is the equality of all persons before the Creator and His Moral Law. The Order of Justice stems from this relationship, with its attendant rights and obligations. Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.

The Order of Justice is threefold, on the basis of the relationship between part and part, and between the whole and the parts. (1) Commutative justice has reference to the relationship between citizens or persons as individuals; it presupposes equality of persons (before the law, in bargaining power, etc.) and equality of things exchanged. This is the kind of justice that is involved, generally speaking, in the area of civil law, particularly in that of contractual relations. (2) Distributive justice takes in the relationship of the whole to each part (of society or the "state" to the individual citizen, e.g., the advantages and burdens of the community as a whole, protection of natural rights, equitable taxation systems, remunerative and vindicatory justice). This is the kind of justice which prevails in the area of what is called criminal law. For example, a man may break into a safe and steal several thousand dollars: he cannot satisfy the demands of justice simply by returning to the legal owner the money he has stolen. That might satisfy the owner's claim but it does not satisfy the demands of the moral law. The thief has not only injured temporarily the legal owner of the money—he has also committed a crime against society; hence he can satisfy the claims of justice fully, only by submitting to the

prescribed penalty (which is designed to be both vindicatory and medicinal). (3) Legal justice takes in the relation of the part to the whole (of the citizen to the state). It includes all the normal duties of responsible citizenship, such as voting, serving on juries, paying taxes, etc. The end of justice is objective right and duty. (Cf. the Preamble to our Constitution, "to establish justice." Also the oft-repeated phrase, "peace with justice," or "a just peace." Incidentally, these terms all derive from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book V.)

## XXXIII. Subjective right is the moral power to possess something, to do something, or to require something to be done.

(1) By subjective right we mean personal right, i. e., that which exists in the person, that which is inherent in personality itself (as distinguished from objective right as that which exists in the world external to the experiencing person).

(2) As noted heretofore, all entities have their specific powers. Man has powers animals have, plus intelligence to select ends and to adapt means to ends, to think and to live in a kind of timelessness that embraces past and present and future. Man, moreover, lives in association with other men who have the same powers, and who, therefore, can "gang up" on him. Hence he has the additional endowment of subjective right.

(3) Subjective right is moral power, that is, power not necessarily dependent on physical strength or effort, but power which is conferred by moral law, and which is to be respected by one's fellows; power which exercises its influence, by means of reason, on another's will. The distinction made here between moral power and physical power is fundamental: thus one may have the moral power (right) to do something, but may lack the physical power to accomplish the act; conversely, one may have the physical power to do something, but may lack the moral power to justify the act. In Nazi Germany, for example, men had the physical power in concentration camps to flay their fellows and use the skin for lampshades, but surely one would have to be utterly amoral to say that they had the right to commit such atrocities. Totalitarianism in general—Leninist, Fascist or Nazi—identifies moral power with physical power; in effect this is to abjure moral power altogether and to substitute expediency for right. It is, in fact, the world-old doctrine that might makes right.

(4) This moral power is inviolable, that is, it is not affected by violence of any kind. Man has these rights in order to attain his natural and proper ends in a manner that is in harmony with his powers, and all other persons are obligated by the moral law to respect this equal dignity of all persons simply and solely because they are all persons. This inviolability of the person applies (a) to the relation of individual to individual (no man can rightly be used as a

means, but is an end in himself), (b) to the relation of individuals to the state, the body politic (the individual cannot morally be used as a mere means to the enhancement of the power of the state or of the ruling regime), (c) to the relation of the human beings to the subhuman orders all of which are ordered to his utility and benefit. The moral inviolability of the person is the basis of the limitation of rights: my rights come to an end where my neighbor's rights begin. I not only have my own rights, but I have also the obligation of respecting these rights in all other persons. Right and obligation (duty) always go together.

## XXXIV. A right is a certain relation in which four factors are involved, namely, the subject, the matter, the foundation (title), and the term.

1. Note, first of all, what a right is not. (1) It is not a material object, a thing. (2) Nor can it be just an idea in the mind. The word "right" must have a referent, even though the referent, obviously, is not just a thing. (3) In what category, then, does a right belong. Undoubtedly, it can belong only in the category of relation: it designates a relation that can exist only among entities that are capable of knowledge, freedom, and voluntariness, that is, among persons.

2. The subject of a right is the person or persons, natural or juridical, in whom the right inheres. (By juridical person is meant one that is created by law, such as a corporation.) The matter of a right is that which the right embraces or involves. The foundation or title of a right is that fact by which the right is vested in the particular person. The term of a right is the person (or persons) upon whom the right impinges to the extent of obligating them to respect it in another or other persons. Take, for example, right to property (goods purchased in a store, a farm, a residence, etc.): the subject and term are persons, the matter is the property under consideration, and the title is a sales receipt, a deed, a will, in some cases a stake driven in the ground to indicate intention of effective occupation, etc. Or, with respect to the right to life, again the subject and term are persons, the matter is life itself, and the foundation or title must be creation as a person (no other title is conceivable). Certainly the title to the right to life is not to be obtained from any human legislation. No human legislature can bestow the right to life on anyone, for the simple reason that human action cannot create a fundamental (unalienable) right of any kind. These rights must come from the Author of human nature Himself, and from no other source. Such is the positive doctrine of our Declaration of Independence.

3. Rights are classified generally as follows: (1) as natural (deriving immediately from the Natural Moral Law), and positive (deriving from customary or statutory human legislation, e. g., copyrights, patent rights, hunting and fishing rights, etc.); (2) As unalienable or alienable (those which, respectively, cannot be, and can be, alienated from the person); as jurisdictional (the right of

governance over subjects for the purpose of directing them into achievement of a common good); and as proprietary (rights over things and with regard to things, things that are marked off as one's own, but never with regard to persons).

4. Natural rights arise immediately from the Natural Moral Law. All human rights and duties have their title proximately in the objective norm of morality (especially the relationships of dependence, equality, and proprietorship), and ultimately in "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" whereby these relationships are ordained. Social order is based ultimately on the equal dignity of all persons, that is, the dignity which derives from the possession by each of the same personal nature and hence from the same Natural Moral Law which interiorly directs each personal nature to the same ultimate ends. There are those today in high places who reject the doctrine of Natural Moral Law: in so doing they repudiate the affirmations of the Declaration of Independence, including its doctrine of natural (unalienable) rights. Obviously, natural rights are unalienable rights, and vice versa, and can have their source and foundation only in the Natural Moral Law, the promulgation of the Eternal Law, but never in the personal ambitions, prejudices, and whims of a human parliament.

5. The Affirmations of the Declaration of Independence: as stated in the first two paragraphs of that great document. (1) "To which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them," that is to say, all human titles to natural rights originate in the Eternal Law which is embodied in mankind in the Natural Moral Law. (2) "That all men are created equal": note well, not born equal, but created equal, that is, equal in the sense that all have been constituted persons by Creation, with the rights that attach to person and personality as such; hence, that every man's soul (being) is worth as much as another's in the sight of the Creator. (3) "That they are endowed by their Creator," not by any human being, not by any group of human beings, not even by any tribal council or human legislature, "with certain unalienable rights." (4) That among these unalienable rights are "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." This is in accord, obviously, with man's natural and proper ultimate intrinsic end. (5) "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Because no state or government (ruling regime) has the power to create man a person, therefore no such human regime can endow him with his basic human rights: these rights he has naturally by having been constituted a person by Creation. The proper function of true government, therefore, is to make "secure," to protect, these rights which attach to, and are inseparable from, man's very nature as a person created in the image of God. (6) "Whenever any Form of Government becòmes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most

likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." The principles (political philosophy) of the American state are set forth in the Declaration; the form according to which its powers are organized is laid down in the Constitution. Moreover, this Constitution provides for necessary changes by ballot, by the process of constitutional amendment, provided there is sufficient public sentiment for such changes: hence there is no legal ground in this country for the operation of a group committed to revolution by force (by bullets); any such movement is in the very nature of the case a conspiracy, and participation therein is a de facto form of treason.

6. "Unalienable Rights." Note this phrase especially; it is the one which, above all others, has teeth in it. Not by the will of one man, nor by the will of a few men, nor even by the will of a majority; not by the will of any human regime, but only by the Will of the Creator are men endowed with these unalienable rights. An unalienable right is one that cannot be alienated from the person: he can neither give it away himself, not can it be taken from him by any external agency or force. Note the subtle distinction implicit here between the right itself and the exercise of the right. One might presume to give away the exercise of the right, but he cannot separate himself from the right per se. Or, a tyrant might unjustly deprive a person of the exercise of his rights, or indeed society might legitimately call on him to forego—even to jeopardize—the exercise of certain rights (even that of the right to life) for the sake of the common good, that is, in the defense of the integrity and freedom of the people involved, but no power on earth can take from the person the rights themselves: they attach to the person because he is a person, and like his thoughts, memories, feelings, and experiences in general, they go with him wherever he goes. (E. g., a tyrant might impose his will upon a people by force and thus impair their exercise of their right to liberty, but the tyrant cannot take away the right itself; if he could, then what would happen to the right should the tyrant be deposed? Obviously, it remains where it has been all the time, in the persons who make up the society over which the tyrant has held temporary sway. Again, Robinson Crusoe, on an island uninhabited by man had, according to the Declaration, the same rights and duties that all persons have: in such a state of isolation, however, he had not the opportunity of sharing the exercise of his unalienable rights and duties with his fellows. Even in this state, however, he believed he had certain duties to God and also to himself—at least the duty to preserve himself in the integrity of his being. Crusoe, it will be noted, did not indulge an orgy of self-pity, much less a selfish pessimism that terminated in suicide.) Obviously, from the foregoing considerations, unalienable rights are natural rights.

In the Declaration we have many far-reaching affirmations: "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," "created equal," "unalienable rights," "the pursuit of Happiness," "the consent of the governed." Not one of these can be proved in a laboratory of science.

They are essentially articles of faith. They have been tested and proved, however, in the laboratory of human experience. It has been proved again and again in history that when a people abandons or rejects these principles, that people is on its way to every form of injustice and cruelty imaginable. The doctrine of human rights and human equality by creation, and not by government action, is the very foundation stone of the American political system: it supports every minority right and every right of individual conscience which we cherish. To reject the doctrine of the Moral Law is to adopt the only alternative doctrine possible, namely, that might makes right.

To what does all this point implicitly? To a very simple basic truth: Jefferson put it, in the form of the well-known rhetorical question: "Can the liberties of the nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that liberties are a gift of God?" Or, as William Penn once said, in substance: If men are not governed by God, they will be governed by tyrants. And in the same vein former President Eisenhower affirmed recently, that democracy as a political institution rests "on a completely false premise unless we recognize a Supreme Being in front of whom we are all equal." This has always been, and still is, the American Faith.

7. Theories of rights which we must reject are the following: (1) Those that would derive the juridical order from force, as from coercive power in the legislator, whether the lawgiver be one man, a group of men, or even a majority: hence, those that would derive the Order of Justice from the civil law exclusively. The juridical order is a part of the moral order. Rights belong in the moral order; they exist independently of force. Certainly no one who "thinks straight" would contend that the moral can be derived from the non-moral (that social order is derived from the instincts of the jungle). Throughout the centuries men have shed much precious blood to preserve their freedoms from those who would try to impose upon them the vicious pretension that Might makes Right. (2) Those that would derive the juridical order from physical necessity. Need for food does not justify any man's killing another and eating his victim's flesh. Nor does it justify any man's voluntary offering of his body, in a dire emergency, as food for other men. (3) Those that would derive the juridical order from personal liberty. This is not acceptable because of the fact that the juridical order is inseparable from the moral order. But personal liberty per se does not create the moral order. To hold otherwise would result in the legalizing of acts which are against public decency and moral sensibility. No one has the right to do as he pleases under all circumstances. True freedom does not consist in doing always as one pleases (which would not be liberty, but license), but in pleasing to do what is right and good, both for the individual and for society in general.

## XXXV. The subjective and term of a right are persons.

1. (1) Human beings, persons, are moral beings; they are moral beings because they have the intelligence to recognize and to assume responsibilities. Only human beings have need of rights in order to live according to their nature. Irrational entities have neither sufficient intelligence nor freedom of choice, but are under physical necessity (in animals this necessity is called "instinct"); hence, they are not subjects of rights.

2. Animals do not have rights. If they do, they are obligated to respect human rights. It is a matter of human experience, however, that animals have no such obligation, nor even the awareness of any such obligation. They do not have the property of human dignity which is the basis of rights. (2) As we have already learned, man's right to use the products of the lower orders (mineral, vegetable, animal) for food, shelter, clothing, medicines, etc., stems from his relation of proprietorship over them. There is no rational accounting for the existence of the subhuman (and amoral) orders if they are not here primarily for man's use and benefit. Man's right to life, moreover, presupposes his right to the means of sustaining it, and these lower orders alone afford him these means. (3) Men do not have duties toward animals: they have duties only with respect to them. Hence, to use animals in a manner that is in accord with ideal human character, that is, reasonably and without cruelty, and for man's use and benefit, is right. To inflict unnecessary pain on animals is to act below the standard set by human dignity. Unnecessary cruelty of any kind (torture especially) is intrinsically evil. (4) Still and all, animals do not have rights. Animal experimentation is not wrong if done to further knowledge and skill in medicine and surgery, provided the measure of pain that may be inflicted in such cases is kept to a minimum. A great deal has been said and written on this subject which is sheer "wumgush," "mere mental mush." I confess I cannot muster any measure of sympathy for those mentally warped individuals who will leave thousands of dollars for the establishment of a refuge for homeless cats, when there are millions of human beings in the world, including small children, who are slowly dying from malnutrition. (5) In the Middle Ages it was not uncommon for animals to be brought into court

to be charged with, and convicted of, "crimes." Such a practice would, I am sure, be regarded as absurd in our day, in practically all parts of the world. Today, it is the owners who are held responsible, and can be sued, for damages inflicted by their various pets and domesticated animals.

3. Reverence for life was the late Dr. Schweitzer's fundamental ethical thesis. To be sure, we must agree with this in principle. But what kind or kinds of life are to be included? Those who practice vegetarianism, for instance, take life, that is, plant life. Some cultists, in India and elsewhere (e.g., the Jainists), refuse to take the life of any creature, even of the lowliest insect. If this principle should be pressed to the limit, the use of antibiotic drugs would be immoral: do they not kill micro-organisms? To carry this notion to such extremes would certainly produce most unsanitary living conditions. I know of no ground on which filth can be justified.

## XXXVI. The title of a right is the contingent fact by which that right comes to be vested in the person.

1. A person has the right to acquire property from the time he comes into existence—a watch, a suit of clothes, a farm, etc. But there must be something—some specific evidence—to connect him with that particular thing and to mark it off as peculiarly his. This contingent fact shows that the thing is subjected to his use exclusively, that he has a right to it. ("Contingent"—from the Latin contingere, "to happen"—means "may or may not be," as distinguished from "necessary," which means "must be.") In the case of a watch, the contingent fact or title of right may be a bill of sale or a sales receipt, or even of the character of a gift; in the case of a farm, it may be a will by which one inherits, or a deed by which one acquires the farm by right of purchase, or a few stakes driven in the ground by which one homesteads the farm. The contingent fact, whatever it may be, vests moral power in one person, to the exclusion of all other persons, in the possession of a thing, or in the performance of an act, or in the exaction of a thing or an action. The contract of marriage, for example, is the contingent fact which gives the man and the woman rights and duties with respect to each other.

2. The contingent fact by which every person is endowed with the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, is the fact that he is by creation a person; that his human nature and relationships exist by virtue of creation, not by virtue of any act or law of the state. (Creation itself gives no evidence of having been a necessary act of God; rather, it is to be regarded as following upon the free and deliberate decisions and decrees of Divine Knowledge and Love.) The state did not create or constitute man a person; therefore, the state is powerless to vest him with those unalienable rights which attach to a person solely because he is a person.

## XXXVII. A person can never be the matter of a right.

1. If the natural equality and dignity of man mean anything, they surely mean that a person can never be owned by another person. (It is a religious tenet, of course, that man is ordained immediately, and never mediately, to God, the Author of his nature. This nature is such as to make it self-evident that he is never to be used as a means, but must always be treated as an end in himself.) (The right of a parent, or that of a teacher, is simply the right of governance, by which the actions of a child or of children are directed for their own good and for the common good. The authority of the parent is natural, that of the teacher in the school, or that of the elected official in public office, is jurisdictional.) If men are equal in the sight of the Author of their nature, there is no means by which one may obtain a just title to another man's person. One may obtain a legitimate title to another man's services by contract, but one cannot in any way obtain a just title to another's person, that is, to a human being per se.

2. Hence, both slavery and social exploitation are immoral. One cannot morally engage in a business of any kind which destroys the mental or physical powers of his fellows, nor can one morally take advantage of the ignorance or misfortune of his fellow-men to further his own interests. To do so is to violate not only the law of love (good will), but the whole Moral Law as well. (Note well the ancient form of slavery of captives taken in war, servitude for discharge of a debt, and the economic disadvantages of slavery of the Gold Coast variety.) Does not the kind of slavery that regards the slave as mere chattel encourage the moral degradation of both owner and slave? Does not this kind of slavery promote indolence in the society that permits it? It is an article of religious faith, of course, that man is ordained immediately, and never mediately, to God, the Author of his nature; hence, that the person's ultimate destiny is in the hands of God. A person's last end, like his beginning, is not in his control, nor is it under the control of any other man, community, or state. A person is a creature, subject in birth, life, and death, to "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God." Human power does not extend into or beyond the grave.

I am reminded here of the story of the old slave who escaped to the North by way of the Underground Railway, in the days before the Civil War. This man was brought before a judge on a minor charge, and the latter began questioning him as to why he had chosen to run away from his former "owner." "Did you not have it rather easy on the plantation"? asked the judge. "Yes suh, yes suh, I didn't have it too hard—the master was a kind man." "You had plenty to eat," continued the judge, "you had a home and time for recreation, did you not?" "Yes suh, yes suh," admitted the old Negro. "In short," said the judge, "you had a relatively easy life—in fact, you had security. Why on earth did you run away from all this?" "Well, jedge," said the old slave, after a pause, "the position is still open—why doan yuh apply fer it?" In a word, slavery (and social exploitation as well) involves something more than the matter of material security: it involves the supreme fact of the dignity of the person. Any practice which results in the downgrading of a person's self-respect, of his own proper evaluation of himself as a person, is mentally and morally disintegrative.

## XXXVIII. All human rights are characterized by (1) coercive inviolability, (2) limitation, and (3) the likelihood of collision with other rights.

1. These are usually designated properties of rights. A property of a thing (from proprius, "one's own") is defined as that characteristic without which the thing would not be what it is. E. g., if water did not quench fire, it would not be water. The properties of a thing go to make up the essence of the thing.

2. Coercive inviolability has reference to the moral power a person has to use physical force to protect, to defend, or to recover the exercise of a right. For example, one who has the right to life has the right to defend forcibly the exercise of that right against an aggressor. This means, moreover, that the right of itself remains unimpaired, even if one is deprived of the physical force necessary to support the exercise of it. (Remember: the distinction between the right itself and the exercise of the right). The use of force to protect the exercise of a right belongs primarily to the subject in whom the right inheres, and secondarily to others who may be properly constituted representatives of the subject: e. g., a father with respect to his wife and children, public officials with respect to citizens and subjects. According to the Declaration of Independence, "to protect these (unalienable rights), governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

3. All human rights have their necessary limitations. Freedom of expression, for instance, is limited by laws governing slander, libel, advocacy of treason, advocacy of any capital crime, etc. It is also limited by the truth: no teacher has any right to tell his students that two plus two equals five; as Professor Hocking puts it: "The right to error in pursuit of truth does not include a moral right to be deliberately in error." A university professor was reported in the daily press, not so long ago, to have declared to his classes that marriage is not a necessary institution: why should not couples just live together, said he, as long as they find the relationship compatible, and when it ceases to be that, why should they not be free to seek other "affinities"? He is reported to have said also that of course he would not commit adultery without first having obtained his wife's permission to indulge the delectability of such "episodes." This was all the president of that university could stomach—he

"fired" the professor. Unfortunately, we do have men in the profession who seem to be blind to the distinction between liberty and license, and who seem to take it for granted that a professor has "academic freedom" to say anything he pleases to say in the classroom. Property rights also are limited. Your house is indeed your "castle." Still and all, you would be charged with arson if you tried to burn it down. You may own property in the form of an automobile, but if you should drive it into a crowd, killing some and maiming others, just for a thrill, you would be charged with, and convicted of, committing murder. Human rights, in every area of human activity, definitely are limited. My rights come to an end where my neighbor's rights begin.

4. Collisions of rights are occurring all the time and cause most of the difficult problems in ethics. A most obvious example occurs in war, in the opposition of a society's exercise of its collective right to preserve its freedoms against external aggression, to the individual citizen's exercise of his right to life which is bound to be put in jeopardy by military service. Such collisions occur always in the opposition of the right of individual conscience to the collective rights of a society. (Note, in cases of "therapeutic abortion," the opposition of the right of the mother to live to the right of the child to be born.) Collision of rights occurs in every area of life. Collision is implicit in the vast majority of cases that are tried both in our civil and in our criminal courts, and particularly so in cases tried in courts of domestic relations. They lie at the root of nearly all controversies involving profound ethical considerations.

## XXXIX. The juridical order is a part of the ethical order.

Rights and obligations go together; no right inheres in anyone apart from a corresponding duty or obligation. (Duty is something due; obligation is something owed.) Many persons are extremely zealous for their rights, but not nearly so zealous to faithfully discharge their obligations. All rights and obligations arise from human (personal) nature itself and human natural relationships.

1. All duties are ethical in the sense that they appertain to man's natural relationships and to his natural and proper ends and the means of attaining those ends. When such considerations are not involved, no question of duty arises. (For example, in learning to play golf one must keep one's eye on the ball, but no question of duty is involved.)

2. Some duties are ethical only, that is, ethical but not juridical. Moral obligation is obligation to practice all the virtues, not that of justice only. (1) You find a pocketbook with one thousand dollars, and a card with the owner's name, in it. You hire a taxi and drive across town to return the pocketbook and the money to the owner. It is evident that the latter should compensate you for your taxi fare, your time and effort; that out of sheer gratitude, he should give you a reasonable reward. Strictly speaking, however, you have no rights in the matter. The duty involved in such a situation is that of gratitude. (2) So-called professional ethics usually belong in this category. This term usually refers to a set of procedures agreed upon by those devoted to a certain profession (medicine, law, teaching, etc.). Professional ethics have no binding force, however, unless one has agreed to them in a prescribed formal manner; in all such cases one has the ethical duty of fidelity to promise. A physician, for instance, may violate the ethical code adopted by his colleagues; in such a situation, the most severe punishment meted out by the medical society would be expulsion. For those who might violate the legal code, the extreme penalty would be disbarment. However, if in either case a crime has been committed, the prosecution would be conducted by the state, through its duly elected officials. (3) Refusal to salute the American flag surely is objectively wrong in that it sets an example of unpatriotic action. Any religious sect is wrong in refusing to salute the flag on the ground that it is

giving honor to an "idol" rather than to God. Of course this is ridiculous. School boards, however, are only depriving children of an education by dismissing them from school for not saluting the flag (a refusal provoked, of course, by parental fanaticism). Patriotism belongs in the category of duties that are strictly ethical. (Tenets of certain sects sometimes do clash with the law, as, for example, nudism, polygamy, etc. Such practices have been prohibited by civil law, just the same. One cannot violate the moral order under the specious claim of "special revelation.") (4) There are many duties that are strictly ethical, such as good will, almsgiving, mercy, kindness, courtesy, friendship, truthfulness, gratitude, fidelity to promise, etc. "He who has the most thankfulness in his heart has the most heaven in his life."

3. Some duties are both ethical and juridical. "Juridical" means belonging to the Order of Justice (the order of rights and duties). A juridical duty is a duty to another which cannot be omitted without injury to the other (hence, injustice): to the juridical duty in one person, there corresponds a strict right in the other person which is the basis of the duty. (Strictly speaking, a right is usually a claim which is enforceable by law.) Violation of an ethical duty is usually designated an offense; violation of a juridical duty, an injury. Juridical relations among persons are safeguarded by commutative justice which is based on equality of persons (natural or juridical) and equality of things exchanged.

The juridical order is a part of the moral order. To deprive another of his rights is to act contrary to the norm of morality (the natural equality of man) and therefore contrary to the Moral Law. In the very nature of the case, justice is a part of ethics.

## XL. Human duties in general are of three kinds: (1) duties to God, (2) duties to one's self, and (3) duties to our fellows.

1. Man's duties to God, according to the spiritualistic view, arise from his status as a creature and consequently from his relation of dependence. To be sure, the idea of duties to God is rejected—or ignored—by atheists, agnostics, "humanists," "naturalists," etc. But this rejection does not obviate the fact that every human being is utterly dependent on some kind of providence, from hour to hour, for preservation from physical death. Man is a creature. His duty to God, therefore, is to render unto Deity both the exterior and the interior worship that is due Him: worship is recognition of God's worth-ship. Religion goes far beyond morality in the fact that in its noblest form it is devotion, commitment, worship, service, etc., rendered by the creature solely out of his pure love for God, not as a matter of barter, not as a matter of "fire insurance," not even entirely as a matter of duty. To be sure, man is so constituted that he has the mental power to be an atheist; but, in view of this fact of dependence, does he have the moral power (right) to be one? (Cf. the rights of individual conscience, the right of worshiping God according to one's private convictions, as guaranteed by our American Bill of Rights. The power of government is employed to protect citizens in the exercise of these rights.) On the negative side, man is under obligation to refrain from blasphemy (any speech or gesture that involves contempt for God), profanity (irreligious acts in general, especially any disrespectful use of the Name of Deity), from taking the name of God in vain (as in private swearing, perjury, etc.). Obviously any human attempt to determine God's acts, as in swearing personally, is sheer vanity: man has no control over the Divine Will. Perjury, too, is presumptuous in that it involves the invocation of God's approval of a lie, and that publicly, an act that is unthinkable of a God who is holy. (Incidentally, it is interesting to note that swearing as a personal habit—invoking the name of God or of Jesus Christ—is a kind of compliment in reverse: it implies that only these names are worthy of being invoked in an oath.)

2. Man's duties to himself. (1) The duty to love himself with a properly disciplined love, that is, with proper moral discernment. "Love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 22:39) is not to be inter-

preted, "Love thy neighbor and hate thyself." A proper measure of self-love is essential to the integrity of the personal and moral life. As opposed to self-love we have egoism (putting one's own satisfactions above everything else), and self-hatred (failing to provide for one's physical and spiritual needs). As a matter of fact, it could be maintained, I think, that every sin is a sin against a reasonable measure of self-love. Man's duties to himself arise from his dignity as a person, his interior constitution, and his position of primacy in the universal order (the Creation).

(2) The duty of shaping his intelligence in the proper understanding of himself and his place and purpose in the totality of being; that is, by seeking the truth respecting his own origin, nature, and destiny. Habits of thought determine habits of conduct (Cf. Prov. 23:7, 4:23: "keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life.") A fair understanding of the right answers to the questions, What am I? whence came I? and, whither am I bound?—an understanding that gives meaning to personal life—is of infinitely greater import than the understanding of the phenomena of the physical world. This is true for the simple reason that there is no physical force that can determine the destiny of the human spirit.

(3) The duty of training his will to control his animal appetites and passions, and even his coarse emotions. Man has been endowed with reason for the purpose of controlling these lower powers by the proper directing and strengthening of his will to do so. Of course, this does not mean that he will always act in this manner; indeed it seems that he is more often inclined to yield to his baser impulses than to be guided by reason. However, he is endowed with the power of reason whether he uses it properly or not. Moral perfection consists in the actual exercise of the natural sovereignty of reason over the entire organism.

(4) The duty of maintaining the integrity of his being. (a) Homicide in self-defense is generally recognized to be both a legal and a moral act. If a man has the right to life, surely he has the right to defend his life against aggression, even if this should mean the killing of the aggressor. (b) Suicide, which is the direct taking of one's life on one's own authority, is intrinsically bad, for the following reasons: (i) It is a direct repudiation of the Will to Live that is characteristic of all living species. That this is true is evident from the fact of the relatively small number of human beings, out of the entire population, who resort to suicide. (ii) It is looked on with disfavor by society generally. You hear a man say, "Our Uncle John is a great man. He has received one promotion after another in the army, and just recently he was made a full colonel. We are proud of our Uncle John—he is a credit to the family." But do you ever hear anyone say, "My Uncle John is a great man, too. He is one of the most independent persons who ever lived—so independent is he that he considers himself independent of living itself. And to demonstrate this fact he went out to the barn the other day and hung himself"? No—you do not boast about a suicide in the

family. Such an act is spontaneously rejected as unnatural. (iii) A suicide is a person upon whom the walls of self have fallen with crushing power. Suicide is an act which demonstrates lack of fortitude—the suicide simply "can't take it." It is the final proof of complete selfishness. I doubt seriously that suicide is necessarily a mark of insanity: it strikes me, rather, as the natural consequence of an uncontrolled orgy of self-pity. (iv) If equality means anything at all, it means that one has no more right to take his own life than he has to take the life of another human being.

It is a fundamental principle of Biblical religion that what is commonly called "one's own life" is really not one's own; that it is, rather, a Divine gift; and that, therefore, since man cannot endow himself with life, he acts immorally in presuming that he can deprive himself of it, solely on his own authority: in a word, that the issues of life and death are not under man's control. To all who have this conviction, such acts as suicide, euthanasia, self-mutilation, etc., present no problem: they are immoral acts: man is motivated by sheer presumption when he assays to play God. Biblical teaching is that man is ordained immediately, and never mediately, to his Creator; hence, suicide becomes an invasion of God's exclusive dominion. (c) Dueling is also an immoral act. It is illegal under American law, and if death occurs it is considered to be either murder or manslaughter, and in all such cases, the "seconds" are liable to punishment as accessories. (d) Emasculation (castration), that is, mutilation of the reproductive organs, is an unwarranted human presumption and hence an immoral act. Of course, surgery to remove a diseased organ in order to save the organism as a whole, is a positive good.

(e) Euthanasia ("the termination of human life by painless means for the purpose of ending severe physical suffering") is still generally regarded as unjustified killing rather than as a "merciful release." However, distinction should be made, I think, between ordinary means as distinguished from extraordinary means of preserving Life. To keep a person alive by ordinary means to the time he dies naturally, is considered obligatory. Ordinary means include food, drink, shelter, possibly hospital care, the attendance of a physician, and necessary sedation or other medical treatment, provided this is normal procedure and within the patient's financial means. However, to keep a person lingering hopelessly month after month, with a malignancy, for example, from which no possible relief is evident, by such extraordinary means as costly irradiative treatments which bankrupt the patient and his family, is hardly justifiable either from a humanitarian or from an ethical point of view. However, in all cases involving the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of prolonging life, if a remedy for the particular disease is thought to be near at hand, account must be taken of the fact. This is always to be considered, too, in cases in which insanity (with proposed "eugenic" sterilization) is involved: in our time, "wonder" drugs are appearing almost overnight which

restore to insane persons, at least temporarily, some measure of sanity.

(f) Sterilization is regarded by many as morally indefensible on the ground that it is an unjustifiable mutilation of a human organism. Since it is contended that the act is not designed to prevent sexual intercourse, obviously it permits the continued use of the sex powers in physical union, and at the same time directly involves the abuse of them by making conception impossible. Voluntary sterilization is that which is willed by the individual; compulsory sterilization is that which is ordered by the state. Sterilization is said to be eugenic when it is performed on defective persons in the interest of the common good. Advocates of eugenic sterilization contend that the practice permits many high-grade defectives to return to their respective families; that it permits many persons to marry who would not otherwise be allowed to do so; that it prevents the birth of children who would be likely to become state charges; that it decreases the tax burden on the state by reducing the number of persons who must be kept in state institutions; that it has not increased the number of sex offenses; that it is a protection, not a punishment, for the mentally ill, and hence that no stigma or humiliation attaches to it. Opponents of the practice take the position that it is an invasion of "the supreme dominion of God over His creatures"; that it is a "grave mutilation" of the human being; that it does not lead to a marked decrease in the number of children born mentally defective, because there are too many other factors which result in producing these defectives (such as dietary deficiency, excessive alcoholism, glandular dysfunctions, abortifacients, bacterial poisons, during pregnancy; brain injuries at birth; infectious diseases after birth which cause inflammation of the brain and its coverings, diseases such as meningitis, sleeping sickness, epilepsy, etc.); that it does bring about an increase in sex offenses and social diseases; and that it tends to the abuses of state power over the individual citizen. Those who take this position contend that publicly authorized euthanasia, mutilation, sterilization, and like practices, in the name of eugenics, not only have no more validity than personally authorized and committed acts of these kinds, but that public (state) procedures have the additional stigma of liability to the abuses which inevitably accompany the evils of bureaucracy in general, and especially to those which have to do with the lives of individual citizens. Particularly suspect in all state cases is the make-up and character of the public agency which is set up to adjudicate them and the susceptibility of its members to corruption. Another factor which must be considered here is the possibility of the surgical restoration of those reproductive powers which may have been suspended by sterilization, should developments be deemed to justify such restoration. Generally speaking, all human acts which have to do with adjusting the life process become valid only when necessary to the preservation of the organism as a whole. (Cf. the teaching of Jesus, Matt. 5:29-30, 18:8-9; Mark 9:43-47.)

(g) Solitary sex acts (voluntary in origin and involving sex satisfaction through some method of erotic stimulation of the sex organs) are unnatural (in that they involve the abuse of the sex function) and harmful (in that they tend to become habitual and hence gradually to weaken the will). In this category we put the following: masturbation, commonly called "self-abuse," sometimes erroneously called onanism (See Gen. 38:8-10: Onan's act was an offense against the theocratic family, not an act indulged for erotic pleasure), an act which, if it becomes habitual, undoubtedly contributes to sexual impotence in later life; bestiality, coition of a human being with a brute; necrophilia, erotic satisfaction obtained by physical sexual contact with a corpse (a practice prevalent in ancient Egypt especially, where mummification of corpses of the nobility, both male and female, was common); fetishism, an act in which the person obtains sexual gratification "onanistically" with the aid of a symbol, usually a symbol of the loved object; transvestism, putting on the clothing of the opposite sex for purposes of sexual satisfaction; scoptophilia, the avid viewing of the external sex organs or of actual sex acts for the purpose of obtaining sex excitation; voyeurism, defined as "pathological indulgence in looking at some form of nudity as a source of gratification in place of the normal sex act."[1] Under this heading we must also include obscenity, pornography, lasciviousness, lewdness, exhibitionism and indecent exposure, etc.

(h) Homosexual activity, even though it involves another person, belongs in the class of solitary sex acts because the erotic pleasure is confined to the one who plays the role of the active agent in the perversion. Homosexuality may stem from a glandular dysfunction; generally, however, it seems to be psychological in origin, that is, a habit formed in adolescence which results in such a weakening of the will that the victim, in adulthood, lacks the mental and physical power to cast it off. In the end, its effect, like that of alcoholism, is often pathological; obviously, it is not a natural use of the sex function. Many eminent authorities speak of it as a "congenital anomaly" rather than a disease. Usually the homosexual possesses characteristic psychic and physical traits of the opposite sex. Pederasty is anal coitus of an adult as the active partner with a boy as the passive partner. Sodomy is oral or anal coitus between two adults. This term however, has come to be used in many legal codes for all kinds of sex perversion. History proves that in cultures in which homosexuality has become a common practice, woman has never been accorded any particularly honorable status. (See Paul's list of the vices of the pagan world, in Romans 1:18-32.) (Parents have a solemn obligation to instruct their children about all these unnatural uses of the sex function; moreover, this instruction should begin even before the child reaches adolescence.)

(i) Any act of sex perversion is an utterly selfish prostitution of the sex function; it gives pleasure only to the one who performs the act, and physical pleasure only. In the true conjugal union, however, one that is sanctified by mutual love, the participants

enjoy the planned sharing of the bliss, one with the other; indeed this bliss is enhanced by the fact that each participant is thinking in terms of what is being contributed to the enjoyment of the other participant; the satisfaction thus becomes spiritual and not exclusively physical. There is a vast difference here, difference which evidences the importance of the conjugal union, and the superiority of monogamy as a selective institution.

(j) Finally, under this caption, man is obligated to avail himself of the necessary means, in the form of material goods, to sustain his physical life and growth. The world owes no one a living. Society does, however, owe everyone the opportunity of making a living: the obligation on man's part is that of honest (mental or physical) labor. The moral law, "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread," Gen. 3:19, has never been rescinded. Sloth is immoral: parasites on society are reprehensible because their indolence is of their own choosing. (How many persons in our country today prefer to be "kept" by Uncle Sam than to make an honest living by their own efforts?) Work is one of man's greatest blessings. The moral issue inherent in the shorter work-week is that of the right versus the wrong use of this additional leisure. Will the people use this leisure for ends beneficial to themselves and to their fellows, or will they use it to dissipate their mental and physical powers in riotous living? It is too often true, unfortunately, that "an idle brain is the devil's workshop."

3. Man's duties to his fellow-men. (1) In this category duties that are ethical only are the duty of gratitude to all to whom gratitude is due; the duty of kindness and courtesy generally; the duty of truthfulness; the duty of protecting the moral integrity ("good name") of another; the duty of fidelity to promises; the duty of heeding the cry of the weak, the poor, and the oppressed, etc., because one's neighbor is every human being, and especially every human being who is in need. (2) The duty of truthfulness is of great importance. Lying is speaking that which is contrary to what is in the mind of the speaker. The forms which lying may take are numerous: one can lie, under some circumstances, by saying nothing. (It is interesting to note that one of the great novels of all time has as its motif the sublimity that under certain conditions can be engendered by a falsehood. The novel is Victor Hugo's Les Miserables. The fact that the Bishop protected the ex-galley slave in court against the charge of having stolen his—the Bishop's—valuable candlesticks, by calmly announcing that he had given the candlesticks to the defendant, resulted in the latter's reformation and return to society.) (Is failure to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, ever morally justifiable?) Under the law, perjury, in any degree, definitely is a crime. Violation of the duty of protecting another's good name may take the form of slander (spoken) or libel (printed slander), or even that of idle gossip. Many a person's reputation has been smirched by "whispering campaigns."

(2) In this category there are also duties that are both ethical and juridical. (a) For example, the duty of protecting by force another's right to the exercise of life, provided one can give such assistance without losing one's own life. Take the well-known story of the Good Samaritan as an example, in Luke 10:25-37. As the story goes, as Jesus told it, a traveler went by road from Jerusalem to Jericho. Along the way, brigands set upon him, robbed him, and left him by the wayside wounded and half dead. A priest, representative of the formal "religion" of the day, who happened to be traveling the same road, saw the sufferer lying by the roadside, but "passed by on the other side." Later, a levite, a priestly attendant, making the same journey, acted in precisely the same callous manner. Then appeared a Samaritan, of the hybrid ethnic group cordially hated by the Palestinian Jews. This man, seeing the condition of the wayside sufferer, dismounted, bound up the latter's wounds after pouring oil and wine upon them, put the victim on his own beast and brought him to a near-by inn, saying to the innkeeper, "Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, I, when I come back again, will repay thee." This story was told by Jesus, in answer to the question, "Who is my neighbor?" In this instance it was the fellow human being who was in dire need of "first aid." But—what would have been that Samaritan's duty had he happened along that road a few minutes earlier, just at the time the traveler was being set upon by the brigands? Obviously, it would have been his duty then to go to the man's assistance with force, if he could foresee any possibility of preventing the crime by so doing. The use of force, under such circumstances, would have been the Samaritan's duty as a good neighbor. Is not the use of physical power to repel unjust aggression always morally justified, either on the individual or on the national level? Obviously, there have been many times in the history of mankind when the destruction of a nation's power has become a moral necessity (Jer. 18:5-10, Ezek. 21:27). This writer cannot find any justification for the theory or practice of absolute pacifism. Some of the most admirable characters of the Bible, even of the New Testament, were soldiers (cf. Luke 3:14, 7: 2-10; Acts 10:1-8; Matt. 27:54, etc.)

(b) The duty of respecting the juridical rights of others. Among such are obligations to refrain from fraud, theft, contract-breaking, etc.; from infanticide and geronticide (exposure of aged persons), practices which were quite common in ancient times, even in so-called "enlightened societies"; from all forms of murder and manslaughter; from aggressive violence of any kind against the person of another, such as assault and battery, kidnaping, lynching, torture, rioting, genocide (the attempted destruction of an entire ethnic group), etc. These acts all take place within the scope of criminal law and those who commit them are subject to prosecution in the courts of all civilized states.

(c) The duty of refraining from unnatural uses of the sex function in association with other persons. In this category of acts both

ethical and juridical, we must put sex attacks on children, rape, incest, prostitution—all such perversions that are recognized as crimes in nearly all legal codes. Rape is assault upon a female without her consent; incest differs from rape in that it occurs by mutual consent. Father-daughter, mother-son, brother-sister sexual relationships are radically different from the type of affection on which the conjugal union is based, and hence cannot become the bases on which domestic society is constructed. No doubt this is the reason why they have been frowned upon, or prohibited outright, by all human societies, primitive, prehistoric, and historic.

(d) The notion that the male—for alleged reasons of health—must gratify his sexual desires outside the relationship of marriage has its basis not in physical fact but in the carnal mind—a mind "conditioned" by general social attitudes and in some cases, unfortunately, by parental promptings (and parents ought to know better). Man acts according to his real nature when, under the guidance of his own reasoned judgment, he disciplines his physical impulses. Celibacy is not impossible by any means. It seems, however, that man's depravity is such that he has never succeeded in curbing in any great measure, even by legal means, his two most ancient enemies, intoxication and prostitution. Incidentally, why is it that the sex joke, no matter whether subtle or obscene, never fails to evoke the raucous laugh from the listener or the reader?

(e) The duty of refraining from activities which destroy the minds and bodies of men. For example, the peddling of narcotic drugs. Consider also the evil of alcohol addiction which has become one of the most serious problems of our time: does it not, in the great majority of cases, have its beginning in "social drinking"? Can anyone morally support, either by private example or by corporate investment, any business, whether legal or illegal, that destroys the minds and bodies of his fellow human beings? Can anyone morally indulge any form of social exploitation that has the same result?

Man's duties with respect to the subhuman orders consist in properly caring for these creatures which may be subordinated to his utility, in treating them with kindness, in abstaining from unnecessary and unjust cruelty in the use of them for his own benefit. These are fundamentally duties he owes to himself and to all his fellows if he is to actualize the ideal norms which serve to mark him off as man.

## FOOTNOTES

[1] See Benjamin Karpman, M. D., The Sexual Offender and His Offenses, esp. p. 17. (The Julian Press, Inc., New York, 1954.)

## XLI. The right of private ownership is a natural, but not an unlimited, right.

Property right (proprietary right, dominion, ownership, etc.) is defined as moral power to possess, use, or dispose of something as one's own (i. e., to the exclusion of all other persons). Private ownership has for its objects external material things, things that are amenable to exclusive appropriation; hence no person can be considered to be property, because every person is an end, never a means, in himself. The subject of private ownership is either a natural person or a juridical person (a group acting as one, such as a firm, company, corporation, etc.) Proprietary right differs from (1) jurisdictional right, which is the right of ruling a community by laws (as exercised by a government), or the right of guiding the activities of individuals by means other than laws (as exercised by parents over children, by teachers in the public schools, etc.); and (2) from eminent domain, which is the right of a society, through its ruling regime, and by due process of law, to take over certain material possessions and utilize them for the common good (e. g., a railroad right-of-way, public roads, parks, military posts, etc.) Proprietary dominion has things, jurisdiction has persons, for its object.

1. The right of private ownership is a natural right. This right is founded on no other fact than the fact of man's existence: the right to life carries with it the right to the means of sustaining life and of enriching the personality. Among primitive peoples, allocation of land (real estate) was not necessary because of sparseness of population: however, as population grew, it became necessary to allocate land; and later to make a distinction even between surface and subsurface (mineral) rights. That the external goods of the world exist for man's use and benefit is evident from (1) his absolute need of them, and (2) their perfect adaptability to his needs as an organism. A natural right is one that is postulated by the needs of human life itself—individual, family, and social. The right to acquire private property is postulated by this threefold need. Individual need includes (a) capability and necessity of human providence, (b) the right of the individual to the fruits of his labor, and (c) the necessity of an adequate incentive to personal labor. That which belongs to everybody is never properly cared for,

because it is human nature to have special interest only in what is one's own. Family need includes (a) duty of maintenance of home, wife, and family, (b) duty of adequate education of offspring—physical, intellectual and moral, and (c) provision for emergencies, such as births, sickness, accidents, old age, etc. The right to private ownership of a home goes along with the right to establish a family. The most stable form of civil society is that in which there is a dominant home-owning middle class. Revolutions occur only in cases in which this middle class disappears, leaving only the ultra-rich and the ultra-poor. Social need includes (a) the promotion of the arts and sciences, and of the amenities of life; (b) wholesome competition arising from private enterprise; (c) prevention of anarchy that arises from universal sloth, or of tyranny from forced conscription of labor, conditions that invariably occur if private enterprise is outlawed. Man either owns some private property, or he will be owned by the state (the ruling regime). As Aristotle pointed out long ago, (a) the great crimes of man are not due to considerations of property, but to human excess (passion, lust; lack of self-discipline, lack of character); (b) elimination of private property, moreover, would destroy the virtue of liberality (generosity) altogether and would make man simply a ward of the state. Any governing regime that tries to eliminate private property will have to resort to brute force to do so. Complete equalization is contrary to human nature: unity is not to be confused with uniformity. A Kentucky thoroughbred and a Missouri mule can be put on the same track, and if the track is made muddy enough, the thoroughbred will not be able to move any faster than the mule. Again, a thousand dollars may be divided equally among ten persons, but it will not be long before two or three of the ten will, by superior initiative or ability or cleverness, acquire possession of the entire sum. Equalization of human talents and incentives, and equalization of property as well, goes directly against human nature itself. Paternalistic government, moreover, destroys individual initiative; citizens who must be "kept" by the state can hardly be called citizens. Finally, no evidence is forthcoming that the much-touted proletarian (from proles, Latin word for a father whose only property is offspring) will prove to be his own messiah; he turns out to be, rather, merely the puppet of the ruling regime.

2. The right of private ownership, however, is not an unlimited right. (1) The individual has the absolute right to assume those goods which are necessary to the sustenance of his own life, provided he is willing to give honest labor in return: the obligation placed upon every man is that he shall earn his daily bread in the sweat of his face, a provision which is for man's own good. The individual has the right to assume for his own use that which has not been assumed by others on the basis of the same right. (2) Other persons have rights, too: the same basic rights (to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness); rights to safety, order, security, integrity of limb, etc. Property right is a right which I am

obligated to use reasonably. I do not have the right to drive my automobile at excessive speed such as to endanger the lives of others, nor do I have the right to drive anywhere, on the sidewalks as well as on the streets, etc. I have no right to use my residence as a place for making explosives, nor as a brothel; I have no right to set fire to my property and thus endanger the property and lives of others, etc. In fact I have no right to use my property in any manner that would be injurious to others—not even to manufacture chemicals, narcotics, etc., that would destroy the minds and bodies of my fellows. (3) Nor do I have any right to the unlimited accumulation of wealth. There was a time a few years ago when a few men owned the quinine supply of the world; had they resorted to price-fixing to excess, that would have been monopoly, and the kind of monopoly that is detrimental to human welfare the world over, and therefore both immoral and illegitimate. One of the legitimate functions of government is that of outlawing such monopolistic practices. There is a moral limit even to "free enterprise." Excessive monopoly can stifle free enterprise as effectively as government control. (4) Much ado has been made in recent years about the subordination of property rights to human rights. No sane person questions the fact that human rights take precedence over everything; indeed there are no rights, property rights included, which are not human rights.

3. That private property is a natural right is confirmed historically. (1) The right to life carries with it the right to the means of sustaining life. The only means of sustaining life available to man are those material goods which provide for him food, shelter, clothing, etc. Hence we reason that the material goods of the earth are here for all mankind. The only ethical problem involved is that of the just allocation of such goods: no society can afford to allow such a maladjustment to prevail as to make it impossible for a citizen to earn a livelihood through honest toil. The world does not owe me a living, but society does owe me the opportunity of making a living. (2) History proves that private property, through relatively just allocation of material goods (and relative justice is all that one can expect in this present world), is the only method that has ever been found to succeed permanently and at the same time to provide for the greatest measure of individual freedom and initiative together with collective security and contentment. Hence private property has existed as a world-wide institution from the very dawn of history. (3) No other system can be correlated with the rise and spread of human initiative and freedom and with the rise and spread of democracy. The only alternative is strict regimentation under a rigid dictatorship; in a word, totalitarianism, in which the social, political, economic, and even the cultural life of a people are all placed under rigid bureaucratic control.

4. Any politico-economic system which denies this basic right of private property is undemocratic and therefore unacceptable, e.g., the following: (1) Social Positivism, which is the doctrine that the sole source of private property right is the civil law,

hence, that only such "rights" exist as are granted (created) by the state. This is simply the denial of natural law and natural right. Under such a view, obviously neither the right of individual conscience, nor minority right, exists: only the will of the ruling regime, enforced by physical power, becomes the source of laws and "rights." However, these would hardly be rights at all: rather, they would be only gratuities doled out by the ruling authority. (2) What is called Communism holds that no right of private property exists and calls the exercise of that right "robbery." Absolute Communism would make all things positively common (including women—the doctrine of "free love") so that neither the individual person nor society as a whole could have dominion over them, but individuals could use them according to their individual desires. This is real "Communism": it seeks the overthrow of all government and hence is anarchistic in character. Marxist-Leninism entrusts the dominion over all goods to the society as a whole, in the final analysis, to the ruling regime set up by the society. In practice this is really Absolute State Capitalism. (Advocated by Fourier, Robert Owen, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotzky, Stalin, etc.) Limited Communism takes the form of what is generally called Socialism.

It would vest in the community as a whole, operating through a duly elected government and through "public corporations," the administration of all means of production and distribution of goods essential to the general welfare. [Evolutionary Socialism (also known as "Fabian" or "creeping" Socialism) proposes to bring in the socialistic order gradually by ballot (legal change). Marxist-Leninism contends that the rule of the proletariat can be achieved only by violent revolution (by bullets); hence it is known as Radical or Revolutionary Socialism.] (3) Anarchism rejects all public authority and would destroy the present social order by force. It would tolerate no other bonds than those by which workers might associate themselves in guilds and in municipalities, to which would be entrusted dominion over various kinds of goods to be produced. (Cf. Syndicalism, Guild Socialism, Industrial Workers of the World, etc). We must conclude that any politico-economic system is inadmissible, the introduction of which and the administration of which reduces the citizenry of a given region to abject subservience to the ruling regime, otherwise known as the State, the Party, or the Cause. Totalitarian systems, moreover, are ethically unjustifiable because they can be instituted only by bloody revolutions (in no instance has what we call "Communism" today ever been introduced by a free popular election). In a democracy, however, the only justifiable instrument for effecting political change ("reform") which public sentiment may deem necessary, is the ballot-box. Certainly our Constitution is sufficiently elastic to permit any kind of change which public sentiment may demand sufficiently to bring about constitutional amendment by due process of law (as provided for, in the Constitution itself); hence there is no excuse for the existence of any movement in the United States that is committed to the doctrine

of revolution by force: such a movement cannot be regarded, in the very nature of the case, as anything but a conspiracy, a form of treason. Totalitarianism can be achieved only by the "liquidation" of the middle class (the bourgeoisie), and can be maintained only by brute force, so contrary is it to human character The "dictatorship of the proletariat" is, in the final analysis, not a "classless" society, but a one-class society maintained by a ruling oligarchy which sees to it that there shall be one, and only one, class in the state.

## XLII. Titles of ownership are classified as original and derivative titles.

A title of ownership is a clearly evident fact by which a moral bond (of ownership) is established between a definite person and a definite thing. No definite thing can belong to a definite person (natural or juridical) without a title.

1. Original titles are those by means of which a thing formerly belonging to no one becomes the property of a particular person: these are effective occupation, accession, and productive labor. (1) Effective occupation is the action by which an unowned thing is taken as the possession of a person or persons. This country was settled in this manner: people settled on the land occupied by no one (certainly the landed area of the United States was not being effectively occupied by the aborigines); hence, effective occupation gave original title. No other original title—to land, especially—is conceivable: however, great injustices can occur in the process. Juridical prerequisites of effective occupation are (a) that the thing is capable of exclusive ownership, (b) that there is a permanent occupancy (squatters are outside this category); and (c) that a permanent sign is set up denoting intention to occupy and thus to acquire possession. No injustice is involved in taking over a thing which belongs to no one, which is not being utilized by anyone: if someone does not come along and take possession of the thing, it will be of no use to anybody. Before injustice can occur, one has to infringe on the rights of another. (2) Accession is the original title to the natural increase of the thing possessed, such as new creatures of the herd, fruits of the orchard, yield of farm land, alluvial deposits, etc. (What about mineral rights?) (3) Productive labor is the gainful expenditure of energy, mental or physical, or both. It gives new form or quality to something already existing and hence makes that thing more useful and valuable. To the extent, therefore, that it makes the occupation effective, labor becomes a primordial title to ownership. (Non-productive labor takes the form of service rendered: it includes the various services and liberal professions, e.g., teachers, dentists, physicians, etc. Such persons do not produce anything as a rule; they do render invaluable services, however, and hence are entitled to proper remuneration.)

2. Derivative titles of ownership occur by transfer of ownership from one person to another: these are prescription, inheritance, and contract. (1) Prescription is the acquiring of ownership by fortuitously coming into possession of a thing that once belonged to another whose claim to the thing has evidently been abandoned. E. g., an outlawed debt, an article which one finds with which no previous owner is identifiable, etc. Prescription is a natural title for two reasons: unless it were, many material things would be of no utility to man; ownership would be so uncertain that contests for it would be multiplied beyond reason. (2) Inheritance is legitimate succession to ownership of a thing upon the death of the former owner. Intestate succession (when an individual dies without leaving a will) is in favor of the wife and children of the deceased. The right of inheritance is essential to democratic society, for the following reasons: (a) right order demands the stability of family life; wife and children are clearly indicated by the Moral Law to be the natural heirs of the husband and father of the family, as the continuation of his personality; (b) hereditary succession is necessary to safeguard parental authority; (c) if a person could make no such disposition of his earthly goods, and if the state took them over at his death, obviously the state would own everything within a generation or two; (d) if the state did not take over the property of the deceased, then the first occupant would do so, and this would mean a fight among the relatives for the disposition of the property, and in the end would spell the destruction of the social order; (e) abandonment of inheritance would mean that all families ultimately would be thrown upon the bounty of the state; (f) abandonment of inheritance would throw upon the state the duty of subsidizing all worthy cultural and humanitarian causes, and the result would be the stamping out of altruism; (g) the right of inheritance is a positive stimulus to human initiative; (h) property right is domestic and personal in character, and therefore is by nature antecedent to civil law and even to the beginning of civil power; hence it is the duty of a society to safeguard this right and to control its use by law, in such a manner as to prevent the accumulation of vast wealth in the hands of a privileged few. While equal distribution of material goods is impossible and unnatural, equitable distribution is absolutely essential and should be maintained by governmental action if necessary. By equitable distribution is meant a relatively fair allocation of goods among all segments of the population, in order to prevent unemployment and to safeguard free enterprise in general. Devices that serve this general purpose are death taxes, inheritance taxes, income taxes, minimum wage laws, collective bargaining, etc. In the final analysis, private inheritance, if properly controlled, is a necessary safeguard of democratic institutions. The state has a right to be supported by its citizens by means of taxation of private enterprises. The state also has the duty of protecting its citizens from the corruptions and injustices that proceed from the "cornering" of excessive wealth in the hands of a minority, to the detriment and degradation of the many. Such a condition—that in which only two classes exist, the

ultra-rich and the ultra-poor—issues inevitably in violent revolution and the overthrow of the government. As Aristotle pointed out long ago, the stability of any social order depends on the stability of a large home-owning class. Individuals who are fortunate enough to amass great wealth—and in most cases great wealth comes fortuitously—are too often prone to overlook the fact that great wealth entails great responsibility to society.

I have no quarrel with men of wealth, but I must insist that responsibility to society is in proportion to the wealth accumulated. I have often made the statement that if I am to be exploited, and I know that I am exploited (by marked-up, even excessive, profits) about every time I go to the store to purchase needed material goods, I prefer to be exploited by private industry than a government bureaucracy of some kind. It is not money, but the love of money, that is the root of all kinds of evil (1 Tim. 6:10). We can—and often do—carry the profit motive to unjustifiable extremes; yet we cannot do away with it without destroying democracy and every value that is associated with it, even freedom itself. There are two fundamental human rights, lacking either of which no political order can rightly call itself democratic: these are the rights of religious freedom and private property. When these two rights are usurped by government, democracy perishes. Moreover, I have never been able to convince myself that poverty is a virtue, when, as a matter of fact, it breeds vice, crime, and all kinds of wickedness; it is about the costliest business—to all segments of the economy—that any community can engage in. Among the poor themselves it usually resolves itself into a psychological, rather than an economic, problem: hence the solution is not easy to find. Nations and communities are acting wisely, however, in seeking a solution, one that at least will reduce poverty to a minimum.

I recall walking with a friend, on one occasion, over his fertile farm land of several hundred acres in extent. In the course of the conversation, he became rather boastful. "I suppose," he said, "that I could sell out tomorrow for a quarter of a million dollars. Yes, I think I am worth that much." That was about all I could take, and so I said to him, "You are mistaken. That is not what you are worth." In astonishment, he replied, "I don't understand. Just what do you mean?" "I mean," I answered, "that two hundred and fifty thousand dollars represents what you have cost society. What you are worth is to be measured by what you put back into society, for the common good." Worth is not measured by getting, but by giving. Jesus, Luke 12:15: "A man's life consists not in the abundance of the things which he possesses." This is a truth that selfish man is very reluctant to admit.

(3) Contract. (This is discussed under the next Proposition.)

## XLIII. The essential elements of a contract are (1) matter, (2) subject, and consent.

Contract is a natural derivative title of ownership. It is an agreement by which the contracting parties obligate themselves to do, to give, or to refrain from (omit) something.

1. The Matter is that which the agreement covers or with which it deals. This has to be possible, of course: no one can have the duty to do the impossible, nor can anyone acquire the right to attempt to exact the impossible of another. The matter must exist either in fact (in re) or in reasonable hope (in spe rationale): e.g., a school borrows money at a bank in reasonable expectation of tuition to be collected the next semester, or a farmer borrows money on the reasonable expectation of proceeds from his spring crops, etc.

2. The Subjects are the persons who enter into the agreement. All and only those who have the use of their freedom can enter into a contract, that is, can transfer dominion or incur an obligation. With respect to aliens, restrictions vary from one country to another. In general, infants, insane persons, drunken persons, and others are physically incapable of entering into contracts; minors, and those sentenced to prison for life, are juridically incapable of doing so.

3. Consent. This is the mutual meeting of wills, the free agreement of both parties to the same juridical (contractual) effect. Consent must be internal, free and deliberate, and externally signified. Consent may be vitiated by error (deception through ignorance), by fraud, by fear, or by violence. The very essence of a contractual relationship is in the meeting of wills: for such mutual and free consent, there must be equality of persons involved, that is, one must not be in such a position as to enforce advantage over the other by some kind of pressure.

## XLIV. Contracts, generally speaking, are of two kinds, gratuitous and onerous.

A gratuitous contract usually involves an advantage on one side and an obligation on the other; an onerous (from onus, oneris, "burden," "debt") contract involves an obligation on both sides.

1. Among gratuitous contracts are a promise (involving the duty of fidelity), a gift (full and free transfer of ownership from one person to another), a loan (for use or for consumption, e. g., a typewriter, a pound of butter), and a deposit (by which one undertakes to protect the property of another which has been entrusted to his care).

2. Onerous contracts are bilateral, and belong in the Order of Justice. They include the following: (1) Buying and selling; tokens, coins, bills, etc., serve as media of exchange. Monopoly occurs when a person or persons have control of a commodity, a business, or a power of nature, to such an extent as to be able to fix prices. Monopolies are lawful (a) for the legal protection of the rights of industrious individuals (patents, copyrights, etc.); (b) for the restriction of articles harmful to the community (selling of drugs, liquor dispensaries); (c) in cases of the necessity of concessions for the common good. Some monopolies are necessarily government owned and operated (the postoffice department); others are government sanctioned (the telephone service: if there were ten companies, one would have to have as many different telephones). Monopoly is a positive evil (a) if it results, unnecessarily, in high prices and low wages; (b) if it impedes the rights of labor; (c) if it corrupts public officials for its own protection; (d) if it favors privileges in common utility or indiscriminate underselling; (e) if it leads to the lack of equitable protection of private property; and (f) if it lessens initiative, independence, and opportunity, and thereby serves to create a proletariat. (2) Renting. (3) Service or Labor (to be treated fully in the next section on the wage contract). (4) Partnership, corporation, holding company, etc. (5) The interest contract. Contrast interest and usury. Ancient thinkers held that money is intrinsically sterile; therefore any form of interest was held to be usury. This view changed in medieval times, especially with the rise of mercantilism: then and now it is held that money can fructify, in the form of investment, and in relation to the law of supply and demand.

(6) Contracts of chance. The insurance contract: this involves a large measure of contingency, such as, If I die, If my car is stolen, etc.; however, it is the protection afforded by the contract that modifies the contingency. Wagers, lotteries, gambling, etc. The evil effects of gambling are obvious: it tends to dissipate the material means which should be devoted to the care of the family or to other constructive ends; it tends to become a kind of "fever in the blood"—hence the term "compulsive gambler"; it produces a class of "professional" gamblers who contribute little or nothing to the common good, and hence become parasites on society.

## XLV. The wage contract is based on the Natural Moral Law which gives to the head of the family the right to the opportunity of earning a living wage by giving honest labor in return for it, on a contractual basis.

The almost inconceivable advances in technology, and the problems of automation brought on by these advances, have transformed the United States economy from an agricultural into a predominantly industrialized economy. All this has happened since the turn of the present century. These changes have brought into focus, unavoidably, the problem of labor and industry relations.

Collective bargaining was instituted as a national policy—as a war measure, in fact—in the second Wilson administration. (See, in this connection, the Railway Labor Act of 1926, the Clayton Act of 1914, the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932. The first comprehensive law designed to deal with these matters was the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935, later (in 1947) amended as the Labor-Management Relations Act (generally known as the Taft-Hartley Law). The first law which brought the power of government into the area of free enterprise was, of course, the Sherman Act of 1890 which prohibits monopolies that tend to restrict the flow of interstate commerce.)

The Taft-Hartley Law explicitly affirms the policy of the United States in these matters to be that of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" in the field of labor-industry relations. The same law declares the rights of employees to be those of unionization, collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, leading to the negotiation of a wage contract. It also affirms the right of an employee to refrain from all such activities, except in such cases as those in which the union shop procedure is (by a negotiated agreement) in effect. (This is the agreement according to which the employer is free to hire anyone he chooses, provided the person hired joins the union that is serving as bargaining representative within a specified time. This union shop policy is generally disliked by management, but is justified by labor on the ground that the employee benefits from the union's representation and hence should support it as a paying member.) (Incidentally, in all such negotiations, the bargaining representative does not have to be a local or national union: it may be an individual, or it may even be an association of the employees of a given

company provided it can be established that no manipulation or control by management is involved.)

The wage contract is that form of contractual relationship whereby the worker grants to an employer his services (mental or physical) at a definite price for a specified time or work. The employer may be a natural or a juridical person. A wage is a remuneration of justice for physical or mental work; hence the wage contract is a personal contract. A minimum just wage is that below which justice is said to be violated.

We summarize, up to this point, as follows: (1) The right to life carries with it the right to the means of sustaining life. (2) The only means of preserving physical or natural life are the material goods of the earth. (3) The material goods of the earth are here for all mankind. (4) The problem involved, however, is that of the relatively just allocation of such goods. (5) Property right is a natural right, but not an unlimited right. (6) The only property which the great majority of men have to put on the market is productive labor.

Evidently there are four, and only four, ways of resolving this problem of the relations between industry and labor, as follows: (1) Absolute control by industry. This would be a return to the old system by which the employer hired and "fired" at will. Under such a system the employee's wage would not be a matter of his right, but solely a gratuity on the part of the employer. (2) Absolute control by labor. This would surely introduce chaos into the manipulation of the economy; moreover, it would reduce the dividends reasonably expected by stockholders to gratuities on the part of organized labor. (3) Absolute control by government. This no one wants, neither labor, nor industry, nor government. This control would certainly take the form of compulsory arbitration by government, which would be a "hot potato" for any political party. However, if management and labor cannot compose their differences by negotiation they will force the adoption of compulsory arbitration for the protection of the common good. (4) Collective bargaining within the framework of private property right. Obviously, this is the only democratic procedure, and thus far it has worked amazingly well. However, we must always keep in mind that freedom will "work" only if we make it "work," that democracy will "work" only if we make it "work," and that collective bargaining will "work" only if the leaders of labor and industry are resolved to make it "work." The best plan in the world will be a failure unless men of ability and good will work the plan. A handful of die-hard radicals on either side can effectively frustrate the whole procedure of collective bargaining.

The ethical grounds on which the United States courts have validated present-day labor-industry legislation, are as follows:

1. The true intrinsic value of labor is in its function or end. Intrinsic value is natural worth. The obligation to work rests upon man in general, and hence on every man in particular.

2. The natural function of labor is the provision of a living wage, which, in the nature of things, is a family-supporting wage. If the obligation to work rests on every man in particular, the question arises, to work for what or to what end? Obviously—to the end of establishing and providing for a family. The family is the ultimate unit of social organization and order; it is a natural institution. Man has the duty of providing for himself and for the family which he establishes; moreover, the existence of the duty presupposes the existence of sufficient means for the proper discharge of it. Honest labor is this means and in the great majority of cases is the only means at hand. The true intrinsic value of labor, therefore, is determined not by the law of supply and demand (here we must part company with classic economics), nor by the number of hours put in, nor by the kind of product turned out, but by its natural function or end, which is the preservation and sustenance of the worker and his family. A minimum just wage, therefore, is a family-supporting wage. This means genuine sustenance and includes a decent habitation, the necessities of life, plus moderate conveniences in accord with the existing standards of living, and moderate savings for sickness and other emergencies and for old age.

3. Labor has extrinsic norms of value also, all of which are titles to a higher wage than the mere minimum. Among these are (1) years of preparation which add to a man's ability and consequently to his worth, (2) the danger involved, and consequent risk that may have to be taken, in a particular job (e. g. , the mining of coal), (3) special skill of any kind, and (4) an employee's particular advantage to an employer, as having had long years of faithful service, or as being the head of a special group, etc.

4. The Natural Moral Law which gives a man the right to a living wage gives him the right also to the necessary means of obtaining it. This is a corollary to the right to life itself.

5. Among the means necessary to the obtaining of a living wage may be included unionization, collective bargaining, the wage contract, and some forms of the strike. (1) One of the prerequisites of a true contract is that the parties thereto meet and negotiate on a mutually free and equal footing of power. Free consent of wills is necessary to a contract: to make such a contract valid, in the field of commutative justice, there must be, as we have learned equality of persons and equality of things exchanged. (2) In our present economic system, a single employee, or even a group of employees, would be at a distinct disadvantage in trying to negotiate with an economically powerful industry. The balance of power would be so heavily on the side of the employer that the ends of justice would be dependent on his charity rather than on the demands of the Natural Law. Hence, in order to bring about balance of power (that is, bigness on both sides, for bigness is not necessarily a sign of badness), necessary to wage negotiations and to a just wage contract, employees have the right to form unions and to bargain col-

lectively through representatives of their own choosing. It is difficult to see how any other procedure could be essentially democratic.

Ethics of the Various Kinds of Strikes. A strike is a concerted cessation of labor for the purpose of removing or correcting alleged injustices or inequities. The right to strike comes under the Principle of Double Effect, that the real grievance to be corrected and the common good to be thereby advanced must far outweigh the temporary evils to both parties (to the employer, cessation of production and loss of profit, and to the employee, cessation of work and loss of pay) to validate the strike. Moreover, the general welfare must take precedence over the welfare of any particular segment of the population. (Cf. strikes in public utilities, railroad or bus strikes which tie up transportation, strikes against municipalities, etc., in relation to the general welfare. What about the legitimacy of absentee ownership of utilities of any kind?) Kinds of Strikes: (1) The direct strike: a cessation of work on the part of the employees laboring under a specific industrial grievance, usually a strike against a single plant or industry. This is the kind of strike that is usually validated by the Taft-Hartley Law. (2) The sympathy strike ( or the secondary boycott). This is the strike in which men who have no complaint themselves strike in order to support their fellows who are engaged in a direct strike. This form of strike might be valid within the limits of the same industry; in relation to a different industry, however, the chances are that it penalizes an employer who is just, and thus makes him suffer unjustly for the alleged offenses of an employer who is thought to be unjust. Sympathy strikes and secondary boycotts are generally treated as unfair labor practices by the Law. (3) The sit-down strike. This is an importation from France. It is the strike in which the strikers not only quit working but also assume possession of the plant in which they work. This is the forcible taking over of the property of another without due process of law. To permit such action is to invite anarchy. Generally speaking, it is an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Law. (4) The jurisdictional strike is that form of strike designed to compel recognition of a certain union, in preference to another union, as the employees' bargaining representative, in the same plant or industry. This kind of strike is prevented by the machinery of the Taft-Hartley Law which provides for elections of bargaining representatives annually: hence by each annual election the matter is settled for another year. (5) A general strike is the concerted cessation of work by all organized labor within the national state, and is equivalent to a revolution. A strike of this kind is almost certain evidence that a grievance of extraordinary proportions really exists and should demand the undivided attention of all statesmen entrusted with the maintenance of the general welfare.

Generally speaking, the machinery of the Taft-Hartley Law makes either illegal or impossible such devices as the lockout, the closed shop, the sympathy strike, the secondary boycott, the yellow dog contract, the sit-down strike, etc. In recent years the trend of

legislative enforcement in this field is, to say the least, to frown on what is called featherbedding. So-called "right-to-work" laws have been enacted in some of the states of our Union. The ethical aspect of such laws involves two important considerations: first, there is the matter of questionable motivation on the part of the legislators—whether they really seek the protection and benefit of the non-union worker, or whether they seek to use these laws as devices for breaking up the unions; second, there is the contention of many that common justice obligates any state which enacts such laws to maintain an economy in which a choice of various opportunities for work is always available to the job-seeker. As stated above, the unions contend that since the new employee benefits from the union's representation (in the form of higher wages), he should support the union as a paying member.

ADDENDA:

The Pillars of Marxist-Leninism. It is a basic principle of Americanism that error can be exposed and counteracted only by the teaching of the truth. Such is the case especially with respect to Marxism and Leninism. How can succeeding generations meet this menace if they do not know what it is? We therefore shall proceed to set forth briefly, at this point, what we choose to call the "pillars" of this system, at the same time pointing up the prime fallacies, as follows:

1. Materialism. This is the cornerstone of the whole system, to which all economic and political doctrines are secondary. This materialism embraces various ramifications: (1) That the world we live in is ultimately a world of matter exclusively, or, as Democritus put it in ancient times: "In reality nothing exists but atoms and the void." All phenomena, including those of the life processes and of the thought processes are reducible to energy-matter. (2) That the human being is nothing but an aggregate of protons and electrons; hence, the rabble is to be used by the Party intellectuals as instruments of production, and the "liquidation" of a nonconformist is on the same level of expediency as the killing of a mad dog. (3) Economic Determinism, that is, that all events of history are determined by economic factors; that under any private property system history will continue to be a struggle between the "haves" and the "have nots," etc. Both Marx and Lenin repudiated morality in toto: both morality and religion, they affirmed, are "ideological veils" that hide from view the dominance of the exploiting class. (It should be noted that in all Leninist "take-overs" of various peoples, the first necessary step was the elimination of the middle class. This class—the bourgeoisie—is the class that must be wiped out before social change can be instituted, and this social change must be effected by a forcible coup d'etat. But: there is no evidence that the higher life and thought processes in man can be reduced to sheer matter, that psychology can be reduced to sheer physiology: in fact, the empirical evidence, and especially

commonsense evidence, is all to the contrary. And, not all events of history by any means have been caused by economic factors: ideas, and ideologies, have affected the course of history just as powerfully as economic factors (cf. the rise and spread of Buddhism, of early Christianity, of the antislavery movement, and of the growing sense of social justice in many parts of the world, etc.)

2. Scientism. This is the deification of science. In the thinking of the monolithic Leninist, science is man's cure-all; by his science he will finally solve all the problems in this world and out of it. This absolute faith in human science, it has been said rightly, "is so naive as to be almost unbelievable." Hence, there is no place in the system for religion, for faith of any kind which has as its object some Power or Powers believed to be superior to man. The utter self-righteousness and assumed infallibility of the committed "Communist" is really absurd: his mind is a closed mind—he is right and simply cannot be wrong. It is a fact worthy of note that the movement is headed by "intellectuals" in all parts of the world: these are persons who, having lost their faith in God, have allowed devotion to the Party and its System to fill the vacuum. Hence, their deification of science. As a matter of fact, man's most positive proof of his own asininity becomes obvious especially in this absurd pretension to omniscience in the form of his science.

3. Dialectic, the tension of opposites. The "dialectical materialism" of Marx and Lenin has taken over "bag and baggage" the Hegelian "philosophy" of the historical process as the sequence of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—a kind of "spiral evolution." According to Marx, the thesis is the capitalistic system; the antithesis is world revolution; the synthesis is supposed to be the dictatorship of the proletariat, as a result of which "the withering away of the state" will bring in the classless society. But—history itself fails to validate the Hegelian triad; moreover, according to Hegel the synthesis became a new thesis and the spiral process went on from there ad infinitum, whereas Marx "froze" the whole process with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

4. Surplus Value. This is the doctrine that labor is the source of all value, that is, that the value of a commodity is determined by the labor that goes into the production of it. Surplus value is the difference between what the workers create, namely, all value, and the share which they get, namely, wages. To maintain and to increase surplus value (profit) by exploiting labor is, according to Marx, the very life blood of the capitalistic system. But—this view ignores in toto the use value of a commodity: of what value is any product if it cannot be sold in the open market? Moreover, factors other than labor enter into the determination of the value of commodities, such as the corporations which initiate new enterprises, scientists who create new materials, managerial experts who provide the "know-how" for production and distribution, etc.

5. World Revolution. The Marxist thesis is that world revolution is inevitable. But there is little or nothing to support this view. Class struggle is not inevitable: indeed, in the United States it is prevented by the growing altruism of both capital and labor and their willingness to cooperate in the solving of mutual problems. (Note the many practical methods that have been adopted by both labor and industry to meet the problems of automation.) World revolution by force is not necessary to the resolution of economic inequities; such a resolution can be brought about by government action as authorized by popular vote, as has been done in the United States, without the necessity of any resort to force. Moreover, economic conditions are different in different parts of the world and therefore are not uniformly amenable to a single method of treatment, and least of all to that of forcible revolution. All this adds up to the fact that the Leninist System is in fact a world conspiracy which seeks to impose itself upon all peoples by every form of deceit, treachery, espionage, and brute force.

These radical economic and political theories have never gained any headway in the United States, for several reasons, such as the following: (1) their coercive character makes them repugnant to people who have been reared in the democratic tradition and under democratic prodecure; (2) the fact that in the United States no feudal system with its aftermath of economic inequities, no military caste, no specific nobility of wealth or pedigree, no established church, in fact no real capitalistic class (corporations in the United States include great numbers of middle-class stockholders or investors), much less any genuine proletariat, has ever existed, removes from our people the temptation to give heed to the seductive appeals of international "Communism"; (3) any system which openly repudiates religious faith and espouses atheism is repugnant to the vast majority of Americans; (4) the dynamic character of the American economy makes it relatively immune to inroads of any monolithic politico-economic system; (5) the growing sense of social responsibility and social justice on the part of the owners and managers of American industry is one of the outstanding social phenomena of our time. Our industrialists themselves realize that their employees desire to be respected and treated as fellow human beings, and that the contented workman is the efficient workman; hence their willingness to accept the policy of collective bargaining. This has surely been one of the prime factors in the rejection of Marxism by the American people as a whole. (6) Finally, American labor itself has never permitted itself to be victimized by these radical theories, but has always adhered religiously to the policy of collective bargaining within the framework of private property, with government acting only in the role of mediator and conciliator. American labor has consistently repudiated direct political action (that of constituting itself a separate political party known as the Labor Party such as exists in England), and has adhered firmly to the policy of indirect political action (that of supporting the candidates of all parties

believed to be sympathetic toward the policies and aims of organized labor.)

Consider, in this connection, F. D. Roosevelt's Four Freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear (as stated in his message to Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1941).

The student is urged to look up a copy of The Saturday Evening Post, issue of August 20, 1960, and read the article in it by Mr. Clinton Rossiter, entitled "Why Marx Failed Here." Rossiter develops the thesis that Marx himself was disappointed by the refusal of the American people to respond favorably to his theories, and attributes this reaction essentially to the fact that Marx believed in government not by, but only for, the people, a goal thoroughly repugnant to all who have been steeped in the American heritage. As a matter of fact, according to this article, Marx failed here because he had no clear conception of the character of American capitalism. Rossiter goes on to say, however, that there are some lessons which we Americans can learn from Marx's bad example and from the worse example of the "tough heirs" of his system, if we wish to preserve and to improve our own capitalistic economy. These he lists as follows:

1. "That toilsome poverty is not the heaven-ordained state of men."

2. "That the forms of democracy are not necessarily democracy itself."

3. "That psychological security is not easily found in an industrial system." (As a matter of fact, struggle—some measure of insecurity—is the price we have to pay for freedom.)

4. "That capitalism is bound to have its ups and downs."

5. "That private property is property—but it is also power." (Money is good only for what it can buy, and the most dangerous "commodity" which it can buy is power, power that is often exercised sub rosa.) I commend these conclusions to every reader of this text.

In the heydey of the "New Deal" some wit drew up a series of definitions of current politico-economic systems, definitions which, though obviously intended to be facetious, are nevertheless characterized by more truth than fiction. This set of definitions has appeared in the press many times, but I think it worthy of being remembered, hence I present it here as follows:

> Socialism—You have two cows: you give one to your neighbor.
>
> Communism—You have two cows: you give both to the government, and the government gives you back as much milk as the government thinks you ought to have.

Fascism—You keep two cows, and then give the government the milk, and the government gives part of the milk back to you.

Nazi-ism—The government shoots you and takes the two cows.

New Dealism—The government shoots one cow, milks the other, and then pours the milk down the sewer.

Capitalism—You sell one cow and buy a bull.

"A word to the wise is sufficient."

## Resume of the rights of man

"Rights of the human person as such. —The right to existence. —The right to personal liberty or the right to conduct one's own life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible for them before God and the law of the community. —The right to the pursuit of the perfection of rational and moral human life. —The right to the pursuit of eternal life along the path which conscience has recognized as the path indicated by God. —The right of the Church and other religious families to the free exercise of their spiritual activity. —The right of pursuing a religious vocation; the freedom of religious orders and groups. —The right to marry according to one's choice and to raise a family, which will in its turn be assured of the liberties due it;—the right of the family society to respect for its constitution, which is based on natural law, not on the law of the State, and which fundamentally involves the morality of the human being. —The right to keep one's body whole. —The right to property. —Finally, the right of every human being to be treated as a person, not as a thing.

"Rights of the civic person. —The right of every citizen to participate actively in political life, and in particular the right of equal suffrage for all. —The right of the people to establish the Constitution of the State and to determine for themselves their form of government. —The right of association, limited only by the juridically recognized necessities of the common good, and in particular the right to form political parties or political schools. —The right of free investigation and discussion (freedom of expression). —Political equality, and the equal right of every citizen to his security and his liberties within the State. —The equal right of every one to the guarantees of an independent judiciary power. —Equal possibility of admission to public employment and free access to the various professions.

"Rights of the social person, and more particularly of the working person. —The right freely to choose his work. —The right freely to form vocational groups or trade-unions. —The right of the worker to be considered socially as an adult. —The right of economic groups (trade-unions and working communities) and other social groups to freedom and autonomy. —The right to a just wage. The right to work. And wherever an associative system can be substituted for

the wage system, the right to the joint ownership and joint management of the enterprise, and to the 'worker's title.'—The right to relief, unemployment insurance, sick benefits and social security.—The right to have a part, free of charge, depending on the possibilities of the community, in the elementary goods, both material and spiritual, of civilization."
—J. Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 111-114. (Scribners, New York, 1943.)

## XLVI. Society is defined as a permanent moral union of two or more persons, for the attainment of a common end by means of their co-operative activity.

Man lives with others, works with others, is benefited by others of his kind, universally and inevitably. These are facts of history, and of ordinary observation and experience. Man is a social being. (1) Society is a permanent union: to accomplish its proper end, it must have stability. (2) It is a moral union, i. e., an order of persons joined in a complexus of rights, duties and sanctions. (Wherever persons live together, always there are some who must be watched, restrained and punished.) (3) It is a permanent union of two or more persons, a union flowing from intellects and wills, attributes only of persons. (4) It is a union of persons for a common end—"the general welfare"—an end which can be brought about only by their cooperative activity. It is a union for the attainment of such ends as food, shelter, clothing, education, art, science, religion, etc. Every one contributes some little bit to the common good and all benefit therefrom. What could one man cast on an island uninhabited by his fellows, as was the experience of Robinson Crusoe, have for the enrichment of his personality? How could he have even a bar of soap or a pocketknife, not to mention a refrigerator or an automobile, etc. ? Or, what does a streetcar motorman do with respect to the shoes he wears, or the suit he wears, or the tickets he punches? Nothing. All these things are done for him. The end of society is great good which could never come to the individual per se.

1. Aristotle's Four Causes as applied to society.[1] (1) Material cause (the stuff of which a thing is made: the cause of which); Formal cause (that which gives to the matter the precise form or specificity which it has, that which puts it in the class to which it belongs: the cause according to which); the efficient cause (that which unites form and matter to give the object concrete existence: the cause by which); and the final cause (the end or function to be served by the object: the foreseen final cause which precedes all other causes; that which is last in actuality is first in motivation: the cause for which). The matter of which a society is formed is persons, obviously (not a multitude of chairs, nor a herd of cattle, nor a span of horses, nor even a man on a horse: such aggregates do not constitute a society). A society can be formed only by persons,

because persons alone can foresee a common good and cooperate in the attainment of it. The formal cause, or that which changes a mere crowd or aggregate of persons into a society, is the social moral bond which unites its members. A society is a union of intellects perceiving an end, and of wills cooperating to attain that end. The efficient cause of a society is the fact or circumstances giving rise to the social moral bond. The efficient cause of a natural society is the Natural Law itself; that of a pactitious society is the free association of its members. The final cause of a society is a common good to be attained through the cooperative activity of its members. In a pactitious society, the individual may either cooperate or quit. In a natural society, he enjoys certain rights and is bound to perform certain duties, as a part of the nature of things. Parents have the natural duty of providing for and protecting their children; and children have the natural right to be provided for and protected by their parents, etc. In any society, the person has the duty of doing good and avoiding evil. Take lynching, for example: it is wrong for one man to take the law into his own hands; hence, it is wrong for two, twenty, or fifty men to do so. Man has no right or obligation to cooperate with his fellows in the production of evil. He has no moral right to conduct or support any kind of enterprise which destroys the minds or bodies of his fellow men, or results in their exploitation for his own selfish ends. And moral right is always superior to civil or legal (positive) right. That is to say, no human law can make a naturally immoral act moral.

2. The end for which a society exists gives that society (1) its specificity, and (2) its dignity and perfection. (1) Societies differ specifically according to their respective ends: e. g. , a conjugal society (of husband and wife), an athletic society, an educational society, a recreational society, etc. Some societies are necessary to the conservation of the race: many others are not. (2) The dignity and perfection of a society are determined by the end for which it exists. Obviously, the conservation of the race, and the general peace and prosperity of its members, are necessary ends if human beings are to live in this world; and these necessary ends are served by the family and the state, respectively. (The church exists and functions, of course, primarily for the spiritual good of the race. ) There are many societies, however, which the human race could dispense with without incurring any great loss.

3. Classification of Societies: (1) As to origin, they are either natural (demanded by the nature of things, their ends determined by the Natural Law itself as embodied in human nature and human relationships), or pactitious (their constitution and ends determined by the free consent of the members). Pactitious societies are usually designated "associations" by the sociologists. (2) As to perfection (completeness), societies are either perfect (one whose end is subordinate to that of no other society, and which possesses within itself the means necessary to the attainment of that end), or imperfect (one whose end is subordinate to that of another society, and one

which does not have within itself the means necessary to the attainment of its proper end, as e. g. , the family). (Are there any complete societies other than the state and the church?)

4. Man is by nature a social being. Cf. Aristotle's famous dictum: "Man is by nature a political animal," that is, a dweller in a polis or city-state. Men have always lived in society: the person who isolates himself altogether from social intercourse is rightly regarded as abnormal. Moreover, the conservation and perfection—physical, intellectual, and moral—of men as individuals depend to a large extent on the fact of this social life. What is the basis for this fact? Why are men social? There can be only two possible answers: man is social either by education or by natural (physical and moral) necessity. We take the position here that man is by nature a social being and that society is a natural institution. (1) The contractualist theory of the state is that it has its sole cause in the agreement (compact, "social contract") of its members to form such a union. This view originated with Hobbes and may be summarized diagrammatically as follows:

| | "State of Nature" | The Social Contract |
|---|---|---|
| Thomas Hobbes[2] (1588-1679) in Leviathan. | A state of "warfare of all against all," with brute force as the determinant of human action. | The compact into which man's demand for self-preservation impelled him, a compact in which he renounced anarchy for submission (preferably) to the hereditary absolute monarch, the delegation of power being absolute and never subject to recall. |
| Jean Jacques[3] Rosseau (1712-1788), in The Social Contract. | A state or primitive simple life such as supposed to have prevailed among the higher primates, with no morality, save that of compassion. | The substitution for this primitive freedom-in-nature, of a form of political liberty-under-law, by the total submission of each subject to the General Will regardless of the dictate of his individual will. What is called Civilization, though the cause of man's troubles, has to be accepted as a kind of necessary nuisance. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| John Locke (1632-1704) especially in his second treatise, of Civil Government. | A hypothetical state of human beings living together as individuals, prior to the introduction of government. | Simply the agreement to abide by the will of the majority, freely expressed at proper intervals. |

Objections to the contractual theory of the state are as follows: (a) the original "state of nature" as proposed by Hobbes and Rosseau are purely suppositious, with little or no evidence to warrant them; (b) in his essential humanity (human nature) man is no different from what he has been throughout the historic period, and what he was, or whether he was truly homo sapiens, prehistorically is still a matter of conjecture; (c) no generation has any moral or physical power to bind absolutely succeeding generations (in our United States system no generation is bound absolutely by preceding generations, because of the possibility of change that is implicit in the procedure of Constitutional amendment); (d) no generation of men can enter into a pactum subjectionis whereby they would abdicate the rights and duties that attach to personality as such: this would be, quoting Cassirer again, an act of renunciation by which man "would give up that very character which constitutes his nature and essence: he would lose his humanity."

(2) It was understood by all thinkers of ancient and medieval times that man is by nature a social being and that social order has been a natural development: from family, to clan, to tribe, to nation, to national state. Plato taught that the state is a natural institution, deriving from the natural needs of man (for food, shelter, and clothing) and from the natural division of labor (according to individual aptitudes). Aristotle taught that the household was the original social unit, and that development was from household (oikos, from which is derived oikonomika, "economics"—that is, household management) through the village (a universal institution) to the polis or city-state.[4] Cf. Genesis 2:18—"It is not good that the man should be alone," that is, not good for the man himself, nor for the Plan of the Universe which demands the propagation and increase of the human stock. Man is by nature a social being, and society is a natural institution. (3) Evolutionists hold, as a general rule, that in the process of evolution men were gathered into civil society by an irresistible impulse of their own nature: that social organization is but another manifestation of inevitable "cultural evolution." But thi view differs little, after all, from the position taken here that man is by his very nature a social being, or that the manifestations of a truly natural impulse under the guidance of reason in man, is but an operation of the Natural Moral Law.

5. Our view that man is naturally social is based on human nature as we know it today and as we know that it has existed for some seven thousand years (that is, on human nature as we know it from

the pages of history, not from mythology nor from conjectural prehistory). The nature of a thing is properly judged from its constant and uniform aptitudes, tendencies, and needs. History shows that man at all times and in all places has manifested a natural aptitude, tendency, and need (real necessity) to live in society and to cooperate with his fellows for the common good to be obtained in and through social order and impossible to be obtained outside social organization. Therefore, man is by nature a social being. (1) Man's natural aptitude for society is proved by his faculties of speech, hearing and reason, by his ability to communicate ideas in the form of language and to understand them when communicated; by his propensity for division of labor, for pursuing definite lines of work and sharing with others the products of his activities; and by his propensity for organization to accomplish his ends. (2) Man's natural inclination to society is evidenced by the fact that very few persons are content to live in seclusion from their fellows, and that those who do so (hermits) are regarded as abnormal; by the fact that sympathy and cooperation are, and have always been, among man's most universal virtues. From the dawn of history, cooperation has existed side by side with conflict; both are equally ancient and persistent phenomena: (See P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, Knopf, New York, 1922); and by the fact that man has tended from the beginning to make a distinction between right and wrong in his conduct (the sense of justice): no clan or tribe has ever been found without some form of customary law. (3) Man's absolute need of society is evident from the following facts: (a) the conjugal relation itself is nature's provision for the conservation and education of the race; (b) children would die without the help of society; there is no creature on earth so helpless, or so helpless for so long a time, as the human infant; (c) the real benefits and privileges of life would be impossible without society; (d) normal human development—in art, science, business, religion, in every field of human enterprise—would be utterly impossible apart from society; (e) history shows that man has always been in need of protection and defense against injuries at the hands of his fellow-men (those who will not play the game according to the rules); such protection can be afforded only by organized society. We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that without any social proclivities whatever, the race would have perished long ago. On the basis of this array of evidence, we reaffirm our position, that man is by nature, and not by education or by social contract, destined to live in society. "Man is by nature a political animal." (4) To sum up: the three fundamental prerequisites of human happiness are something to do, something to love, and something to live for. To the provision of these essential needs, society is absolutely indispensable. That is to say, without society, it would not be possible for man to attain his natural and proper ultimate ends.

6. The primary and essential property of society is authority. (1) Authority is the right to direct efficaciously (i. e. , to oblige and to compel) the members of a society to seek by their cooperative

efforts the proper end of that society. Authority includes both preceptive power (the power to make laws; prohibitions are negative precepts), and coactive power (the power to enforce, or to compel obedience to, the law). No domestic or civil society ever existed without authority and government in some form. (2) The natural or moral person holding authority in a society is known variously as the superior, ruler, executive, etc.; the persons ruled by proper authority, and directed thereby in their cooperative activity toward the society's proper end, are known as the subjects. (3) This general thesis is denied, of course, by the anarchists, of whom there are two general classes: (a) the philosophical anarchists who deny the need and right of authority altogether, and hold that human beings can and should live side by side in enjoyment of fullest possible personal liberty. (Anarchism generally advocates the forcible overthrow of all civil governments.) (b) The evolutionary anarchists held that the progress from imperfect to more perfect forms of government (despotic, monarchical, aristocratic, democratic, in the order named) would inevitably and ultimately culminate in anarchy. It is obvious, surely, that anarchy could be realized in the heavenly state, but hardly among men on earth: there are always those who are motivated by selfish and antisocial considerations; hence the function of law to restrain the lawless, and that of government to make and compel obedience to the law. (4) Authority is the essential property of society, in the sense that without it organized society, and social order, cannot exist. It is the natural concomitant of the nature of society itself. Authority, however, is not the formal cause of the existence of society; that formal cause is, as we have seen, the Order of Justice. (5) Authority is necessary to the permanence, efficiency, and success of society, for the following obvious reasons: (a) frequently the members of a society do not fully understand what the end of that society is or how that end is to be attained; (b) frequently there exists diversity of opinion among the members of a society as regards the proper means to the attainment of that society's end or ends; (c) frequently the end can be attained by a variety of means, and therefore a selection must be made officially and authoritatively; (d) because of human egoism and disinclination to accept responsibilities and burdens, cooperation without authority and its preceptive and coactive force would not be had; and (e) because of the taint of lawlessness in every human being, without the authority to make laws and to compel obedience to them, organized society simply could not function or even exist for any great length of time. For these reasons, we insist that authority is an absolutely necessary element in every society; authority must come in, in every case, to make the cooperation effective. (6) If human equality has any worthwhile significance, it is obvious that no person has any inherent authority over any other person. How, then, can nothing be added to nothing (some one hundred and eighty million times, or ad infinitum) and get something? Sovereignty, therefore, cannot de facto be in the people. Hence, it is a fundamental of Biblical ethics that God alone is Sovereign of the universe;

that, therefore, all human exercise of authority is by His sufferance. Cf. Rom. 13:1—"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God." The term "powers that be" has reference to civil authority in general. Cf. Ezek. 21:27—"I will overturn, overturn, overturn," etc. (See also Jeremiah 18:7-10).

## FOOTNOTES

[1]Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. 1, 988a, b.

[2]See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan.

[3]See Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract.

[4]Aristotle, Politics, Bk. 1, chs. 1, 2.

## XLVII. The natural sociality of man is actualized primarily but imperfectly in domestic society.

The word domestic derives from the Latin domus, meaning "home" or "household." The corresponding Greek word is oikos: hence oikos plus nomos ("rule") is oikonomikos, "household rule," "household management," from which our word economics derives. Domestic society is the society of the home or household. It embraces the husband-wife (conjugal) relationship and the parent-child (parental, filial) relationship.

1. That domestic society in its various aspects is an ordination of the "laws of nature and of nature's God" is evident from the following: (1) From the definition of the word "natural." We define as natural in man that for which there is, in his make-up, a real ability or capacity, a real inclination, and a real need. (2) From the constitution of human nature itself. "It is not good that man should be alone" (Gen. 2:18): no man can realize his potentialities living in isolation. (3) From the natural division of the sexes into male and female, and from the union of the two as nature's modus operandi for procreating and preserving the race. (4) From the natural physiological and psychological ability of both male and female to enter into matrimony. (5) From the marvelous complementary character of the sexes: each has its peculiar aptitudes and needs, and the aptitudes of the one complement the needs of the other. (6) From the natural inclination of both male and female to the conjugal union. No one, no law, compels the male and female to get married, but they do so universally, and have always done so. Children are a perfectly natural phenomenon, as is also the inclination to want, to love, and to care for children. "Love of adults for children is a universal human trait."[1] This need for children, and the need on the part of children to be loved and cared for—all this is perfectly natural. (7) From the genuine need of both the normal male and female for the conjugal union. Marriage is the natural and moral outlet for the channelizing of the libido, the natural and legitimate outlet for physical sex desire. Promiscuity, on the other hand, is destructive of self-respect and of character; it blunts the finer sensibilities and debases character generally. (8) From the genuine need of children for the protection, care and love of parents. There is no kind of offspring that is as helpless, and as helpless for

as long a time, as the human infant. Animal offspring mature in a few weeks or months at the most; the human offspring must have from eighteen to twenty-one years to mature physically, and many more years to mature mentally. Indeed maturation, insofar as personality is concerned, is a lifelong process: it is never complete in this life. And some persons never mature—they remain childish to the end of life. (Note again the difference between childishness and childlikeness.) In a word, the natural ordination of domestic society (husband and wife, parents and children) is evident from a whole complexus of physiological and psychological factors. This reasoning is corroborated too by what is probably the most solidly authenticated fact of archaeology, anthropology, and history alike, namely, that at all times, in all places, and among all peoples, primitive as well as civilized, the family was and is the first of all social groupings.

Goldenweiser writes:

> Contrary to a widespread notion for which anthropologists are in part responsible, the family, consisting of husband and wife and children, is found everywhere. There may be more than one wife, and, here and there, more than one husband; the average duration of matrimonial ties may fall short of modern standards; the household may embrace other related individuals in addition to the immediate family. The fact remains the family is there as a distinct unit. It is there, whatever other social units may coexist with it. Moreover, it antedates them—where no other social forms are found, as in the most primitive tribes, the family can always be discerned. It may be noted incidentally that in the crudest cultures, for example among the Andamanese Islanders or the African pygmies, monogamy is more generally the rule than among somewhat more advanced tribes.[2]

Sociologists generally agree that there are three social institutions, and that they are so called because they have their origin in human needs. These are the family, the state, and the church (or other religious institution). (We are not discussing here the sacramental aspects of marriage: such a topic belongs to Moral Theology, not to the science of ethics.) That the conjugal relationship exists as a part of the very nature of things, as an integral part of the universal order, that part in fact upon which the propagation and education of the race depends, appears to be a fact beyond dispute.

2. The natural sociality of man is actualized primarily in domestic society. (1) Domestic society is necessarily presupposed in every other form of society: without the conjugal relation there would be no other form of society that rightly could be called human. (2) Domestic society is nature's provision for the fitting and secure preservation of the human species, and for the necessary and suitable education of the young. The only natural and proper environ-

ment for children to come into at birth is a good home, a well-ordered home. In the very nature of the case, parents are the only persons properly motivated to care for their children; hence the right and proper domestic society is the most necessary factor in the natural order. Society simply cannot be built on any other foundation. When a home fails in its duties, fails to provide the environment and training which it should, no other person or group can adequately discharge those duties for it. Certainly the state cannot do so. Sociologists and criminologists are unanimous in agreeing that juvenile deliquency has its origin, in most cases, either in the broken home or in disunity and conflict within the family. (See David Abrahamsen, M. D., Crime and the Human Mind, pp. 48, 49, Columbia University Press, New York.)

3. The natural sociality of man is actualized imperfectly, however, in domestic society. (1) By imperfectly we mean incompletely. Per, "thorough," plus facere, "to make," means to make thorough, complete, whole," etc. (2) Man is first of all a member of a family, and then a member of a state. This is the order of nature, arising from the natural division, and from the mutually complementary character, of the sexes. If this were not true, 99% of the adult human race would not be living, as they are, in a state of matrimony. But the family is per se insufficient to provide for the necessities of the physical, intellectual and moral perfection of the human being. A single family lacks the division of labor essential to the provision of food, shelter and clothing that it needs (that is, according to civilized standards of living); and certainly it cannot provide for its needs in the field of education, art, science, business and industry, all of which are integral parts of our modern complex civilization. Hence the state must come in to make provision for these needs and thus to complete the family's well-being. Without civil society, the family would suffer immeasurably insofar as physical needs are concerned, and in all cases it would starve intellectually. (3) Again, the family is per se insufficient to protect its rights, to defend itself against attacks upon its peace and prosperity. It has to rely upon the state for this necessary protection: for there are always those who will not play the game according to right and law. The state arises naturally from the insufficiency of the family as such to provide for the common good ("general welfare").

4. Conjugal society (matrimony) may be considered from two points of view, as follows: (1) In its becoming. What causes marriage? A free contract. Marriage is a free contract of two persons (male and female) with regard to the same juridical effect. The essence of a contract is the meeting of wills. Presupposing the independence of the human being, and the mutual equality of all persons regardless of sex, coercion cannot elicit the mutual love and helpfulness necessary to marriage. The essence of the marriage relation is free choice and consent of the contracting parties. This consent, moreover, must be mutual. This mutual consent has to

be internal (an act of the will: a drunk, for example, or an insane person, is incapable of giving internal consent); external (communicated by each party to the other, in such a manner that official witnesses can certify that the consent has been manifested to them); free and deliberate (the contracting parties themselves are the ministers of matrimony: the officiating clergyman or judge is only a witness). (2) In its being. Matrimony in its becoming is a contract; in its being, that is, in its completed form, it is a society. A contract is a mutual agreement with respect to the same juridical effect: therefore, the consent in marriage is the mutual transfer of rights. The wife is not to become a squaw, nor the husband a lackey. The consent is to the performing of those acts which are by nature apt (fitting, ordered) to bring about the procreation and training of children and the mutual helpfulness and personality-development of the married couple. If one party excludes these acts, if, for example, either refuses the sexual relation, if the wife immediately runs home to her mother, or the husband immediately deserts his wife, it is doubtful that there has been a meeting of wills, hence a true marriage. The first element of the matrimonial consent is the mutual transfer of rights. If this is excluded through ignorance or fear, there is no marriage for the simple reason that the primary end of marriage is excluded. (In all such cases, a physician should be consulted). (For Biblical teaching on this matter, see I Cor. 7:3-5, 9.) The second element of the matrimonial consent is the common society of life. It is our home: the man is not a star boarder, neither is the woman a hired girl: neither is merely to be tolerated; what belongs to the one belongs to the other. Consanguinity (blood relationship) is regarded by society, generally speaking, as a natural, and hence moral, impediment to true marriage: it is, and has always been, regarded as incest. Father-daughter or mother-son marriage is illegitimate (a) because it violates every propriety, and (b) because, since children cannot by nature be on the same plane of equality with their parents, a true contract is impossible. Brother-sister relationship also excludes matrimony, because, like parental-filial relationship, the two types of affection are naturally incompatible. The biological objection to these forms of marriage consists in the dangerous effects of excessive inbreeding. The problem of different ages, moreover, also that of the incompatibility of the different kinds of affection involved, enters into the consideration of all forms of incest. Obviously, physical impotence is also a natural impediment to the marriage contract.

5. The Ends of Marriage. (1) The primary ends of marriage are the procreative and unitive. (2) By procreative, we mean the proper (i. e., as befitting the dignity of man) begetting and training of children. (The unitive function will be treated infra, especially in connection with the problem of birth control.) The human infant is the most helpless, and the most helpless for the longest time, of all offspring; it must have nurture and training over a period of

some eighteen to twenty-one years (legally). It must have physical care (without which it would die), and intellectual and moral care (if it is to grow up to be a useful member of society). Therefore, the primary end of matrimony is infinitely more than the mere generation of children: it includes their education as well. (A well-rounded education includes the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual aspects of personal life.) There would be few delinquent children if there were no delinquent parents. The natural order demands that children not just be born and then be tossed out to grow up like Topsy. Lack of discipline in infancy and in early childhood is one of the prolific sources of juvenile delinquency. We train our horses, dogs and other pets; why, then, do we just allow our children to "grow up"? Generation without education would mean death to the individual or he would become a menace to society. Some of the silliest cults of our day are the cults of so-called "self-expression." (3) The secondary end of marriage is the mutual love and helpfulness, and resultant personality development, of the married couple. The man has a home; the wife has security; both have affection (that mutual love which is the union of spirits as well as of bodies); the result is the most tender, intimate and sacred companionship into which human hearts can enter. (The physical union is a factor in true marriage, of course; but success in marriage depends on more than physical compatibility: it requires an affinity of souls. St. Paul makes the intimate union of husband and wife in marriage the type of the mystic relationship between Christ and His Church, Eph. 5:22-23.) (4) I think we may also state that marriage is the legitimate outlet for human concupiscence, for the proper channeling of what Freudian psychologists term the libido. Sex appetite is very strong: it is not accidental, but a part of the order of nature, a necessary part in order to insure the preservation and propagation of the race. One of the natural inducements to marriage is the healthfulness and joy to be experienced in the conservation of the family and of the species.

6. The Problem of Birth Control. (1) (In view of the fact that the person begins to exist potentially at conception, surely abortion must be regarded as a form of murder.) (2) Conception occurs in the union of the male spermatozoon and the female ovum. Contraception is the prevention of this union. Contraception may be (a) negative (sometimes called natural), i. e., the limiting of conception by abstinence from sexual relations during the period in each month in which fertilization of the female can take place: consultation of a physician is necessary to secure scientific information for the practice of this type of contraception; or (b) positive or artificial (i. e., by physical, mechanical or chemical means). The end of the agent in contraception may be (a) disinclination to bother with children, which is pure selfishness; (b) inability to support children (which apparently has a species of goodness); (c) inability of the wife to live through another pregnancy (this involves urgency) or (d) a couple's feeling that they already have a sufficient number of

children. (3) Natural contraception quite generally is accepted as morally valid (even by those who reject positive contraception), provided, of course, that the motive for abstinence is a good one. In this case, it is argued, there is no positive frustration of the ends of nature for the simple reason that nature is not functioning toward reproduction. To others, however, this would seem to be a specious argument: obviously, nature is not functioning to produce children only because the male and female are not permitting it so to function. Moreover, it is evident that even this form of birth control, if universalized, would effectively prevent the preservation of the race in that it does not allow nature to function in the customary manner. (4) Contraception in any form is opposed by many on the following grounds: (a) that it is a positive and illegitimate (from the viewpoint of the Moral Law) frustration of the ends of nature; (b) that it unduly limits the size of families; (c) that it tends to reduce in quantity the better stock (among whom the practice is usually more widespread) and to increase the less desirable element of the population; (d) that it encourages young unmarried persons to indulgence in fornication by providing means of preventing its natural consequence (pregnancy) and thus has a demoralizing effect upon them; and (e) that contraceptives as a rule have an injurious effect upon those who use them. Protagonists of this view hold that the act itself is a moral evil in that it frustrates nature's end, a fact which can never be justified on the ground of any good motive, or intention: "evil may not be done that good may come from it."

(5) It will be seen that the basic question involved here is this: Is procreation the only legitimate and sufficient purpose of sexual intercourse? One's attitude toward birth control will depend largely on one's answer to this question. Hence, the advocates of birth control will argue as follows: (a) The non-periodic character of the sex urge in human beings (as distinguished from its strictly periodic character in lower animals) indicates that it may have been designed by the Creator, not only for the purpose of procreation, but also as a means whereby married persons express, in an intimacy not possible in any other act, their love for each other. (See again 1 Cor. 7:1-7, Eph. 5:28-32). (b) The natural order is given us, not as an absolute finality, but as something to be guided and controlled by rational man: activities of mind are indeed an integral part of the whole natural process. Man guides and controls nature by such devices as sanitation, immunization, medicine, surgery, etc. Moreover, he utilizes nature to his own ends in many different ways. Hence, in the matter of birth control the real point at issue is that between rational control and resort to chance; the question of Divine Providence is not even involved. Indeed, if anything, in view of the fact that the Creator has endowed man with reason (by which the Natural Moral Law is said to be promulgated in him), providential guidance would seem more probable through rational control than through the operation of chance factors. (c) Changed environmental conditions (from those of a century or more

ago) make smaller families desirable, if not actually necessary. Economic factors also enter the picture. It is fundamentally as immoral to beget children and then fail to support and to educate them, as it is to prevent their procreation in the first place. (d) In virtue of the great reduction of infant mortality by modern medicine, the need no longer exists for so many children per family (except, of course, in totalitarian states in which dictators need them for "cannon fodder"). As a matter of fact, many of the world's ill at the present moment are directly traceable to a too rapid increase in world population (as forecast by Thomas Malthus, 1766-1834, in his celebrated Essay on Population).

(6) Finally, the more enlightened estimate placed upon womankind in our day—the refusal to regard her any longer as hardly more than an instrument of mass production, a mere "breeding machine"—makes for a more enlightened conception as well of the marital relation itself, its rights, privileges and enjoyments. All these factors would seem to contribute to the more widespread practice of intelligent birth control. However, this is another of those practices which can result in great and widespread abuse; its proper utilization will depend largely on the general knowledge, and especially on the moral sense, of mankind in general. In fact, the only guarantees against such abuse lie in education—intellectual and ethical—by home, school, church, and synagogue.

7. The Unity of the Conjugal Relation. By unity is meant that simultaneously only one man and one woman may unite to form this relation. Such a unity is necessary to the integrity of the relation, to the attainment of its proper ends, and to the perfection of society in general. (1) Fornication (defined as "illicit sexual intercourse on the part of an unmarried person") tends to the procreation of children under conditions such that their proper nurture becomes a matter of grave uncertainty if not actual impossibility, and thus violates their natural rights by depriving them of the care and affection of both parents and by rendering uncertain their standing in society; and tends also to degenerate into promiscuity with all its well-known evil consequences. (2) Adultery (sexual intercourse with a person bound to a third person by matrimony) (a) has per se all the potential evil inherent in fornication, (b) is a direct violation of the marriage contract (a violation of commutative justice in that it violates the clear and exclusive right of another), and (c) is intrinsically and extrinsically destructive of the family. For these reasons, and especially for the protection of the family, and ultimately of the state, adultery is, and has always been, forbidden by the customary and civil codes of practically all peoples. (3) Solitary sexual acts are intrinsically wrong because (a) they involve unnatural use of a natural power, (b) they evidence a degradation of human character in engendering increase of concupiscence, (c) they vitiate the will, (d) they tend to sexual excesses destructive of physical, intellectual and moral life. These are all effects, too, of homosexuality. Deliberately practised, these acts are all unworthy of man

as man. It is doubtful that any person can practice them habitually without losing self-respect. (4) Polygamy (many marriages) may take the form of polyandry (one wife, many husbands) or polygyny (one husband, many wives). Polyandry per se defeats the primary end of marriage in that it results in (a) uncertainity of paternity, and (b) in many instances, the sterility of the wife, as the result of promiscuity. It also renders the secondary end of marriage unattainable (a) by engendering inequality of mutual aid and helpfulness, and (b) by engendering discord through the rivalry of husbands. Polygyny, as a universal practice, would be impossible: it would ultimately destroy the family and probably the whole social order; it would multiply world population beyond all practicable limits. It also destroys the secondary end of marriage (a) by engendering inequality of mutual aid and affection, (b) by engendering discord through the rivalry of wives, (c) by degrading womankind in general. These various practices are all intrinsically bad in that they all tend toward the destruction of the family and family life. Since the state is interested in the family and its preservation and proper functioning, the state cannot afford to legalize any of them.

8. The Permanence of Marriage. (1) Complete divorce is not just separation, but the dissolution of the marriage bond itself, leaving the contracting parties free to enter into a new marriage. On the morality of perfect divorce there is widespread controversy. The position of some religious bodies is that the marriage bond is indissoluble on any ground (except, perhaps, by special dispensation from the proper ecclesiastical authority). To support this position it is held that a consummated Christian marriage is a sacrament, and that it represents the mystical union between Christ and the Church; hence, since the latter union is indissoluble and a sacrament is permanently valid, Christian marriage must be indissoluble. (It has been affirmed by some, of course, that despite this edict closing the door completely to perfect divorce, legal devices for escaping the edict became, in the course of time, as Lord Bryce said, "so numerous and so intricate that it was easy, given a sufficient motive, whether political or pecuniary, to discover some ground for declaring almost any marriage invalid" (Studies in History and Jurisprudence, II, p. 826. On the other hand, it may well be argued that the widespread violation of a moral principle by the human race does not necessarily invalidate that principle: it has always required much stamina for men to discipline their passions, and none whatever to yield to them.) These same religious bodies take the position that even natural marriage (that is, outside the Church) is equally indissoluble, on the ground that the contracting parties having already made one mutual transfer of rights, have no rights left to transfer to a third party in another marriage: hence remarriage after divorce is a clear violation of commutative justice. (Would complete divorce imply the mutual recovery of rights which were ceded in the original marriage contract?) Complete divorce, it is contended, frustrates both primary and secondary ends of mar-

riage; its impact upon society, moreover, is demoralizing. (2) Many other religious bodies hold that there are at least two morally valid grounds for perfect divorce, viz., adultery on the part of one spouse (based on the teaching of Jesus in Matt. 5:32 and 19:9; cf. Mark 10:11-12, Luke 16:18), and desertion by an unbelieving wife or husband (based on Paul's words in 1 Cor. 7:15). (3) Some Biblical scholars have justified perfect divorce on other grounds than the two just cited, namely, such grounds as extreme cruelty (savitiae,) plotting against the life of the other party (invidiae), and refusal of the debitum conjugale. These offenses, they say, are actually tantamount to desertion and are therefore valid grounds for perfect divorce. (4) In Continental Europe various other grounds for complete divorce have been recognized, such as conviction of a crime, sexual impotence, insanity, and certain diseases. In England the law still allows divorce only on sexual grounds. In the United States the divorce laws vary among the different states from great laxity to extreme strictness; this variability, moreover, is a constant source of legal confusion.

Certainly the evils of easy divorce are already manifesting themselves in our culture. (a) Facility of divorce naturally leads to multiplication of the number of divorces; the hope of finding happiness in a new marriage, if the present one grows stale, diminishes application, devotion and patience required to make the existing marriage a success. (b) The impact of easy divorce upon children and young people affected thereby, has indeed proved to be demoralizing. (It may well be argued, of course, that an atmosphere of marital strife is just as demoralizing.) It is universally recognized, by sociologists and criminologists alike, that the majority by far of juvenile delinquents and of inmates of penal institutions are also from broken homes. The general situation in this country as regards the prevalence of juvenile deliquency is indeed alarming: the problem is heightened, of course, by the increase in population. And there is the additional fact to be considered that many marriages ending in divorce are childless marriages. Certainly these facts in combination do prove that easy divorce frustrates both the primary and secondary ends of marriage. The Roman write Seneca is authority for the statement that in the decadent days of the Empire, Roman matrons were wont to reckon the years by the names of their successive husbands. We Americans seem bent on attaining a similar distinction. The problem is a serious one—for sociologists, churchmen and statesmen alike. The unfortunate aspect of the case is that divorce, in too many instances, is only a manifestation essentially of the lack of moral character.

9. The Problem of Divorce is in Fact the Problem of Marriage. What are the causes of failure in marriage? The following are suggested: (1) The morally disintegrating effects of war, with its enforced long separations of husbands and wives, all too often puts too great a strain on human character. (2) A lack of conscience regarding the permanence and sanctity—and practical significance to

society—of the marriage contract. Too many couples in our day look upon marriage as an institution that can be made or unmade at will, and easy divorce tends to encourage this attitude. The result in many cases is what has been rightly called "legalized progressive adultery." (3) Hasty marriages. There is real value in a courtship of some length. (Differences in education and in tastes are not necessarily impossible to overcome.) (4) Childlessness. This frequently leads to the breakdown of the marriage relation. (5) Failure to live at home, following marriage: that is, too many clubs, lodges, dances, parties, etc., and in particular too much "tavern life." The making of a real home requires "a heap of livin' in it," as Edgar Guest puts it. (6) Breakdown in the parental home is frequently reflected in the inability of the children of that home to make a success of marriage themselves. (7) The failure of married couples to adjust to each other sexually: this goes under the specious name of "incompatibility," and is one of the primary causes of divorce. This failure to adjust sexually is the result of ignorance of the physiology of sex, in most instances, and more particularly of the technique of sexual intercourse. There is a great need for education in these matters—education by competent persons who have a real appreciation of the value of marriage and the home. (8) Financial difficulties. (9) Finally, a great many divorces can be attributed only to lack of moral character. The contracting parties simply lack the moral stamina to stand up under the pressures (oftentimes financial) that arise from time to time, and hence to make the mutual adjustments necessary to a happy life together. Human affections are naturally inconstant and must be self-disciplined, and human selfishness itself needs constantly to be curbed: failure to do this may result in almost anything.

10. The State and Marriage. (1) The state, in virtue of its necessary interest in the integrity of the family, assumes the prerogatives of supervising (and regulating) marriage as a social institution. The state, however, cannot make a marriage; neither can it unmake it. Civil law may recognize and determine the fact of a broken marriage, but it cannot break it, for the obvious reason that the civil law did not constitute the marriage in the first place. Marriage is a free contract entered into by the man and the woman: the state merely witnesses and regulates.

One eminent authority in this field has stated the case clearly as follows:

> The moral validity of marriage is dependent exclusively on the free choice of the couple concerned. From this it might be concluded that mutual consent should be a sufficient ground for the dissolution of a marriage. And if the pair were the only ones concerned, this conclusion might be warranted. But society has as great an interest in the permanence of marriage as in its consummation. And as it regulates the latter, so it seeks to protect the former.

It makes laws governing divorce and at times forbidding it altogether. That it has the right to do this can hardly be questioned. But what measure of legal restraint should be placed upon divorce is a question that can be settled only by experience. What the law should aim at is 'a maximum of social health and decency.' and experience would seem to indicate clearly that this cannot be obtained by an absolute prohibition of divorce. When the union of husband and wife has lost its moral purpose and become revolting to them, there is no good reason why they should be compelled to live together. The result would be evil rather than good.[3]

(3) Certainly a lifelong monogamous relationship is the ideal of marriage, and most certainly it is the Christian ideal: it is the only foundation on which the ideal home can be erected. Sanctified by mutual love and trust, "growing old together" is the most fruitful and satisfying relation possible to human experience.

11. Parental Society (or Filial Society, depending on the point of view) is the relationship existing between parents and children. (1) Parental society is a natural society, the natural result of the conjugal union; hence a true society established by the Natural Law. Parental society has for its primary end the care and education of children, and for its secondary end, the happiness of domestic life. (2) Authority. The conjugal society came into existence by the free consent of its members. In parental society, however, there is no consent of children; their position in the society puts on them the duty of obedience. The society has its basis in that natural ability on the part of the parents and natural needs on the part of the children: one of these needs is proper discipline. (Disrespect for authority is not liberty, nor is it democracy. Failure to give obedience to whom obedience is due is not democracy. Self-discipline is not no-discipline.) There is need of authority in every family: someone who can efficaciously direct the members to their proper end as a society. Normally, the father is indicated by the Moral Law, in virtue of his greater maturity and stability of thought, to be the head of the family. The exercise of the father's authority, however, is the result of joint effort, that is, of consultation and provision, with the mother. Both parents are vested with the natural authority, but in such a manner that the father is the acting (executive) superior in the relationship. This is obviously as nature intends it to be in the well-ordered family. (The Natural Law legislates for normality, not for exceptions.) (3) Reciprocal obligations. Exodus 20:12, the Fifth Commandment, "Honor thy father and thy mother." Cf. the words of Paul, Eph. 6:1-4: "Children, obey your parents in the Lord; for this is right. Honor thy father and mother. . . that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest live long on the earth. And, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath; but nurture them in the chastening and admonition of the Lord."

(4) The Education of Children. The right to determine and to supervise their own children's education belongs to the parents alone. By education is meant the application of those necessary means by which the life of a child (physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual—the fourfold complete development) is properly brought to maturity. (The end of education is not education for education's sake, but the proper and complete development of the child.) Who, then, has the first right to apply these means? We reason as follows: (a) there is an absolute need on the part of every child, without exception, of care and training. (b) The right that is founded on an absolute need points to a corresponding duty somewhere. (c) The duty in this case is resident in the parents, because they are responsible for the child's being in the world. (d) If the duty is resident in the parents, so then is the right: otherwise the obligation would be to achieve the impossible. But there is no obligation to do the impossible in the moral order. Parents are thus indicated by the Natural Law as the proper ones possessing the duty and right to determine their own children's education. Parents may delegate their own authority, however, to teachers in the school. The mother lacks the time to impart instruction to her offspring, and, in addition, probably is not qualified to do so: the same is true of the father; hence, most children nowadays go to school. This delegation of authority, however, cannot be wholly without supervision on the part of the parents; they have the duty of ascertaining what kind of a school it is and what kind of instruction the child is receiving. They also have the duty of cooperating with the teachers in the proper administration of disciplinary training. Again, the possession of a right postulates the use of the necessary means of actualizing it; schools are normally the necessary means to education; therefore, parents have the right to erect, direct and select schools to which to send their children. (e) The state also has a right in this matter. The state is a natural society (a relation of citizens to one another through the agency of government), and has an end to achieve, namely, the temporal goods of peace and prosperity, that is, the general welfare. The necessary means to the attainment of this end is (a) an intelligent and cooperative citizenry, and (b) education of all citizens in certain minimum essentials at least. Especially does a democracy depend on the intelligence, training and virtue of the people themselves. The state, therefore, has a positive duty to assist parents in every way that it can, in return for which assistance the citizens pay taxes for the support of the public schools. But the rights of the state must be secondary to those of the parents, for two reasons: (a) the state presupposes the existence of the family, and (b) the state functions to protect the rights of the family. Therefore the state cannot absorb or abolish prior rights of parents with respect to the care and education of their offspring. The assertion of such absolute sovereignty on the part of the state (a state monopoly of education, "thought control," etc.) will surely result in the totalitarian state. (Read Orwell's books, Animal Farm, and Nineteen Eighty-Four.) Cf. also

the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Oregon School Law Case, June, 1921:

> The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional duties. . . .[4]

(5) The Policy of the United States with respect to the rights of parents in relation to the education of their children may be summarized as follows: (a) The state requires all children to attend some school, public or private or church-related, for a specified time or up to a specified age, (b) but reserves to the parents the right to determine the kind of schooling their children shall have, and (c) at the same time provides public schools for all who may wish to use them. The fact must never be lost sight of, that the state is just an instrument which the people set up for their own welfare; hence, the establishment of the state does not take away basic parental rights. The moment a government official begins to look upon himself, not as a public servant, but as a somebody over and above the people themselves, then he becomes a dangerous person and should be removed from public office.

ADDENDA:

In re various phases of domestic society:

1. The following statements from a story appearing in the metropolitan press not so long ago are interesting:

> A dim view of the future of mankind is taken by Sir Charles Darwin, grandson of the author of the theory of evolution. While he thinks the world must sooner or later adopt widespread birth control, he is not in the least sure that it is going to solve the problems of the world. . . . He thinks that nothing can be done to stop the population of the world from doubling in the next fifty years and probably doubling again the half century after that. This would mean a total of ten billion people on earth within the next century.
>
> He says that there is no alternative to birth control as a measure of holding down the population during the next two hundred years. But, he adds, in the long run birth control will have dangerous consequences for the human race. A major complication, he continues, arises from the fact that "birth control tends to be practiced by educated, intelligent, and prudent people, and as a result,

the less prudent and less intelligent become more numerous." "And so," he maintains, "we are continually exposing ourselves to the danger of lowering the average intelligence of our nations."

The famed British scientist also raises the possibility of the world being divided between nations which practice birth control and nations which refuse to limit their population. He predicts that in such a world, victory will go to the "much more numerous non-limiters, trained as they would be in the hard battle for mere life."

As the world grows more crowded during the next century, conditions will become more difficult, he insists. He predicts:

Political jealousies among nations will increase rather than diminish under the hardening conditions of life.

A single world-government, so ardently hoped for by idealists, will not be achieved.

The harder conditions of life will cause individual personal liberty to diminish in favor of the state. Pressures pushing nations into wars will mount. "The world will be divided by the jealousy of the unprosperous directed against the prosperous," he says. "Under these conditions, it is hard to believe that wars can be avoided. But it is to be hoped that they will be small wars of the old type, and not the major atomic wars which are so much in our minds at present."

Certainly these observations are well worth the serious attention of all lovers of democracy and freedom.

2. Some years ago (to be exact, in the nineteen twenties, dubbed by Frederick Lewis Allen, in Only Yesterday, as the great Age of Whoopee and Ballyhoo), a certain Judge Ben Lindsay attracted widespread attention by propagandizing for what he called "companionate marriage." According to this procedure, a man and a woman would simply go to living together "without benefit of clergy," for a predetermined period of time: a kind of "trial balloon" arrangement. On finding the arrangement to be satisfactory, they would proceed to "formalize" the union in the prescribed legal manner. Some wag remarked at the time that, whereas the formula of legitimate marriage is "love, honor, and obey," that of "companionate marriage" would have to be "love, honor, but no baby." Of course we never hear of "companionate marriage" in our day. It has gone the way of all fads, along with Dr. Watson's laryngeal conditioning, Hubbard's dianetics, Bridey Murphy, Hadacol, and Kilroy was here. (In the present day of the "offbeat" generation, we have "beatles," "beatniks," "buggers," beards, and the like, along with dancing that is the complete expression of tension, frustration, chaos, violence,

even despair. All this too, no doubt, is the passing craze: these are the current fads that sooner or later will pass into the limbo of all their kind.)

3. Incidentally, what appears to be a kind of "mythology" of sex, consisting of popularly parroted cliches, seems to persist from generation to generation: each cliche is obviously a case in which the wish is father to the thought. A writer in a well-known periodical has mentioned some of these "sayings" (I seem, unfortunately, to have lost the original article and hence cannot give proper credit), as follows: (1) the myth that sex is natural and hence automatically self-adjusting and self-fulfilling (but "all the technique in the world cannot fill the emptiness which grows between two people who no longer have anything important to say to each other," therefore no ground exists for blaming the estrangement on some lack in the physical relationship in the marriage); (2) the myth that "there is a right man for a right woman"; (3) the myth that sex can be treated casually ("I can take it and leave it when I am ready" point of view); (4) the myth that "sex is something I have to have or I will be sick" (the argument often used by the male to win the acquiescence of the female); and (5) the myth that "sex is great fun and will not hurt anybody," etc. Many a young woman has permitted a young man to use her body for his own physical pleasure, under the specious pretext of "fun," or even of "love," only to awaken—when it was too late—to a realization of the fact that she has only contributed to the male animal's voracious egoistic drive to add to his "conquests," and that no love whatever was involved in the coition. It has been rightly said that the sexual crisis in our time is "the sign of that chaos which afflicts men and women whose capacity to love has been lost or taken from them." The only safeguard that a young woman has today against these "myths" is her own moral standard and stamina.

4. Premarital sex indulgence, a practice all too common in our day, is frowned upon by reputable physicians and psychiatrists alike. Such indulgence is declared to be not psychologically fulfilling but psychologically disastrous in two ways especially: in that it engenders fear of pregnancy and consequent rejection (not only by society, but even by the boy who plays the male role in each case); and in the fact that it leads many girls to pretend that it is a necessary element in dating. As one mother has put it: "It is a girl's nature to want affection, not sex, and in a boy's nature to want a girl he can look up to." Besides the element of genuine love is lacking in this type of physical indulgence. One eminent physician specifies three major dangers in premarital sex relations: the danger of pregnancy, the danger of venereal diseases, and the emotional impact "in patients upset and remorseful from the ordeal of giving in to what they knew to be wrong."[5]

On the subject of extramarital relations, the following statements from the pen of Abraham Stone, M. D., a man long distin-

guished in the field of marriage education, are exceedingly pertinent:

> Some psychiatrists claim that a casual extramarital affair may serve as a safety valve and preserve a marriage which might otherwise break up. Yet from my quarter century of counseling on marital problems I cannot recall a single case where infidelity has strengthened the marital bond. Seldom does either husband or wife find lasting emotional satisfaction in an extramarital relationship. In fact, it usually leads to deep personal conflicts and family disruption.
>
> Even if it is unknown to the other mate, an act of infidelity is still a disintegrating force. There is always a feeling of guilt and the fear of detection on the part of the offender, a need for inventing excuses and complex explanations. With the effort to deceive, a wedge is driven between husband and wife which may in time become an impenetrable wall.
>
> When the affair is known, there is emotional injury that often leads to a broken home. It is rare for a wife to accept her husband's unfaithfulness openly, and even rarer for a husband to be tolerant of his wife's infidelity. Few men or women can fail to feel deep resentment and deeper hurt when faced with the fact that the mate has preferred, even transiently, another sexual partner.
>
> And what of the effect upon the children within a family? The bewilderment, the sense of insecurity, of shame, of grief which children feel when they learn of their father's or mother's extramarital affair frequently lead to emotional injury that may leave lasting scars. A 27-year-old patient told me that at the age of 11 she found her mother in the embrace of another man. It was because the episode had so haunted her for 16 years, had so profoundly shaken her attitude toward marriage and family life, that she came to seek aid. . . .
>
> The solution, then, to the extramarital problem is to make marriage and family life so satisfying, so fulfilling that neither partner will want to stray.
>
> By cultivating sound attitudes toward sex and marriage and by realizing the values of a happy family, marital fidelity can be maintained.
>
> Successful marriage requires character and effort, an adherence to basic social values and to the precepts of the Golden Rule. Often it requires self-discipline. Is a good marriage worth it? I believe it is.[6]

The following pertinent statements from the pen of Abram Kardiner (former director of the Psychoanalytic Clinic at Columbia University, and distinguished writer in the field of the study of relationships between society and the individual) are of such significance that I feel justified in presenting them here:

> The family is not necessary for the propagation of the species. But what we call culture or civilization needs the family in order to insure effective forms of cooperation between its constituents, to maintain internal balance within the society, and to find effective means of mastering the material of the external environment. We hold it to be the special merit of the monogamous family that it is best suited to the biological characteristics of man. The human infant has the longest period of helplessness and dependency. The compensation for this is that man has the widest range of adaptability known. But this adaptability is not inborn; it is acquired, learned, or integrated. The success with which effective adaptive devices are acquired depends in part on an inherited organic apparatus and predisposition, but it also depends on the effectiveness of the protection and the direction furnished by the culture and the parent. In other words, neither growth nor instinct is responsible for the development of effective coping devices. The child is therefore at the mercy of the parents for physical survival and for emotional and intellectual development. It is precisely because the acquisition of adaptive tools is so slow and is contingent on experience that this period is filled with many hazards. The chief of these hazards is the possibility of defective, malformed, or ineffectual character traits. . . .
>
> In short, the family is the conveyor of the cultural heritage and also the molder of character. Most of all, it is the breeding place of the social emotions: idealization of the parent, development of conscience, the ability to sympathize with and identify oneself with others and to have a healthy self-esteem, and the ability to know what goes on in the minds of other people. When these capacities develop they act as a powerful stimulus to the intelligence.[7]

This writer goes on to say that the social role of parenthood must never be downgraded in relation to the biological: that to do this will "have a demoralizing effect on the institution of marriage."

6. Again, marriage, the family and the home—all must be rooted deeply in love. I am reminded here of the title of a book published a few years ago, Love or Perish. This title states inescapable truth: without the love that prompts the procreation and care of offspring, and so cements the family together, the human

race—indeed all living species—would have perished long ago. As Dr. Blanton, the author, writes:

> Most people understand love to mean simply love between the sexes. It does mean this, but also much more. On the deepest level, love is an instinctive force present in every person from birth to death. It is a profound urge to preserve and extend life by means of union with another living force, and it expresses itself through an exchange of energy that mutually strengthens and rejuvenates.[8]

In like vein are the following sentences from the pen of the biologist, Julian Huxley:

> As a biologist, but also as a human being, I want to affirm the unique importance of love: an affirmation badly needed in a tormented age like ours, where violence and disillusion have joined forces with undigested technological advance to produce an atmosphere of cynicism and crude materialism.
>
> Love is indispensable. Mother love is indispensable for children's healthy and happy growth, both physical and spiritual. Personal love is indispensable both for the continuance of the species and for the full development of the individual. Love of beauty and of all lovely and wonderful things is indispensable for our growth. It brings reverence and a sense of transcendence into personal love, and indeed into all of life.
>
> Love is a positive emotion, an enlargement of life; it leads on toward greater fulfillment and counteracts human hate and destructive impulses. In the words of a poet who was also a man of science—Robert Bridges: . . . "love is a fire in whose devouring flames all earthly ills are consumed."[9]

Truly and literally, humanity must love—or perish. One of the powerful natural impulsions to the conjugal union is the healthfulness and joy to be experienced in the conservation of the family and of the species. Premarital episodes can only tend to coarsen, extramarital to blight, the profound love—which is both physical and spiritual—that is needed to knit the family together.

## FOOTNOTES

[1] Robert H. Lowie, Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, new and enlarged edition, p. 249. (Rinehart, New York, 1934.)

[2] A. Goldenweiser, Anthropology, p. 298. (Crofts, New York, 1934.)

[3]Albert C. Knudson, The Principles of Christian Ethics, p. 207. (Abingdon-Cokesbury, New York and Nashville, 1943.)

[4]A copy of this decision may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, 25, D. C.

[5]Dr. Joseph G. Molner, in his syndicated column, in the El Paso Times, January 11, 1966.

[6]Abraham Stone, M. D., "The Case Against Marital Infidelity," The Reader's Digest, May, 1954.

[7]Abram Kardiner, "When the State Brings up the Child," Saturday Review, August 26, 1961.

[8]Smiley Blanton, M. D., Love or Perish, p. 2. (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1956.)

[9]Julian Huxley, art., "All About Love," in Look, July 12, 1955.

## XLVIII. The natural sociality of man is actualized secondarily and perfectly in civil society.

By civil society is meant the state, an interrelationship of persons acting through a government. [A nation must be distinguished from a state: the former, from nascor, natus sum, "be born," refers to a people with a specific culture, whereas the latter term refers to a population with a definite territory, independence, and government. A state may include several nations (peoples, ethnic groups): the United States, for example, has often been called, and rightly called, "the melting pot" of nations. The state is a society, a permanent moral union of many persons seeking the common good by means of their cooperative activity.]

Civil society, we hold, is an ordination of the Natural Moral Law, to supplement the family and to make provisions for family needs, and thus "to promote the general welfare." The evolution of social organization (from family to clan, to tribe, to nation, and finally to national state) is clearly marked out in the history of various peoples. This was a perfectly natural development, corresponding to population growth and need. Civil society is necessary to protect the family against invasion of its rights, against aggression upon its order, prosperity and security. It is necessary to provide the family with the necessary means of conserving and developing its potentialities, both as a family group and as individual members of the group. The state exists and functions for the family and its individual members, not the family for the state. The state complements the family, thus actualizing and fulfilling man's natural sociality. History indubitably reveals the universal aptitude of families for, and their tendency to, union in larger groups for the fuller realization of their potentialities. That which meets a universal human aptitude, inclination, and need, is, we insist, an ordination of the Natural Moral Law. Such is civil society.

1. The natural sociality of man is actualized secondarily in civil society. (1) The state necessarily presupposes the family, the institution to which man's first social needs and instincts direct him. The state is thus built on the family and exists only because of the insufficiency of the family to provide adequately for its own needs. (2) The family is first, or primary, and the state secondary, in the order of nature. Man's greatest needs are in the home:

no person is so bankrupt as a person without a home. There is perfect consistency here: the natural order is not a hit-and-miss affair; in all its complexity it is a regular and perfect order designed to meet all possible temporal needs of man.

2. The natural sociality of man is actualized perfectly in civil society. (The word "civil" is from the Latin civis, "citizen," and civitas, "state.") The state is truly an e pluribus unum ("one formed of many"). By perfectly as used here is meant completely, that is, from the temporal point of view. (The word has no reference to moral perfection.) (1) Civil society is a perfect society in that its ends are not subordinated to any other society and that it possesses within itself all the necessary means to the attainment of those ends. [It is understood, of course, that the church—or any other religious unit—is not under consideration here: the church is a spiritual (mystical) fellowship: its constitution and ends lie in a different area of human life and being.] The state is of itself sufficient to provide the additional means necessary to the general temporal welfare: no other society is required in the temporal order to complement the family. (International order is simply an extension of the functions of the various states included in its jurisdiction.) Man in the natural order is capable of the actualization of all his potentialities, and he has abilities to cooperate with others in making provision for common needs. Thus, in the natural social order, domestic and civil, all perfectible qualities of man are capable of actualization and all his needs capable of satisfaction. The state functions properly to preserve that order in which men may develop physically, morally, mentally, and spiritually—the fourfold development the ultimate goal of which is the attainment of wholeness (completeness). (2) Thus it will be seen that the state has certain duties to perform. (Cf. the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States.) Having duties to perform, the state (society acting through its government) has the right to take whatever means may be necessary to the performance of its duties, i. e., the right to impose sanctions, the right to levy and collect taxes, the right to conscript men for the common defense, etc. It is only by the exercise of such rights that the state can discharge its functions in the natural order of things. The state fully complements the family, and in the state, therefore, the natural sociality of man is said to be perfectly (completely) actualized.

3. The Essential Elements of a State. These are as follows: (1) A territory. Land or territory is necessary to the existence of a state. (We are using the word state here as being equivalent to civil society.) The state is not something suspended in mid-air or having its existence through some form of psychic union alone. The state is not a mystic super-entity or super-organism floating around in the stratosphere. This is the specious doctrine championed by would-be tyrants eager to seize absolute power: under this view the state turns out to be in practice an oligarchic group who arrogate unto themselves all the prerogatives and functions of the myth-

ical super-entity which they call the "state" (Cf. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Soviet Russia, etc.). (2) Independence. The idea of subordination of another entity of some kind is foreign to the very concept of the state. (3) Government. In every state some form of government (kind of ruling regime) is necessary, for without the exercise of authority, weak or strong, regardless of its origin, no social group could be organized and held together in effective cooperation with sufficient continuity. Anarchy cannot exist in nature (which is, itself, the rule of law); neither can anarchy co-exist with, or be tolerated by, the state. [Even the law of the jungle is a kind of cause-and-effect order which is maintained by a strange combination of natural affinity (love and care) and sheer brute force.]

4. The State as a Natural Society. That civil society is a natural—and not an artificial—society is evident; no other adequate reason can be given for the natural aptitude, specific tendency, and genuine need that are found everywhere on the part of human beings for civil society. [Cf. the Republic of Plato (II, 369ff.) on the natural bases of the state, namely, the natural needs of man, and natural division of labor among men on the basis of different natural aptitudes. Aristotle, in his Politics, likewise traces the natural development of the state from the household to the village to the polis or city-state.] (1) Human aptitude for civil society is indicated by (a) mutual love or benevolence with reference to the common good; (b) proportionment of activity to the cooperation necessary to the attainment of this end; (c) the human faculty of communication (by language) and consequent obedience to authoritative direction; and (d) capacity for the triple function of government (executive, legislative, and judicial). (2) Human tendency to civil society is indicated by (a) the common desire for temporal felicity, (b) the general appreciation of order, justice, peace, security, and material prosperity, (c) propensity for living with others under authority, (d) inclination to cooperate with others for the common good. (3) Man's genuine need of civil society is indicated by the following facts: (a) the insufficiency of the family to provide fully for the physical needs of its members; (b) the need of a power above that of the family to exercise care of the juridical order; (c) the need of a system of education, for intellectual development, beyond that which the family is capable of providing; and (d) the need for clarification, definition, and propagation of the secondary and tertiary principles of the Natural Moral Law (in the form of positive law). (4) Human nature alone is the only possible explanation of these inescapable facts. Hence any purely contractual theory of the origin and nature of the state (other than that which is implicit in the acceptance of majority decision and rule, provided that rule may be made amenable to modification by public sentiment, all of which is implicit in the phrase, "consent of the governed") is groundless and contrary to fact, for the state (as civil society) is an integral part of the natural order and an integral factor in the development of the Plan of the Universe. Moreover, because the

state is a natural society, it has a natural end, and its activity must be in accord with the demands of the Natural Moral Law, namely, the establishment of justice, order, and peace.

5. Aristotle's Four Causes as Applied to the State.[1] (Review Proposition XLVI, in re the material, formal, efficient, and final "causes." For example, a statue: the material cause is wood, stone, bronze, marble, etc., the formal cause, the image or likeness imposed on the matter; the efficient cause, the sculptor; the final cause, for commemoration, ornamentation, or possibly art for art's sake. Or, by a human being: the material cause is living matter or cells; the formal cause, the soul or mind which gives the organism its specificity as a human being; the efficient cause, the Creative Power which has actualized all nature; and the final cause, as we have noted heretofore, happiness or well-being.) (1) Material Cause of the State: the families, or plurality of persons, cooperating toward common ends. (2) The Formal Cause: the Order of Justice that transforms the plurality of persons from a crowd into a society. (3) The Efficient Cause: remotely, the Natural Moral Law which ordains civil society; directly, the consent of the governed. "Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Obviously, the governed must have ample opportunity at regular intervals, by means of free elections, to register consent or protest, as the case may be. There is no real actualization of the consent of the governed in states in which there is only one political party and hence no possibility of free registration of a protest vote; nor in states in which there are several political parties and hence no opportunity for a clear expression of majority sentiment or effective exercise of majority rule. (Coalition governments are bound to be weak and ineffective.) Consent is the free act of the will to accept in general the rights and duties of civil society. This consent may be positive, that is, by evident cooperation; but in some cases it may be coerced (as in the totalitarian system). Consent is indicated by voting, by paying taxes, and by obeying the laws in general. When citizens stay away from the polls, it is to be taken for granted that their consent is given tacitly; if the consent were not real, they would go to the polls and register a protest vote. It is the possibility of freely registering protest that gives consent actual existence. However, one of the supreme privileges (and duties) of a citizen of the United States is that of voting: in the area of legal justice, he owes it to the society of which he is a unit to express his cooperation actively by going to the polls on election day.

(4) The Final Cause of civil society (the state) is the ground of its existence (its raison d'etre). From this ground or end come the rights and duties of citizens, the rights and duties of governments, and the justice of all laws. Civil society exists for the attainment of a specific end—the temporal goods of justice, order, peace, prosperity, security, etc. Hence civil society has authority for directing cooperation effectively for the attainment of its natural

and proper ends. (a) The ultra-positive theory of the state is that the state is everything, that the individual exists for the state and has one paramount duty—that of obeying without question the ordinations of the state. This, of course, is the totalitarian state. (b) The ultra-negative theory is that the state functions properly only as a policeman: as some pessimist has put it, the state functions only to enable those who hate each other, to live in peace until they shall have unlearned hate. Both Kant and Spencer held that the state is nothing in itself, but acts only as a policeman, to protect the law-abiding from the lawless. This is the doctrine of absolute free enterprise, of laissez faire, carried to unjustifiable extremes. According to Marx, the state, as presently constituted, serves only to protect the privileged classes: once the dictatorship of the proletariat is achieved, the state will have no ground for existing, national boundaries will wither away, and the utopian world order will be ushered in. History, however, affords no evidence that such a world order will ever exist short of the society of heaven itself: as a matter of fact, Plato was honest enough to admit that the ideal state is necessarily "laid up in heaven." (c) The middle view is that the state is both negative and positive in its functions. It is negative in that it functions to protect its citizens and to preserve order; it is positive in that it acts, generally speaking, for the common good, the general welfare. According to the Preamble to our Federal Constitution, the state functions negatively to "insure domestic tranquility," to "provide for the common defense," and to "secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity." It functions positively to "promote the general welfare." It functions in an overall sense "to establish justice." (d) The state is a natural society functioning to meet specific temporal needs. Where a multitude of persons live together under law there is need of peace (and peace is order): preservation of the juridical order of rights and duties (need for this is shown by the number of persons in our penitentiaries; the anti-social we have with us always), and there is need of prosperity (a modicum of security, economic as well as political, for all, or at least opportunity for all to provide for their own material well-being). No society can afford to allow its economy to become so maladjusted that hundreds of citizens who are willing to give honest labor cannot find opportunities to make a living for themselves and their families. Hence the proper and proximate end of the state is the temporal good of justice, order, peace, prosperity, etc. Peace is the tranquility of order, resulting from the mutual fulfillment of duties and enjoyment of rights. Prosperity is not to be identified with paternalism. It is not the end of the state to act as "papa" to its members; rather, it is the state's function to supply the means by which each member may be able to develop his physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual life, in proportion, of course, to his own ability, initiative, and willingness to work. Each member's temporal felicity ("a perfect sufficiency of life") follows naturally from such a fourfold development: it includes both economic freedom and cultural advancement. Given such opportune

means, any man may by his own initiative and activity experience proper self-development and enrichment of personality. The negative function of the state, according to the middle view (the "golden mean") is the preservation of the juridical order; the positive function is to promote the general welfare. This middle way has been the policy followed by the United States since the turn of the century. The problem is that of maintaining a "golden mean" between free enterprise and government control, to such an extent that individual initiative and enterprise shall not be stifled.

6. The Mythology of the State: the Organic Theory. (See Cassirer's great book, The Myth of the State.) The Organic Theory is that the state is a "living being," an organism. Note the characteristics of an organism: the whole is logically (not chronologically) prior to the parts; some parts, as those of the human body, are naturally superior to other parts (Plato held that some men are born with gold, some with silver, and some with brass and iron, in the soul; Aristotle said that "from the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, others for rule"); the parts share the life of the whole and die when separated from the whole; the parts necessarily function to serve and preserve the whole. In the Republic, Plato describes the ideal state, by analogy, as "the individual writ large," making three classes in the state analogous to what he calls the three "parts" of the psyche ("soul"), with the particular virtue (excellence) characteristic of each part and class, as follows:

| Parts of the Soul | Ruling Virtue | Classes in the State |
|---|---|---|
| Rational part | wisdom ("good counsel with respect to the whole") | guardian class (philosopher-kings) |
| Spirited part | courage (bravery in battle plus discernment of real versus apparent dangers: "salvation of the opinion respecting things to be feared") | auxiliary class (the military) |
| Appetitive part | temperance (self-control: on the part of the hoi polloi, this is implicit obedience to the guardian class) | the hoi polloi (the rabble) |

Justice in each case, according to Plato, is the over-all virtue: it is the harmony of the parts of the soul under the guidance of reason, and it is the harmony of the classes in the state under the guiding wisdom of the philosopher-kings. It will thus be evident that Plato's ideal state is the organic state: indeed Plato was the first person in human history to state this view. Aristotle followed Plato in describing the state as a "living being." Aristotle, however, insisted that the supreme power in the just state must be, not in the arbitrary will of men, but in the sovereignty of law. Moreover, his doctrine of "constitutional rule" clearly puts him in the category of those who support the trusteeship theory of the state.

This doctrine of the organic state was further developed in modern times by Rousseau, with his doctrine of the General Will as the sovereign power—the form, one might well say, of the state—into which each individual will is to be submerged. This, to be sure, is a kind of mystical view, one which is difficult to present and equally difficult to understand.

The organic state theory was carried to its logical completeness by the German, Hegel (1770-1831). According to Hegel, the space-time process is the actualizing of the Absolute (Divine Idea): this Idea as unfolded in space is nature, as evolving in time is history. The state is the final embodiment of the Idea, the final expression of social and ethical ideals: it is "the march of God" in the world; it is the conscious spirit of man realizing the Absolute (Spirit). Thus the state must be described as a super-entity, a super-organism, so to speak; it is an end in itself, indeed the chief end of man; the state does not exist for the individual; on the contrary, the individual exists for the state. When states find themselves in conflict, the only recourse is war: war is not only necessary, it is inevitable; it is not only inevitable, it is ethically good because it puts the individual in his proper place in relation to the state. Conquest, annexation, colonialism—all are inevitable—and good. Powerful states have a perfect right to self-realization. (Hitler wrote of "the physical immortality of the nation.") (Contrast with all this "mythology" of the state the Biblical doctrine of the infinite dignity and worth of the human person.)

Now, as Cassirer rightly holds, this theory of the state as an organism is just a figment of the human imagination, another form of the "myth" of the state. The state is not a super-organism in the sense that individuals cannot live apart from it: indeed the state has nothing to do with the origin, constitution, and destiny of the human being; as a matter of fact, individuals and households existed naturally and chronologically prior to the origin of any state. Moreover, if all the persons living within the boundaries of any given state were all to be slain at one and the same time, where would the state be? It simply would not be, for the simple reason that it is not a super-personality, not a super-organism, indeed not an organism in any sense of the term. It is simply an inter-relationship of persons

acting through the insturmentality of government. Plato's description is clearly an instance of the fallacy of illicit analogy, i. e., carrying analogy (a series of comparisons) beyond factual bounds. There is no evidence to support Plato's main thesis, that the state is "the individual writ large," etc.

Other forms of the "myth" of the state are, according to Cassirer, the following: the concept of a General Will (a mystic, romantic something having no existence outside Rousseau's imagination); Carlyle's totalitarian hero (although Carlyle's hero was a moral force); Gobineau's totalitarian race ("Nordic supremacy"); Nietzsche's "Superman"; fatalistic theories which apotheosize such non-entities as Fate, Fortune, Destiny, and the like; and all specious "myths" which are concocted to "justify" infiltration, colonialism, and other forms of aggression (such as the "myths" of the "noble savage," "Liebensraum," "the white man's burden," "sphere of influence," "manifest destiny," etc.). Perhaps the most deceptive "myth" of all is the specious promises of a near-at-hand millenium: fictional Utopias have been characteristic of the literature of practically every period since the time of Plato.

7. The Mythology of the State: The Force Theory. This is the theory of the completely secular state, the state in which morality is repudiated and expediency is made the norm of political action. This view was first presented in detail by the Italian political philosopher, Machiavelli (1469-1527) in his book, The Prince, was elaborated by the Englishman, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and was given a cosmopolitan twist by Marx (1818-1883). In Machiavelli's view, political action was to be determined by what was expedient for the prince, the sole repository of authority; according to the Hobbesian theory, in his Leviathan, it was to be determined by what was expedient for the hereditary monarch (or some other kind of regime holding the absolute power); according to Marx, it is to be determined by whatever proves to be expedient to usher in the world-wide dictatorship of the proletariat. Obviously, in actual operation, the organic and force theories dovetail: the organic—totalitarian—state is maintained essentially by force.

8. The Trusteeship Theory of the State: that governments are instituted among men to make secure the unalienable rights which all persons have by virtue of having been created persons. According to this view, government functions properly only when acting as a trustee (steward) of the natural law and the natural rights which proceed from it. The basic principles of this view are presented by Aristotle in his Politics. They are further developed by Grotius, John Locke, Jefferson, Madison, et al. This theory as set forth by Locke, Second Treatise on Government, is in brief as follows: (a) The State of Nature (a pre-political state, the state in which men may be assumed to have been when living together without external government) has a law of nature to govern it: moral principles belong to men as men regardless of the state, or whether the state

exists or not; (b) there is always need for an arbitrator to settle disputed points among men—hence the social compact is nothing more than a general agreement to accept majority decisions as binding (according to Locke, this is just plain common sense); (c) the acceptance of majority rule in principle is the foundation stone of all legitimate government; (d) the state thus formed on the principle of majority decision is in no way absolute, but is only a juridical person, a trustee appointed to safeguard specified rights which are laid down in the deed of trust, the Constitution; its activity is strictly limited to carrying out of the terms of the trust, within which it has wide discretionary powers, but outside which it has no powers whatever (hence the need of some well-trained body of men, a Supreme Court, to decide in all cases of uncertainty whether the legislature has acted unconstitutionally or not (that is, outside the terms of the trust); (e) whenever it becomes obvious to the majority of the citizens that the state (which is, operatively, the government) has broken the trust, either by infringing the written constitution, or by acting contrary to the law of nature (which the trust supplements, but cannot override), then it is not merely the right but the plain duty to restrain or remove it (thus revolution becomes simply a change of management); (f) because men are notoriously bad judges in cases involving themselves, it is advisable that the legislative authority which makes the rules should not be entrusted with the obligation to enforce them (hence the doctrine of the separation of powers in government); (Aristotle defines a constitution as the organization of powers within a state, and specified the elements of a constitution as deliberative, magisterial, and judicial; in Latin, the consilium, magisterium, and judicium, respectively, or as we are wont to state them, legislative, executive, and judicial); (g) the function of law is not to restrain freedom but to preserve and enlarge it: "freedom is ensured only when governments govern in accordance with known laws enacted by properly constituted majorities; nobody ought to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man." Locke insisted, and that rightly, that his political philosophy is simply common sense thinking. The ideal state, in the American view, following Locke, Jefferson, and others, is that which gives its citizens the greatest opportunity to develop their latent talents without infringing upon the rights of their fellows. Efficiency is not the same in a democratic state as in a totalitarian state: a certain measure of insecurity is the price which we must pay for freedom. Hence, the paramount importance, in our day as always, of education to preserve democracy as superior to education for personal success. Education can never be just an adjunct to the production line.

9. The Consent of the Governed, in a truly just state, determines (1) the type of regime, (2) the personnel of government, that is, those who shall hold office (the word "office" is from the Latin officium, and means literally a "duty"; cf. Cicero's De Officiis; also Grover Cleveland's famous dictum, "a public office is a public trust"; and (3) the seat of the exercise of authority in the state.

10. Types of Regime. (1) Aristotle, Politics, classified governments as follows: [2]

| Government | True Forms (ruling with a view to the common interest) | Perverted Forms (ruling for the benefit of private interests) |
|---|---|---|
| (1) Of the one | royal rule | tyranny |
| (2) Of the few | aristocracy | oligarchy (usually a plutocracy) |
| (3) Of the many | constitutional rule | pure democracy (mob rule) |

Of these different forms, said Aristotle, royal rule (that of a "benevolent monarch") is probably the most efficient for as long a time at least as the monarch lives; its weakness, however, is in the fact that a succession of benevolent monarchs is too much to expect; history shows that good fathers all too often sire notoriously bad sons. Therefore, on the whole and in the long run, constitutional rule is preferable. This he defines as the rule of the many under a constitution (the organization of powers and offices as determined by law). Every government, Aristotle insists, should be a government under law: "matters are better regulated by laws than by the will of man which is a very unsafe rule"; "the arbitrary power of acting on their own judgment, by rulers, and dispensing with written law, is dangerous"; "whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man"; "the law is reason unaffected by desire." Pure democracy, a kind of mob rule, says Aristotle, is the least desirable of all forms: this he defines as "a state in which the multitude have power, but supersede the law by their decrees"; the result is that they prostitute liberty into license and precipitate a kind of anarchy. "Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all; for where the laws have no authority, there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme over all, and the magistracies should judge of particulars, and only this can be considered a constitution." A citizen Aristotle defines as one who shares in governing and being governed, one who alternates at ruling and being ruled. Laws should be changed, of course, when they become obselete; but frequent and needless changes diminish respect for law in general. (Practically every principle of political science embodied in our Federal Constitution is laid down in Aristotle's Politics.)

Types of regime, as determined by the manner in which authority is possessed and exercised, are the following: Absolute Monarchy, usually hereditary, in which one person exercises authority without any external limitations; constitutional monarchy, in which the monarch is hedged about by constitutional limitations imposed by

the people; aristocracy (from aristoi, "the best"), in which a legally determined group of the elite (by pedigree or by wealth) exercises the authority; many governments are controlled sub rosa by such an elite: an elite of wealth is properly designated a plutocracy: oligarchy (from oligoi, "the few") in which a selected few possess and exercise the authority; democracy (from demos, "people") (in which the authority is in the people collectively and the seat of authority is designated by them). Pure democracy exists only in cases in which the whole people vote on proposed legislation, determine sanctions, etc., as in the early New England town meeting. A representative democracy is one in which authority is vested in representatives elected by the people at stated intervals: this form of government is usually known as a republic. The United States of America is a republic. T. D. Weldon writes:

> The distinguishing mark of the state is simply the exercise of compulsory and organizing power by a selected body of individuals within the community.[3]

In the morally constituted state this exercise of power is in virtue of its delegation from the community as a whole, that is, the consent of the governed. (A dictatorship, of course, is absolute rule by one man exercised by sheer force: in ancient times, this was known as a tyranny.)

11. Authority in Civil Society. The Natural Law in ordaining the society and its proper end, thereby ordains the means necessary to the attainment of that end: civil authority is that necessary means. Indeed, without civil authority the state could not exist. Authority in itself must be distinquished from the form of administration or type of regime. Authority is always present irrespective of the will of man, and cannot be abolished (any more than the law of gravity, or that of valence, for example, can be abrogated by humankind); the essence of authority is immutable. It is evident, from the fact of natural equality, that no human person has any authority per se over any other human person. Hence, not having this authority in the first place, that is, primary authority, it follows that no man or group of men can delegate authority to any other man or group of men. The people can determine their form of government and elect men to administer it, but they are powerless to confer authority on these men for the simple reason that they have no inherent authority to confer. (Nothing plus nothing equals nothing.) Sovereignty is in the people, to be sure, to determine the type of regime and the personnel of elected officialdom, but not to confer authority upon those elected to govern. The Biblical teaching is that primary authority comes directly from the Author of Nature, and that it is by His sufferance that the people exercise whatever measure of sovereignty they may have. Rom. 13:1—"there is no power but of God, and the powers that be are ordained of God." Authority is moral power, and this moral power carries with it the right to use physical power to maintain order. There are three basic rights of which the Author

of Nature (or the Natural Law) is the sole efficient Cause, rights which need to be exercised by any national state: these are jus puniendi (the right to punish), the jus obligandi (the right to punish), and jus belli (the right to war). These powers are necessary for any state to attain its natural and proper end. A state without authority is a joke; as a matter of fact it is inconceivable, human character being what it is, subject to every form of selfishness and greed.

12. American Executive government differs greatly from European Parliamentary government (the regimes of Western Europe) in important respects, as follows: (1) Under the Western European systems the parliamentary body is the supreme authority, the prime minister (or premier) being only the titular head of the political party in power; under the American system, on the other hand, the executive is one of the three co-equal branches of government: the President has real power at all times (e. g. , to veto proposed legislation) and special powers in times of emergency. The Founding Fathers were indeed wise in making it a Constitutional provision that the Chief Executive, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, should always be a man with civilian status. (2) Under the European system the government does not have specified tenure but is liable to overthrow (followed by a national election) at any time it fails to win a vote of confidence; under the American system, on the other hand, government is given specified tenure by provision of the Constitution itself. In the final analysis, the government of the United States is, in actual operation, government by a political party. (3) Under the European system, there is no judicial review of current legislation, the latest act of parliament becoming the law of the land superseding all prior legislation on the same subject; under the American system, on the other hand, judicial review of legislation is provided for: indeed it is made essential by the need for preventing conflict between current legislation and the supreme law of the land, the written federal Constitution. The American system is one of separation of powers and accompanying checks and balances par excellence. The Founding Fathers realized the necessity of imposing curbs on the exercise of power by elected officials. To protect even the people themselves from the evil consequences of their own emotional orgies, the Fathers, while making amendment of the Constitution possible by a provision of that document itself, at the same time and in the same way made the process of amendment possible only if and when overwhelming public sentiment supports such a change. (Cf. Lord Acton's famous dictum that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Cf. also Plato's story of Gyges, the Lydian peasant, who fortuitously discovered a way of making himself invisible, and who, equipped with such a secret means of exercising power, made his way to the royal court, "liquidated" the king, took over the queen, and made himself sole master of the kingdom (Republic, Bk. II). Thus Plato poses the question: Should you (or any person) find yourself in possession of practically unlimited power, power which you could exercise with-

out fear of punishment, what would you do with it? How many persons under such circumstances would use such power beneficially? How many would abuse it to eliminate all who might oppose them or to serve their own selfish ends.) Cf. in this connection the successive steps in the degeneracy of the state as described by Plato (Republic, Bk. VII): (a) from an aristocracy (of philosopher-kings, an intellectual Elite) to a timocracy (in which the motivating principle of the ruling regime is thirst for power and glory); (b) from a timocracy to an oligarchy (in reality a plutocracy, in which the motivating principle of the ruling regime is love of wealth); (c) from a plutocracy to a democracy (in which the motivating principle of the whole society is "the illusion of freedom," which is in reality the prostitution of liberty into license (that is to say, an ochlocracy, or mob rule, which inevitably sets the stage for the appearance of "the little man on horseback"); (d) and finally from democracy to tyranny (the rule of the wild beast in man, as represented by the Fuehrer, the Leader, the Dictator, etc.) (Every American citizen should take time to read Plato's analysis of the elements of weakness in a democracy: the change which he describes has taken place under our very eyes and in many parts of the world in recent years. We must remember that democracy, freedom, collective bargaining, indeed all the devices of democracy, will work only if we, the people, have sufficient intelligence and good-will to make them work.) (Cf. Kant's view that freedom is not a natural inheritance of man; that, on the contrary, in order to possess it, man must himself create it. If man were simply to follow his natural impulses he would not strive for freedom; rather he would choose dependence: obviously it is much easier to depend on others than to think, to judge, and to decide for himself. That is to say, freedom is not a gift, says Kant, with which human nature is endowed; it is, rather, a task to which man must set himself.

13. The System of Checks and Balances is perhaps the outstanding characteristic of our United States political system, as based on three co-equal powers of government—legislative, executive, and judicial. The executive department is checked against the legislative by the President's power to veto a bill passed by Congress; the legislative is checked against the executive, by its power to override the President's veto, and by means of the confirmatory power of the Senate in dealing with appointments and with treaties; the House of Representatives is checked against the Senate, and vice versa, by the necessary concurrence of both houses to enact a bill into a law; the judicial department is checked against both the executive and legislative departments by its power to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional; the legislative department is checked against the other two departments by its power to impeach the President, the Vice-President, and members of the Supreme Court; Congress itself is checked by the people by the election of Representatives every two years and one-third of the members of the Senate every six years; and the people are checked against their own passions and follies by

the power of judicial review, and by the necessity of overwhelming public sentiment to achieve the amendment of the Constitution. In addition to all these checks, there is still another of great importance, namely, our Federal Union of fifty semi-sovereign state jurisdictions. The writer, for example, like all American citizens, has dual citizenship: he is a citizen of the United States of America, and is at the same time a citizen of the state of Texas. This is something unique. The whole system of Federal Union is an effective brake on the concentration of governmental power in any department of the political structure. The Founding Fathers knew very well that men cannot be trusted with too much governmental power and set up this entire system of checks and balances to prevent any such development.

14. Philosophies of History. Herodotus (5th century B. C.): the ethical interpretation of history (that history is largely the record of the work of the goddess Nemesis, Retributive Justice, who inevitably interferes in the affairs of men to overthrow inordinate human pride, ambition and insolence). Thucydides (c. 471-400 B. C.): the secularistic theory of history: [that the effects (events) of history are brought about by purely secular (chiefly economic) causes]. Polybius (c. 205-c 125 B. C.): the fatalistic interpretation of history (that all the events of history are foreordained by a Sovereign Power bearing the name of Destiny or Fortune. Polybius was a Stoic, and this was the Stoic view.) The secularistic interpretation has been revived in modern times, first by Machiavelli, and later by Marx and Lenin with their theory of economic determinism and accompanying repudiation of morality. The fatalistic interpretation is represented in our day by the work of Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. According to Spengler, every culture inevitably passes through four periods corresponding respectively to the seasons—spring, summer, fall and winter, the last-named being the period of decay ending in death, the period that should be properly designated that of "civilization." Spengler was a pessimist: there is no escape from this remorseless cycle, according to his view. The ethical interpretation, in broad outline, is represented today in the thought of such men as Berdyaev, Sorokin, Schweitzer, and Toynbee. Toynbee's elaborately-worked-out theory is known as that of challenge and response. According to Toynbee, modern man faces three primary needs or challenges: the need to establish a constitutional system of cooperative world government (politically); the need to find a working compromise between free enterprise and socialism (economically); and the need to put the secular superstructure back on a religious foundation, that in which the dignity and worth of the person is made the supreme ethical norm. (This last-named need, says Toynbee, is the most significant of all). His over-all thesis is that our Western culture will survive only if it responds in a positive way to these basic needs or challenges. The providential interpretation of history is given us in the Bible, specifically in Jeremiah 18:5-10. It may be stated in brief as follows:

(a) God rules the world, both physical and moral, including the march of human events; (b) within the framework of His providence, however, both individuals and nations are left relatively free to work out their own history and destiny (that is, God rules the world, but He does not rule the world by force); (c) nations fall when they ignore and violate the moral law on such a scale that they make themselves vessels fit only for destruction; that is to say, the stability and permanence of the nation (or state) is dependent on the ethical quality of the national life. The providential interpretation of history includes, in a general way, the ethical. (d) Augustine, City of God: The function of the legal (secular) state is to preserve the modicum of order whereby the righteous can cultivate the Spiritual Life here befitting that of the Heavenly City. Montesquieu: the end of the state is its own preservation. Hegel: the end of the state is its self-glorification to the achievement of which individual citizens are but the means. Ultra-Capitalism: the end of the state is the protection of unlimited property right and free enterprise.

15. Freedom of Conscience. By this phrase is meant permitting a person to follow the dictates of his conscience, that is, (1) not forcing him to refrain from doing what he considers to be a morally good act, or (2) not forcing him to perform what he considers to be a morally bad act. (a) With reference to purely internal acts, the state has no right to force him in any way in his thinking and believing: in this respect the state grants full freedom of conscience. As a matter of fact, no individual or group or state can, in the very nature of the case, force a person to believe anything: they may put him in jail for not believing, but they cannot force him to believe against his own will. (Brainwashing, a phenomenon introduced by the totalitarian state, does seem to be a form of compelling the intelligence and will.) (b) With reference to external acts, the state may not impose the performance of an act which a man's conscience sincerely tells him to be wrong. Every civilized government recognizes, within limits, the right of the conscientious objector, provided of course that such objection is demonstrably bona fide. (Respect for every man's conscience is of the very essence of democracy. On this ground, the United States allows a man to be an atheist if he wants to be one.) But surely the state does have the right to insist on the omission of certain acts which may be performed in the name of religion, but which may be deemed contrary to the general good (e.g., infanticide, human sacrifice, the blood feud, polygamy, nudism, etc.). Moreover, it seems obvious that in dire emergencies in which a nation's integrity and freedom are threatened, even the exercise of conscientious objection must give way to the demand for the common defense (note this phrase in the Preamble to the Constitution).

16. Freedom of Expression. Expression may be (a) oral, or (b) stereo-typed (printed, written, etc.). Certainly freedom of expression is a fundamental right. A free press, for example, is undoubtedly the foremost protector of a democracy: exposure of

corruption in high places, by the newspapers, is a necessary phase of the democratic process; in many cases it is the sole protection which the people have against abuses of power by elected officials. Freedom of expression, however, is not an unlimited right. One does not have the right of such freedom to the extent of resorting to slander (oral defamation of the character of another), or to libel (written or printed defamation of the character of another). Is not the vocal or stereotyped expression in support of any movement that seeks the overthrow of the United States government by force just another form of treason? Is not the Leninist movement of our day just such a world-wide conspiracy, to espouse which is treason? In such a land as ours, where ample provision is made in the Constitution itself for modifications in the structure of our form of government, that is, for change by ballot, is there any justification for the existence of a movement that seeks change by force (bullets)? Espousal of the Leninist conspiracy, because it is a conspiracy, a cult propagated by espionage, deceit, treachery, lies, confusion, and violence, surely is a form of treason or an activity that verges on the edge of treason. And "Communist front" groups share the conspiratorial character of their paternity. (Note the specific definition of treason given in Article 3, Section 3, of the Constitution.)

Is freedom of instruction on the part of the teacher (which is usually the idea implied in the use of the term, "academic freedom") to be regarded as an unlimited right? Of course not. Does any teacher have any right to teach that a person can jump off the Empire State Building without injury to himself? Does any professor have any right to advocate, in the classroom, such acts as murder, bigamy, treason, adultery, rape, theft, etc. ? I think not. It is difficult to see, for example, how a teacher who is committed to Leninism in our day can qualify to teach in our public school system when, as a matter of fact, by his very espousal of "Communism" (as we call it) that teacher aligns himself with a cult that would stamp out all freedom of thought and expression. I am confident that this is the position taken by the overwhelming number of educators in the United States today.

17. Church and State. (Cf. the words of Jesus, Matt. 22:21, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.") (1) Personal religion, if at all vital, necessarily affects personal attitudes and shapes personal conduct: one naturally translates his religious convictions into all activities of life, including those of his duties as a citizen. Hence any complete "separation" of personal religious conviction and personal political decisions is impossible. It must be remembered also that practically all members of the church (or any other religious institution) are also citizens of the state. (2) The norms explicitly set down in the Constitution regarding the separation of state and church are those of (a) non-establishment and (b) non-interference (Amendment I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"), and (c) non-

qualification (Article VI—"No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.") It should be noted that the Constitution thus explicitly bans any institutional union of state and church (or any other religious institution). (Institutional union tends to secularize the church and thus to vitiate its mission and influence.)

(3) However, since it obviously was never the intention of the Founding Fathers to put the state in a position of hostility to any form of religion, the policy of the United States has always been that of what is called "a union of minimum essentials." That is to say, the church is recognized by the state as a complementary and therefore privileged society; the state acknowledges the good that is done by the church (or synagogue) and gives the latter recognition and encouragement. This recognition takes several forms, as follows: (a) the church is granted competence in marriage and in the education of the young; (b) church property is exempt from taxation; (c) the church is granted various other immunities; (d) the government manifests the state's interest in religion by providing chapels and chaplains for the armed forces; (e) all citizens are guaranteed the right to worship according to their private convictions and are protected in the exercise of such rights. This is the type of relationship between state and church that prevails in the United States. (For additional information on this subject, read the "Prefatory Instructions" at the beginning of the present text.)

(4) The most recent decision of the United States Supreme Court invalidating an officially formulated and prescribed prayer for use in the public schools of New York state has caused a great deal of confusion in the public mind. This decision disallowed "official prayers." It is not prayer in itself, but officialism, which is the nub of this particular decision: a fact which has been all too generally overlooked. Moreover, a prayer of the kind involved in this Court decision is bound to be so innocuous as to bring discredit on religion in general. However, it must be admitted that a precedent has been set here which could have serious consequences in the future, especially at the hands of a Court made up largely of legal positivists. One wonders how the Court would rule if any agency of government should order the periodic singing of the national anthem in the classroom ("Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just, And this be our motto, 'In God is our trust'"), or the periodic recitation of the first two paragraphs of the Declaration of Independence (with the phrase, "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God"), or the periodic singing of "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" (the last verse of which is a prayer, "Our Fathers' God, to Thee, Author of liberty, To Thee we sing," etc.), or the periodic reading of Article VII of the Constitution ("Done in Convention by the Unanimous consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven," etc.). Is it not true that we may be catering too much to insignificant minorities of "fastidious atheists and agnostics" and allowing these groups to

become the tail that wags the dog? (I am reminded here of the teacher of biology in an Eastern high school who removed the praying mantis from his laboratory lest its presence there might wound the sensibilities of the honorable Court.) These apparently insignificant trends in our democratic system could have disastrous consequences, especially, I repeat, if our juridical system falls into the hands of legal positivists. Is minority "bigotry" any less "bigoted" than majority "bigotry"?

Eternal vigilance is always the price of liberty.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. I.

[2] See Aristotle, Politics, Bk. III.

[3] T. D. Weldon, States and Morals. p. 50. (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1947.)

## XLIX. The state is never an end in itself.

1. Nature is individualistic. We come into the world one by one, and we go out of it one by one; one by one we either attain, or fall short of attaining, our natural and proper ultimate ends as human beings. Nature's providence is directed essentially to the welfare of the individual; the "general welfare" is but the extension of individual welfare; the common good is a good shared by individuals alike. (Democracy has been properly defined, from the ethical point of view, as that form of society in which the welfare of all is the chief concern of each, or vice versa.) In the concrete, humanity exists as individual human beings and in no other form or capacity. To attain his natural and proper end, however, the individual needs, first, domestic society, and then, civil society. Both family and state exist essentially for the welfare of their members as individuals, for the realization of their individual potentialities. The state is, in the final analysis, simply an inter-relationship of individuals cooperating, through the medium of government, to attain their common ends. If all persons living within the boundaries of the United States were to be "liquidated" at one and the same moment, where would the state be? All theories envisioning the state as a super-personality or super-organism are simply figments of the academic or mystic mind.

2. To use any human being as a means, and not as an end in himself, would be a clear violation of the basic relationship of human equality. Hence, since no one person has any right to use any other person as a mere means to the furtherance of his own ends, it follows that no aggregate of persons has any such right either. The state exists, therefore, for its individual members, not the individual members for the state.

## L. The Natural Moral Law counsels the establishment of an international order based on reason and law.

It is undoubtedly a fact of great significance that for the first time in human history statesmen the world over are beginning to think and act in terms of an international order, a concert of national states, for the universal good of peace, prosperity and security. (Cf. again Roosevelt's Four Freedoms "everywhere in the world.") The underlying moral progress of the race is evidenced by this fact, and by the accompanying fact that the conviction is dawning upon men in various parts of the world that war is not inevitable and that it ought to be outlawed as an instrument for the settlement of disputes among peoples. The spread of this conviction has been accelerated in recent years by two factors, namely, (1) by the ever-growing facility of communication and transportation which has turned the world into a neighborhood, and (2) by the recent utilization of atomic power which has obviously rendered cooperation the only alternative to human self-destruction.

The principles of social ethics apply just as truly to international order and society as to any other form of society. These basic principles may be stated as follows:

1. There is an international moral law. This may be defined as the ordination of reason for the good of all peoples, for the common good of the society of nations. (The fact must not be overlooked, however, that a society of nations can never be erected on this moral basis by power politics, but only by the politics of good will. Before world order and peace can become a reality, there must be a universal will to peace, that is, on the part of all peoples, and obviously such a condition cannot come about as long as the world is half slave and half free, as long as there are peoples who are denied full freedom of expression by oligarchic ruling regimes. Cf. Tennyson's poem, "Locksley Hall" (1842):

> "For I dipped into the future, far as human
> eye could see,
> Saw the Vision of the world, and all the
> wonder that would be. . .

"Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and
the battle-flags were furled
In the Parliament of man, the Federation
of the world.

"There the common sense of most shall hold
a fretful realm in awe,

And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapped
in universal law."

Note that the phrase used here, "the common sense of most," is, practically speaking, the equivalent in meaning of the phrase, "Natural Moral Law." We might well ask: Is such a goal too idealistic, too much to expect of human nature? (Cf. the essay by William James, "A Moral Equivalent for War," in which the author contends that war gives a certain intoxication to life, and can be eliminated only by our finding a "moral equivalent" for it, some activity that will challenge the heroic in man. In this way adventure would still remain with us; there would be the thrill of new experiences, but our task would be constructive instead of destructive and in all probability peace would become general throughout the world as the result of such a policy.) (1) There is always, over all society, the Natural Moral Law which is binding alike on the ruler and on the ruled (whether acknowledged or not). Mere association does not destroy the natural law for individuals, nor does it absolve them from obligations demanded by that law. The basic principle, Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you, applies equally to individuals and states always and everywhere. This universal principle, based on the natural equality of men as men, is the foundation of order, and of every kind of order. (2) Hence (a) there may be set up over international society a common authority (a world state of government); or (b) there may be such an arrangement as a free agreement (compact or treaty) among individual nations by which they bind themselves. All such arrangements constitute international positive law. (All rights are granted by law, natural and positive; all privileges are protected by law, natural and positive, and all duties are imposed by law, natural and positive.) (3) Positive law exists within a national state, as passed by a duly constituted government. But there has never been any duly constituted authority over national states themselves; hence the greater part of positive international law has been in the form of treaty, up to the present time. (There have been codifications of international law, such as occurred, for example at the two Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Universal obligatory arbitration was championed as an international policy, but no agreement was reached.) A free agreement between nations must be either (a) a tacit custom which attains the force of law, or (b) by express pact, treaty, "convention," etc. (Cf. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, Macmillan, 1928.) (4) The mere association of individuals does not put them above the moral law, nor does it dispense them from the operation

of that law. Natural rights antecedent to all positive law are those of life (self-preservation), liberty (internal and external), and the pursuit of happiness or well-being (which includes physical, intellectual, moral and social commerce). Every nation implicitly admits the existence of an international Natural Moral Law: it does so by insisting that it has rights and by defending those rights, if needs be, against aggression. (5) Positive law (agreements, pacts, treaties, covenants, etc.) is groundless without the Natural Law. Treaties are not worth the paper on which they are written, if individuals do not consider themselves bound by the Natural Moral Law which obligates both individuals and nations to the duty of fidelity. If there is no natural law to bind the ruler as well as the ruled, why should not the Germans have pronounced their treaty with the Belgians a "scrap of paper" and invaded Belgium in 1914? Why should Hitler not have invaded Russia in open violation of his pact with Stalin? Why should professors who teach that there is no such thing as the Natural Moral Law condemn the violation of treaties? If expediency is the law of nations, why should international "Communism" put such value upon the so-called "classless society"? Why should agreements be held binding at all if there is no Natural Moral Law to sustain them? (6) Famous cliches are often false, e.g., "All's fair in love and war,"—this is not true. "My country right or wrong"—but what is wrong for my country is wrong for me, too. One of the most far-reaching evils of our day is the utter disregard for international agreement, truth, justice, etc., that is evident in high places in different parts of the world. The Leninists will violate their promises, execute an about-face over night, in fact do anything to seize power. If Leninism were only an economic theory, the rest of the world might be able to accept the compromises necessary to "peaceful co-existence" with the Leninist states. But the essence of Leninism is anti-religion: to this its economic doctrine is secondary. Sheer hyprocrisy is its most effective tool for the achievement of its ends; no system ever known to man was more immoral in its technique. (Cf. Lenin's writings on the "art" of revolution.)

2. The Natural Moral Law does not formally outlaw war in itself. There is such a thing, we believe, as a just war, namely, a war in defense of fundamental human rights, a war to resist aggression. (This doctrine was formally set forth by the eminent Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, who lived 1583-1645, in his work, On the Law of War and Peace.) (1) The state exists by ordination of the Natural Law. It exists in the natural order to achieve a definite end—the common good. It has every right, therefore, to defend its right to exist and to attain its natural end. To put this truth in another form—the state has a necessary right to the means of its self-preservation, and under certain circumstances war may be one of those necessary means. For this reason we cannot subscribe to the doctrine of absolute pacifism. (2) There can never be any moral justification for a war of aggression. History proves that any state

which embarks upon a policy of conquest will itself eventually be conquered; that the individual or nation which lives by force will sooner or later encounter superior force. Empire building is a business that must go on forever; otherwise the empire falls to pieces, as soon as the conquerer ceases to bring in the loot. (Cf. the words of Jesus, Matt. 26:52—"All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.") The only war that can be justified morally is a defensive war, a war to defend fundamental human rights. (3) The necessary conditions to a just war may be summarized as follows: (a) It must be a defensive war. The good must far outweigh the evil to justify the war. (A doctor, for example, can cut off the fingers of a child bitten by a mad dog, to save the child's life; but certainly he cannot do it just to study the bones of the finger.) War is an unmitigated evil; in fact there is no evil comparable to it, especially to global war as waged in our day; it can be justified only on the Principle of Double Effect. (c) It must be entered upon with reasonable hope of success. (We can envision circumstances, of course, in which death would be preferable to the loss of freedom.) (d) It must be declared by the supreme, and properly constituted, authority in the state. (e) It must be in defense of a strict right (and not some mere pretext, such as Lebensraum: if there are too many persons in a given state, let them move to some other part of the world: arrangements of this kind can be worked out satisfactorily by means of an international order). (Cf. the famous distinction made by Thucydides between the prophasis, that is, the occasion or pretext for launching a war, and the aitia, or underlying cause of the war.) (f) It must be conducted according to the rules and covenants of war. To shoot a man down when he is surrendering ("no quarter") is murder pure and simple. (If one party repudiates its signed word, however, the other party is no longer obliged.) (g) It must be entered upon only as the last resort, that is, only after all pacific means of solution (by negotiation, arbitration, etc.) have been exhausted. (4) If coercion itself were intrinsically evil, the efficacious protection of any right would be impossible. Since a government has the duty of protecting the rights of its subjects, it has the right to use war, as the last resort, as the necessary means to this protection. In the final analysis, war is simply the use of coercion, and just war is the use of coercion to protect inalienable rights. (5) War is the greatest of all physical evils: hence the only true proportionate cause is absolute necessity. (Cf. Wilson's Fourteen Points; the Covenant of the League of Nations; the Charter and Covenant of the United Nations, especially for the concept and definition of aggression. Are not undercover conspiracy, infiltration, and the like, forms of aggression?)

3. Victory in war does not confer upon the victor any new rights. (1) The only justifiable war is a defensive war; no new rights are acquired, however, by a defensive war—it is merely for the defense of existing rights; therefore, victory confers no new rights upon the victor. (2) Physical power does not confer moral

power; that is, Might does not make Right. (3) The just victor has the right to what he fights for; he has the right also to exact compensation for the losses incurred in fighting; and he has the right to take precautionary measures necessary to prevent unjust aggression in the future. War is essentially a means of establishing peace and order; the victor in a just war has the right to the necessary means of achieving this end.

4. The Natural Moral Law at least counsels an international community of some kind. (1) The need for such an order is evident (a) from the closeness of international life in our day, the result of modern means of communication and transportation; (b) from the obvious need of some kind of world authority to prevent the rise of would-be dictators; (c) from the terribleness of global wars; (d) from the catastrophic character of total war; and (e) from the awful means of self-destruction which man is capable of utilizing in our day. War is no longer the purely local thing it used to be. As it occurs today, it means irreparable loss of life, equally terrible loss of moral and spiritual values, loss of money and property in terms of billions and billions of dollars, a demoralizing impact upon civilization in general. Total global war is the greatest catastrophe that can befall the human race; and its catastrophic character is enhanced, if that were possible, by the introduction of atomic power as a means of destruction. (2) Certainly if intelligent people can look ahead and see any instrument that can be utilized for the prevention of global war, they have the positive duty to bring into existence such an instrument of prevention. The natural moral law counsels—if it does not actually oblige—them to effect and to set up any and all possible means of preventing war in the future. (3) By this statement we do not mean to advocate cosmopolitanism, the view that the human race should become one community. This would not be feasible for two reasons: (a) there is too great a diversity of existing peoples and cultures, and (b) the world is too big for a single human ruler or ruling regime. We mean to advocate, rather, the use of existing nations, and especially regional confederations, as building-blocks, so to speak, of a world society. This would be a society of nations (a) with each nation retaining complete autonomy in regard to its internal affairs, (b) but living under a common international authority (a world court?) to direct international affairs. (4) With the world situation as it is at present, however, we do not advocate the surrender of any portion of national sovereignty on the part of the United States. As a matter of fact, our national sovereignty is protected as long as we retain the veto power in the Security Council of the United Nations. (5) International political union will have to be built upon a foundation embracing three absolutely essential elements, namely, (a) universal and simultaneous disarmament, (b) international obligatory arbitration, and (c) genuine international sanctions. If any one of these elements be lacking, in our opinion such a political union cannot possibly endure or be effective. (6) Universal and simultaneous disarmament,

In establishing a world order, something will have to be given each nation that is equivalent to the right of self-defense; this must be, in the very nature of the case, disarmament, and the disarmament must be simultaneous and universal. Every nation must scale down its armament to what is needed only to preserve order within its own borders. Moreover, every nation must be willing and able to give bona fide evidence of its disarmament. (7) Effective arbitration. This must be instituted, and it must be obligatory and universal, i. e., applicable to all cases without exception. Every dispute must be submitted to this authority, probably a World Court. (8) Genuine international sanctions, that is, for those nations who will not submit their disputes to arbitration, and those nations that will not accept decisions once they are rendered by a World Court. Such sanctions must be decided upon on the basis of their effectiveness. They may be any one or more of the following kinds: (a) moral sanctions (asserted disapprobation of the civilized world); (b) political sanctions (severing of all political relations with the recalcitrant nation, general ostracism); (c) financial sanctions (prohibition of exchange and other forms of monetary sanctions); (d) economic sanctions (embargo on exports to a recalcitrant nation, and boycott of imports from that nation: a complete financial and economic boycott is very effective); (e) military sanctions (the employment of actual physical power, by an international police force, to discipline the recalcitrant nation). (9) In our opinion, the honesty and sincerity of nations in the forming of an international society is evidenced, in the concrete, only by their willingness to disarm and to do it in such a manner that all other nations can see that they have disarmed. The implication of disarmament is clear and unmistakable: disarmament means the relinquishment of the material force of arms; it means that the power of Right is going to supplant Might; it means that a nation is deliberately adopting the policy of Right as against that of Might; it means that the effective physical means of self-defense is abandoned and that the moral force of Right is to be substituted therefore. Disarmament is the first necessary step in the actualizing of a world concert of nations: this disarmament, however, must be simultaneous and universal. Until this step is taken, there can be little hope, in our opinion, that any such instrument as the old League of Nations or the present United Nations will be much more than a makeshift. (11) Finally, let us not forget that international law, like every other form of true law, is reason unaffected by desire. The criterion of a civilized society is its abandonment of force for the rule of reason and law.

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
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